



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

UC-NRLF



B 3 920 849

















**T H E**  
**PHILEBUS OF PLATO**

**EDITED BY**  
**CHARLES BADHAM.**

---



THE  
PHILEBUS OF PLATO,

WITH  
INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND APPENDIX;

TOGETHER WITH A  
CRITICAL LETTER ON THE LAWS OF PLATO,  
AND A CHAPTER OF  
PALAEOGRAPHICAL REMARKS;

BY  
CHARLES BADHAM, D.D.,  
PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES.

---

SECOND EDITION  
REVISED AND ENLARGED.




WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,  
14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON;  
AND 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.

1878.

B381  
A2B3

45924



TO THE REV. W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.,

MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

My dear MASTER,

A vivid remembrance of you arises in my thoughts whenever I am called upon to occupy myself with Plato; and now that I am once more editing the *Philebus*, I cannot but revert to the time when I derived so much help and encouragement from you in the execution of my earlier task. What then is more natural than that I should wish to see your name appearing in the present work, which is not merely a new edition, but an attempt to redeem a hasty and crude performance by something which I shall be content to leave behind me? There are many reasons why I desire to make this record of our friendship; one is the intrinsic worth of the friendship itself as it affects me. During the two and twenty years which have passed since the First Edition, your good will has never flagged. First you spared no pains to enable me to remain in England; and afterwards when some δούρετος πλοῦς became expedient, it was through your good opinion and the weight of your authority, at least as much as through any other cause, that I found my way to a haven not altogether undesirable. You also were one of the few who understood that among the trials of banishment not the least is the fear of being utterly forgotten; so while many good friends, and some very eminent scholars, have scarcely ever found sufficient leisure to prove that fear to be groundless, your letters have sustained my hopes. One other English Scholar, of whose friendship we are both proud, was not less considerate; and now I must record my great affection for him in a Book which he will not read. Never did any one so generously interpret the obligations of his high place to the prejudice of his own ease and comfort, and in favour of all who claimed his help, as the late Lord Lyttelton. He was,

Platonis *Philebus*.

a

as you well know, a man of infinite modesty; and of the genuineness of that modesty none could doubt, who saw how perfectly free he was from any sickly fear of publicity. He took his place in the world with frank boldness, and did his work in it according to his sense of right. As an excellent scholar, and as a champion of scholarship, he did good service to a cause not overburdened with defenders; but while he was glad to seek refuge from sadder thoughts in Classical studies, he never hid himself in them to escape from any troubles or labours which could make him useful to mankind. There is yet another common friend of ours, who needs my praise as little as the other, and who is equally removed from all human comments; but this is probably the last time I shall ever publish anything, and I will not lose my only chance of glorying in his friendship. Frederick Denison Maurice was, as he informed me many years ago, an enthusiastic admirer of Plato's Philebus. He saw more deeply into it, and indeed into all Philosophy, by reason of that devout humility which made him so accurate an observer of many things which a man who is thinking half of his author and half of himself is sure to overlook. Where other men perplexed themselves with their own ingenuity and love of systems, his teachable sympathy with all that he studied led him into truths which they had neglected as unmeaning. But it is not for me to celebrate that great Heart and Mind. I merely claim him as one of those friends for whom my affection revived with peculiar vividness while I was busied with the preparations for this Book.

As for the Book itself, you will perhaps have leisure to decide, whether on the whole it contains many improvements on its predecessor: but having once addressed myself to you, I am loth to let you go, without taking some note of certain Platonic lucubrations, the fruit of the past year. They are verbal criticisms; but verbal criticisms which make an author more legible, seem to me no barren exercise. Nor will *you* think so, who have never had any lot or part with the supercilious and ignorant dogmatists who have brought scholarship to so low an ebb in England. You will be glad to find any text made a little more worthy of its author, than the Græculi have made it; and will rejoice for the sake of those who are to come after us, if they are not scared away from important works by the almost hopeless state in which

they have been left. This is why I have again taken up the same inquiry into the later books of the Laws, which I commenced in a certain Epistola. My belief is now stronger than ever, that three fourths of the bad grammar, obscurity and nonsense which we find in good authors is due to nothing more than interpolations, whether purposely inserted or accidentally derived from the Margin. Not that the other part of criticism which detects the right word lurking under the wrong has done all its work; very far from it. Take the following example from the Sophist, p. 218, A. Ἄρα τοίνυν, ὃ ξένε, οὕτω καὶ καθάπερ εἶπε Σωκράτης πᾶσι κεχαρισμένος ἔσει; if you will read Heindorf's note, you will see that second thoughts are not always wiser. One easily confounded letter has caused all this trouble. Theaetetus says: Ἀρᾷ τοίνυν, ὃ ξ., οὕτως—Or take this in the Politicus, 286, D; where for ἔφαμεν δεῖν μεμνήσθαι, it is self-evident that you want ἐφ. δ. μεμρίσθαι.—In the Laws, 904, D where we now read διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλε τόπον ἄγιον ὅλον μετακομισθεῖσα, common sense bids us read, δ. κ. μετέλαβε τόπον, ἄγιαν ὁδὸν μετακομισθεῖσα, leaving out what follows. I do not know whether you have seen a striking proof of the audacity of interpolators, which I adduced from the Phædo. It is in the passage<sup>1)</sup> beginning σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σουτοῦ σκιάν, where the *very opposite* precept is put into Socrates' mouth in place of that which Plato had assigned to him; and all for what? Because the two forms ἐφς ἄν and ἐώς ἄν were disputing for admission, some one inserted both, but one with a change of accent and breathing, and then another came and changed χαίρειν ἐφς ἄν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα, into χαίρειν ἐφς ἄν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἄν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο. And on this rubbish Wyttensbach comments as on a sound logical precept. Another such forgery occurs in Euthydemus 305, C, D. Here ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις and so forth down to κολούεσθαι, ought to be removed back so as to precede ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν. But because it was inserted out of its place, in order to give it some air of continuity, the scribe built for it this beautiful bridge: εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφαῖς σοφωτάτους: which Cobet, little dreaming whose work he was correcting, altered into σφαῖς σοφώτατοι. In the same dialogue 287, B, C, we have these glaring interpolations: [ἂ τὸ πρῶτον

1) P. 101, D.



εἴπομεν νῦν ἀνάμινυρήκει καί]—[ὃ λέγεις]—[ἐπεὶ εἶπε . . . . τοῖς λόγοις.]

But I must now enter upon the Laws. Shall I follow Pindar's precept of *πρόσωπον τηλαυγές*? or that given in Troilus and Cressida, which I will quote, *ut obiter emendem*?

1) Let us like merchants shew our fouler wares  
And think perchance they'll sell: if not, the lustre  
O'th' better yet to shew will shew the better  
By shewing the worse first.

I will not presume to say that the following correction is better or worse than the general run, but the passage is at all events a strikingly corrupt one, and so an emendation of it, if tenable, deserves a special place.

In the twelfth Book p. 960, c, d, of Stephens we find the following passage, which looks at first impenetrable; but by and by we discern a kind of bush-track, and at last, if I am not altogether mistaken, with a very little thought and very sober dealing with difficulties, we are able to restore an old highway in all its completeness.

ΑΘ. Ὡ Κλεινία, πολλὰ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν καλῶς ὕμνηται, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὰ τῶν μοιρῶν προσρήματα.

ΚΑ. Ποῖα δὴ;

ΑΘ. Τὸ Λάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, Κλωθὰ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν Ἀτροπον δὲ τρίτην, σώτειραν τῶν λεχθέντων, ἀπεικασμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων τῷ πυρί, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεργαζομένων δύναμιν· ἃ δὴ καὶ πόλει καὶ πολιτείᾳ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ὑγίειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῖς σώμασι παρασκευάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐνομίαν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων. ἡμῖν δ' ἔτι μοι φαίνεσθαι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἐλλεῖπον τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι, πῶς χρὴ τὴν ἀμετάστροφον αὐτοῖς ἐγγίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν δύναμιν.

I will not trouble you with the attempts already made: they are one and all random guesses, only half serious, rather indications of an obstacle than attempts to remove it. We see thus much; that as the destiny Atropos preserves the work of her sisters, τὰ κλωσθέντα, so he wishes that his and his friends' work, τὰ λεχθέντα, should be made ἀμετάστροφα. Now Atropos cannot be σώτειρα τῶν λεχθέντων; it is therefore safe, at least provisionally so, to write τὴν Ἀτροπον δὲ τρίτην σώτειραν. τῶν ΔΕΛΕχθέντων—

1) Act 1. Sc. 3.

The allusion to the well known τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτήρι is obvious, and justifies us in placing σώτηραν thus by itself. Then we come to ἀπεικασμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων—, and the question is; who or what is made like to what? But that question is soon answered. The preservation of their statutes is to be made like to the preservation of the fatal thread. But as ἀπεργάζεσθαι must be the act of the old men, and as in these Books we find five or six instances of μεθα being confounded with the participial ending, μενος μενη &c., it is worth while to try ἀπεργαζώμεθα, and therefore to adapt ἀπεικασμένοι to it. The moment this is done the rest of the sentence corrects itself. τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων; ἀπεικασμένοι τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων σωτείρ AI, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεργαζώμεθα δύναμιν. The remainder is likewise faulty; but in the first place a little thought will soon shew us *how* this sentence is to be connected with the foregoing, and a little more will suffice to clear away what is at once an impropriety and a tautology. εἰ δὴ καὶ πολίταις καὶ πολιτίσι δεῖ μὴ μόνον ὑγίειαν κ. τ. εἰ.

A shorter but equally corrupt passage is in the tenth Book, p. 905, c. γιγνώσκειν δὲ αὐτήν, ὃ πάντων ἀνδρείοτατε, πῶς οὐ δεῖν δοκεῖς; ἢν τις μὴ γιγνώσκων οὐδ' ἂν τύπον ἴδοι ποτέ, οὐδὲ λόγον ξυμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατός ἂν γένοιτο εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τε καὶ δυσδαίμονα τύχην. This αὐτήν refers to τὴν συντέλειαν. "What you call the neglect of the Gods, you so call, because you do not understand that all which they do contributes to a great whole." We may therefore translate συντέλεια by *joint action*. This then the youth is told that he must know. But it is precisely what he cannot know, and, not knowing, ought to distrust his own judgment concerning the prosperity of the wicked. Eusebius in quoting this passage has πρὸς οὐδέν, the MS Q has as a correction in the Margin πόσου δεῖν, and although this rests on MS authority, and is confirmed by the corrupt reading in Eusebius, and yields the only admissible sense, the Editors have passed it over. Again though we may use ἀνδρείος ironically of an unabashed man, this is not the language of monitors to a youth of infidel tendencies; and here, where they are reminding him of his weakness and incapacity, the word is altogether unsuitable. I have no hesitation in reading; γιγνώσκειν δ' αὐτήν, ὃ πάντων ἀχρεϊότατε, πόσου δεῖν δοκεῖς; You will observe that the mere substitution of χ makes the whole difference of the

reading.—I have before me the larger Zurich Edition; what may have since happened to the text of the Laws I know not; but I can scarcely conceive that such obvious blunders as the following can have been left as they were by any subsequent Editor. 878, B, τραυμάτων οὖν ἐνεστώτων ὀργῇ γενομένων for τ. οὖν ἐν ἔστω τῶν ὁ. γ. Thus also in 829, A we read ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτο ἔστι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχειν, γενομένη μὲν ἀγαθῇ βίος εἰρηνικός κ. τ. ἐ. in place of ἔστι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχει γ. μ. ἀ. κ. τ. ἐ. and in 837, C, ὁρῶν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶν τῇ ψυχῇ, δεόντως τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιτεθυμηκώς κ. τ. ε., for ἢ ἐρῶν, τῇ ψυχῇ δὲ ὄντως τ. ψ. ἐ. 836, C, ἀκολουθῶν for ἀκολουθόν, and πιθανῶ for ἀπιθάνῳ. 898, E, περιπεφυκέναι (an absurd repetition of π) for πεφυκέναι. 899, A, αὐτοῦ δὲ ἄμεινον for ἄρ' οὖν δὲ ἄμεινον, omitting χρεῶν. 903, E, μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, οἶον ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ ξμψυχον!, καὶ μὴ ξύμπολλα ἐξ ἐνός—for ὕδωρ, ξμψυχα καὶ μὴ, ξύμπολλα ἐξ ἐνός. and lastly, in 904, B, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διανοήθη—for ὅσον ἂν ἀγαθὸν ψυχῇ διανοηθῇ. But I will pass to other places, where the correction is not so self-evident. In 829, D, for τοῦτο ἀποδιδόντων, the sense requires οὗτοι δ' ἀποδιδόντων, and in E, for τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ λόγῳ. In 832, C, we find: τὸ δὲ τῆς νῦν πολιτείας, ἣν νομοθετούμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκπέφευγεν ἀμφοτέρω. There will be no more harshness or obscurity, if we read ἣν νομοθετούμεν, ἃ λέγομεν ἐκπέφευγεν ἀμφοτέρω. In 833, A, for σύστασις which is quite foreign to the purpose, for even if you interpret it according to προσιστώμεθα in the Philebus, it would amount to συμπλοκή, so that we should have, ἐν συμπλοκαῖς συμπλοκή, read σύντασις, *contentio*. 834, A, τόξοις καὶ πέλταις καὶ ἀκοντίοις. This would do very well if the peltasts threw their targets at the enemy. Till this is shewn to be the case, I should vastly prefer καὶ παλτοῖς. There is a strange order of words a few lines further: τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔππων δὴ περὶ ἀγῶνος γίγνοιτο ἐξῆς ἂν νομοθετούμενα. The first *AH* is nothing but *AN* in its right place, and ἂν νομοθετούμενα is a corruption from ἃ νομοθετούμεν. 836, C, I have no doubt that the nearest approach to the true reading now possible, is πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο, ὁ διὰ πάντος . . . . τούτῳ ἐν τούτοις τίς οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ; τοῦτο is the aim, τούτῳ the advocate of purer manners, τούτοις are the measures he recommends. 839, A, For λήψεται γόνιμον κ. τ. ἐ., a new light breaks in upon us, if we read γόνιμον δ' ἀπεχομένους ἀρούρας θ. πάσης. Thus

we have the opposition between the absolutely sterile, and that which though fertile in itself, we do not mean to use as such. 841, c, For *περιλαβόν* read *παρалаβόν*, and for *τὰ νῦν λέγομεν' ἐστὶν εὐχαί*, read *τανῦν λέγομεν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶν εὐχαί κ. τ. ε*. The interpolations which spoil the next sentence were probably only meant for the margin. You will see that I mean *παλλακῶν* and *ἀρρένων*. Who can suppose that Plato would speak of *their σπέρματα*? 844, d, I am altogether for the other reading, *παιδιὰν Διονυσιάδα*, and in place of *ἔχει χάριτος αὕτη*, I have no scruple in writing *ἡ θεὸς ἐχαρίσατο αὕτη*. The copyist wrote *εχαχα* and forgot to put his dots under the first *χα*. Then came another, and made this absurd correction. *παιδιὰ Διονυσιάς* is a very suitable expression for all the fruit obtained by *grafting*. 846, d, For *δεόμενον ἐπιτηδεύειν*, read *δεχόμενος ἐπιτήδευσιν*. 864, α, *ἔσσεσθαι τούτων* should be *ἔπεσθαι τούτῳ*. 898, β, The displacement of two words has caused a woeful confusion in an otherwise simple passage. I will merely indicate it. [*μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ*] *φερομένη . . . . . μηδ' ἐν (ἐνὶ) τινι λόγῳ κίνησις*— But I must break off from this desultory work, which is fatiguing to any reader who shall be good enough to verify my references, and keep on steadily through one Book; and as the Seventh is that on which I have been very recently engaged, I will ask of you to accompany me through it.

798, α, *καὶ ἂν ποτ' ἄρα ἀναγκασθῇ μεταβάλλειν αὐθις*—The sentence, having up to this point turned upon *σώματα* as the subject, is now varied, and we look for an individual to whom to refer *ἀναγκασθῇ*, *συνταραχθεὶς* and *ἀπολαβών*. But he is not far off. For *αὐθις* let us read *αὐ τις*, and there he is. In c we have *παίδων* where it is certain that the author meant us to understand *ἀνδρῶν*. When these children who have made innovations in their games and amusements grow up to be men, they are different from former—*children!* Who can be expected to treat copyists with any respect, after such a taste of their quality? In d the same *malu sedulitas* has bestowed on us the word *μεταβαλλόμενα* which is out of its place, and the sense of which is expressed by *ὅσα . . . . . πᾶσχει τὸ τοιοῦτον* which is in its place. In ε, the faulty redundancy in *οὐδ' αὖτις ἄλλως πως* may be accounted for, if we suppose that *οὐδ' ΑΑΑΩC* was copied twice and subsequently changed by a would-be corrector.

799, *κ*. In speaking of νόμοι he says, οἱ παλαιοὶ τότε περὶ κει-  
 θαρφδλίαν οὕτω πως, ὡς λίκιν, ἀνόμασαν. By reading *TOTC* in  
 place of *TOTE* we make the sentence clear and get rid of a  
*then* which points nowhere. "The ancients were not ignorant of  
 the connexion between νόμοι and ῥῥδαί," says he; καθ' ὕπνον δὲ  
 οἶόν ποῦ τις ἦ καὶ ὕπαρ [ἐγρηγορῶς] ἀνείρωξε μαντευόμενος αὐτό.  
 If he only dreamed it, he would have no right to μαντεύεσθαι;  
 but I presume he dreamed it καθ' ὕπνον θεῖον. 800, *β*. I see  
 here as elsewhere the utmost confusion between δὲ and δῆ, but it  
 would be rather dull sport to fly the falcons of criticism upon  
 such exiguous game. *c*. For φαῖμεν, I should much prefer φαμέν  
 in a parenthesis, though I am aware that he has already used  
 it. *d*. A slight transposition will give the ῥήματα and the θυθ-  
 μοὶ their fair share in a necessary epithet. I read ἀρμονίαις γω-  
 δεστάταις. *ε*. I hope you will consent to the removal of χορούς.  
 The gibe is all the more bitter when he substitutes these funeral  
 singing men for the Tragic Chorus. I note εἰ . . ἔν τούτῳ . .  
 κείσθω as a confirmation of Elmaley's οἶσθ' ὡς μέτευξαι.

801, *α*. Instead of μηδὲν ἐπανερωτῶ, which would mean, "am  
 I to ask no question"? I propose μηδέ. "An *ne rogare quidem*  
*oportet*?" We may surely venture to restore δεῖ to the margin  
 where it must have stood as a help to beginners. *c*. He says that  
 τὸ τῶν ποιητῶν γένος is οὐ πᾶν ἱκανόν in judging what men  
 should or should not pray for: and that they might put into our  
 mouths prayers for wealth, though we have already decreed that we  
 shall have no gold or silver statue of Plutus in our City. What  
 will be the result? They will make us *contradict* ourselves in our  
 prayers. This is logical; but not so, that they will make us pray  
 εὐχάς οὐκ ὀρθάς, for they may be right, and we wrong. There-  
 fore away with the insertion, which while it is not to the pur-  
 pose of the argument, is a sore let and hindrance to the syntax.  
*d*. He has never appointed any νομοθέτας for the purpose men-  
 tioned, but certain ἀθλοθέτας, of whom he treats in 764, *ν* &c.

802, *β*. For ἐπανερόμενον I venture to suggest ἐπανορθώσεως  
 δεόμενον. *c*. The direction, νομοθέτου βούλημα, cannot begin  
 with πᾶσα δέ. No wonder then that *A* and *Ω* omit the con-  
 junction. The γε is also to no purpose. Ought we not to read,  
 πᾶσα τακτὴ ἢ τάξιν λαβοῦσα π. *M.* διατριβή? This would refer to  
 the originally proper compositions, and those that had been made

so by adaptation. *ν.* Sense and Grammar call for the change of *ἐκατέρως* into *ἐκατέρω α.* *κ.* The passage about suiting the compositions to the sexes looks very hopeless at first; but the observation of a frequent source of mistake in these books, the confusion between the participial endings and *μεθα* will at once set us on the right track. *ἔστι δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἀμφοτέρα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμενα ἀποδιδόναι*, is nothing more than *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἀμφοτέρα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμεθα ἀποδιδόναι*. When this is replaced, and Ast's supplement introduced, we need only write *τούτω* for *τούτῳ*, and the passage is as simple as any in Plato.

803, *λ.* Having settled the general characters of both kinds of songs, he goes into the details of education. But here we are left suddenly in such darkness as this: *τίνα τρόπον χρηὶ καὶ οἷσισι καὶ πότε πράττειν ἕκαστα αὐτῶν*. What are *ἕκαστα*, and of what *αὐτῶν* are they the particulars? As to *οἷσισι* and *πράττειν* they help out each other; for the dative gives us a palpable hint to change *πράττειν* into *προσάπτειν*, and the succeeding sentence about *τρόποι* and *τροπιδεῖα*, and indeed the whole scope of what follows down to the end of this page of Stephanus, shew that our business is to ascertain *τίνα τρόπον χρηὶ καὶ οἷσισι καὶ ὅποτε προσάπτειν ἑκάστων αὐτῶν*, i.e. *τῶν ἀρρένων τε καὶ θηλειῶν*. *λ, β.* οἷον δὴ τις ναυπηγὸς τὴν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχὴν καταβαλλόμενος τὰ τροπιδεῖα ὑπογράφεται τῶν πλοίων σχήματα, ταῦτόν δὴ μοι καὶ γὰρ φαίνομαι ἐμαντῷ δοῦν τὰ τῶν βίων πειρώμενος σχήματα διαστήσασθαι κατὰ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν, ὅντως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα καταβάλλεσθαι, ποῖα μηχανῇ καὶ τίσι ποτὲ τρόποις ξυνόντες τὸν βίον ἄριστα διὰ τοῦ πλοῦ τούτου τῆς ζωῆς διακομισθυσόμεθα, τοῦτο σκοπεῖν ὀρθῶς. In this passage it is a matter of controversy whether *τροπιδεῖα* is governed by *καταβαλλόμενος* or by *ὑπογράφεται*, and the rest of the construction will depend on this. But as Ast's *appositio*, that is, that *τὴν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχὴν* is a sort of anticipating description of *τροπιδεῖα*, is in itself unlikely, for then the words might just as well be away; and seeing that, if *καταβαλλόμενος* governs *τροπιδεῖα*, and *ὑπογράφεται* governs *τῶν πλοίων σχήματα*, we have this result; that a man is sketching the ship's hull at the same time that he is laying down its timbers, which is at least a day too late, and lastly since the play on words requires that the stress of the antithesis should fall on *τροπιδεῖα*

ὑπογράφεται = βίων σχήματα κατὰ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν διαστήσασθαι, I leave σχήματα to find a regimen where it can, only not in this text, to which it is a stranger, and I conclude that, just as the interpolator borrowed the word σχήματα from the following clause, so when he inserted ὧτως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα καταβάλλεσθαι, he helped himself from what preceded. Who needs such an explanation of a play upon words? and is not ταῦτόν κ. φ. ἰ. δρᾶν enough? Then again what have we to do with any μηχανή? I think it certain that ποίᾳ μηχανῇ was added, because some one did not see the purport of καὶ in καὶ τίσι ποτὲ τρόποις. Of course μοι ought to be expelled, and as for τὸν βίον it looks very like a wish to bring back the τῶν βίων which we had before.—The next sentence but one ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν, εἰ πως διὰ προσήκοντός τινος αὐτὸ πράττομεν, ὥς ἂν ἡμῖν σύμμετρον ᾖ εἶη is not very clear, nor will the *Græcillas* of διὰ προσήκοντος τινὸς commend itself to you. But ΔΙΑ is the palæographical twin of ΑΡΑ, and εἰ πως ἄρα προσηγόντως αὐτὸ πράττομεν seems all that is required. D. "We are the playthings of the Gods, and our best earnest, such as it is, consists in acting as such, and rejoicing before them. People now-a-days say that War is the serious part of life, and Peace the playful part; thus they make the serious to be for the sake of the playful." τὸ δ' ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὐτ' οὐν παιδιὰ πεφυκνῖα οὐτ' αὖ παιδεῖα ποτὲ ἡμῖν ἀξιόλογος, οὔτε οὔσα οὔτε ἐσομένη. τὸ δὲ φάμεν ἡμῖν γε εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, δεῖ δὲ τὸν κατ' εἰρήνην βίον ἕκαστον πλεϊστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον διεξελεῖν. τίς οὖν ὀρθότης παίζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιωτέον, τίνας δὲ παιδιάς θύοντα καὶ ἄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον. τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα means more than Cornarius understood by it. I should render it: "Whereas we have found that in war &c." The stop should be removed from ἐσομένη, and we must read, ὃ δὲ φάμεν ἡμῖν γ' εἶναι σπουδαιότατον. "War has no sport nor education worth mentioning, and to have that was just what we affirm to be most serious." But if you insist upon preferring ὥ . . . σπουδαιότατω, non repugnabo. The rest I read thus: τίς ΟΤΝ Ἡ ὀρθότης; τίνας δὲ παιδιάς παίζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιωτέον; θύοντα κ. τ. ἰ. It is incredible that any one should have attempted to correct this passage, and that others should have adopted his correction, and yet all have consented to leave such an absurdity as παιδιάς θύοντα in the text.

804, B. πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀπιδὼν καὶ παθὼν—Was it once *εὐκότα* παθὼν? D. Perhaps you will approve of οὐχ ὃν μὲν ἂν ὁ πατήρ βούληται [φοιτῶντα] ὃν δ' ἂν μὴ ἔωντας [τὰς παιδείας]. D & E. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλειῶν ὁ μὲν ἑμὸς νόμος ἂν εἴποι πάντα, ὅσα περ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρρένων, ἴσα καὶ τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν. καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεῖς εἴποιμ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον. Never was a passage more miserably interpolated than this. First his law speaks, and then *he* speaks; his law would say the same about women as about men, *that women ought to be trained and drilled as much*. Any one who knows what ἴσα καὶ is, will welcome the conjecture, which joins ἴσα καὶ with οὐδὲν φοβηθεῖς <sup>1)</sup>, and so gets rid of this repetition about women; and as the law is still the subject, the spurious εἴποιμ' ἂν absconds from before it.

805, B. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τελῶν καὶ πόνων. This is untrue; for the women add their labour to that of the men. Read πόρων. C. ἐν τούτοις. Perhaps ἐν τούτῳ γ'; in the meanwhile, till he has found some better reasons.

806, A. As ἀργοὺς μὲν ταλασίαις is opposed to θεραπείας δὲ, and not to ἀσκητικόν τινα βίον, for δὲ τινα we should read δὴ τινα. Then follows a passage which must be given in its whole state. τῶν δὲ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας, ὥστ' οὐδ' εἴ τις ποτε διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεώς τε καὶ παίδων ἀναγκαῖα τύχη γίγνοιτο, οὔτ' ἂν τόξων, ὥς τινες Ἀμαζόνες, οὔτ' ἄλλης κοινωνῆσαι ποτε βολῆς μετὰ τέχνης δυνάμεναι, οὐδὲ ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ λαβοῦσαι μιμήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, ὡς πορθουμένης αὐταῖς τῆς πατρίδος γενναίας ἀντιστάσας φόβον γε, εἰ μὴδὲν μείζον, πολεμίοισι δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινὶ κατοφθείσας; Σαυρομάτιδας δὲ οὐδ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν τολμήσειαν μιμήσασθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαβιοῦσαι, παρὰ γυναικας δὲ αὐτὰς ἄνδρες ἂν αἱ ἐκείνων γυναῖκες φανεῖν. I need not point out the impossibilities of this passage, nor refute their champions. One specimen of their logic will suffice. We have κοινωνούσας, δυνάμεναι, λαβοῦσαι, ἀντιστάσας, κατοφθείσας. "It is nothing: the nominative may precede the infinitive". Yes! and so may the accusative; but can both do so indifferently—and in one and the same sentence? This, and the barbarism of ὥστε οὐδὲ suffice to shew the condition of the text; but where is the remedy to

1) Omitting τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν.



come from? From the nature of the argument. Which is the worse case? that described by *πορθουμένης τῆς πατρίδος*, or that which is here called *διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῶν φιλιτάων*? The latter. Which demands most courage, to appear *ἐν τάξει*, or to use the weapons of close fighting? The latter. Then why does he weaken his sentence by putting the worse case, and the greatest instance of courage, first? Moreover what a clumsy arrangement is this, that he should interrupt his examples of warlike females, the Amazons, Minerva, the Sarmatian women, by a long sentence which might have as well appeared elsewhere?—It did appear elsewhere, till some blunderer left it out, and the same or some equal blunderer brought it back, not *postliminio*, but through a breach in the text. By re-transposing what has been displaced we surmount nearly all these difficulties, grammatical and rhetorical; for the rest we must trust to probable conjecture. *τῶν δ' εἰς πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας, ὥστε (πορθουμένης αὐταῖς τῆς πατρίδος, γενναίως ἀντιστάσας φόβον γε εἰ μηδὲν μείζον πολεμοῖς δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινὶ κατοφθείσας)*;—all this depends upon *φῶμεν δεῖν ζῆν*; Then follows the direct. *οὐδ' εἴ τις ποτε διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεως (πόσεως?) τε καὶ παίδων ἀναγκαῖα τύχη γίγνοιτο, οὔτε τόξων, ὥς τινες Ἀμάζονες, οὔτ' ἄλλης κοινωνῆσαι ποτε βολῆς μετὰ τέγνης δυνάμεναι (φανεῖεν ἂν) οὐδ' ἀσπίδα καὶ δορυ λαβοῦσαι μιμήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, Σαυροματίδας δὲ οὐδ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν τολμήσειαν μιμήσασθαι κ. τ. ε.* c. No one need despair of making a brilliant correction: Stallbaum's *οὐχὶ ἤμισυν* founded on the reading of the best MSS, *οὐ ΔΙ' ἤμισυν* is deserving of much praise. ε. For *ἀποτελοῦσιν* it is absolutely necessary that we read *ἀποτελοῖεν*. The explanation offered by Ast of *αὐταῖς* in *παίδων τε ἅμα θηλειῶν καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταῖς*, that it is put for *αὐτῶν*, is only too like many of his notes on the Laws; *αὐταῖς*, as I need not tell you, is *ipsis seorsim*. But this leads me to offer a conjecture on the words immediately preceding. *ξυσσίτια δὲ κατεσκευασμένα εἴη χωρὶς μὲν τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγγὺς δ' ἐχόμενα τὰ τῶν υἱέων, αὐτοῖς*, instead of *τὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων* which is a most vague designation. For what can *οἰκείοι* mean? Not a man's household, for his wife and daughters are provided with a mess-table apart; certainly not his *domestics*, who are not members of a *συσσίτιον*; and certainly not his friends who, being citizens, would sit with him. Of course *τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων* is not so bad as *τῶν*

αὐταῖς μητέρων, but what writer would ever dream of putting more than τῶν οἰκίῳ in such a case? Why the youths are apart from their fathers, but the girls are with their mothers, is obvious to that great umpire in all truisms, the meanest capacity.

807, A. Having provided the members of his city with their public meals and festive occupations, he asks whether each member has no needful and suitable work left him to do, ἀλλ' ἐν τρόπῳ βοσκήματος ἕκαστον παινόμενον αὐτῶν δεῖ ζῆν; I shall offer you no excuse for altering this into, ἀλλ' ἢ τ. β. ἐ. ἀ. π. διαζῆν. Immediately after, we have οὐκ οὖν τό γε δίκαιον φαρὲν οὐδὲ καλόν, οὐδ' οἶόν τε κ. τ. ἐ. where again the explainer τολμᾷσιν ἀδύνατα. I read, οὐκ οὖν, (τό γε δίκαιον ΦΑΝΑΙ) οὔτε καλόν, οὔθ' οἶόν τε—. B. τετραχωμένον. Pray do not alarm yourself: I am not going to discuss the merits of the word; I simply copy it from the Zurich Edition and set it up as a mark to unwary readers; who, while sliding over the smooth surface, will, unless warned, find themselves suddenly in a very comfortless chasm. *One whole paragraph is missing*, either because a page in the source of our MSS was lost, or because the page was too τετραμένον to be deciphered. How is this to be proved? By unfulfilled promises. He asks τίς δὴ τρόπος τοῦ βίου and the rest, and after a description of their messes, he again asks ἄρα οὐδὲν λειπόμενόν ἐστι κ. τ. ἐ. This question he does not answer, nor has he told us how he proposes to escape from his own prophecy, that these well-conditioned citizens of his will necessarily become the prey of some wiry hungry daredevils. And yet that he *has* pointed out some escape is evident from the sequel, which whether corrected or left as it is, can yield but this sense. "We cannot hope that *all this* will be done with great minuteness, as long as citizens have separate houses." *All what?* "But if the other second-best measures were tried",—*What other?* "But men *living so* have yet another duty and that not a small one"—*Living how?* *Hardily*; as is plain from the context, and from the sequel; but these precepts of hardihood, voluntary penances or whatever they were, and their effects on the character, are all gone, and as a proof of the diligence with which Plato is read, not an asterisk marks where they were. There is some broken ground, as you would expect, on the brink of this chasm; but if I am not mistaken,

I have pointed it out before<sup>1</sup>). εἰ ζητοῖμεν ἄν stands its ground in all editions just now before me. The right reading seems to be; ταῦτ' οὖν δὴ δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν ἱκανῆς, ὡς καὶ νυνὶ ζητούμεν' ἄν, ἵσως οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. c. If the Zurich Editors had thought for a moment, they would have adopted Ast's emendation εἰς ἀρετήν. Of course the scribes wrote ἀρετῆς, because it was next door to ἐπιμέλειαν, and they looked no further.

808, c. Are you very tired of proofs of the *lacuna*? Just one more, and I have done. νύξ μὲν δὴ διαγομένη τοιαύτη τις πρὸς πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημέμοις ἀνδρείαν ἄν τινα προσπαρέχοιτο κ. τ. ε. d. For the miserable πω βιωτέον, I have exhausted every verb beginning with π that I could think of, and found no plausible substitute, except perhaps προλιπτέον, which the scribes would very readily change to προλιπτέον. But a certain form of the β, now out of use, is very like the semiuncial λ and one form of π is an ω with a lid to it. But this is dwelling in the "Meadow of Conjecture". d. ὁ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶ δυσμεταχειριστότατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην, ἐπίβουλον καὶ δριμύ καὶ ὑβριστότατον θηρίων γίνεται. To speak frankly, this is downright nonsense. "A boy is of all animals the hardest to manage: because having a germ of reason, he becomes the most rebellions of all creatures." This any one can see to be far from neat: but how much worse it becomes if we write;—"having his germ of reason not yet daunted and tamed"? Nor is the grammar a whit better: ὅσῳ μάλιστα with two positives and one superlative; the latter probably contrived "to meet the demand". Again why use μήπω for οὐπω in a direct declaration such as this? There can surely be no doubt that Plato wrote: ὁ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶ δυσμεταχειριστότατον, ὅσῳ γε μάλιστα ἔχει τινὰ πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν. μήπω κατηρτυμένον δὲ, ἐπίβουλον καὶ δριμύ καὶ ὑβριστόν θηρίον γίνεται. e. One is rather taken aback by the statement that the lad is to be sent τοῖς διδάσκουσι καὶ ὁτιοῦν. (Τί γαρ; ἢ καὶ τοῖς κλέπτειν καὶ ἐπιρκεῖν διδάσκουσι;) And why is καὶ μαθήμασιν added? Grant that they are *bonds*; they are surely not so in the sense in which οἱ διδάσκοντες are so. Consider, pray, whether we have not here a corruption of καὶ ὁτιοῦν ΚΑΔ' (καλὸν) ΜΑΘΗΜΑ.

<sup>1</sup>) Book 10. 905, d. εἰ δ' ἐπιδεῆς ἔτι λόγον τινὸς ἂν εἴη. Read λ. τ. ἄλλον εἰ.

809, B. τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ χορείας πέρι μελῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως ἐρηγήθη. Not even a Dithyrambic poet, unless very drunk, would sing of the χορεία μελῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως. Plato had discussed the question concerning their *employment*: χορείας πέρι. C. καὶ τοι τὰ μὲν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, ἃ δεῖ μανθάνειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ μελετᾶν, ἔχεις τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ γράμματα πρῶτον καὶ δευτέρον λύρας πέρι καὶ λογισμῶν, ὧν ἔφαμεν δεῖν, ὅσα τε πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν χρῆναι ἐκάστους λαβεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔτι τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ἄστρον τε πέρι καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ὅσα διοικεῖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι περὶ ταῦτα πάσῃ πόλει . . . . . ταῦτα οὐπω σοι πάντα ἱκανῶς, ὦ φίλε, παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου διείρηται. In this sentence, ὅσα τε points to things unknown and beyond discovery, χρῆναι is out of structure, διοικεῖν occupies a place where μανθάνειν alone is apposite, and this mention of *arrangement* seems to have dropped from the clouds. The chief author in all this mischief is the man who introduced ὅσα τε: λογισμῶν ὧν ἔφαμεν δεῖν πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν is in perfect order. Then follows, somewhat loosely, but in a highly Platonic manner — χρῆναι δ' ἐκάστους λαβεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταῦτά ταῦτα ἔτι τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ἄστρον τε [πέρι] καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ὅσα [διοικεῖν] (oh! these interpreters!) ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι [περὶ ταῦτα] πάσῃ τῇ πόλει. (Subaudi λαβεῖν.)—I take this opportunity of observing that in Thuc. II, 102, where we now read, λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ Ἀμφιάρεω, ὅτε δὴ ἀλᾶσθαι αὐτὸν μετὰ τὸν φόνον, τὸν Ἀπόλλω ταύτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰκεῖν, the right reading is ὅτ' ἔδει ἀλᾶσθαι.—Soon after the sense is obscured through faulty punctuation; it ought to be pointed: ἐπικαλοῦντες τί τῇ λέξει; τόδε· ὥς οὐπω διείρηκε κ. τ. εἰ. In the next sentence we have προσοιστέον twice; in the first place it occurs in connexion with ἱεόν: πότερον ἱεόν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ προσοιστέον. And these two verbals have the common complement of εἰς ἀκριβείαν; the second προσοιστέον is followed by εἰς γράμματα. It cannot be denied that such a verbal may be used in a passive sense; but who ever heard of such an expression as προσφέρεσθαι εἰς γράμματα? My own persuasion is that the Margin of the Vossian MS offers a right conjecture in προσοιστέον. The passage in the beginning of the Republic, τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες is in favour of repeating the same verb, and the pre-

position is added because the verb would look too bald when separated from εἰς. In the very next sentence (810, A) we have a marginal note which changes the construction for the worse. The commands of the law are in the infinitive. προσιτέον μὲν τοίνυν φαμὲν εἰς μὲν γράμματα παιδί δεκετεὶ σχεδὸν ἐνιαυτοῦς τρεῖς, λύρας δὲ ᾤψασθαι τρία μὲν ἔτη καὶ δέκα γεγονόσιν ἄρχεσθαι, [μέτριος ὁ χρόνος] ἐμμεῖναι δ' ἕτερα τρία. I point out παράνομον which ought to be παρὰ νόμον, and, in B, τισὶν οἷς, which should be οἷστισι, and proceed to lay before you as corrupt a passage as any in the Book. πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἄλυσρα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων, τοῖς δ' ἄνευ βυθμῶν τμημάτων, ἃ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητῶμενα βυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἀρμονίας, σφαλερὰ γράμμαθ' ἡμῖν ἔστι παρὰ τινων τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα· οἷς, ὧ πάντων βέλτιστοι νομοφύλακες, τί χρήσεσθε; To what interpreter shall we betake ourselves for help in this labyrinth, saying ἐν σοὶ κείμεθα ἐλάμονες? But behold our very invocation has helped us so far, that we may confidently read, ποιητῶν κείμεθα ἐν γράμμασι! But what are we to do with βυθμῶν τμημάτων? I should certainly reject the former and retain the scornful expression τμημάτων, more especially as βυθμοῦ occurs very soon after. Then I propose to separate the text from the gloss upon it, thus: ἃ δὴ [συγγράμματα] κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητῶμενα βυθμοῦ καὶ ἀρμονίας, [σφαλερὰ γράμματα] ἡμῖν ἔστι παρὰ τινων [τῶν πολλῶν] τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα. He cannot call them σφαλερὰ γράμματα as yet, for though τοιούτων (i.e. τητῶμένων βυθμοῦ καὶ ἀρμονίας) is a sneer, he does not prejudge the question whether they shall use those books. D. The commentators may settle it among them, whether the faulty construction of this sentence is a piece of graceful negligence, or of corruption: but τῆς αὐτῆς is very awkward, even if we understand it to mean that the *same way* pleases some and displeases others, and κελεύεις γὰρ is certainly faulty, for this has no connexion of cause and effect with ἀληθὲς λέγεις. The simplest correction would be, κελεύοις δέ με, ὡς ἔ. φ., ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ κ. τ. ἔ.

811, B. The parts of the dialogue are so distributed, that Clinias becomes the protagonist. The persons ought to stand thus:

ΑΘ. . . . εἰ δ' οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει, κίνδυνόν φημι εἶναι φέρουσιν τοῖς παισὶ τὴν πολυμαθίαν. Πῶς οὖν καὶ τί παραινοίης ἂν τῷ νομοφύλακι;

ΚΑ. Τοῦ πέρι λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Τοῦ πρὸς τί παράδειγμά ποτε ἀποβλέψας ἂν τὸ μὲν ἐφ' πάντας μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους, τὸ δ' ἀποκαλύοι.

ΚΑ. Λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκνει λέγων.

812, B.C. ΑΘ. Ἐφραμεν, οἶμαι, τοὺς τοῦ Διονύσου τοὺς ἐξηκοντούτας ᾧδους διαφερόντως εὐαισθητοὺς δεῖν γεγονέναι περὶ τε τοὺς θυθμούς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρμονιῶν συστάσεις, ἵνα τὴν τῶν μελῶν μίμησιν τὴν εὐ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται, τὰ τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς ὁμοιώματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατός ᾧν τις τὰ μὲν ἀποβάλλῃ, τὰ δὲ προσφέρων εἰς μέσον ὕμνῃ καὶ ἐπ' ὀδῇ ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλούμενος ἐκάστους εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔπασθαι κτήσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων. Can any one believe that ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται is correct, or that μίμησις μιμεῖται τὰ ὁμοιώματα means anything conceivable? When a comic actor imitates popular tragedians in a burlesque, he may be said to imitate their imitations; but the province of music is μιμεῖσθαι τὰ παθήματα; and this is, I think, enough to justify us in expelling ὁμοιώματα, which was invented to fill up a fancied gap in the sense, and in reading: ἵνα τὴν τ. μ. μίμησιν, τὴν εὐ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι, ὅς' ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνηται, τὰ τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ [τὰ] τῆς ἐναντίας, ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατός ᾧν κ. τ. ε. By this very slight change we have the true object of imitation, παθήματα; and the construction δυνατός ἐκλέξασθαι μίμησιν μεμιμημένην τὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι is complete and satisfactory. D & E. The grammar requires παρεχομένου and προσαρμόττοντος. Πυκνότης and μανότης appear to be well explained by Mr. Chappell, History of Music, p. 144.

813, A. Ἀληθέστατα τολύνν. καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν κ. τ. ε. should be read continuously. E. διεξόδων τακτικῶν. Significantur, says Ast, exercitus in acie constituti expeditiones. If it signifies this, it signifies nothing, for this has no meaning. Διέοδοι are evolutions, and τακτικῶν is a bad gloss. Στρατοπέδων is of no better origin; but the worst corruptions are those in the following passage. πάντων γὰρ τούτων διδασκάλους τε εἶναι δεῖ κοινούς, ἀρνούμενους μισθὸν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τούτων μαθητὰς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει παῖδας τε καὶ ἄνδρας· καὶ [κόρας καὶ γυναῖκας πάντων τούτων ἐπιστήμονας,] κόρας μὲν οὐσας ἔτι πᾶσαν τὴν ἐν ὅπλοις ὄρχησιν [καὶ μάχην] μεμελετηκυίας, γυναῖκας δὲ διεξόδων καὶ τάξεων καὶ θέσεως καὶ ἀναρρέσεως ὅπλων ἡμέμενας, εἰ μηδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' εἴ ποτε δεήσειε

Platonis Philebus.

b

πανδημει [πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει] καταλιπόντας τὴν πόλιν ἔξω στρατεύεσθαι τοὺς φυλάξαντας παῖδας τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ἱκανὰς εἶναι τὸ γε τοσοῦτον—I offer you the passage unaltered, but for the brackets, except that I change καταλείποντας into καταλιπόντας; that I follow Α and Ω in φυλάξαντας, (those who had kept guard, youths and others, are gone out, and the women must supply their place); and that I read ἱκανὰς, for which there is no authority except the sense. These then are to be sufficient *at least for this purpose*: and again, ὃν οὐδὲν ἀπώμοτον, *it being an inevitable chance*, that an enemy should some day break into the town, and force them to fight *pro aris et focis*, πολλή που κακία κ. τ. ἐ.

814, D. Read, if you approve, Νῦν δὲ τῆς μὲν παλαιστρας περὶ δυνάμεως—. Soon after follows a long passage, which I am tempted to place before you, not in its present state, but as it must have been before it met with any misfortunes either from wounds or surgery. He is speaking of κίνησις of the body and observes: δύο μὲν αὐτὰς χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχρόνων τὸ φαῦλον· καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύο, καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου δύο ἑτέρας, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν βιαίοις ἐμπλεκέντων πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλῶν, ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνδρικῆς, τὴν δ' ἐν εὐπραγίαις τε οὔσης σώφρονος, ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε ἐμμέτρου. εἰρηνικὴν δ' ἂν τις λέγων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ὀρχησιν λέγοι. τὴν δὲ τούτων ἄλλην οὔσαν τῆς εἰρηνικῆς πυρρὴν ἂν τις ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοι, ταῖς τε εὐλαβείαις πασῶν πληγῶν, καὶ βολῶν ἐκνεύσει, καὶ ὑπείξει πάσῃ καὶ ἐκπηδήσει καὶ ἐγκύψει, καὶ ταῖς ταύταις ἐναντίαις ταῖς ἐπὶ τὰ δραστικά φερόμεναις αὐτῶν σχήματα, τόξων βολαῖς καὶ ἀκοντίων, καὶ πασῶν πληγῶν μιμήματι, ἐπιχειροῦσαν μιμείσθαι τὸ τ' ὀρθὸν ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ εὐτόνον. τῶν οὖν ἀγαθῶν σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν ὅποταν γίγνηται μίμημα, εὐθυφρεὲς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν γιγνόμενον, ὀρθὸν μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ τούτοις τούναντιον ἀποδιδόν οὐκ ὀρθὸν ἀποδεχόμεθα. Though I do not suppose that you ever joined in the charge against me, that I did not sufficiently explain the reason of my corrections, others who read this will perhaps be nursing the accusation, and if I should now leave the above passage without other comment but a recommendation to compare it with the received text, many will say, *There, there!* and a few will even go further and say, *So would we have it.* And yet what a misery it is that a man cannot change τε into γε, or ΠΑΘΟΣ

into ΠΑΗΘΟΣ, without turning showman, and pointing out what every body can see for himself. To explain an emendation is as ungraceful a performance as to comment on a joke, and as *this* is seldom done except when the joke is ψυχρότερον τῶν Πλάτωνος νόμων, as that ribald Lucian has it, so *that* had better be reserved for sorry specimens of criticism. But, assuming that any chance reader will take the same trouble as yourself, to compare the received text with that here given, I will observe that αὐτῆς τὰ εἶδη is an explanation of αὐτάς, that ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν is a Platonic elegance adapted to a wrong place, that ἐμπλεκέντων is an Attic form preserved in our oldest copies, as likewise in the best MS of Thucydides, that ἡδοναὶ are μέτριαι, but men are ἔμμετροι, that ταπεινώσει is probably the gloss of ἐγκύψει, or else the substitute for it when it had disappeared into ΕΝΨΕΙ, that the pyrrhic dance *and that alone* can undertake to imitate skill and vigour, and can only do so by a twofold representation, namely of defence and of attack, that, if I am wrong in inserting οὖν, I have no objection to any better mode of conjunction, that, if ἀποδιδὼν is rash, you can leave a mark of hiatus, or else read ἐναντίον, (in which I should not follow you) and that ἀποδεχόμεθα was first discovered by Ast, and is the fourth instance in this Book of similar confusion of terminations.

In turning over some loose papers, I find the following observations bearing on the next few pages of our author. They are written in Commentator's Latin or an imitation thereof, but with the help of the text, it is to be hoped that they will be intelligible. I present them as they are.

815, c. ὅση μὲν βαρχεῖα τ' ἐστὶ, καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ὥς Νύμφας τε καὶ Πᾶνας καὶ Σειληνοὺς καὶ Σατύρους ἐπονομάζοντες, ὥς φασι, μιμοῦνται κατ'ὡνωμένους, περικαθαρούς τε καὶ τελετὰς τινας ἀποτελούντων, ξύμπαν τοῦτο τῆς ὀρχήσεως τὸ γένος κ. τ. εἰ. Diu mihi suspectum fuit verbum ἐπονομάζοντες. *Saltationes quasdam Nympharum et Faunorum aliorumque numinum nominibus appellant. Fac Platonem illud voluisse. Sed quid porro imitantur? Eadem hæc numina ebria. Quæ est hæc negligentia, ut eadem vocabula utpote ab ἐπονομάζοντες pendentia saltationum nomina significent, ad μιμοῦνται autem relata de numinibus ipsis capiantur? Adde quod ἐπονομάζοντες, ὥς φασι, ita conjuncta sunt, ut hoc ad illud necessario referatur. Quasi his saltatoribus proprium esset, ut his*

b \*



nominibus uterentur; vel potius non uterentur, sed uti se dictitarent. Quod vero ad Nymphas attinet, quis unquam illas ebrias finxit, nedum saltatione imitatus sit? Quid vero sibi volunt τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων? Si sic interpretaberis: "*qui Bacchas sequuntur*", praesto erit Astius, qui te commonefaciat, ἃς referendum esse ad ταύταις. Quod quoniam rectissime et ex linguae norma dictum est, sequitur ut ἃς etiam de Bacchabus ipsis intelligi oporteat, non de saltatoribus. Atqui si hoc concesseris, quid de reliqua sententia fiet? Quid multa? Corruptam orationem agnoscas necesse est; vel si forte etiamnum dubitas, vide num vera lectio te ab ista religione liberet. ὅση μὲν βακχεία τ' ἐστί, καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἃς Νύμφας ἐπονομάζοντες, Πᾶνας καὶ Σειληνοὺς καὶ Σατύρους ὥς φασὶ μιμοῦνται κατ'ὠρωμένους. Mulieres Nympharum partes agunt: viri Faunos temulentos Nympharum fugientium amatores imitantur. In verbis τοῦτο [τῆς ὀρχήσεως] τὸ γένος, quae et infra repetuntur, non difficile est Platonem ab interpolatore dignoscere.

Ibid. D. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπολέμου Μούσης, ἐν ὀρχήσεσι δὲ τοὺς τε θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν παῖδας τιμῶν—Si scriptum esset ἀπολέμου μὲν ἐν ὀρχήσεσι δὲ τιμώσης, vel ἀπολέμου μὲν ἐν ὀρχήσεσι δὲ σπουδαίαις τιμῶν, quidquid de reliqua oratione statueremus, δὲ saltem suo loco positum videretur. Nunc autem plane supervacaneum est. Vide, num aliquando a margine in orationem invecutum fuerit. Nam in Cod. Ξ scriptum est τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀ. Μ.: unde suspiceris, dubitasse librariorum utrum δὲ an δὴ scribendum esset. Equidem neutrum probo. Ad propositum redeunt μὲν οὖν usurpant. Sed de τιμῶν longe gravior est controversia; quae lectio nullus dubito quin alteri, τιμώντων, praefenda sit. Sed unde factum est ut illam nullus bonae notae Codex praeter Ξ praebuerit? Scilicet qui illum librum exaravit, ipse finxit. Minime; nam si ita esset, verba illa quae Bekkerus ex illo codice enotavit, "τὸ τιμῶν οὐδετέρως", in margine, non in orationis serie, scripta fuissent. Itaque hoc statuendum; vel lectionem τιμῶν etiam in A vel Ω exstare, sed a Bekkero praetervisam fuisse, vel Ξ non totum ab illis pendere, sed habere propriam auctoritatem, utpote ab antiquiore libro, qui nonnunquam meliores lectiones praebet, descriptum. Mox pro τὸ μὲν ἐκ πόνων τινῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κινδύνων διαπεφευγόντων, lege: τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ, τῶν ἐκ πόνων τινῶν κ. τ. ἐ.

816, c. ἐν τάξει. Haec non intelligo. Aliud est καθιεροῦν,

aliud τάττειν, neque illud fieri potest nisi hoc præcesserit. Quæ vero ad τάξιν pertinent omnia supra memorata sunt; ut jam nihil supersit quam καθιεροῦν πάντα, ἂν τάξη.

Ibid. n. Lege: Τὰ μὲν οὖν . . ψυχῶν, οἷα εἰς τὰς χορείας, εἴρηται. Cetera quam primum abjicienda. Mox dele κωμωδήματα, et κατὰ ante ὄρχησιν, et lege: καὶ τὰ τοιούτων πάντων κωμωδήματα.

818, A. ὡς ἀκριβείας ἐχόμενα. "*Cum perfectione conjuncta*, h. e. perfecte s. exacte, ἀκριβῶς s. δι' ἀκριβείας". Sio Astius, falsa veris permiscens. Lege: ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα οὐχ ὡς ἀκριβείας ἐχομένους δεῖ διαπονεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλὰ τινὰς ὀλίγους.—Mox sequuntur hæc: οὕτω γὰρ πρέπειν ἂν εἴη. τῷ πλήθει δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖα καὶ πῶς ὀρθότατα λέγεται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρόν, δι' ἀκριβείας δὲ ζητεῖν πάντα οὔτε ῥᾶδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν δυνατόν. Quæ sit horum verborum grammatica ratio, οὔτε ῥᾶδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν δυνατόν ἐξηγεῖσθαι. Locus sic mihi constituendus videtur: τῷ πλήθει δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖα πῶς ὀρθότατα λέγεται; ἂ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρόν, κ. τ. εἰ.

Ibid. c. οἷος δυνατός. "*Alterutrum fortasse delendum est*". Ast. Imo δυνατός quantocius expellendum. De Dis loquens consulto maluit οἷος h. e. *idoneus* dicere, quam de potentia eorum videri dubitare.

819, A. οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακόν. Hic οὐ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν οὐδὲ μέγιστον hand minus absurde collocantur quam μέγιστος καὶ σφοδρὸς ἕκως, quæ Cobetus, spreta certissima nostra correctione, in Convivio legenda proposuit. Et quemadmodum illic, ubi de universo amore sermo est, τὸ σφοδρὸν, quod in partem tantum cadit, prorsus alienum est, sic in nostro loco omnium rerum ignorantiam σφοδρὸν κακὸν vocare nec Græcitas nec rei natura patitur. Lege: οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδ' ἢ σφοδρὰ ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων, οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακόν. Neque vero hinc exemplum petere possis adjectivi positivi cum superlativo conjuncti; nam δεινὸν nequaquam ad κακόν pertinet. "Nulla in civitate periculosa est—neque est summum malum." Mox dele τούτων.

Ibid. b. c. Lege: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοὺς ἀτεχνῶς πάρεστιν ἐξηυρημένα μαθήματα μετὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μανθάνειν. Vulgo παισίν. Tum enumerantur τὰ μαθήματα, sc. μῆλων καὶ στεφάνων διανομαί, καὶ πυκτῶν . . . ἐφεδρεῖαι τε καὶ συλλήξεις ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς, [καὶ] ὡς πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι. Vulgo ἐφεδρεῖας

—συλλήξεως; unde effectum est ut *πεφύκασι* sine nominativo esset, et genitivi a *διανομαί* pendere crederentur; quasi quis pugiles spectantibus eodem modo quo poma vel coronas distribueret. Alterum καὶ omisi; quod qui inseruit, parum intellexit quid esset ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς, et tanquam inter se opposita essent, (quod fuisset, ἐν μ. τε καὶ ἐ.) tertium aliquid in ὡς *πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι* contineri putavit. Sed unumquodque par et singuli tertiarii priores ἐν μέρει excipiebant, atque hoc in omnibus *deinceps* fiebat. ὡς *πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι* adjectum est ut significaretur certam esse harum permutationum conjunctionumque rationem, si quidem numeri natura immutabiles essent. καὶ δὴ καὶ παίζοντες, φιάλας ἅμα χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων κεραννύντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλας πῶς διαδιδόντες, ὅπερ εἶπον, εἰς παιδίαν ἐναρμόττοντες τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀριθμῶν χρήσεις—Tria hic præcipue quaerenda sunt. 1. Quid sit *φιάλας κεραννύντες*, 2. quo modo ab ὅλας διαδιδόντες differat, 3. ubi dixerit, quod hic se iterum dicere ait. Duplex, nisi fallor, discrimen in poculis fingitur; nam et e diversa materia facta sunt, et diversum liquorem continent. Si hoc verum est, recte opponuntur οἱ κεραννύντες τὰς φιάλας, h.e. qui pocula vino cum aqua permixto implent, et οἱ φ. ὅλας διαδιδόντες, quod idem est ac φ. ἀκράτου πότου πλήρεις διαδιδόντες. Sed vocem ἄκρατος consulto vitavit, quoniam non minus de aqua pura quam de vino mero cogitabat. Quo autem spectant illa, ὅπερ εἶπον? Planissime ad verba ἀρμοττόντων ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν. Atqui non prorsus idem est, sive numeros *convenire* dicas, sive numeros *accommodari*; et quoniam hoc verius, malim ἀρμοττομένων. Nam qui hoc dixit, idem dixit quod infra, εἰς παιδίαν κ. τ. ἐ. Præterea cum prorsus otiosum sit ἄλλων, et οἱ δὲ alterum quoddam sui simile flagitet, lego: ἄλλοι μὲν κεραννύντες. At unde illud μὲν arripui? Nempe a Cod. Ξ, qui pro κεραννύντες μεραννύντας habere dicitur. Ceterum si quis inutilem esse particulam πῶς contendet, simulque ὅλας φιάλας ægre feret, quidni ὅλας πόσεις reponat?

Ibid. D. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς μετρήσεσιν, ὡς, ὅσα ἔχει μήκη καὶ πλάτη καὶ βάθη, περὶ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐνοῦσάν τινα φύσει γελοῖαν τε καὶ αἰσχρὰν ἄγνοιαν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι, ταύτης ἀπαλλάττουσιν. Supplevi ὡς. Idem valet ὡς ἐνοῦσαν atque κρίνοντες ἐνεῖναι. Mox pro ὑηνῶν lege ὑίνων.

820, A. Εἰ δ' ἔστι μήτε σφόδρα μήτε ἡρόεμα [δυνατὰ ἔνια, ἀλλὰ]

τὰ μὲν, [τὰ δὲ μὴ,] σὺ δὲ πάντα ἡγεί, πῶς οἷσι πρὸς ταῦτα διακείσθαι; Non defuturos scio, qui hos uncinos meos tanquam summæ audaciæ exempla citaturi sint. Ego contra librariorum audaciam me compescere arbitror, qui talem compositionem οὐκ ἔνια ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὐ, pro Platonica nobis obtulerunt. Sed cur δυνατὰ inclusi? Videamus præcedentia. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ δοκεῖ . . ταῦτα εἶναι μετρητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα; Ναί. Μῆκος τε, οἶμαι, πρὸς μῆκος κ. τ. ἔ. Vides orationem continuari, et hæc omnia a μετρητὰ εἶναι pendere. "Imo", inquit, "α δυνατὸν εἶναι μετρεῖν φύσει". Atqui, ut hoc concesserim, qua ratione hæc inter se conciliabis: δυνατὸν ἔστι ταῦτα μετρεῖν et ταῦτα δυνατὰ ἔστι? Scilicet intelligendo μετρεῖσθαι. Et ubi erit Platonicius ille nitor sermonis, quem omnes laudant, paucissimi tumentur? Sed paucissimi illi δυνατὸν εἶναι μετρεῖν φύσει sine ulla dubitatione damnabunt.

Ibid. A. Τί δ' αὖ; μῆκος τε καὶ πλάτος πρὸς βάθος, ἢ πλάτος τε καὶ μῆκος πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστε πως ἄρ' οὐ διανοοῦμεθα περὶ ταῦτα οὕτως κ. τ. ἔ. Sic A et Q. Pro ὥστε πως Winkelmanus infelicitè ἀμῶς γέ πως conjecit. Scribendum videtur: πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀσάυτως; KΛ. Πῶς; AΘ. Ἀρ' οὐ διανοοῦμεθα—.

Returning from the Latin notes the first thing we meet with in the text, that seems to require notice is in 820, c. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ σκοποῦντα διαγιγνώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ παντάπασιν εἶναι φαῦλον, προβάλλοντά τε ἀλλήλοις αἰεί, διατριβὴν τῆς πεττείας πολὺν χαριεστέραν πρεσβυτῶν διατρίβοντα, φιλονεικεῖν ἐν ταῖς τούτων ἀξίαισι σχολαῖς. You will probably assent to ἄλλοις—πρεσβύτερον—φιλονεικεῖν, and likewise to the removal of τὰ μαθήματα in Clinias' answer. Those who want to remove οὐ, shew that they do not understand the force of the particle in εἰκοίε γ' οὖν. κ. The Zurich Editors have gone back to the wrong distribution of persons, which Bekker had rectified. Why should the Athenian not call Clinias ὦ ξένε? And how can οὐκοῦν κείσθω suit any other mouth than τοῦ θέντος?

821, c. Orellius is right in proposing ταῦτ' αἰεί, but there are worse faults in the next sentence. AΘ. Ταῦτ' ἔστι τοίνυν, ὦ Μέγилλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, νῦν ἂν δὴ φημι δεῖν περὶ θεῶν τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν τοὺς γε ἡμετέρους πολίτας τε καὶ τοὺς νέους τὸ μέχρι τοσοῦτου μαθεῖν περὶ ἀπάντων τούτων, μέχρι τοῦ μὴ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτά, εὐφημεῖν δὲ αἰεί θύοντάς τε καὶ ἐν εὐχαῖς εὐχομένους εὐσεβῶς. How can the following bear each other's company: τοίνυν—νῦν, περὶ θεῶν

τῶν καὶ οὐρανόν—περὶ πάντων τούτων, τοὺς πολίτας τε—καὶ τοὺς νέους? Νῦν and the celestial clause must go, and the *cross* division must be changed into a *subdivision* by removing τοὺς. “Those who are *at once* our fellow-citizens and our youth.” E. The words ἐγὼ τούτων οὔτε νέος οὔτε πάλαι ἀκηκοὺς σφῶν ἂν νῦν οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δηλῶσαι δυναίμην. καίτοι χαλεπά γε ὄντα οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἶος εἴην δηλοῦν τηλικούτοις οὔσι τηλικούτος ὢν. I have added the last word, but there are other difficulties which you will require to see solved before you will look on me as the corrector of the passage. I presume you do not approve of either νέον or νεωσι: for a man who has heard a thing οὔτε νεωσι οὔτε πάλαι can scarcely have heard it at all. Τούτων seems to have given no offence, though it is wrong both in number and case. Now as one of the possible hindrances to teaching is the age of the teacher, to which the speaker again alludes, we may restore this feature while we correct τούτων, by supposing that the old reading was τούτουτων (i.e. τοῦτ’ οὔτ’ ὢν) νέος—but what second hindrance does he allude to? “That he had not heard it for some time:” but the Greek for “it is long since I heard it”, would be πάλαι οὐκ ἀκήκοα, not οὐ πάλαι ἀκήκοα, and with οὔτε the same difference would hold good. I therefore incline to read: τοῦτ’ οὔτ’ ὢν νέος πάλαι εἴ οὐκ ἀκηκοὺς—. Perhaps the belief that there was something wrong in οὔτε—τε induced the scribe to make the alteration.

822, A. Read: τὴν [αὐτὴν] γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁδόν, καὶ ἕκαστον . . μίαν κ. τ. ε., and soon after τὸν ἡγεγμένον. c. I should print the text as follows: ἄρ’ οὐκ οἴομεθα τὸ γελοῖόν τε καὶ οὐκ ὀρθὸν ἐκεί γιγνόμενον ἂν, ἐνταυθὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις γίνεσθαι; ΚΑ. Γελοῖον μὲν, ὀρθὸν δ’ οὐδαμῶς. After this I return to another scrap of *Adversaria*, which will lead us to the end of the Book.

Ibid. D. ἐπὶ μείζον nullo modo ferri potest; sed non mutandum in ἐτι μείζον, quod nescio quis proposuit; nam quis dixerit *hoc etiam majus*, nisi qui prius alterum quiddam *magnum* esse contendit? Nec quæ sequuntur sine offensione legi possunt. Quorsum enim τι iteratur, ἕτερόν τι—μεταξύ τι? Deinde si quis doceat πεφυκέναι τι μεταξύ νοουθετήσεώς τε καὶ νόμων, quis hoc intelligat; sin adjiciat νοουθετήσεώς τε ἅμα καὶ νόμων, diversa confudisse videatur, sc. τὸ μετέχειν ἅμα τούτου καὶ ἐκείνου, et τὸ μεταξύ τούτου καὶ ἐκείνου πεφυκέναι. Satis patere arbitror verborum ordinem a scribis

turbatum parum feliciter a correctore aliquo constitutum esse. Quid si sic legamus? κινδυνεύει γὰρ δὴ νομοθέτῃ τὸ προσταττόμενον ἕτερόν τι μείζον εἶναι τοῦ τοὺς νόμους θέντα ἀπηλλάχθαι, ἅμα δ' εἶναι μεταξύ τι νουθετήσεώς τε πεφυκὸς καὶ νόμων.

Ibid. ε. οἷον περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παίδων τροφήν· οὐ γὰρ ζητά φαμεν εἶναι, λέγοντές τε αὐτὰ ὡς νόμους οἶσθαι τιθεμένους εἶναι πολλῆς ἀνοίας γέμειν. Non ζητά sed ἄρρητα desiderari vidit C. F. Hermannus, sed non vidit id ipsum leviter corruptum in omnibus libris haberi. Post λόγοις plenius interpungendum est, legendumque οἷον (τὰ) περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παίδων τροφήν οὐτ' ἄρρητά φαμεν (δεῖν) εἶναι, λέγοντές τ' αὐτὰ νόμους οἶσθαι τιθέναι πολλῆς (αὖν) ἀνοίας γέμειν.

Ibid. ε. Δελε αὐτόν τις. Structura est οὐ τέλος ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅταν φῇ τὸν ὑπερετήσαντα κ. τ. εἰ. Mox quod εἴ præbet ad sensum loci necessarium est. ὡς ἄρα ὃς ἂν τοῖς τοῦ (νομοθέτου) νομοθετοῦντός τε καὶ ἐπαινοῦντος καὶ ψέγοντος πειθόμενος γραμμασι διεξέλθῃ τὸν βίον ἄκρατον. οὗτος ὃ τε λόγος ὀρθότατος—Locum hucusque descripsi ut mancā esse sententiam ostenderem. “Quicumque non modo legibus verum etiam præceptis consiliisque legum latoris vitam regit”—quid tum? Inapte autem dicitur βίος ἄκρατος, et conjunctio sic posita οὗτος ὃ τε λόγος neminem non offendat. Scripsit Plato: ἀκρότατος οὗτος. ὃ τε λόγος κ. τ. εἰ. Horum partem video jam a Winckelmanno occupatam. Mox post μόνον dele γράφειν.

823, β. Jampridem monui legendum: οἷον μάρτυρα ἐπαγόμενοι δηλοῖμεν ἂν ὃ βουλόμεθα μᾶλλον.

Ibid. β. Locum sic interpungi et corrigi velim: πάμπαν δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ περὶ θηρεύματα [, οὐ μόνον θηρίων]. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄξιον ἐννοεῖν θήραν, τὴν τε κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ κλωπεῖαν καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων. πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ φίλαν—Vulgo hæc per amicitiam venatio, in qua procul dubio rem amatoriam, atque omnem suadendi artem et omnia blanditiarum genera includi volebat, inter τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον θήραν atque hujus exempla media interposita est; ipsa autem verba sic corrupta sunt: καὶ κλωπεῖαι καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων στρατοπέδοις θῆραι. Quem nostra reponit correctio chiasmum librarius parum intellexit.

Ibid. c. Transpone sic: καὶ μετὰ ζημίας νομοθετηθέντων.

Ibid. ε. Lege διαπονουμένης . . alioquin nec erit quo τῆς referri

possit, et dativi illi ἔγρηγορόσι, εὐδουσι, prorsus ἀσύντακτοι erunt. Ordo est, τῆς διαπονουμένης κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν τῶν ἐνύδρων ζώων, μήτε ἔγρηγορόσι μήτε εὐδουσι. Mox incredibile est quemquam in verbis μηδ' εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον ἐπέλθοι νοῦν hæsisse. Qui tot ineptias invito Platoni obtrusas defendunt, simul atque Plato ipse in notissimo proverbio jocari cœpit, statim nauseant, et cum procellis jactu decidere parant.

824, A. Lege: ἡ τὸν δι' ἀναπαύματα πόνον ἔχουσα. Mox pro ὁ διειρημένος lege ὃδ' ὁ εἰρημένος. Pro ἐν ἐργασίμοις δὲ καὶ ἱεροῖς ἀγίοις suspicor olim lectum esse ἐν ἐργ. καὶ ἀγίοις, quod ultimum nescio quis per ἱεροῖς interpretatus est. Melius fecisset, si in ΑΓΙΟΙC veram lectionem ΑΓΡΟΙC latere admonuisset. In Α et Ω dittographia ex proba et mala lectione conflata servatur ΑΓ(P)ΙΟΙC.

I had hoped to wander through two or three more Books with you, picking up specimens of palæography and discoursing on them as we went. But from this egotistical design you and all others are delivered for the present by the peculiar character of this ἀντίχθων; which, though we are not quite so remote as Philolaus would place us, holds too scanty a communication with you to satisfy a garrulous correspondent, and forces me, if I would see this in print before the end of this year, to address it forthwith to the European Publisher. With heartiest respect and affection,

Believe me,

Yours ever,

CHARLES BADHAM.

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY,  
FEBRUARY, 1877.

#### CORRIGENDA.

P. VI last line. *For me: read we.*  
 „ IX 9th „ *After τούτω add (i.e. τῷ σχήματι).*  
 „ XIII 26th „ *For became: read become.*  
 „ XVI 6th „ *from bottom. For κελεύσις: read κελεύεις.*

# PLATONIS PHILEBUS

WITH

INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

---







## INTRODUCTION.

---

THE aim of this noble Dialogue is to ascertain the relation of Pleasure and of Intellect to the absolute Good.

The form of the inquiry is a controversy between Socrates and two young Athenians named Philebus and Protarchus. The latter, espousing the cause which his friend had first taken up, and then through laziness abandoned, affirms that pleasure, using the word in its largest sense, is entitled to the name of *good*; to which Socrates advances an opposite claim on behalf of intellect, knowledge, and all kindred species; observing that, if it should prove that some third competitor showed a better title than either of the original claimants, then, whichever of the two should be found most akin to the successful candidate would be entitled to the *second* prize.

Protarchus is then reminded of the great variety and discrepancy in the kinds of pleasure, and is invited to show what common nature there is in all these, over and above their being *pleasant*, which nobody disputes, in virtue of which he calls them all pleasures. In reply, he denies that there is any variety or discrepancy between them, *in so far as they are pleasures*. Socrates shows the fallacy of his argument, and points out that this reliance upon the identity implied by a common name, as if it excluded all diversity, would put an end to all reasoning. This leads to the mention of the great problem about Identity and Diversity, the delight of young arguers and the terror of quiet, respectable people, the argument of *ὅν καὶ πολλὰ*.\* The contradiction between the individual as *one* in nature, and yet *many* in his many changes of circumstance, and that between the Whole as *one* and

\* The bearing of this discussion on the main subject is twofold. The importance of the *τέρας* in dialectics is a suitable introduction to the part which it is to play in physics; and the necessity of the careful division of pleasure under its several heads is shown beforehand.

the Parts as *many*, are touched upon; but Socrates affirms that, though men now look upon these paradoxes as childish and sophistical, there exist other forms of the contradiction which are really important. For, if we consider any genus as one in itself, and then again observe that the representatives of it are many and unlimited, it is difficult to conceive how this One, at the same time that it remains one in itself, is yet one in all the individuals and in each of them. This contradiction is the inherent and unchangeable property of *all* objects of reasoning; but though as such we cannot remove it, there is a remedy provided against its practical difficulty. For, while all things are constituted out of the One and the Many, they have, associated in their constitution, the Limit and the Indefinite. We must therefore, in all objects of inquiry, accepting this natural constitution, begin by taking a unit, which we are sure to find if we look for it; from this we must proceed to the next definite number supplied by the object itself in its own natural divisions, and so, continually advancing through all subordinate divisions, proceed till we arrive at the point where the limit (or given numbers) ceases, and the unlimited begins. This process from the one to the indefinite by means of *number*, or the contrary process from the indefinite to the one, is the gift of the Gods, the true dialectical method, the origin of all discovery, and the opposite of that sophistical manner which passes *per saltum* from either extreme to the other. Socrates beautifully exemplifies this position by language, music, metre, and the art of writing; and proposes that the rival claimants, pleasure and intellect, should be subjected to the same method of scrutiny.

But finding that Protarchus is scared by the difficulty of the undertaking, he professes to remember a shorter solution of the problem before them, by which it can be shown that neither competitor can hope for the *first* prize. It lies in the very conception of the Good that it should be *perfect* and *self-sufficient*. But, if we take either pleasure or intellect in absolute isolation from each other, they are alike imperfect and insufficient; for no one would accept pleasure alone as all in all, if he had no memory, no consciousness, no faculty by which he could be cognisant of the pleasure enjoyed: nor would any one accept a life of mere intellect without at least some admixture of

pleasurable feeling. To either of these states of being, all men would certainly prefer *a combination of the two*; therefore each has failed in its pretensions to be the absolute Good. But which comes the nearest to the mark? That which has most right to be considered either itself the Cause of the Combination, or at least as having most affinity with that Cause. Thus we are led to inquire into the nature of combination itself, and the laws which govern it.

Now it has already been said, that the Limit and the Indefinite\* are the elements out of which all things are compounded; these, therefore, will be the first two *γένη* or kinds which we must consider; the Combination of these two will be the third kind, and the Cause which effects their union, the fourth.

Every quality of matter considered in its abstraction, extends indefinitely in the direction of two opposites, as in the instances of moister and drier†, hotter and colder, &c. The attempt to limit it at once dissolves the abstraction, because it fixes to a point that which is only conceivable as continually capable of *more* and *less*. All things which thus admit of more and less are comprehended in one *ἰδέα*, and receive the name of the Indefinite, *τὸ ἄπειρον*. The opposites of these are the things which effect equality and proportion, and these are classed under the name of the Limit, *τὸ πέρας*‡ or *περατοειδές*. The examples of this kind are *all definite numbers* whatever and their relations to each other, but they can be more easily seen at the same time with the third kind, that is to say, in Combinations of *τὸ ἄπειρον* and *τὸ πέρας*. In music, bodily health and strength and beauty, the temperature of the seasons, and above all, in the instance of pleasure, which would be absorbed in its own indefinite cravings, but for the imposition of law and order to limit and preserve it,—

\* This doctrine Plato is said to have borrowed from the Pythagorean Philolaus, who, through extreme poverty, consented to sell him the book in which he had embodied the tenets of his sect.—See Diog. Laert. in *Philolaus*, and the Extract from Böckh's *Philolaus* in the Appendix.

† The comparatives of all such words are used by Plato because the positive might be misunderstood as implying a ποσόν, or definite quantity, or proportion; but afterwards, he uses the positive, 'Ἐν δ' ὅτι καὶ βαρεὶ καὶ ταχεὶ καὶ βραδεὶ, ἀπείροις οὖσιν. (26, A.)

‡ Πέρας is properly the ἰδέα, or that according to which they are one, and περατοειδές, the γένος: τὰ περατοειδῆ again would be the γένηα, which we must not confound with γένος, as Ast and others have done, but which is the multitude contained in the γένος, its numerous specimens.

in all such instances, where *qualities* are blended with definite *proportion*, we see at once the second element of the combination, and the result of that Combination as manifested in some *γένεσις*. In the fourth place there must be a Cause of such combinations; for that which *is made* cannot be the same as that which *makes*, but must always be subsequent to it. Therefore we may consider the first three kinds to be (1) (2) the elements\* of natural things, and (3) the natural things themselves; but the fourth kind is that which operates with these and upon them.

The question then arises: To which of these four kinds does the Mixed Life of pleasure and intellect bear most resemblance? It is decided that it resembles most the third kind or the Combination. Pleasure again seems most akin to the Indefinite.

The kind which answers to Intellect is not so evident, and Socrates warns his friend against any rashness in the decision, as touching upon impiety. The gay Philebus laughs at his scruples, but Protarchus has more reverence, and is so awe-struck by Socrates' manner, that he is afraid to make any conjecture. Then Socrates declares that his own solemnity was all in sport, and that it is no wonder if philosophers are so ready to pay themselves a compliment, in declaring Intellect to be the King of the Universe; but that it is worth while to see what right it has to the designation. Protarchus is then asked to choose between two opinions; one that the universe is subject to chance and blind caprice, and the other, that it is governed by intellect and mind. He unhesitatingly chooses the latter. But, argues Socrates, in this universe there are the same elements which we find also in the constitution of our own bodies, only that here they occur small in quantity and poor in quality, while in the universe they are abundant and wondrous. Now, the terrestrial elements must have been derived from the universal ones, the earthly body from the body of the universe: but our body has a *mind* which

\* Socrates speaks also presently (29, A) of the Four Elements, as they are called, which are as old as Empedocles, and probably much older. But the elements with which we are here concerned are elements in a different sense. They are not matter, nor even properties of matter, but the *ἄπειρον* is the condition of all the properties of matter, and of number itself, till controlled by *πέρας*. Though the Pythagoreans held *ἀριθμός* to be the condition of existence and the ground of knowledge; this its virtue was derived from the decad, that is from proportion, for the decad contained every kind of proportion. Indefinite number, *ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς*, was reckoned among the *ἄπειρα*.

it must have also derived from the same source; for if we men have a mind, much more must the universe, possessing as it does all that we possess, only in greater perfection, have one also: and if it is in virtue of the fourth of our kinds, viz. Cause, working through the human mind, that that mind gains credit for skill and wisdom (as when, for instance, it trains the body to health and repairs its disorders), much more must the heavens and the order of nature be recognised as effects of the same Cause, operating therein on a grander scale and through a nobler and purer mind. It follows from this, that the Cause which is the chief of the four kinds, will be supreme in heaven and in earth, being the essence of the mind and of the soul of Zeus himself.\* The result of this inquiry is to establish that Intellect rules over all things, and that *our* intellect is therefore also akin to the fourth or highest of the kinds.

The next step is to consider Pleasure and Intellect not abstractedly, but as they are, and to enquire how they arise in living creatures.

The first kind of Pleasure noted is that which arises when the constituent elements of the creature tend towards *Harmony*; but, when that harmony is more or less dissolved, pain is the consequence. This is illustrated by hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, in all which there is a tendency to some loss or dissolution, which is pain, and in the relief of which there is a return to natural completeness, which return is pleasure. A second kind of pleasure (and pain) is in *Expectation*: this kind belongs to the mind alone, without the body participating in it.

These two classes are considered sufficient for the present purpose, and another observation is added, of which Protarchus is told that he will see the importance further on. It is, that there must be an *intermediate state* of the body, when it is tending neither towards completeness nor dissolution of any part; when this state prevails, there can be neither pleasure nor pain. Such a state is quite compatible with a life of mere intellect; it is also such a life as we may conceive the gods to possess.†

\* That is, of the highest mundane divinity. The argument is, that αἰτία ἐν τῷ ἔλῳ is the highest of all the four kinds; but αἰτία is νοῦς, and νοῦς is inseparable from ψυχή; consequently, αἰτία is the ground of the highest νοῦς and ψυχή, i. e., that of Ζεὺς.

† Page 33, B. The sense I have given here is not very clearly expressed  
Platonis Philebus.

This, therefore, is another point to be scored in favour of *voûs* in its competition for the second prize.

It is in the second kind of Pleasure, that which springs from Expectation and belongs to the mind, that the nature of pleasure and its relation to *voûs* become most apparent. Expectation of pleasure must depend upon Memory (that is, not recollection, but the state which is the necessary condition of recollection), and this memory presupposes Sensation. If the body alone is affected, and the movement does not reach to the mind, there is no sensation and no memory. In addition to sensation, which is the common movement of body and mind, and memory, which is the preservation of sensation, we must also notice Recollection, which is the rehearsal by the mind alone of the sensations which it formerly experienced in common with the body; and lastly, Desire. For desire also is a property of the mind and not of the body, as may be shown thus: We desire the opposite of that which we feel; but desire implies memory of the thing desired; for all our relations to things desirable must be either through sensation or through memory: but sensation is occupied with the present state, whereas desire yearns for the opposite of the present state;\* therefore, it must be through memory that desire is brought into relation with the thing desired; and hence it follows that desire belongs not to the body but to the mind.

A third state of pleasure (and pain) is, when, whilst the body suffers through a present void, the mind is conscious of a former satisfaction; in such a case, if there is hope of attaining the desired satisfaction, the memory of it affords a pleasure simultaneous with the bodily pain; but if there be no hope, then there is a double pain: a present void in the body, and a consciousness in the mind that the satisfaction is unattainable.

The great importance of this observation is, that it will enable us to answer a question, without settling which we cannot hope to bring the controversy to an issue: Are there *False Pleasures*?

Protarchus denies this, and affirms that *beliefs*† may be true

in the original as it stands in the Editions: it would come out much more forcibly by the very slight change of *γε* into *τε*. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ *τε* ὑπάρχοι, καὶ ἔσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ Ζησίτατος.

\* The same argument is used by Socrates in the *Convivium*.

† I have rendered *δόξα* in this manner; it is on the whole a handier word than *impressions*, but is to be taken in the sense of that word as popularly used.

or false, but that *pleasures* are all true. And yet, says Socrates, we speak of the pleasures of dreams or of madness as false. And if it be objected that pleasure is still pleasure though the ground of it may be false, surely the same may be said of beliefs also. If again it should be said that, in such a case, the belief is false though real, but the pleasure is true as well as real, this must be shown to arise from some peculiarity in the nature of pleasure which differentiates it from belief. But we do not find any such; for both alike admit of all other qualities, such as great and small, and good and bad. There are also correct and mistaken pleasures following on correct and mistaken beliefs. And here it is worth while to consider the nature of these δόξαι in general. What we believe, results from a comparison of that which we see or feel with that which we remember. This result we record either to ourselves or to others. Now, suppose the former case: then a man carries the record about with him; and it may be said to be written on his mind. Besides this power which writes impressions upon us, there is another which paints them; that is the power by which we recall to the fancy the very images which we formerly beheld with our eyes; and when the beliefs are false, these images will be false also. Among these written and painted records there will be some which have reference to future time, and these are called *Hopes*. The good man will have true hopes and true images of the future, and the bad will have false ones. But these images are *pleasures*, for it was before admitted that some pleasures arose from expectation; consequently, there are false pleasures, which bad men have, and which are the caricatures of the true pleasures of good men. Having established this analogy between δόξα and pleasure, Socrates argues that, as only those δόξαι, which do not answer to things past or present or future, but are false, are admitted to be *bad*, so those pleasures only, which are false, are bad also. Protarchus objects to this, that the badness of pleasures has very little to do with their falsehood; but Socrates defers his answer to a later stage in the controversy, and proceeds to another and stronger proof of the possibility of the falsehood of pleasure. When the body is in pleasure, and the mind at the same time is apprehensive of pain, or the body is in pain and the mind anticipating pleasure, the simultaneous presence of pleasure and pain will produce a similar



effect to the illusion of the eyes when they attribute greater size to near objects and less to those more distant. For the *immediate* pleasures or pains will seem greater than they are, in proportion to those expected; but that degree of pleasure or pain by which they exceed their real dimensions will be false, and cause a false belief: so that not only false beliefs cause false pleasures and pains, but false pleasures and pains cause false beliefs also. The strongest example of falsehood in pleasure is that which is next adduced. If we suppose a state in which there is no change either towards satisfaction or dissolution; such a state will be one devoid both of pleasure and pain. Now it is true that they who maintain the doctrine of a perpetual flux\* deny the possibility of such a motionless state; but it will be enough to suppose that the motion or change is not great enough to reach the sense and the mind; and that there is such a condition nobody will deny. If a man in this state should say that he has pleasure, he would say what is false, and the pleasure which he speaks of would be false. But this is the very thing which happens when a man is relieved from pain without the acquisition of pleasure, and calls this negative state by the name of pleasure; for this supposed pleasure is false, since that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot *come to be* truly either. But there is another set of teachers,† who tell us that these things which we have been considering as three, are in fact only two; that pleasure is a mere illusion, and is nothing more than the removal of pain. Though we shall find reasons for disagreeing with them, they have something to teach us. For if we would judge rightly of pleasure, we must take in view the *highest degree* of it. Now the highest degree of pleasure is that which follows the gratification of the strongest desires; but it is in morbid conditions of the body that the strongest desires arise. Upon this, Socrates enters into a painfully vivid description of the mingled sensations which are produced by the application of relief to an itching surface or an inward irritation, and of the intense pleasure alternating with pain which men in these cases experience. In all such instances the pain is the condition of the pleasure; and these may be

\* The schools of Heraclitus and Protagoras. *Theætet.* 152, 180. *Sophist.* 146.

† Antisthenes and the Cynics. A saying is attributed to Antisthenes, *μαλὸν ἢ ἡσυχίαν*. *Diog. Laert.* 6, 8.

classed with the former examples where the body and the mind were differently affected, either mingling its pleasure with the pain of the other. Then again, the mind by itself has pleasures inseparable from pains; for of this nature are all the passions. Such is the sweetness of anger, and the indulgence of violent grief, and the mimic sympathies with tragic heroes. Nay, in comedy also, the same principle is at work; for ridicule deals with that which is evil; e.g. the ignorant conceit of men about their wealth or their bodily perfections or their wisdom, is evil, and it is in such foibles that ridicule finds its objects. When, therefore, we laugh at our friend's ignorance, we have, it is true, pleasure, for laughter is a sign of pleasure; but we have also pain, for taking pleasure in a friend's evil is *φθόρος*; and *φθόρος* is unquestionably a pain of the mind. Thus we see that those stern despisers of pleasure are so far right, that there are many and intense kinds of enjoyment, which owe their very intensity to the pain with which they are connected.

But then there are other species of pleasure which this School has overlooked: *pure pleasures* not resulting from any previous perceptible want, such as those of Sight, when it has for its objects beautiful outline or beautiful colour, unassociated with desire; those of Hearing, when they are of the same kind, and those of Smelling. (It is remarkable that Touch and Taste are excluded from this list.) And lastly, there are the Intellectual pleasures, which are not preceded by any painful want, and the loss of which is not followed by any sense of void.

Such being the Impure and the Pure pleasures respectively, which are most truly pleasures? As a little *White*, if perfectly unmixed, is more truly white than ever so great a quantity having the admixture of some other colour, so pure and unmixed pleasure, however small, is more truly pleasure than a mixed kind, however great. Consequently, when we come to the comparison of pleasure and intellect (in order to determine which of the two is the *predominant* element in that Mixed Life, which was found to be better than either of them alone), we shall have to remember that the *pure* pleasure is the true kind, and, therefore, that by which we must make our judgment.

But before the judgment commences, Socrates proposes two more reflexions concerning pleasure. All things may be divided into

two classes; that which exists for the sake of something else, and that for the sake of which something else exists. The former will include *γένεσις*, temporal existence, that which *is ever becoming*; the latter, *οὐσία*, eternal being, that which *is*; indeed, the entire former class exists for the sake of the latter. But whereas the Good must be that for the sake of which other things exist, pleasure, we are told by certain ingenious men,\* is a *γένεσις*; and if so, it will be in the *opposite* class to that of the Good. And again, if pleasure be a *γένεσις*, they who make it their good, and pursue it, are most irrational; for they pursue also the state opposite to pleasure, that of want or desire, on the relief of which the generation of pleasure depends; but if pleasure be a *genesis* or production, its opposite is a corruption; so that those who choose pleasure as the Good, choose generation and corruption rather than pure being.

There are also many other absurdities following on the supposition that pleasure is the Good, but the greatest, and indeed the sum of them all, is that, if it were so, a man would be good in proportion to the pleasure of which he partook, and bad in the opposite proportion.

The next step is, to subject *νοῦς* and *ἐπιστήμη* to the same process, and to ascertain if here too we shall find purer and impurer sorts. Science is divided into the Productive and the Instructive. In the former class, some branches are more immediately associated with mathematical science, and others are content, to a great degree, with mere guesswork and practical skill. Such a difference marks some as more, and others as less, pure. But the mathematical sciences themselves may be viewed either as they are conversant with absolute properties of figure and number, or as dealing with figures and numbers in the concrete; so that we may say there is a twofold arithmetic and a twofold geometry; and so in like manner of other mathematical sciences, of which the one branch is pure, the other impure. But the pure science above all others, is Dialectic; for it is that which has for its object the absolute, invariable, and eternal, and which therefore seeks after the truest of all knowledge. Other sciences may be more immediately useful or imposing, but this is more truly science than all

\* Trendelenburg gives it as his opinion that Aristippus is here meant.

others; for whereas they depend on opinions, and are busied about mere phenomenal existence, Dialectic deals with immutable realities.

Having now determined the Pure and Impure both of Pleasures and of Sciences, we are ready to blend them so as to effect that combination of which the Mixed Life consisted. But which shall we use? To begin with intellect and knowledge, shall only the purer sorts enter into the combination? If it were so, there would be an end to all practical life, which is obliged to content itself with the imperfect and impure sciences. Therefore we are compelled to admit into the combination *both* sorts of intellect and knowledge. Shall we do the same with pleasure? Certainly not; for while the pleasures themselves would desire an union with intellect, as that which should give to them a meaning which they have not in themselves, intellect would reject all impure and tumultuous delights, as hindering its efforts and stifling its productions; but with the temperate and healthful pleasures, and such as walk in the train of virtue, as priestesses in the procession of some deity, with these it is willing to have fellowship.

Having, then, the elements of the mixture, it remains for us to enquire according to what law they must be combined. Now, first, no combination can be worth anything which is not a *true* blending: *Truth*, therefore, is a necessary condition; and if it is a condition of combination, and the Good is a result of combination, we must look for the Good in Truth. Again, no mixture can be successful which is without *Measure*; on measure and proportion all combination depends, and in these, therefore, likewise the Good must abide. Lastly, the effect of measure and proportion is *Beauty* and symmetry; and thus we conclude that herein also the Good is to be found.

And now, having not indeed a perfect comprehension of the Good,\* but a knowledge of the three shapes in which it manifests itself, we may endeavour to decide the question, which of the two, Pleasure or Intellect, is most akin to it. This is easily determined, for pleasure is false and fickle, but intellect is either the same as Truth or the nearest akin to it: pleasure is in its own nature immoderate, but intellect and knowledge depend upon Measure: pleasure has so little claim to Beauty, that it often

\* Which Plato thought unattainable. See *Republic*, vi. 508, 509.

shuns the light, and its expression is always unseemly, but intellect is a stranger to all that is not comely and decent.

Upon arriving at this conclusion of the whole argument, Socrates delivers the joint decision of the disputants in these words: *Πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρωταρχε, ὑπὸ τ' ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμ' οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῇ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν αἰδίδιον ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν.* (66, A.)

We shall presently have to consider the exact reading and interpretation of these words; it is sufficient for the summary of the Dialogue which I have attempted to give, if we gather from them that Measure and things partaking of the nature of measure are declared to be the nearest approach to the Good. Next to this, and in the second place, Socrates places the Beautiful, the Symmetrical, the Self-sufficient and Perfect; the third place is given to Intellect and Thought; the fourth to the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs; and the fifth to the Purer Pleasures. The Dialogue concludes with a short recapitulation, and a noble warning, in forming our judgment of pleasure, not to rely, as the meaner soothsayers do, on the teaching of irrational natures, but on the oracles of the philosophic Muse.

---

Of the difficulties presented by this Dialogue none is so important, and at the same time so perplexing, as the assignment of places to the five different Classes.

The classification proposed by Ast needs only to be stated for any attentive reader to see that it is perfectly irreconcilable with the words of Plato, and with the whole tenor of the argument. He arranges them thus:—1. The Definite, which is the *νοῦς βασιλεύς*, the controlling and arranging principle of the world; 2. The Indefinite, which is the material substratum on which the supreme intelligence is exercised; 3. The Real Synthesis of the two former, the Pythagorean *κόσμος*; 4. The Ideal Synthesis, the human intelligence as the reflex of the divine; 5. Pleasure. Nothing, as Trendelenburg observes, can be more remote from the terms *σύμμετρον* and *καλόν*, than the formless and discordant elements of matter; nor are *νοῦς* and *φρόνησις* capable of being understood as the world of beauty and harmony, the living work of the supreme mind. Such manifest violence to the plain words

of the author can only be accounted for by the desire of making a system for Plato, and the vain notion of helping out his supposed imperfect strivings after a regular gradation from the most absolute intellectual to the most sensual.

Schleiermacher proceeded on a much more reverent and a sounder principle. It seemed to him very remarkable that the two competitors whose relative claims the whole Dialogue is occupied in discussing, should appear at the final award not as second and third, but as fourth and fifth. How could the introduction of these new claimants be accounted for? His answer is, that we must look for the explanation to those treatises to which the *Philebus* is intended to be subordinate and introductory, the *Timæus* and the *Republic*. As in the former Plato proposed to give an account of the constitution of the world, and in the latter, that of human society, he prepares us for both by intimating that in the gradation of Good that which is universal must be placed before that which concerns men in particular. He accounts for the third place only being assigned to *νοῦς* and *φρόνησις* by observing that it is not the *divine* mind which is here intended, but that mind, which is itself an element in the Mixture. This mind, according to him, is the *truth* spoken of above as one of the three conditions of combination. 'For the mind is the sole home of Truth, which first gives a reality to things, and it occupies therefore, as a kind of mediator, a middle place between the universal generated good, and the particular good of man.' Few readers will be satisfied with an explanation which accounts for the introduction of new and important matter into the very conclusion of an argument, by supposing an anticipation of what is to be said elsewhere. There is an end to the unity of the Dialogue, and, indeed, to all the laws of disputation, if we are suddenly to be informed of some most important doctrines, as to the proof of which we are left to guess (for no promise of the kind is held out) that it may be forthcoming on a future occasion. But the distribution of Schleiermacher is likewise so far unsatisfactory, that he does not explain in what respect the second class differs from the first. I cannot however assent to Trendelenburg's objection to his view of the third class, that the mind which gives reality to things is the *Supreme Mind*, and consequently can have nothing to do with the *νοῦς*

and φρόνησις, which are ingredients in the Mixture. For it is evident that the meaning of Schleiermacher is, that the mind here spoken of *gives to us* a sense of the reality of things, and is therefore convertible with ἀλήθεια, and is thus a fit intermediate between the Universe and Man. But this question will be better discussed when we have examined Trendelenburg's own classification.

Trendelenburg himself understands the μέτρον καὶ μέτριον κ. τ. ε. to include all the three conditions of combination; for, according to his view, the first class contains the absolute Idea of Good and all those Ideas which are connected with it; and the second differs from the first, as being the realisation of these same Ideas in the Universe. But it is unaccountable why Plato, if he had intended the καλόν and ἀλήθεια to occur twice in his enumeration, should have suppressed the latter altogether, and mentioned the former only in its secondary phasis; and altogether it is a strange way of indicating *the same things*, to designate them, first as absolute, and then as manifested in forms, by a perfectly distinct set of names. But the whole hypothesis rests on a translation which the words above quoted will not bear: "*et quidquid ejusmodi æternam naturam suscepisse credendum est.*" In the first place, ὅποσα χρη τοιαῦτα νομίζειν κ. τ. ε. cannot be taken so: for this would be expressed by ὅποσα, τοιαῦτ' ὄντα, χρη νομίζειν,—and though the order might be changed, the participle would still be indispensable.\* But even if we conceded such an interpretation, what would become of πρῶτον μὲν πη περὶ μέτρον? It is obvious that, in such a case, περὶ has neither meaning nor construction. But, above all, such an expression as "to have adopted (or received) the eternal nature," is at variance with the whole method of Plato. For if the Good is to be sought for in these things, it must be because they are emanations or productions of it; whereas, according to this view, the Good is *superadded* to them, and that through their seeking it. But no one conversant with the language will understand ἡρῆσθαι in the sense of παρεκλιπέναι, or still less of

\* The order has been changed, and most injuriously to the sense, on the authority of the Bodleian MS., from τοιαῦτα χρη το χρῆ τοιαῦτα. Χρη νομίζειν is plain enough when used of some conclusion, which, but for the argument, disputants would not have admitted. But what force or even sense is there in saying, 'all such things as we are bound to believe to have taken upon themselves the eternal nature?' It is therefore evident that we must read ὅποσα τοιαῦτα, and understand ἐστίν.

ελληγέναι. And then, again, why have we the perfect? In speaking of a fact which has no reference to any particular time, the only proper tense would have been *ἔλεσθαι*. Those who feel these objections will not need to have them confirmed by a consideration of the unsuitableness of the sense thus extorted from them; and yet the sense is in itself very objectionable, because it would amount to this,—that Plato having sought, by a laborious argument, for that which had most affinity with the Good, at last found it—in the Idea of the Good! The continual allusions to this *search*, finding its neighbourhood, coming to its threshold, its taking refuge with the Beautiful and the like, all point to the true reading of the passage, which, by the slight change of 'HIP into 'HYP, removes all the objections alleged above.\* It will not be necessary to do more than point out the other misconceptions on which Trendelenburg's explanations are built, viz. the supposed opposition between *ἡρῆσθαι* and *γενεᾶς*, which is annihilated by the particle *αὖ*, which shows that *another* kind is spoken of; and the notion that the third kind is the Idea considered subjectively, the Idea in so far as it is the ground of human knowledge. Surely if the Idea is not just this and nothing else, it is a mere abstraction, and Plato would not bid us look for the Good in *that*.

Stallbaum's view will be at once understood from the classification with which he accompanies that of Plato. 1. τὸ αἴτιον. 2. τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον. 3. τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ πέρας. 4. τὸ καθαρόν πέρας. 5. τὸ καθαρόν ἄπειρον. Those who look for realities in Plato, and who believe that Plato looked for them himself, will never be brought to admit that his own desire—*μαθεῖν πειραῖσθαι τί ποτ' ἐν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τίς ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον* (64, Δ) could be satisfied with a barren dialectic scheme, or that he would offer such a result to his readers. There is not a single hint (and we know how fond Plato is of hints) to show that he any longer dwells upon the fourfold division of *γένη*, propounded before. Nor does the classification of Stallbaum at all tally with that of Plato; for *τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτα* is such a way of expressing the Idea of the Good (which Stallbaum rightly looks

\* For a further discussion of this point see Notes on the Text.



upon as synonymous with *αἰτία*)\* as nobody would ever have thought of, unless he had been predetermined by some theory to find that meaning in the words: and this remark applies to many other interpreters of the passage under consideration.† As to the second class,—τὸ *ἑνμισηγόμενον* is, doubtless, equivalent to τὰ ὄντα; but I deny that τὰ ὄντα are intended, or could be conveyed, by such a periphrasis as τὸ *σύμμετρον καὶ καλόν, καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἱκανόν, καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐτῆς ἐστίν*. The only observation that need be made as to the third class, is, that it is a confusion in place of a division. The *νοῦς* which is *αἰτία*, (A), may be considered as *πέρας*, that is, the absolute Mind may be thought of only as contemplating its own Ideas. And, again, the *νοῦς* which is *πέρας*, (B), may be considered as so far *αἰτία*, that it imitates the productions of the *νοῦς* which is *αἰτία*. But B is identical with the fourth class, or *ἐπιστῆμαι*, and A is liable to the same objection as Trendelenburg's explanation; namely, that such a view supposes us to look for the Good in that which is no *thing*, but the mere common name or property of two things.

I will now venture to offer my own solution of these difficulties.

The Good which appeared most suitable for *man* was found in the combination of two *human* conditions. It is reasonable, then, to expect that in combination *universally* we approach most nearly to the *universal* Good; but combination depends upon three things—Measure, Beauty, Truth: and wherever we trace these, the Good cannot be far off. Now, we trace Measure in τὸ μέτρον, τὸ καίριον, and all that evinces adaptation of *one to another*; Beauty in τὸ καλόν, τὸ ἱκανόν, τὸ τέλειον, and all that is complete and harmonious *in itself*; Truth (subjective) in the *νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις* of man, as that wherein the real is distinguished from the seeming, and the eternal from the accidental: *νοῦς δ' ἦτοι ταῦτόν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν, ἣ πάντων ὁμοιότατον*. (65, D.) But why do the three occur in this order? Not because there is any superiority of *πρεσβεία* or *δύναμις* in any of them, as in the case of *τάγαθόν*, but because there is a difference between them as to priority

\* *Phæd.* 97, foll. *Tim.* 30. A. *Rep.* 508, foll. Nevertheless, I entirely agree with Trendelenburg, that *τάγαθόν* and *ὁ δημιουργός* were held by Plato to be quite distinct.

† The very multiplication of kindred adjectives is a proof that we are to find one object in many, not to contemplate an Idea in itself.

in thought, or because the sphere in which they are exhibited differs as to extent. Everything in the whole universe presents an example of τὸ μέτριον in some form or other; this, therefore, comes first. One of the results of this adaptation is the perfection of individual things as to beauty or use (τὸ ἱκανόν): and this, being a result and part of the former, is placed after it. The least comprehensive of the trio is Intellect and Thought; to these therefore, as the embodiment of Truth, (whence it is plain that the pure speculative faculty is meant) the third place is assigned. In the fourth place come the subordinates of νοῦς, viz. the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs. Nor are we unprepared for this division, since all along νοῦς has been used to express either the Divine Intelligence or the Human indifferently; whereas it is to the latter that, the practical faculties belong so that when the corresponding division to that of ἡδοναὶ had to be made, it was made not in νοῦς, which did not admit of it, but in the ἐπιστημαί. The Pure Pleasures will naturally come next in order.

It may be objected that something more than a greater extent of sphere is implied in the question in p. 64, c: *Τί δῆτ' ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἄμα καὶ μάλιστα' αἷτιον κ. τ. έ.* which is answered by naming τὸ μέτρον: with the further remark that from μέτρον κάλλος necessarily flows, so that the first would seem to be upheld as the antecedent condition, and the second as one of the effects of that condition. In like manner also it may be said that the third, which in the inquiry figures as ἀλήθεια, but in the declaration of the verdict is called νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις (a variation which is accounted for by the paragraph at the end of p. 63, 'Ο δέ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος κ. τ. έ.) is spoken of as necessary to the πράσις, only because, as had been formerly said, without Truth "no true mixture can be made, nor, being made, exist"; so that this also is inferior to the first, because, though it is a condition as the other is, it is one in the quality of the ingredients, and not lying in the very conception of all mixture.

But this mode of explanation does not help us when we come to enquire why ἀλήθεια is postponed to κάλλος; why, if Socrates had intended to bring these three as rival claimants into competition, and to assign them their places according to their comparative merits, he should have made that remarkable state-

ment at the beginning of p. 65, *Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μίαν δυνάμεθα ἰδέειν τὰγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σύντριψι κ. τ. ἔ.*; and lastly, why, in mentioning the three, which he does seven or eight times, he observes no order, but places any one of them indifferently in the middle or at either extreme of the series.

It must be remembered that the main object of enquiry is to ascertain the relative claims of Intellect and Pleasure to the name of Good, and that the question arising out of this is, not *What* is the Good, but *Where* is it? To such a question the first answer would naturally be *in Measure*, which is the largest sphere, (because Measure contains all things,) and in things according to Measure, which are in fact all things made conformably to the great pattern, the οὗ ἔνεκα, according to which the supreme αἰτία works. In brief, the wider and more populous region deserves the first mention in a question of dwelling-place, or place of manifestation, such as has here been the object of search. If we do not understand Plato thus, there is no other possible way of understanding him except as intending to tell us that mere Form is a better thing than Beauty, and Beauty than Reason, which is quite incredible.

This way of explaining the enumeration of the classes is very different from that which is given in an author quoted by Stobæus *Ecl. Eth.* ii. 6, 4, *Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνεται, ὅπερ ἐστὶ θεῖον καὶ χωριστόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐκ φρονησεως καὶ ἡδονῆς σύνθετον, ὅπερ ἐνίοις δοκεῖ κατ' αὐτὸ εἶναι τέλος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνου ζωῆς· τρίτον αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν φρόνησιν· τέταρτον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν σύνθετον· πέμπτον αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἡδονήν.* This division is expressly referred to the *Philebus*; but when we consider that the writer was himself making a system of Plato's definitions, and dividing them under the heads *τῷ γένει, τοῖς τόποις, τοῖς εἶδεσι*, we are prepared for a little straining of his author to suit his theory. The objections to this theory are the same as have been urged against Stallbaum, and may be summed up in this, that such a division is not reconcilable with the language of Plato. At the same time, I do not deny that Measure and all its cognates, are, according to Plato, the *nearest* approach to the Idea, nor that the κοινὸς βίος in its quality of *ἰκανόν* will come under the *second* denomination, in that it partakes of it; but in a discussion as to

what causes make a certain thing an object of choice, in ascertaining which, we find the Good, it is absurd to class the thing itself as one of the results of our search. Else indeed, it might be thought to have an equal right to the *first* place; but Plato seems to have confined this to the instances of *antecedent suitability*, or of the *modes of combination*, and to have reserved for the *second* those things which owe their own excellence to such combinations.

The parts in this Dialogue which are confessedly Pythagorean, namely the power of Number, the elementary and opposite properties of *τέρας* and *ἄνεργον*, and the distinction between Empirical and Mathematical knowledge as applied to music, could not be better illustrated than by setting before the reader the Extracts from Böckh's *Philolaus*, and the fragments of Philolaus himself, which bear upon these topics. These will be found in the Appendix. A few other Extracts from different authors are added in order to illustrate various matters touched upon in the course of the Dialogue.

For all other more or less certain information, such as the bearing of the Philebus on the rest of the Platonic doctrines, the date of its composition, its intrinsic value as a contribution to Moral Philosophy etc., I must leave the reader to those who profess to teach them; I have been content to confine myself to the task of endeavouring to understand what appeared on the face of the text, and of ascertaining as far as possible the very words of the author, unencumbered by the additions of ignorant men, and set free from the blunders of negligent transcribers. I have trusted no other MS. authority save that of the Bodleian in the first place, and of the Coislinian in the second. Where these guides have failed to satisfy me, I have endeavoured to constitute the text according to the principles of Criticism, without caring to suit the taste or to defer to the prejudices of any School. Much that I had spared, and even tried to defend, in a former Edition I now unhesitatingly condemn, whether I have seen my way to correcting it or not. I have known critics to be charged with making difficulties and fancying faults for the pleasure of displaying their ingenuity in conjecture. The charge shows a thorough ignorance of the very frame of mind in which a critical scholar is obliged to work: such an one well knows

that, if he durst so tamper with his own sense of truth, he would most certainly and speedily injure the one instrument on which he relies for success, his judgment. Others there are who treat all conjecturing as at best an effort of wit, and a pretty pastime. Such persons seem not to have considered that, if the *ᾄπειρον* of verbal criticism consists of changes of similar letters and compendia, transpositions, bracketings and indications of hiatus, the *πέρας* which is to bring these elements to a *γένεσις* is, not a dithyrambic ecstasy which exults in its own contortions and tosses about wildly whatever it picks up, but a cold, severe, watchful calculation of probabilities, which shuns all outbreaks of fancy as interruptions of its work. But why should any one try to expostulate with the gainsayers? Some of them are too ignorant of the language to see any faults, and therefore cannot see the use of corrections. And yet it is useless to tell them so, for they can count on the applause of the many hundred minds which they have perverted. Some have tried verbal criticism and failed; and hate the pursuit which would not gratify their vanity and yield them fame. Let us dismiss the former with:

*εὐδαιμονίζων ὄχλος ἐξέπληξέ σε.*

and the latter with:

*ἀπόλωλεν ἀλήθει', ἐπεὶ σὺ δυστυχεῖς;*

The only kind of observation to which I do not feel indifferent, is the imputation of having offered the corrections of others as my own. But this I anticipate by saying that I possess no edition of Plato later than that of Didot, and no Philological journal except the two series of the *Mnemosyne*. If any one has claims on aught that appears in this Book, let him give me the opportunity of righting him, and I shall be thankful for it.

---

# ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΡΧΟΣ, ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

p. 11  
Steph.

1. Ὅρα δὴ, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλίβου δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἐὰν Β μὴ σοι κατὰ νοῦν ἢ λεγόμενος. βούλει συγκεφαλαιωσώμεθ' ἐκότερον;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τοῦτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημ' ἐστὶ μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῦτων

[Πρώταρχε] The dialogue is supposed to commence at the moment when Socrates turns from Philebus to Protarchus. When the speaker changes his address from one person to another, or from several to some one or more out of the whole number, *ὃ* is often omitted before the vocative, as in *Parm.* 136 D; *Symp.* 216 A, 217 B; *Euthyd.* 296 E; *Prot.* 358 E, 359 A; *Phileb.* 12 A, 28 B. The same omission also takes place when the speaker is represented as calling in an especial manner on the attention of the person addressed; as in *Gorg.* 489 A, 521 A (where Callicles would fain let the conversation drop), *Symp.* 172 A, 175 A, 213 E; *Euthyd.* 293 D, 294 C, 295 D. In *Symp.* 173 E, if a second *ἑταῖρος* is speaking (which is probable on other grounds), the omission may be accounted for in the same manner. I confess that in *Phaedr.* 261 A, *Soph.* 220 D, 234 D, *Euthyd.* 300 A, the reason is not so evident: though in the first three instances there is a suspension of the argument, and an appeal to the person addressed.


ἀγαθόν] Not τὰγαθόν: for Philebus'

Platonis Philebus.

assertion is not represented as being one about The Good in itself, but merely this; that pleasure, and that which is akin to it, has a right to the name of good in its proper signification, which Socrates denies, while claiming the name for mind, knowledge and all things belonging to that class.

[τέρψιν] Why not τὴν τέρψιν? Probably because verbal forms of this kind have less of the nature of the noun than ἀρετή, δόξα, ἡδονή; and because, as denoting a process, and not a state, they cannot assume the article without being thereby confined to a particular instance.

μὴ ταῦτα] not ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, but ἀμείνω γίνεσθαι, which is equivalent to ἀμείνον εἶναι ταῦτα γίνεσθαι. I have no doubt that τῆς γ' ἡδονῆς is an interpolation. A still worse one is δυνατός, which was probably inserted to fill up a lacuna caused by the obliteration of the syllable ΤΟ. There is no way of avoiding an absurd repetition, but to make μετασχεῖν a new subject, and this cannot be done without the article.



αὐ ξυγγενῇ, δόξαν τ' ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, [τῆς γ' ἡδο-  
C νῆς] ἀμείνω καὶ λῶν γίγνεσθαι ξύμπτασιν, ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ  
μεταλαβεῖν· τὸ [δυνατοῖς] δὲ μετασχεῖν ὠφελιμώτατον ἀπάν-  
των εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὐσί τε καὶ ἐσομένοις. μὴν οὐχ οὕτω πως  
λέγομεν, ὦ Φίληβε, ἐκάτεροι;

ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν ἔν δοδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε,  
λόγον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπει-  
ρηκεν.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τὰληθές πη περαν-  
θῆναι;

D ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογησάμεθα καὶ τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἔξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀπο-  
φαίνειν τιν' ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον  
εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν. ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ  
φρονεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν ἄλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φανῇ; μὴν οὐκ,  
E ἂν μὲν ἡδονῇ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ξυγγενής, ἡττώμεθα μὲν ἀμφο-  
τεροι τοῦ ταύτην ἔχοντος βεβαίως βίον, κρατεῖ δ' ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς  
12 τοῦ τῆς φρονήσεως;

Δέχει] It is a fond fancy of one of the Editors that δέχεσθαι τὸ δοδόμενον is a proverb; and that the answer Ἀνάγκη is in allusion to this. In the passage quoted for the purpose (*Gorg.* 499, c) τὸ παρὸν εὐ ποιεῖν is the popular saying referred to. The oracle given to *Myscelus* δῶρον δ' ὅ τι δῶ τις ἐπαίνει, "be content with your portion" is quoted indeed by the Paroemio-graphers, but it is not alluded to here. I take this opportunity of restoring another proverbial saying to one of the so called Platonic Dialogues. (*Amatores* 134, b.) Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὦμην

τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν γινώσκω. Read καὶ νῦν γινώσκει. See *Laches* 196, D, and the Scholium thereon.

διάθεσιν] The place of this word and its redundancy, to say nothing of the technical character of the word itself, incline me to put καὶ διάθεσιν in brackets.

ταύτην ἔχοντος] The common reading is ταῦτα, which is explained as referring to τὸ κρείττω φανῆναι; but though ἔχειν might be used in such a sense, ἔχειν βεβαίως shows that a real possession is intended,—that is, the ἔξιν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς spoken of above.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικᾷ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἡδονήν, ἣ δ' ἡττᾷται; ταῦθ' οὕτως ὁμολογούμενά φατε, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ Φιλήβη; τί φῆς;

ΦΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾷν ἡδονὴν δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσει.

ΠΡΩ. Παραδούς, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κύριος εἴης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τοῦναντίον.

ΦΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιῶμαι καὶ μαρτύρομαι Β γυν αὐτὴν τὴν Θεόν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι τούτων γ' αὐτῶν συμμάχους ἂν εἴμεν, [ὡς ταῦτ' ἔλεγες ἃ λέγεις]. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἐξῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβου ἐκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ πειρώμεθα περαινέειν.

Nor again is it conceivable that Plato would indicate these by a neuter plural, or by any plural at all, since they are not really two things, but the same thing differently viewed. The confusion between the apostrophus and the compendium for *ἡν* is one of the commonest which occur in manuscripts. I have changed τὸν τ. φ. into τοῦ τ. φ. It is ridiculous to appeal to Greek Tragedy as a standard of prose syntax. The spurious passage in the Birds (v. 420) κρατεῖν ἂν ἢ τὸν ἐχθρὸν, is worthy of φιλοισιν ὠφελεῖν which follows it.

ἢ δ' ἡττᾷται] I formerly proposed τῆς δ' ἡττᾷται, but this would be almost as much a repetition as the other. Perhaps the redundancy is due to the construction with μὲν, which was wanted for the sake of emphasis.

δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξει] Unless we are prepared to suppose with Stallbaum that a certain climax is intended in these words, *'videtur, et vero etiam videtur'* we must believe τε to be indispensable, though 'all the MSS.' (that is, two independent sources, and the copies made from them) omit it.

αὐτὸς γνώσει] Literally, *yourself shall determine; you shall do as you please.* Gorgias 505, c. Σω. Εἴην· τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; μεταξύ τὸν λόγον κατα-

λύομεν; Κα. Αὐτὸς γνώσει. Eurip. Ion 1356 Πρωτ.: λαβὼν νυν αὐτὰ τὴν τεκνοῦσαν ἐκπύνει. Ἴων: Ἀσιὰδ' ἐπέλθε καὶ σὺν. Εὐρώπης ὦ βροῦς; Πρωτ.: γνώσει τὰς αὐτὸς.—for this is the true reading of that passage. See also *Thucyd.* Δ, 99, init. and *Xen. Hell.* v, 1. 34, where the men implicated in the bloodshed αὐτοὶ γνόντες ἀπὸ τῆς Κορίνθου.

ἀφοσιῶμαι] *I set myself free from the pollution; I disclaim all share in the guilt.* This was done by a variety of trifling formal acts, such as pretending to spit, &c., or by the use of certain words. Hence, in the later Greek writers, to do anything for form's sake and without serious purpose, is δρᾶν τι ὅσας χάριν or ὅσον ἀφοσιώσασθαι. In the Attic authors I know of no instance where the words are thus used without some accompanying notion of the discharge from a religious obligation or compliance with a religious ceremony.

[ὡς ταῦτ' ἔλεγες ἃ λέγεις] A most unnecessary addition after τούτων αὐτῶν, or rather a false gloss, for τούτων αὐτῶν means τῷ ἀφοσιώσασθαι σε καὶ μαρτύρασθαι τὴν θεόν.

ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ] A polite way of implying ἢ βίᾳ Φιλήβου.



ΣΩ. Πειρατέον, ἀπ' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς θεοῦ, ἣν ὁδ' Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσθαι φησι, τὸ δ' ἀληθέστατον αὐτῆς ὄνομα ἴδονην εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

C ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αἰεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματ' οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπη κείνη φίλον, ταύτην προσαγορεύω· τὴν δ' ἴδονην οἶδ' ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον, ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοπεῖν ἥτινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ἐν τι, μορφᾷ δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἴληφε καὶ τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίους ἀλλήλαις. ἰδὲ γάρ, ἴδεσθαι μὲν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντ' ἀνθρώπων, ἴδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονούντ' αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν· ἴδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν, ἴδεσθαι δ' αὖ τὸν φρονούντ' αὐτῷ φρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἴδονων ἑκατέρας πῶς ἂν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνεται ἐνδίκως;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὗται πραγμαμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γ' ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἴδονή E γ' ἴδονῃ [μὴ] οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων;

ἀπ' αὐτῆς δέ] Some MSS. have δή. It is impossible to decide between them while the rest of the sentence remains faulty. Every one will perceive that ἀρεξαμένοις, or ἀρεχτέον, or some word to that effect, must have dropped out.

Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος] That this was the real feeling of Socrates as well as of the men of his time is plain from many passages. Compare *Cratylus* 400, E where nevertheless he regards the current names of the Gods as of human invention. The fear is that there is more risk of offending Ἀφροδίτην, by giving her a new name, though even the old one is not certainly correct, or free from offence.

ῥαίην] This pronoun is here used in preference to ταύτην, because the person is in her own nature remote and invisible. In the next sentence, ἀπ' ἐκείνης is put for ἀπὸ ταύτης, on account of ὅπερ εἶπον, which makes ἴδονην ap-

pear not as the present subject, but as that of a former proposition.

οὕτως ἀπλῶς] There has been a strange scruple, whether these words, which are so commonly joined together, can be so here; and recourse has been had to the expedient of a comma in order to separate them. In the double contrast which follows it is to be observed, that on one side the healthy desires and the healthy intellect are themselves the source of the satisfaction, αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν, αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν, whereas their opposites are but the channels of pleasure. This is why he adds ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν.

πῶς γὰρ κ. τ. ε.] We have above πῶς οὐκ ἂν φαίνοιο, which is the ordinary construction. The μὴ is nothing more than a result of carelessly reading ΗΑΟΝΗΙΟΥΧ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρώμα, ὦ δαιμόνιε, [χρώματι] κατὰ γ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐδὲν διοίσει, τὸ χρώμ' εἶναι πᾶν· τό γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὃν τυγχάνει· καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα [σχήματι] κατὰ ταῦτόν γένει μὲν ἐστὶ πᾶν ἓν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιώτατ' ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφοροτότητ' ἔχοντα μυρία<sup>13</sup> που τυγχάνει. καὶ πόλλ' ἕτερ' οὕτως ἔχονθ' εὐρήσομεν, ὥστε τοῦτω γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τὰνακτιώταθ' ἐν ποιούντι. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τις ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὐρήσομεν ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθ' ἡμῶν βλάβει τὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτ' ἀνόμοι' ὄνθ' ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι. λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντ' εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐκ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ· κακὰ δ' B ὄντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, ὁμοίως σὺ οἰμῶς προσαγορεύεις [ἀγάθ' αὐτά,] ὁμολογῶν ἂν ἀνόμοι' εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ,

[χρώματι] This addition is due to some blunderer, who made two sentences out of one. Had κατὰ γ' been the beginning of a new sentence we should have had some conjunction. The same reason applies to σχήματι. Any one may see how much elegance is gained by their omission.

μυρία] This is to be understood not of the number of differences, but of the extent of some particular differences. Comp. *Apolog.* 23, c. ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἶμι.

φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή] Compare, among other passages, *Rep.* 451, A; *Phædo* 84, κ, φοβεῖσθε μὴ διακίμῃ, and *Arist. Nub.* 493, δίδουκά σ', ὥ πρεσβῦτα, μὴ πληγῶν δεῖ.

Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις] Because, my side will say, you call all these, though unlike each other, by a new common name. This would be assuming a second ground of agreement between them; for that they agree in being pleasures is proved by their common name of pleasure; but it does not follow that they agree in anything else, as, for instance, in being good. But if Protarchus asserts that they are all alike, and yet must confess that they are not alike good, he is bound to mention some other ground

of likeness. Socrates therefore cannot be introduced as asking him for a proof that they are ἀγαθὰ, but as wanting to know, forasmuch as they do not agree in this respect, in what else they do agree. But the received text makes him say: "You know they are not all 'good, and you are ready to admit that 'they are so far unlike; and yet you 'call them all good': which is so absurd that I have changed ὁμῶς into ὁμοίως, and put ἀγάθ' αὐτά and ἀγαθὸν εἶναι in brackets. The worse MSS. have πάντα before σὺ. Had Plato written it, he would certainly have placed it immediately next to αὐτά; but it is due to a misconception of the meaning, caused by ὁμῶς. I have supplied ἂν after ὁμολογῶν, τε before ταῖς, and ταῖς before ἀγαθαῖς for obvious reasons. The restoration of ἂν is necessary for the sense; it was probably absorbed by the following word.

τῷ λόγῳ] This belongs to ἀνόμοια: for προσαγορεύειν implies ὄνομα, and the ground of the ὄνομα is in the λόγος or description. It is worth while to quote a passage from the *Laws* which bears on this point, and which has been suffered to remain hitherto in a very corrupt state. *Legg.* 895, 896,

εἴ τις σε προσαναγκάζοι. τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτόν ἐν τε ταῖς κακαῖς  
 ὁμοίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς [ἀγαθὸν εἶναι]  
 προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἷμαι γάρ τινα [συγχωρή-  
 σεσθαι,] θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, εἴτ' ἀνέξεσθαι σου λέ-  
 C γοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ τινὰς [ἐτέ-  
 ρας] αὐτῶν κακάς;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι  
 καὶ τινὰς ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτι καθ' ὅσον γ' ἡδοναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρωταρχε.  
 οὐδ' ἄρ' ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι  
 φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμῶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντ' οὐδὲν  
 τιτρώσκειν, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐροῦμεν ἅπερ οἱ πάντων φαυλό-  
 D τατοί τε περὶ λόγους ἅμα καὶ νέοι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σὲ μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν τολμῶ  
 λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιοτάτον ἐστὶ τῇ ἀνομοιοτάτῃ πάντων ὁμοιό-

"Ἔστι (τί) που δίχα διαιρούμενον ἐν  
 ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριζμῷ. τούτῳ δὴ  
 τῷ κατ' ἀριζμόν ὄνομα μὲν Ἄρτιον,  
 λόγος δὲ, Ἀριζμός· διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα  
 δύο μέρη. . . . Μῶν οὖν οὐ ταῦτόν  
 ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἂν τε τὸν  
 λόγον ἐρωτῶμενοι τοῦτομα ἀποδιδώμεν,  
 ἂν τε τοῦτομα τὸν λόγον, "ἄρτιον" ὀνό-  
 ματι, καὶ λόγῳ, "δίχα διαιρούμενον  
 ἀριζμόν" προσαγορεύοντες ταῦτόν ὄν;  
 . . . . . Εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτ' οὕτως ἔχον,  
 ἄρ' ἔτι (τι) ποδοῦμεν, ἢ ἱκανῶς δέ-  
 δακται ψυχὴν κ. τ. ἔ. (A little lower  
 down after γενομένη supply φανερόν γε.)  
 [συγχωρήσεσθαι] As εἴτα depends  
 immediately on the participle θέμενον, if  
 we retain συγχωρήσεσθαι we have two  
 infinitives συγχωρήσεσθαι and ἀνέξε-  
 σθαι with an equal right to a position  
 which cannot belong to more than one,  
 unless we suppose this to be Greek:  
 νομίζω σφαλῆναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οἰώ-  
 ζέντας ἀμαρτεῖν. Ἐτέρας is the sup-  
 plement of a man who had never heard  
 of τὰς μὲν τινὰς.

τιτρώσκειν] The MSS. have τίτρω-  
 σκει. But it cannot be said that "these  
 examples do not damage them"; but

only that they refuse to see it. Nor  
 could a new independent clause be  
 added by means of καὶ . . οὐδὲν in  
 place of οὐδέ.

πεισόμεθα] The common reading is  
 πειρασόμεθα, but some of the better  
 MSS. have πειρώμεθα, and the best of  
 all, the Bodleian or Codex Clarkianus,  
 πειρόμεθα. The common reading is  
 probably the conjecture of a copyist,  
 who felt that a future was wanted. It  
 will not be expected that I should  
 adduce any proof in support of so ob-  
 vious a correction as that introduced  
 into the text. The critic who approved  
 of my correction, but at the same time  
 wondered that, in finding it, I did not  
 also find that καὶ ἐροῦμεν was spurious,  
 does not appear to have considered  
 that φερέμεθα is connected with πεισό-  
 μεθα, and φήσομεν with ἐροῦμεν. "We  
 shall be in the condition of unpractised  
 disputants, and talk their language". As  
 φαυλότατοι does not refer to any other  
 φαυλότης but that in the art of dis-  
 putation, I have transposed καὶ from  
 before περὶ to before νέοι.

τατον, ἔξω ταῦτά σοι λέγειν, καὶ φανοίμεθα γε κωτέροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οὐχίησεται. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουόμεθα, καὶ τάχ' ἂν ἰόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ἴσως ἂν πως ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαιμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐμὲ θεὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὦ Πρωταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ καίον δῆ;

ΣΩ. Φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ κοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἶπον [ἀγαθόν], διερωτώμενος ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τάχαθόν, ἃς οὐ ταῦτὸν πείσονται τοῦθ' ὅπερ ὁ σὸς λόγος;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Παλλαί θ' αἱ ξυνάπτασαι ἐπιστήμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντία πη γίνονται τινες, ἃς ἄξιός ἂν εἶην του, [διαλέγεσθαι νῦν], εἰ 14 φοβηθεῖς. ταῦτ' αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φράων ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμη γίνεσθαι, ἥπειθ' ἡμῖν ὄντας ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ μῦθος ἀπολόμενος οἴχουτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σωζοίμεθ' ἐπέ τινας ἀλογίας;

νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος] *Euthyd.* 295 D, ἀρχαιότερος εἰ τοῦ δέοντος. The latter is obviously the familiar expression, and that in the text a play upon it. ἀνακρουόμεθα] This figurative expression, which is properly used of backing a ship, has induced some to believe that ἐκπεσὼν οὐχίησεται is part of the same metaphor. But in all the instances given, ἐκπίπτειν is used of the casting away of a voyager, not of the stranding of a vessel. Its use here is rather singular, but it probably means nothing more than *having failed*. Why ἀνακρ. is in the middle voice, and whether αὐτὸν is genuine, others must determine. Perhaps we should read αὐτόθεν.

τὰς ὁμοίας] We must supply λαβὰς. The Scholiast explains the phrase as a metaphor from wrestling. Socrates, therefore, proposes that they should resume their former position as disputants, in order that he may show Protarchus the unfairness of the feint through which he sought to elude Socrates' question, by professing that he should consider himself bound to afford

Protarchus the same grip or handle, that is to distinguish the kinds of ἐπιστήμαι, when called upon to do so. As the phrase is εἰλεῖν, and not ἀνελαιεῖν, εἰς λαβὰς, it is better to read τάχ' ἂν ἰόντες. With τάχα and ἔως used separately the ἂν is sometimes repeated even in prose.

[ἀγαθόν] As διερωτώμενος x. r. ε. contains the occasion—"which I mentioned when I was asked what was The Good",—the word ἀγαθόν is as superfluous, as it is inelegant.

ἄξιός] It is altogether foreign to the spirit of Attic dialogue to speak of being worthy of the honour of disputing &c.; and even if such a sentiment were allowed, it would have been expressed by ἄξιός διαλέγεσθαι without the article. But all that Plato wrote was: ἃς ἄξιός ἂν εἶην του.

μῦθος ἀπολόμενος] It is not clear whether the original proverb was ὁ μῦθος ἐσώθη or ὁ μῦθος ἀπέλετο. Photius' testimony is in favour of the former: μ. ἐσώθη . . . Ἐπίρρημά ἐστι λεγόμενον ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ τοῖς λεγομένοις μῦθοις τοῖς παιδίοις. The Scholiast on

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆ-  
ναι. τό γε μὴν μοι ἴσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει·  
πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλὰ δ' ἐπιστῆ-  
μαι καὶ διάφοροι.

B ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ  
τοῦ τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δ'  
εἰς τὸ μέσον, †τολμῶμεν ἂν πη ἐλεγχόμενοι μὴνύσωσι, πότερον  
ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν δεῖ λέγειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι.  
νῦν γὰρ οὐ δῆπου πρὸς γ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἀγὼ  
τίθεμαι, ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθ' ἃ σὺ, τῷ δ' ἀληθε-  
στάτῳ δεῖ πον συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφω.

ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

C ΣΩ. Τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον δι' ὁμολογίας  
βεβαιωσώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩ. Τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντ' ἀνθρώπους πράγματα ἐκοῦσά τε  
καὶ ἄκουσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίετε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φῆσαι πως πεφνικῶτα  
θαυμαστόν. Ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πόλλ' εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαν-

this place, with less probability, ex-  
plains δ μ. ἀπώλετο, as used by those  
who find they are speaking to *inattentive hearers*; and he quotes the comic  
poets, Crates and Cratinus, as employ-  
ing it, but without adducing the pas-  
sages. I suspect from the otherwise  
unnecessary redundancy in *Rep.* 621, n  
μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, that  
the latter is the original form, and that  
the former is Plato's own coining. The  
allusion in this passage is to men  
suffering shipwreck and escaping on a  
raft. (Compare *Phaedo* 86, D.) And so  
the argument would, like a tale, come  
to nothing, and we should make our  
escape upon an unreason.

τολμῶμεν] This word appears to be  
the main difficulty of a sentence which  
has perplexed so many critics and  
editors; but for it I should have ad-  
opted Winckelmann's conjecture, and  
inserted οἱ λόγοι after ἐλεγχόμενοι, but  
nothing can be determined with cer-  
tainty till we know what ails τολμῶ-

μεν. Either some other verb has been  
corrupted into this, and we might read  
κατατιθῶ. δ' εἰς τὸ μ. τῷ λόγῳ, ὀρῶ-  
μεν—or a whole line has dropped out.  
The words ἐλεγχόμενοι μὴνύσωσι would  
seem to favour the latter supposition,  
for there seems to be an allusion to  
the practice of giving up one's servant  
to the judicial "question". τολμῶμεν  
(ἐκάτεροι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον παρέχοντες εἰς  
τὴν κρίσιν) ἂν πη κ. τ. ε. may serve  
to represent the sense of the missing  
clause.

ἢ τι τρίτον ἄλλο] The best MSS.  
omit τι; but the sense is incomplete  
without it. I believe the right reading  
to be ἢ ἄλλο τι τρίτον εἶναι. See below  
20, B, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον.

Τοῦτον τοίνυν] We should have ex-  
pected τόνδε, for this λόγος has not  
yet been mentioned, but is now to  
follow. I am inclined to read τοῦτου.  
"Let us by question and answer make  
good the λόγος, not of you or me, but  
τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου."

μαστόν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὁποτέρων οὖν τιθεμένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον, ἕνα D γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

ΣΩ. Σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θανμαστώων περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἄπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥάδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβάνόντων γίγνεσθαι· ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅταν τις ἐκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν E ἐκεῖνο εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελῶν ὅτι τέρατα διηνάγασται φάναι, τό τε ἐν ὡς πόλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἐν μόνον.

[ῥάδιον ἀμφ.] *Affording a ready objection against any one who advances either.*

Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις κ. τ. ἄ.] Unless καὶ joins ἐναντίους with πολλοὺς, it is of no use in the sentence; I have therefore removed the comma from πάλιν. The sense is as clear and well-expressed as could be desired. *Do you mean, when a man says of me Protarchus, who am one by nature, that I am again many and opposite 'me's', bringing forward the same person as at once great and small, heavy and light, and so forth?*

τῶν θανμαστώων] Rather θανμάτων, *Conjuring tricks*. Συγκεχωρημένα μὴ δεῖν, *given up and admitted* to be such as men ought not to meddle with. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν qualifies πάντων. It is strange that one of the editors should not have known such a common usage.

ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα] The proper construction would have been either, μὴδὲ τῶν τοιῶνδε (ἄπτεσθαι δεῖν συγχωροῦσι,) or ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα (συγχωροῦσι, δεῖν αὐτῶν ἄπτεσθαι). But as the very form ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ is colloquial, a certain looseness of syntax is perhaps allowed, and the reader is left to supply μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἐλέγχεσθαι, προσφέρεσθαι, (δεῖν συγχωροῦσι,) or any

other passive answering to ἄπτεσθαι. Otherwise we must look on τὰ τοιαῦτα as interpolated.

μέλη] *Legg.* 795, B, μελῶν καὶ μερῶν. The MSS. and edd. all exhibit μέλη τε καὶ ἅμα μέρη, which, if it means anything, means that the μέλη and μέρη are the same, whereas it is plain that μέρη is added because the body cannot be properly divided into μέλη only. If it were μέλη δ' ἅμα καὶ μέρη, there would be no objection to the word but its inutility. I have written ἅλλα, which is continually confounded with ἅμα by the copyists. In p. 17 D, ἅμα ἐννοεῖν, the Bodleian and Vatican have made the opposite mistake.

διομολογησάμενος] *Having made another admit.* Properly, *having admitted each to the other*. Διομολογεῖσθαι is to ὁμολογεῖν, what διαλέγεσθαι is to λέγειν, διακτελεύεσθαι to κτελεῖν &c., διὰ and the middle voice together expressing reciprocal action. No one will regret to see συγκεχωρημένα in the next speech of Protarchus banished from the text; the wonder is, who could have taken it into his head to put it there. οὐ γὰρ δῆπου τὰ συγκεχωρημένα δημεύομεν, τὰ δὲ δεδημευμένα, ὅταν δόξῃ, συγχωροῦμεν.

- ΠΡΩ.** Σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερα λέγεις, ἃ μήπω [συγκεχωρημένα] δεδόμενται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον;
- 15 **ΣΩ.** Οποῖαν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται, καθάπερ ἀγτίως ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν. ἐγ-  
ταυθὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν νῦν δὴ, συγ-  
κεχώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δέ τις ἐν' ἀνθρωπίνον ἐπι-  
χειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἓνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν  
ἐν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν κοιούτων ἢ πολλῇ [σπου-  
δῇ,] μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.

**B ΠΡΩ.** Πῶς;

**ΣΩ.** Πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπο-  
λαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὐσας· εἶτα πῶς αὐ ταύτας, μίαν ἐκάστην  
οὐσαν αἰετὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γενέσιν μήτ' ὄλεσθον προσδεχ-  
μένην, ὅμως μὴ εἶναι βεβαίότατα μίαν ταύτην· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ'

ἐνταυθ[ι] So with Elmsley for ἐνταυθός.  
ἢ πολλῇ [σπουδῇ]) I once thought  
σπουδῇ to be genuine, and therefore  
added δὲ after μετά; I am now con-  
vinced that the word is neither ap-  
propriate nor genuine, but supplied by  
a copyist who had in his head the well  
known passage in the *Phaedrus* 248, π  
ὅς δ' ἐνεχ' ἡ πολλῇ σπουδῇ κ. τ. ἐ.  
*Then arises the great controversy as  
soon as we attempt to decide.*—What  
else is needed? or what have we to  
do with the earnestness of the dis-  
putants, except indeed as a measure of  
their difficulty? But the difficulty being  
expressed, any other word is super-  
fluous.

Πρῶτον μὲν) When I endeavoured to  
explain this passage in a former edition,  
I maintained that there were only two  
questions proposed, although πρῶτον,  
εἶτα, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο made it appear  
that there were three. As the text  
then stood, it was impossible to see  
more than two questions, that beginn-  
ing with πρῶτον, and a second; for if  
εἶτα . . . . μίαν ταύτην were considered  
as an independent question, and not  
rather as the beginning of that pro-  
pounded afterwards, the question would  
have been, *how it was conceivable that  
that which is one and imperishable should  
be nevertheless unchangeably one*:—than  
which nothing could be more absurd.  
But the words πρῶτον, εἶτα, μετὰ δὲ

τοῦτο ought to have opened my eyes  
to the absolute necessity of finding three  
points of enquiry, or, if they were not  
to be found, of treating the text as  
corrupt. I now feel confident that I  
have discovered the source of all the  
perplexity in the omission of μὴ after  
ὅμως. The first question is; have these  
monads a real being? The second is;  
if each of them is one and not subject  
to the changes of γένεσις and ὄλεσθον,  
how can we imagine it ever to vary  
in the least from this oneness? The  
third is; when it *does so vary* by  
entering into individuals, does the unity  
cease when the plurality begins, or are  
they concurrent?—in other words are the  
monads to be regarded as distributed into  
as many parts as there are individuals  
to partake of them, or as remaining  
as wholes in each individual, so that  
each monad is at once one in each,  
and again one in many? This last  
supposition is πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον,  
because in this case the one both agrees  
with itself and contradicts itself. *Parm.*  
131, ἂ οὐκ οὖν ἥτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἶδους ἡ  
μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μετα-  
λαμβάνει;—πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι  
ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκαστῷ εἶναι τῶν  
πολλῶν, ἐν ὅν; ἢ πῶς; Τί γάρ κω-  
λύει—ἐνεῖναι; Ἐν ἀρα ὃν καὶ ταύ-  
τὸν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς εἶναι ὅλον ἅμα  
ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς  
ἂν εἴη.

ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὐ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονῶσαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρὶς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνεται ἂν, ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἡμ' ἐν ἐνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦθ' ἐν C καὶ πολλά, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Πρωταρχε, ἀπάσης ἀπορίας αἰτία μὴ καλῶς δημολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας [ἂν] αὐ καλῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρη τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Σόκράτες, ἐν τῇ νῦν πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;

ΣΩ. Ὡς γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντα τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ἐπόλαβε συγχωρεῖν σοι τοῦσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα· Φίληβον δ' ἴσως κράτιστον ἐν τῇ νῦν [ἐπερωτῶντα] μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.

ΣΩ. Ἐλεν. πόθεν οὖν τις [ταύτης] ἀρεξήται, πολλῆς οἴσης D καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης; ἀρ' ἐνθένδε;

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν;

ΣΩ. Φαμέν που ταῦτόν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενον περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων αἰεὶ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτ' οὔτε μὴ παύσῃται ποτ' οὔτ' ἤρξατο

ἐπορίας κ. τ. ε.] Not ὄντα but ἐστὶ being understood, the construction with ἂν is a barbarism. The sense is not conditional; for we have the statement of a fact founded on experience no less than its opposite. The appearance of ἂν in the text is due to a repetition of αὐ, and a subsequent attempt to correct what should have been expunged.

τὰ τοιαῦτα.] One would rather have expected ταῦτά ταῦτα, for this does not refer to the ἐν κ. π., but to the proposed investigation.

Φίληβον.] The proverbial saying was μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ κείμενον: for κακὸν he puts Φίληβον. We had better let well alone, and not ask Philebus for his consent. But ἐπερωτῶντα thus placed before μὴ κινεῖν would make it appear that the participle is a means not τοῦ κινεῖν, but τοῦ μὴ κινεῖν; and as it is quite superfluous, there can be little doubt of its origin.

[ταύτης.] I have cancelled this word without hesitation. He is not going to begin a fight; but to begin a subject, of which the very beginning point is

difficult to find, because almost everything is a matter of controversy. Besides ταύτης μάχης is bad Greek.

Φαμέν πως.] The construction is not φ. π. ἐν κ. π. ὅ. λ. ταῦτόν γιγνόμενα (Stallb.), for if Socrates had spoken here of the reconciliation effected between the one and the many by dialectics, it is inconceivable that Protarchus should answer, εἴ τις τρόπος ἐστὶ καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην παραχὴν ἡμῶν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν. Nor are the young men described as delighting in the discovery and exercise 'of the synthetical and analytical processes', but on the contrary, in the sophistical employment of this contradiction which is the inherent property (ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀγνόων πάθος) in all objects of conception, by which they throw into perplexity both themselves and others. Either therefore we must read ταῦτόν . . . γιγνόμενον, or suppose that πολλὰ has by attraction affected the number of the participle, which, considering the presence of ἐν, is most unlikely.

παύσῃται.] I formerly wrote παύσει-



νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐ-  
 τῶν ἀθανάτων τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν. ὁ δὲ πρῶτον  
 αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἐκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἴσθεις ὡς τινα σοφίας  
 Εὐφρηκῶς θησαυρόν, ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινῇ  
 λόγον ἄσμενος, τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς  
 ἓν, τότε δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐ-  
 τὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων, δεύτερον δ' αἰεὶ τὸν  
 ἐχόμενον, ἂν τε νεώτερος ἂν τε πρεσβύτερος ἂν θ' ἡλιξ ὢν  
 16 τυγχάνη, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς οὔτ' ἄλλον τῶν  
 ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, [σὺ μόνον  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων,] ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενός ἂν φείσαιο, εἴπερ  
 μόνῳ ἐρηγνεία ποθὲν ἔχοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ  
 ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν; καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου  
 ξυνηπιθώμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῇς; ὅμως δέ, μανθάνομεν γὰρ

ταῖς in obedience to Dawes' Canon. But it is only in the older Attic that the first aorist subjunctive with οὐ μὴ need excite our suspicion; whereas οὐ μὴ with the future in this sense I take to be a poetical usage.

πάντα κινῇ λόγον] This is an allusion to the proverbial saying πάντα λίσσον κινεῖν. But the expressions ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν, and πάλιν ἀνειλίττων, *rolling them up one way, and again unrolling them another* allude to the manner of handling a volume. Συμφύρων εἰς ἓν, and διαμερίζων are added to shew the application of the figurative words.

ὀλίγου δ' οὐδέ] This I have written in lieu of ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ, which would mean *nearly sparing*. The repetition οὐδε-οὐδε was probably treated by some copyist as a blunder, and one half was left out. Then came the corrector who felt the want of a conjunction and inserted καὶ. I agree with Stallbaum as to the spuriousness of οὐ μ. τ. ἀ.; but ἐπεὶ β. γε shews that some bolder assertion has just been made, and justifies τ. ἀ. ζ. In the next sentence I have added καὶ, because Protarchus gives two grounds for Socrates' fear, their number and their youth.

ὅμως δέ] In this sentence Protarchus is made to offer two suppositions; "if it is possible either to conjure away

the perplexity, or to find some other method of investigation". I believe that the second alternative is Socrates' suggestion. Εἴ τις ἔστι τρόπος καὶ μηχανὴ καλλίω ὁδὸν ἀνευρεῖν is in itself a clumsy circumlocution for εἴ τις ἔστι καλλίων ὁδός, and what is the subject of ἀνευρεῖν? Σὲ or ἡμᾶς cannot be understood; μὲν and δὲ would imply that the two requests put into the mouth of Protarchus are not alternative; but if so, the latter must be the means to the former, and in that case what becomes of *coaxing the difficulty out of the way*? Σὺ τε προθυμοῦ τοῦτο is quite proper as answering to τὴν ταρχήν ἀπελθεῖν, but as the clause now stands in immediate dependence on ἀνευρεῖν, προθυμοῦ is not only enough, but rejects anything between itself and the infinitive. The New Way is said to be ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, instead of out of it. For these reasons, and because it is more in keeping that Socrates should be the first to suggest some other method, I condemn ὁδὸν—ἀνευρεῖν as spurious, and μὲν as invented to give it currency. As in most cases of this kind, the interpolator has borrowed his words from the neighbourhood, καλλίων ὁδός from Socrates' next speech, ἀνευρεῖν from his next but one.

ὃ λέγεις, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν [μὲν] τοιαύτην  
ταραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, [ἔδδόν δέ B  
τινα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνευρεῖν,] σὺ τε προθυμοῦ  
τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· σὺ γὰρ σμι-  
κρὸς ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ παῖδες, ὥς φησιν ὑμᾶς προσαγορευῶν  
Φίληβος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο, ἥς ἐγὼ  
ἐραστὴς μὲν εἰμι ἀεὶ, πολλάκις δέ μ' ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον  
καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς αὕτη; λεγέσθω μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἦν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πᾶν χालεπὸν, χρῆσθαι δὲ παγ- C  
χάλεπον. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμεν' ἀνευρέθη πώποτε, διὰ  
ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ἦν λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. †Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται  
ἡμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ Θεῶν ἐρρίφη διὰ τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανο-  
τάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ὄντες ἡμῶν καὶ  
ἐγγυτέρω Θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, τὴν φῆμην παρέδωσαν, ὥς ἐξ ἐνὸς  
μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν αἰεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ  
καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τού- D  
των οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων αἰεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περι παντός ἐκά-

Θεῶν μὲν] In this remarkable passage  
everything seems out of its place. For  
εἰς ἀνθρώπους belongs not to δόσις but  
to ἐρρίφη. ὥς γε x. ἡμοί ought to be  
ὥς ἡμοίγε καταφαίνεται, the enclitic  
ποθὲν can scarcely come first after such  
a break in the sentence, Θεῶν δόσις  
ἐκ Θεῶν ἐρρίφη is also quite intoler-  
able; add to this that if the gift was  
throned from Heaven, it could not be  
sent διὰ τινος Προμηθέως. Though I  
have thus stated why I can no longer  
stand by this reading, I cannot offer  
any certain emendation of it; but I  
believe that the following is not very  
far from our author's sentence. Σω.  
Εἰς ἀνθρώπους, ὥς ἡμοίγε καταφαίνε-  
ται, ἡ δόσις ποθὲν ἐκ Θεῶν ἐρρίφη τι-  
νός, [Sch. in Marg. Προμηθέως] ἅμα  
φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί.—I have supplied  
ὄντες, which is necessary to the con-  
struction, and was absorbed by the  
preceding termination οὐτε.

ἐγγ. Θεῶν οἰκοῦντες] Dwelling nearer  
to the gods,—i.e., in more familiar inter-  
course with them.

τὴν φῆμην] Bodleian has ταύτην φή-  
μην, Coislinian φῆμην. The former, if  
for ταύτην we read τὴν, seems pre-  
ferable to the latter, because,—although  
there is no impropriety in saying that  
they handed down the gift by traditional  
report,—the construction ὥς—ὄντων—  
ἐχόντων must depend on a word mean-  
ing belief, and therefore on φῆμην rather  
than δόσις; and this is less apparent if  
the φῆμην is made the mere instrument,  
in which case δόσις as the principal  
word would be that on which the sub-  
sequent construction rested.

πέρας] We must not confound this  
with the ἐν or genus, as Stallbaum does.  
It is the determinate number, the pro-  
duction of the one, which reconciles the  
one and the many.

σῶτε θεμένους ζητεῖν· εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνούσαν. εἴν οὖν [μετα] λάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἢ τιν' ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ ὅτι ἐν καὶ πολλὰ [καὶ ἄπειρά] ἐστι μόνον ἴδη τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποσα. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπειρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλήθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατὶδῇ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπειρου τε καὶ Ε' τοῦ ἐνός· τότε δὴ δεῖν τὸ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαιρεῖν εἶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπαν, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μὲν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι,

17 [καὶ πολλὰ] θάττον καὶ βραχύτερον παιοῦναι τοῦ δέοντος [μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν] ἄπειρα εὐθύς· τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει· οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

θεμένους ζητεῖν] It is difficult to see how these words can be reconciled, for how can a man look for that which he has already laid down? I strongly suspect that the passage originally ran thus; αἰ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντός ἐκαστοτε θεμένους, εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνούσαν, μετὰ μίαν κ. τ. ε.

[μετα]λάβωμεν] μεταλάβωμεν is the reading of the MSS., which Stallbaum in vain endeavours to defend. In place of adopting Stephens' conjecture, καταλάβωμεν, I suspect that the copyist had at first omitted the verb, and written the following μετά, and then on discovering his mistake, neglected to place the usual dots over the superfluous letters. I have therefore put μετά in brackets.

τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων] Ast, with Stallbaum's approval, reads τῶν ἐν ἐκείνω, —i.e., τῷ παντί. But we must not adopt any correction of this passage which removes ἐν, for this ἐν is evidently referred to immediately afterwards, where it is distinguished from τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν. But as the *subordinate Ones* are to be distinguished from the *original One*, this can only be done by speaking of the former as ταῦτα, and the latter as ἐκεῖνο; and this is as fatal to Schütz's conjecture—τὸ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, as it is to the received reading.

But what should prevent Plato from using τὰ ἐν, τῶν ἐν, τοῖς ἐν, if he had occasion for a plural? Thus below we have ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ὁτιού. For this reason I incline to read either τῶν ἐν ἕκαστον or τῶν ἐν τῶν ἐν ἐκείνω ἕκαστον.

πολλὰ [καὶ ἄπειρα]] It is possible by application to discover τὰ πολλὰ ὅποσα ἐστὶ: but all the dialectic in the world will not enable you to find τὰ ἄπειρα ὅποσα ἐστὶ. It is therefore inconceivable that Socrates should bid them "not only see that the original ἐν is one, and many, and indefinite, but also how many it is." The word αὐτοῦ in τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ refers to πλήθος.

τότε δὴ δέον] See Addenda.

οἱ δὲ νῦν κ. τ. ε.] This passage has been corrupted and interpolated so as to become quite unintelligible. I have changed βραδύτερον into βραχύτερον, and separated the genuine parts of the sentence from the spurious. It is impossible to make ἐν καὶ πολλὰ either quickly or slowly; for they are not things of man's making, but ready to his hand. What your modern captious disputers do, is to make ἐν to be ἄπειρα without passing through the intermediate stages. As to βραχύτερον, compare *Philæus* 279 c, ὅτι μάλιστα διὰ βραχείων ταχὺ πάντ' ἐπελθόντες.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ μὲν πως, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκῶ σοι μάθάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον δέσμαι ἢ λέγεις ἀκούσαι.

ΣΩ. Σαφὲς μὲν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ἢ λέγει, καὶ λάμβανε αὐτὸ ἐν τούτοις οἷσπερ καὶ πεπαύδενσαι. B

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ που μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰαῦσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴ πλήθει, πάντων τε καὶ ἐκάστου.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὲν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδετέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἴσμεν οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ ἐν· ἀλλ' ὅτι πόσα τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γραμματικὸν ἕκαστον ποιῶν ἡμῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὃ τυγχάνει ποιῶν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν που καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ ὁ μία [ἐν αὐτῇ].

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὲ θῶμεν, βαρὺ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμότονον. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐπω σοφὸς ἂν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνον, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ὥς γ' ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἔσει.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὴν λάβης τὰ διαστήματα δρόσα

ἐν τούτοις οἷσπερ] Either ἐν οἷσπερ, or ἐν τούτοις ἐν οἷσπερ.

οὐδετέρῳ] The books have οὐδὲν ἐτέρῳ, which is inadmissible. οὐδ' ἐν ἐτέρῳ for ἐν οὐδετέρῳ would be according to Attic usage. But if he were speaking of that *whereto* a man is skilled, he would say οὐδέτερον, not ἐν οὐδετέρῳ; the dative expresses that whereby he becomes skilful.

Φωνὴ μὲν που] The text follows the inferior MSS. in reading καὶ τό—. καὶ is so useful an addition, that one is justified in adopting it; nor is τὸ κατ' ἐκείνην a likely variation for a scribe

to have made *de suo*. I formerly thought that κατ' ἐκείνην must refer to the first mentioned art, that of grammar, but οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος, though never used capriciously, as some learned men tell us, sometimes apply not to the greater or less proximity of *mention*, but to that of *interest*, as in the beginning of the Euthydemus, or to the different degrees of familiarity, as here. Of ἐν αὐτῇ I can make nothing, unless we transpose it to a place where it would be welcome if not necessary. Δύο δὲ θῶμεν ἐν αὐτῇ.

διαστήματα] These intervals are

ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξύτης τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος, D καὶ ὅποια, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν, ἃ κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδωσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἐπομέναις ἐκείναις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἁρμονίας, ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτ' ἐνόητα πάθη γιγνόμενα, ἃ δὴ δι' ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὐ φασὶ ἔνθιμους καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἅμ' ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὕτω δεῖ περὶ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν· ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτά τε λάβης E οὕτω, τότε' ἐγένου σοφός, ὅταν τ' ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ὁτιοῦν ταύτῃ σκοπούμενος ἔλῃς [, οὕτως ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας]. τὸ δ' ἄπειρόν σ' ἐκάστων καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις πλήθος ἄπειρον ἐκάστοτε ποιεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ' ἐνάριθμον, αἶ' οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδέν' ἐν οὐδενὶ πάποτ' ἀπιδόντα.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα, ὦ Φίληβε, ἔμοιγε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα εἰρηκέναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.

18 ΦΙ. Κάμοι γ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος νῦν εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενος;

nothing more than musical notes; ὅροι are musical proportions. See Plat. Τιμαίους 36, B, and Cicero's translation.

ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα κ. τ. ἔ.] The particle γὰρ marks the resumption of an incomplete sentence. The antithesis between τότε' ἐγένου σοφός, and ἔμφρων γέγονας, is a poor verbal contrivance, and the tenses are strangely chosen, ὅταν λάβης, ἐγένου . . ὅταν ἔλῃς, γέγονας. Stallbaum translates the last word by "evades" which would answer to γεγωνώς ἔσει. Ἐγένου may be defended by the well known usage of the aorist; compare παρέσχοντο in 46, E. If the words οὕτως—γέγονας were omitted, nobody would miss them. I have followed the Bodleian in ὅταν τε for ἔταν δέ, and in τῶν ἐν ὁτιοῦν for τῶν ὄντων ὁτιοῦν. That a writer can if he likes, break his sentence so as to give more emphasis to the second half, by introducing such terms as ἀλλὰ σὺ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν σὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμὴν, in place of σὺ τε,—ἐγώ τε, no one will deny. But here the speaker begins with a

general precept, and then applies it to the particular instance of music, and so returns to the general rule. A very little reflexion will shew that in such a case if he commenced with "and indeed whatever you take up", he would have the air of opening out some new application in place of resuming a previous statement. I prefer ἐν to ὄντων, because it is more likely that a scribe should stumble at τῶν ἐν than invent it. The Bodleian has also περὶ τούτων which I prefer, because it is a worse reading, and so throws more discredit on a suspected passage.

τὸ δ' ἄπειρον] The reader will not fail to admire the skilful play upon the words ἄπειρον, ἐλλόγιμον, and ἐνάριθμον. Stallbaum compares Tim. 55, C, τὸ ἀπείρου κόσμου εἶναι λέγειν ἡγήσασθαι ἂν τις ὄντως ἀπείρου τινὸς δόγμα ὡς ἔμπειρον χρεῶν εἶναι: and the oracle given to the Megarians, Ὑμεῖς δ', ὦ Μεγαρεῖς, οὔτε τρίτοι οὔτε τέταρτοι οὔτε δυωδέκατοι, οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὐτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.\*\*\*

Κάμοι γ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα] Commonly Καὶ

\*\*\* A sheet of the Editor's MS. has been lost in transmission from Sydney. The missing notes will appear in the Addenda. [Publisher's Note.]

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς μέντοι ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἡρώτηκε Φίληβος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ.

ΣΩ. Ἀράσω ταῦτα, διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν οἰοῦν εἴ τις ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν ἔδει βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τιν' ἀριθμὸν, οὕτω καὶ τὸναντίον, ὅταν τις τὸ ἀπείρου ἀναγκασθῇ B πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, [μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπ'] ἀριθμὸν αὖ τινὰ πλήθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν δεῖ, τελευτᾶν τ' ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἕν. πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς γραμμασι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ [φωνὴν ἀπείρου κατενόησεν] εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεῷ τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἐν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὐ, C φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δὲ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διήρει τὰ τ' ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα, καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἐνὶ θ' ἑκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασιν στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασε. καθορῶν δ' ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄνθ' ἓνα καὶ πάντα ταῦθ' ἐν D πως ποιοῦντα, μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγγετο προσειπεῖν.

ἔμοι ταῦτά γε αὐτά. The first change I have adopted from Bodl., which has καί μοι, the second from Coisl., which has καὶ ταῦτά γε ὄντα αὐτά. Stallbaum has a strange way of explaining the misplaced αὐτά—*per se seorsum spectata*.

τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφαμεν] \*\*\*

ἔβα] \*\*\*

[μὴ ἐπὶ κ. τ. ἔ.] \*\*\*

Ἐπειδὴ [φωνὴν δ. κ.] \*\*\*

λέγων, πρῶτος] \*\*\*

τά τ' ἄφθογγα] We should rather have expected τὰ ἄφθογγα τε καὶ ἄφωνα, but τε is sometimes moved from its place

(cf. Elmsl. *ad Heracl.* 622), and in this place the hiatus is avoided by the change. The μέσα, which he describes above as partaking not of voice but yet of sound, are the liquids which stand midway between vowels and mute consonants.

καθορῶν δέ] Because we can have no true conception of φωνή except as distinct from φθόγγος; nor of this again without also knowing both φωνή and τὸ ἄφωνον.

μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν is explained by Stallbaum as ὡς οὖσαν μίαν;

\*\*\* A sheet of the Editor's MS. has been lost in transmission from Sydney. The missing notes will appear in the Addenda.

Platonis Philebus.

ΦΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον. τὸ δ' αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.

ΣΩ. Μῶν, ὦ Φίληβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὐ ταῦτ' ἐστίν;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πρώταρχος.

Ε ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γ' ἤδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φῆς, πάλαι.

ΦΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἡδονῆς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν αἰρετέον;

ΦΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γ' ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι φαμεν.

ΦΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὃ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, †πῶς ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ [πῶς μὴ] ἄπειρα

he has illustrated this position of ὡς by *Sophist*, 242, c. παλαιὸν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, and other examples; but he should not have quoted for this purpose *Arist. Clouds* 256, οἱμοὶ Σωκράτην (sic) Ὡσπερ με τὸν Ἀτάμανδ' ὅπως μὴ δύσετε. αὐτά γε π. ἀ.] This means that the several parts of the last λόγος are consistent with each other. ἐλλείπεται, is left unperformed, is deficient.

τί πρὸς ἔπος] *Euthyd.* 295, c. ἐὰν μηδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἀποκρίνωμαι, i.e. nothing to the purpose.

Καὶ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γ'] And yet you are close upon that which, as you say, you have been some time looking for. The Zurich editors have placed a mark of interrogation after this sentence, which is certainly incorrect; but as the common formula is καὶ μὴν—γε, and H is continually confounded with the compendium of καὶ, I have altered ἤ into καὶ accordingly.

πῶς ἐστὶν ἐν] The impudence of the interpolation in this passage betrays the author of it. In place of letting Socrates ask what number of kinds we can discern in ἡδονῇ καὶ φρόνησις, he makes him enquire, how they are not straightway indefinite (as if there could be a how of that which is simply negative,) and again how either of them

has some number, a question which Plato himself could not have answered. I have no hesitation in condemning what appears in brackets, and in making τίνα interrogative, without which it would have no right to ποτέ. But even πῶς ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ α. ἑκάτερον is far from satisfactory. Either it is a clumsy way of asking what is more plainly asked in τίνα ποτ' ἀριζμόν χέκτηται, or it proposes a question which the upholders of Ideas have been content to leave unsolved (*Phædo* 100, D, τοῦ καλοῦ παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωμία, εἴτ' ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη) for so that passage should be read. In our text I propose to read ἀπαιτεῖ πως, εἰ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, τίνα ποτ' ἀριζμόν ἔμπροσθεν χέκτηται τοῦ ἄπειρα γεγονέναι. The reasons for interpolating ἑκάτερον and αὐτῶν ἑκαστα are quite obvious; the first word was repeated because of the previous supplement, and itself was thought to be inconsistent with ἄπειρα; to accord with which ἑκαστα was contrived. And the result of all this ingenuity is that we have the same things designated twice as ἑκάτερον, and once as ἑκαστα in such proximity, that a single designation was alone needful or bearable.

εὐθύς, ἀλλὰ] τίνα ποτ' ἀριθμὸν [ἐκάτερον] ἐμπροσθεν κέκτηται τοῦ ἅπειρα [αὐτῶν ἕκαστα] γεγονέναι; 19

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γ' ἐρώτημα, ὦ Φίληβε, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον κῆκλῳ πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε Σωκράτης. καὶ σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. ἴσως δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμέ, τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάττειν· γελοιότερον δ' οἶμαι πολὺ τὸ Β μῦθετον ἡμῶν δύνασθαι. σκόπει δὴ τί δράσομεν. εἶδη γάρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης, εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὅπως ἔστι καὶ ὅποια· τῆς τ' αὖ φρονήσεως περὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσανύτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ παῖ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο κατὰ παντός ἑνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταύτου δοῶν καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὥς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος ἐμήνυσεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἡμῶν εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος.

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ κα- C λὸν μὲν τὸ ξύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὐτόν. τί δὴ μοι τοῦτ' εἰρηται τὰ νῦν; ἐγὼ σοι φράσω. σὺ τήνδ' ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι [καὶ σεαυτὸν] πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι

διάδ. παντελῶς ὑποστάντα.] *Having this was added, unless there was some unreservedly taken your place as your successor.* παντελῶς qualifies διάδοχον on which Protarchus plays by adding ὑποστάντα as taken together. The Attic Orators have χορηγός ὑπέστην, ὑποστήναι πρατήρα, ἐξελοντὴν ὑποστήναι τριηραρχον, without any infinitive to follow. In Xen. *Anab.* iv, 1, εἴ τις ἐθέλει ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι καὶ ὑποστὰς ἐξελόντης πορεύεσθαι, the order of construction is, καὶ πορεύεσθαι, ἐξελόντης ὑποστὰς.

οὐδέ τις ἂν ἡμῶν] The received text reads ἂν ἡμῶν after οὐδενός, the ἂν being placed most perversely in the midst of all these negatives; but as ἡμῶν certainly belongs to the first of them, we may infer that the words ἂν ἡμῶν were both omitted together, and then restored, but to a wrong place. ἐπέδωκας] *You bestowed upon us all this conversation [and yourself,] for the purpose of discussing what is the best of human possessions.* Compare *Laws*, xii, 944, A, ὅπλα, ἃ Πηλεὶ φησὶν ὁ ποιητῆς παρὰ θεῶν προῖκα ἐν τοῖς γάμοις ἐπιδοῦναι Θετίδι. The difference between ἐπιδοῦναι in such passages, and the simple verb, is that the former applies only to *making presents*. But for these very reasons a man could not be said ἐπιδοῦναι ἑαυτόν. The addition is borrowed from a passage occurring a few lines below, where the reading of all authorities is ἐδωκας; but this is said of a later period and one contained within our own dialogue (p. 16, A. B). The present reference is to



τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον. Φιλήβου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, D σὺ πρὸς αὐτ' ἀντείπεις ὡς οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλ' ἐκεῖν' ἐστίν, ἃ πολ- λάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναμιμνήσκομεν ἐκόντες, ὀρθῶς δρῶντες, ἔν' ἐν μνήμῃ παρακαίμενα ἐκότερα βασανίζονται. φῆς δ' ὡς ἔοικε σὺ τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς [ἄμεινον ἡδονῆς γ'] ἀγαθὸν εἶ- ναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντ' αὐτὰ τούτων ξυγγενῇ, ἃ κτᾶσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα. τούτων δὲ μετ' ἀμφισβητήσεως ἐκατέρων λεχθέντων, ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς E ἡπειλήσαμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν οἴκαδέ σε, πρὶν ἂν τούτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἱκανὸν γένηται τι διορισθέντων. σὺ δὲ συνεχώ- ρησας καὶ ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθ' ἡμῖν σαντόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγο- μεν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὀρθῶς δοθέντων ἀφαιρέσεις οὐκ ἔστι. παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Τίνα λέγεις;

20 ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβαλλὼν καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὧν μὴ δυναί- μεθ' ἂν ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν. ἀλλ' εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστήον' ὑπέσχο- γάρ. βουλευόν δὴ πρὸς ταῦτ' αὐτός, πότερον ἡδονῆς εἶδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἑατέον, εἴ πῃ [καθ' ἕτερόν] τινα τρόπον οἷός τ' εἴ καὶ βούλει δηλώσαι πως ἄλλως τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν.

B ΣΩ. Δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως εἶπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει δηθὲν λῖνε πάντα

his first consenting to hold the con- versation, so that αὐτόν ἐπέδωκας would be a ludicrous hyperbole.

τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς [δ. ἢ γ'] See Addenda. τέλος ἡμῶν εἶναι] i.e. the end and aim.

καθ' ἕτερον] There cannot be a more feeble tautology than καθ' ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον πως ἄλλως. The first two words were added by a scribe who did not see that τινά τρόπον belongs to οἷός τ' εἴ.

τὸν ἐμέ] i.e., me, the threatened one,

—poor me. Plat. Ep. 7. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἐμέ παρεμυθεῖτο, —i.e., Plato, who had apprehended mischief from Diony- sius. Theat. 166, A, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμέ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε, —i.e., Protago- ras, who complains of hard usage.

τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει δηθὲν] It has not been observed that this is said gene- rally, and ἐκείστων περί has been mis- translated in consequence. The sense is, *When men say 'if you please', it does away with all fear in every case.* I confess that I have no great faith in the genuineness of ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὐ. εἴπ.

φόβον ἐκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δ' αὖ τούτοις μνήμην τινὰ δοκεῖ τίς μοι δεδοκέναι θεῶν ἡμῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνων;

ΣΩ. Λόγων ποτέ τινων πάσαι ἀκούσας ὅναρ ἢ καὶ ἐργηγορῶς νῦν ἐννοῶ περὶ θ' ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ὥς οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστὶ τὰγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἕτερον μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δ' ἀμφοῖν. καίτοι τοῦτο γ' ἂν ἐναργῶς ἡμῖν φανῇ ὅτι νῦν, ἀπῆλλακται μὲν ἡδονὴ τοῦ νικᾶν· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ταῦτόν αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τῶν δέ γ' [εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν] εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεσόμεθα κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν. †προῖόν δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιςτ' εἰπὼν, οὕτω καὶ διαπέραινε.

πρὸς δ' αὖ τούτοις] The Bodleian has οὐ τοῖς, which form is inadmissible here. The origin of the error, which has been corrected from Coisl., is obvious.

καίτοι τοῦτο γ' ἂν] The Bodleian has καίτοι οὕτω γε ἔαν, which Orelli changed into καὶ τοιοῦτό γ' ἂν. But this will not mean what we want. For as he has not yet named this *something better*, he cannot say "if it should appear such", but either "if any such thing should appear" which would require τι, or, "if this thing should appear". As γε is in the best MSS., it is admitted by Orelli into his correction: but καὶ—γε means "and besides", whereas καίτοι—γε is equivalent to "and yet you must admit", which is the proper transition. I therefore retain τοῦτο from the inferior MSS., but adopt γε from the Bodleian.

[εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν]] In order to get rid of the awkwardness of saying: "we shall not want the εἶδη of pleasure to serve the purpose of διαίρεσις", (as though they had to look for the εἶδη first, and then to begin διαίρεσιν into those very εἶδη) as well as to escape the intolerable harshness of the construction, I resorted to the expedient of taking τῶν by itself and not as the article of εἰδῶν. But this was too violent a proceeding. I now believe that any attempt to reconcile oneself

to εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν is a waste of time on words which do not belong to the author. Those who understand, "εἶδη for the purpose of διαίρεσις", will say that transposition would be a milder remedy; but Socrates intends to give up the διαίρεσις *itself*, and not merely some particular means towards that end.

προῖόν δ' εἰ. σ. δείξει] The proverbial expression is, αὐτὸ δείξει, *the event will make things clear*. But we are told that both δείξει and δηλώσει are used in the same manner without αὐτό. The first occurs in Arist. *Frogs*, 1261, where, however, μέλη may be the subject, and in Herodotus III, 82, where διέδειξε follows the impersonal ἀπέβη. All the other instances quoted are of δηλοῖ or ἐδήλωσε. If therefore this is a real instance, it is a very rare one. It is uncertain whether the thing which is to shew itself is the ἄλλο τί τρίτον, or the correctness of Socrates' δόξα, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεσόμεθα κ. τ. εἰ. In either case, what is the meaning of ἔτι σαφέστερον, where at present nothing is σαφές? If it be said that ἔτι belongs to προῖόν, this is only admissible if εἰς τὸ ἐμπροσθεν or some equivalent phrase be added to it. A MS. of no authority gives δέ τι. I should prefer προῖόντι δέ, "It will appear more clearly (whether I am right) as I proceed".

ΣΩ. Σμίκρ' ἅττα τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογησώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

D ΣΩ. Τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον [ἢ μὴ τέλεον] εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δὴ που τελεώτατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἱκανὸν [τἀγαθόν];

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ πάντων γ' εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων.

ΣΩ. Τόδε γε μὴν, ὥς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαϊότατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὥς πᾶν τὸ γιγνώσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται [βουλόμενον] ἔλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει [πλήρ] τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστι τοῖτοις ἀντειπεῖν.

E ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τὸν θ' ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρὶς.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς εἶπες;

ΣΩ. Μήτ' ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις, μήτ' ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι· δεόμενον δ' ἂν φανῇ πό-  
21 τερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτ' ἔτι τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

[ἢ μὴ τέλεον] No one in his senses would ask "whether the Idea of Good necessarily implied incompleteness". And yet this nonsense has been left unchallenged since the revival of letters, nay was so perhaps even under the Ptolemies. Another evident addition is τἀγαθόν. For with τἀγαθόν we must understand ἐστὶ. But that the true construction is ἀνάγκη . . εἶναι appears from the answer, in which all the MSS. give διαφέρειν. A third interpolation disfigures the clause ὥς πᾶν τὸ γιγνώσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον εἶλεῖν. Εφίεται is sometimes followed by the infinitive as in Eur. Ion 521, εἰ φιλεῖν ἐφίεται; but some one who did not know this, supposed αὐτοῦ to be understood, and introduced βουλόμενον to govern εἶλεῖν.

πλήρ τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς is the reading of all MSS. and Editions, as far as I know; and one editor undertakes to explain it, and his explanation is commended by another. But we may be quite certain that Socrates is intended to say, that men care for no other results than such as are in themselves good. Why then represent him introducing, as the sole objects of men's care, other results produced *along with* good things? I had once proposed to cancel πλήρ and to read ἀλλ' ἢ ἀγαθόν. But this violent change is unnecessary. *Antiquum obtinet.* The intrusion of πλήρ has made nonsense of a simple and easy sentence.

πότερον] used here and elsewhere as = ὁποτεροῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου δή.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέξαι' ἄν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ζῇν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐκ ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῖο, εἰ τοῦτ' ἔχοις παντελῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι [τὰ δέοντα], καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μὴν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι; B

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμ' ἄν που τὸ χαίρειν ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου [ταῖς μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς] χαίροις ἄν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε [καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν]

Πρώταρχε] ὧ seems to be omitted here on account of the pronoun being placed after the name of the person addressed, which is usual either when the speaker first turns to him, or makes an especial appeal to him.

[τὰ δέοντα]] Five lines lower down the list of mental powers or qualities is again given as νοῦς, μνήμη, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα ἀληθῆς. Of that list it will be time to speak when we come to it: but a third series follows immediately upon the second one, which tallies pretty exactly both in substance and order with that before us: 1. τὸ φρονεῖν=φρόνησις. 2. τὸ νοεῖν=a. μνήμη of past things, b. δόξα of future. 3. τὸ λογίζεσθαι=λογισμός. 1. *Consciousness or immediate Perception.* 2. *The Representative faculty.* 3. *Inference*, not logical, but in its lowest type. If any one will compare this passage with the other, he will see why τὰ δέοντα ought to be rejected without hesitation.

μὴν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι] The MSS. have μηδὲ ὅπῃ τι. Several scholars have proposed to change ὅπῃ into ὅναρ, but they all appear to leave τι, which in this case would be contrary to Greek usage. I made this correction in the year '55; but, unless my memory fails me, the Leipzig Edition by C. F. Hermann appeared in '54. Any one who

has that Edition will see in Herrmann's Preface the name of the scholar to whom he attributes the emendation. I am unable to recall it, but I confess that I have been beaten by at least one year.

[ταῖς μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς]] Even supposing that Plato could use χαίρειν ἡδοναῖς in the sense of *enjoying pleasures*, the words τ. μ. ἡ. are nothing to the purpose, for the *amount* has been already mentioned, and the drift of this passage is, that he would be in a *continual* state of pleasure—and never once know it.

νοῦν δέ γε] It has been shewn above that there is an exact correspondence between the series given in the sentence beginning "Ὅρα δὴ, and that which occurs in the argument commencing with πρῶτον. But the list now before us, though so much nearer to this last, has no such congruity. And indeed it is worse than unnecessary; for what sort of reasoning is this? "As you do not possess Memory, Knowledge, and Belief, you cannot know whether you are in pleasure or not, because you have no Consciousness." All that Plato wrote was Νῦν δέ γε μὴ κεκτημένον πρῶτον μὲν κ. τ. ἔ. As he has no νοῦς, he cannot have φρόνησις, which is a part of νοῦς.

μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ], πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτ' αὐτό, εἰ ἢ χαίρεις ἢ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δὴ πού σε ἀγνοεῖν, κενόν γ' ὄντα πάσης φρονήσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

C ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δὴ πού σε μὴθ' ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνήσθαι, τῆς τ' ἐν τῷ παρα-  
χρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μὴδ' ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν·  
δόξαν δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ] μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαί-  
ροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μὴδ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς  
χαιρήσεις δυνατόν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δ' οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον  
ἀλλὰ τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα [θαλάττια] μετ' ὁστρεῖνων  
ἐμψυχά ἐστι σωματίων. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ παρὰ ταῦτ' ἔχομεν ἄλ-  
D λως πως διανοηθῆναι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐν αἰρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ  
λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακίζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ μετα-  
λαβόντες αὖ βίον ἴδωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν  
καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων κεκτημένους, ἡδονῆς  
E δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν, μὴδ' αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ  
παράπαν ἀπαθὲς πάντων ὧν τῶν τοιοῦτων.

πού σε μὴθ' ] που μὴδὲ is the read-  
ing of the MSS. But it is necessary to  
insert the pronoun, and Stallbaum was  
right in his first edition when he changed  
μὴδὲ into μὴτε. There is no reason  
why μὴ μεμνήσθαι should receive more  
stress than μὴ δοξάζειν or μὴ λογίζε-  
σθαι; (for though we have μὴδὲ in  
this last instance, the "not even" or  
"also not" refers not to δυνατόν εἶναι  
λ., but to εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον).

[ἀληθῆ] The reason for putting ἀλη-  
θῆ in brackets is that any δόξα, whether  
false or true, would suffice πρὸς τὸ δο-  
ξάζειν χαίρειν, and, where there is no  
vous, there can be no δόξα.

[θαλάττια] If Plato had cared to tell

us that shellfish lived in the sea, he  
would not have done so by placing an  
adjective where it is out of construction.  
He would at least have written θαλάτ-  
τια ὄντα. Let us therefore leave the  
commentators to decide, when they can,  
whether the sense is ὅσα θαλάττια  
ἐστὶν ἐμψυχά, or ὅσα ἐμψυχά ἐστι  
θαλάττια.

μεταλαβόντες] i.g. ἐν μέρει λαβόν-  
τες. Compare below 51, A.

πάντων ὧν] I have supplied ὧν, which  
is required by the rules of the language.  
Not even an inferior writer would say,  
μὴ μετέχων ἀλλ' ἀπαθὲς. The syl-  
lable was absorbed by that which pre-  
ceded it.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τούτων αἰρετός, οὐδ' ἄλλω μὴ ποτε, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, φανῇ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὁ ξυναμφοτέρος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμ- 22  
μυθεῖς κοινὸς γενόμενος;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ [καὶ φρονήσεως];

ΣΩ. Οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἔγωγε.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δὴπου τοῦτόν γ' αἰρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων ὁποτεροῦν, καὶ ἑπρὸς τοῖτοις γ' οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅ τι νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τὸ ξυμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ὅτι τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προὔτεθσαν, τοῖν δυοῖν δ' οὐδέτερος ἱκανὸς οὐδ' αἰρετός οὐτ' ἀνθρώπων οὔτε β ζώων οὐδενί.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἦδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν εἶχε τάγαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλος καὶ πᾶσι [φντοῖς καὶ] ζώοις αἰρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως αἰεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ἤρειθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἰρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικε γοῦν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν τὴν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖ- C  
σθαι ταῦτόν καὶ τάγαθόν, ἱκανῶς εἰρησθῆναι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΦΙ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστι τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἔξει που ταῦτ' ἀγκλήματα.

ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμυθεῖς] i.e., διὰ τὸ συμμυθεῖναι. This use of the participle is very frequent in Plato. Compare *Rep.* 506, B, προδυμίουμος ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτ' ὀφλήσω,—i.e., διὰ τὸ προδυμῖ-σθαι. In the next sentence καὶ φρο-νήσεως is a manifest interpolation.

καὶ πρὸς τοῖτοις γε] This is commonly understood to mean *and besides*; but it is evident that nothing additional is stated. Stallbaum's defence of it, 'notio atque vis præcedentis p̄as confir-matur et augetur,' is only true as to *confirmatur*, whereas *augetur* is the point in question. Schleiermacher under-stands, in *addition to those lives* (the unmixed); but this would have been of the many euphemisms for Madness.

choose both contraries, the unmixed and the mixed together? I cannot uphold my own former solution of this difficulty, for "in addition to my friends here" would be πρὸς τοῖσδε. As some addition is intended, the only conceivable addition to "every body will choose this life", is "and one and all will bear me out in saying so". This might be, καὶ προσῆσεται τοῖτοις γ' οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ.

[φντοῖς καὶ] [ζώοις] He afterwards adds, εἰ δέ τις ἡμῶν, and is evidently think-ing of ζῶα capable of choice, and pos-sessed of intellect. It is therefore high time these φντὰ were weeded out of the text. Ἀνάγκη οὐκ εὐδαίμων is one

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἂν, ὦ Φίληβε, ὃ γ' ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τόν γ' ἀληθινόν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως πως ἔχεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ [πῶ] ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι  
 D τί δρασόμεν. τάχα γὰρ ἂν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιώμεθ' ἂν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν [αἴτιον], ὁ δ' ἡδονήν [εἶνα], καὶ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη, τάχα δ' ἂν αἰτιόν τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι. τούτου δὴ πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον διαμαχομένην ἂν, ὥς ἐν τῇ μικτῇ τούτῳ βίῳ, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦθ' ὃ λαβὼν ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἰρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ ξυγενέστερον καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον  
 E οὔτ' ἂν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδ' αὖ τῶν δευτερείων ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἂν ποτε λέγοιτο. πορρωτέρω δὲ ἐστι τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῇ ἐμῇ νῦν δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονή σοι πεπτωκέναι καθάπερ εἰ πληγείσα ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων πέρι μαχομένη κεῖται. τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὥς  
 23 ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὥς ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν νικητηρίων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἔπαθεν ἂν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων στερηθεῖσα

οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ [πῶ] It is difficult to account for πῶ in this place, for he evidently renounces for ever the claims of νοῦς to the first prize, and contends only for the second. Perhaps the reservation may be accounted for by his mention of the δεύτερος νοῦς, the relation of which to that of man is afterwards treated of. But then again if this had been intended, he would scarcely have used the words πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον: and altogether why confuse the argument with an afterthought about some other νοῦς? I now believe πῶ to be a mere reproduction of the preceding τῷ in ἀμφισβητῶ.

αἰτιώμεθ' ἂν] See Addenda.

οὔτε—οὐδ' αὖ] Of this construction Stallbaum gives the following instances: *Phileb.* 42, c; *Lysis* 840, a; *Rep.* 608, b; *Ibid.* 428, b; from which it appears that although οὔτε—οὐδέ is inadmissible, οὔτε—οὐδ' αὖ or οὐδέ γε is correct.

μετόν] As you cannot say λέγεται ὦν, but λέγεται εἶναι, you would here expect μετεῖναι, not μετόν. But μετόν came to be looked upon as almost a noun, so that in λέγοιτ' ἂν μετόν we understand the infinitive εἶναι. Thus in *Lysis* 800, e, we read: θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετόν ἐροῦμεν.

νῦν μὲν] The Bodleian has no μὲν, but I think it is an accidental omission, for the opposition is between this *first* bout and *another*, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων—.

σοι πεπτωκέναι] σοι cannot belong to πέπτωκεναι, for ὑπὸ σοι is the proper construction after πέπτειν. Nor can it belong to πληγείσα, for then Socrates the agent, and λόγοι the instruments, would be made to change places. It is difficult to say what should be done with the word, for it does not look like an interpolation. Did Plato write ἐπεπεπτωκέναι?

ἡδονὴν παντάπασιν ἂν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχολήν πρὸς τῶν αὐτῆς ἐραστῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔτ' ἂν ὁμοίως φαίνοιτο καλή.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἔαν ἦδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν; B

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὥς οὐδεὶς πῶς σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει, πρὶν ἂν εἰς τέλος ἐπεξέλθῃς τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.

ΣΩ. Βαβαὶ ἄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ πᾶν τι ῥαδίον. νῦν γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν [ἄλλης μηχανῆς], ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον, ὅλον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἐμπροσθεν [λόγων]. ἔστι δ' ὥσως ἔνια καὶ ταυτά.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρεῖ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; τὴν δέ γ' ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι C πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ.

ΠΡΩ. Καθ' ὃ τι φράζοις ἂν.

ῥαδίον] The best MSS. have ῥαδίον; if you will. But is this tolerable even but the μὲν after συχνοῦ appears to me conclusive in favour of the other reading. In the common text, we have ῥαδίον πᾶν τι νῦν.

νῦν γὰρ δὴ κ. τ. ἔ.] But the enquiry is no more difficult now than at any other time; whereas we want νῦν with φ. δ. "we must now begin a new argument". Because the misplaced πᾶν τι seemed an awkward desinence, some scribe brought the νῦν into the first sentence, and contrived καὶ as the beginning of the next.

δεῖν [ἄλλης μηχανῆς] This is a singular construction of δεῖν, at once with a genitive and an infinitive; it may be said that as the ἄλλη μηχανή consists in ἔχειν β. ἔ., this is added by way of explanation. But is there any beauty or propriety in such a manner of writing? Plato imitated the freedom, even the license, of common conversation,

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;] This is given in the Books as the answer to Socrates. But Οὐκοῦν χρεῖ is the answer, and Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; is Socrates' assent. Χρεῖ is the answer to δεῖν . . . πορευόμενον . . . ἔχειν, another proof of the spuriousness of ἄλλης μηχανῆς.

διευλαβεῖσθαι παρώμεθα τιθέμενοι furnishes one of the editors with the excuse for a learned note to shew that verbs and participles sometimes change hands. Surely it needed neither Heindorf ad Gorgiam, nor Schäfer on Gregorius Corinthus, nor Seidler on the Iphigenia in Tauris to shew that you can say either *percurreo ridens*, or *rideo percurrens*. It costs more effort διευλαβεῖσθαι than τιθεῖσθαι.



ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν ἅττα τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον  
D ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτων ἔν τι ξυμμισγόμενον. εἰμὶ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν,  
ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις [ἐκ] ἀνος, τὰ τ' εἶδη διςτὰς καὶ συναριθμοῦ-  
μενος.

ΠΡΩ. Τί φῆς, ὦ γαθέ;

ΣΩ. Τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνας.

ΣΩ. Τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὄρα,  
καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.

ΠΡΩ. Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτον προσδεήσει διάκρισιν  
τινα δυναμένον;

ἀπειρον . . πέρας] It is evident that the *πέρας* and ἀπειρον of 16, c, are different from those now brought forward. In the former case they express the indefinite multitude of the individuals and the definite number of species; in the latter, the unlimited nature of all quality and quantity in the abstract, and the definite proportions of the same in existing things. But in both cases we find that the effect of the *πέρας* is analogous; that knowledge in dialectics and life in physics are the result of a certain limitation.

πέρας] Heindorf and Schleiermacher are by no means to be followed in reading *πέρας* ἔχον. As Böckh rightly observes in his *Philolaus*, the opposite power to the ἀπειρον is not that which is limited, but that which limits. Unless we keep *πέρας* here clear from the proposed addition, and cancel ἔχον in two subsequent places, we make nonsense of the whole disputation.

Τούτῳ δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν] I have adopted Stallbaum's emendation, which the context makes necessary. "Let us lay down these two, as two of the Classes required." But in the manifestly corrupt sentence which follows, something less weak and flat than γελοῖός τις, οὐχ

ἱκανῶς κατ' εἶδη δ. is wanted. The Bodleian has ἱκανὸς τὰ τ' εἶδη. It is probable that in the archetypal MS. the text ran thus: ΓΕΛΟΙΟΣ ΤΙCΑΝΟΣ, i.e. γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος, and that some scribe thought that in ICANOC he saw ἱκανός. The other various reading τὰ τ' appears decidedly preferable to κατὰ, for he is endeavouring not to separate *things according to their kinds*, but to point out distinct kinds, and then to repeat the catalogue of them. On the whole there is little violence done to the oldest text, and nothing left unsaid or said improperly, in the reading: εἰμὶ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος, τὰ τ' εἶδη διςτὰς καὶ συναριθμῶ.

πρὸς τοῖς τρισίν] See Addenda.

Μῶν οὖν] This question and the answer given to it are of importance, being introduced by Plato not only as an example of the care which is requisite in every dialectic process to leave no distinction unnoticed which may help towards a complete classification, but still more because it serves to bring out in its full significance the αἰτία τῆς ξυμμίξεως. Had this latter been a mere agent, one would expect the counter-agent to be also mentioned; but Socrates observing in his ironical

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἂν οὐ μὴν οἶμαί γ' ἐν τῷ νῦν. ἐὰν δέ τι δέη, συγγνώσκει πού μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι [πέμπτον βίον]. E

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι, τὰ δύο τούτων πειρώμεθα, πολλὰ ἐκότερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ διεσπασμένον ἰδόντες, εἰς ἓν πάλιν ἐκότερον συναγαγόντες, νοῆσαι πῇ ποτὲ ἦν αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἐκότερον.

ΠΡΩ. Εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχ' ἂν ἐποίμην.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δύο, ἃ προτίθεμαι, ταῦτ' εἶναι ἅπερ 24 νῦν δὴ, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας [ἔχον]. ὅτι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πολλὰ ἔστι, πειράσομαι φράζειν· τὸ δὲ πέρας [ἔχον] ἡμῶς περιμενέτω.

ΠΡΩ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ. χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον δ' κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ σκόπει. Θερμότερου καὶ ψυχρότερου πέρι πρῶτον ὅρα πέρας εἶ που ἔστι νοῆσαι, ἢ τὸ μᾶλ-

manner, "that he does not think he shall want any such," prepares us to attach a higher importance to the αἰτία than to anything yet spoken of. Nor indeed is there any εἶδος διακρίσιν τινα δυνάμενον. For these ἄπειρα are represented as forced into this conjunction with the πέρας, and kept so against their will. So that dissolution is not an act of the αἰτία but a consequence of its not acting. I have changed τινός into τινά, and further on, I have followed all later editors in bracketing βίον, which is clearly out of place; but it is probable that πέμπτον was added at the same time; at all events it is needless and worthless.

τὰ τρία] More probably τὸ τρίτον i.e. γένος: for the process is not to take three out of the four, and then two from those three; nor would διελόμενοι be the right word in such a sense as separating, but ἀπολαβέντες. Such a roundabout way of getting at the first two is evidently unmeaning; but we are bidden to take the κοινόν, which is the third, and resolve it into its constituents, πέρας and ἄπειρον. And this is the simplest way of arriving at those two: for the instances of the

κοινόν are found in sensible objects, out of which we obtain by analysis the qualities which in their own nature are More or Less, and the proportion which limits and confines them. τὰ δύο τούτων, if the reading is correct, must be taken to mean the first and second of these γένη. We shall find lower down another striking instance of the cardinal and ordinal numbers being confused through their being expressed by the same compendia. πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον is like μέρη διαιρεῖν Polit. 283, D, and elsewhere. It is a variety of the accusative of effect, like ὑψηλὸν αἶψιν, βραχὺ συστέλλειν, σμικρὰ κατακόπτειν &c.

πέρας [ἔχον]] This expression both here, and two lines lower, is certainly faulty. Τὸ πέρας ἔχον is that ἄπειρον which has ceased to be such by being submitted to the πέρας; so that this description belongs properly to the third γένος.

εἴ που] εἴ ποτέ τι νοήσεις ἂν is the reading of all the MSS., and followed by, I believe, all editors. Nothing can be more unsuitable than the use of the optative, or rather the conditional, where all that the speaker

Β λόν τε καὶ ἦττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦντε, τοῖς γένεσιν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον, τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεται γίγνεσθαι· γενομένης γὰρ τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτῷ τετελευτήκατον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ δέ γε, φαμέν, ἐν τε τῷ θερμότερῳ καὶ τῷ ψυχρότερῳ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦττον ἐνι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τούτῳ μὴ τέλος ἔχειν· ἀτελεῖ δ' ὅντε δῆττον παντάπασιν ἀπειρῶ γίγνεσθον.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὖ γ', ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, ὑπέλαβες, καὶ ἀνέμνησας μ' ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦθ', ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθόγγω, καὶ τό γ' ἡρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχον τῷ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦττον. ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ ἔατον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ', αἰεὶ σφοδρότερον ἡσυχαιτέρου καὶ τούναντίον ἐκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποιῶντε, τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἕλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζοντε. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νῦν δῆ, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλ' ἐάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ D ἦττον [καὶ] σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα ἔδρα ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν χώρας ἐν τῇ ἐνῆ. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον εἴτην ἂν, λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν· προχωρεῖ γὰρ

intends is, "tell me if you can discern." The common copy from which our MSS. are derived was probably made by a scribe who had before him, ΕΠΙΟΥ ΕCΤΙ ΝΟΗCΑΙ, and as the Υ looked very like Τ (with which it is continually confounded) he thought he saw ΗΟΤΕ; and out of ΗΟΤΕCΤΙ he made ΗΟΤΕ ΤΙ. After this, νοῆσαι would necessarily pass for an optative, and the sense would suggest the correction of νοῆσαις ἂν. The same mood has been forced upon the next sentence through the prevailing habit among the later Greeks of confounding, (as indeed they still do), ε and αι; so that the word would pass through the following changes: ἐπιτρέψεται—ἐπιτρέψαιτον—ἐπιτρέψαίτην with ἂν. A due consideration of ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον would have stopped the course of this corruption. οἰκοῦντε] This is Stallbaum's correction for οἰκουν. The words τοῖς γένεσιν

are not to be taken with ἐν αὐτοῖς, in the kinds themselves, which would be needlessly emphatical, but with τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεται γίγνεσθαι, will not allow any bound to be fixed to the kinds (hotter and colder), as long as they reside in them.

αὐτά] i.e., the More and the Less.

ἀνέμνησας μ'] See Addenda.

[καὶ]] He is no longer speaking of μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον in the abstract, but of a new instance of them in σφοδρότερον καὶ ἡσυχαιτέρου, an expression which he here varies by μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα.

λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν] If they were to admit Quantity. As λαβόντε here = εἰ λάβοιεν, and not εἰ λαβον, the optative εἴτην which rests on εἴτην in Bodl. and εἴτην in Ven. is better than ἦστην (Bekk. and Stallb.), which was conjectured by the scribe of the Vat. MS., who could make nothing of εἴτην.

καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔσται καὶ προῖον ἐπαύσατο. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγναιτ' ἂν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τοῦναντίον ἄμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἔστι δ', ὅπερ εἶπες, οὐ ῥάδια ταῦτα ξινέπεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰς αὐθις τε καὶ αὐθις ἴσως [λεχθέντα] τὸν τ' ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἱκανῶς ἂν ξυμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήνειεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὖ μὲν λέγεις, καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν· νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξιόμεθα σημείον, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξιόντες μηχανώμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνεται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἥρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖν πάντα 25 ταῦτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον, ὃν ἔφαμεν, ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τινα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέννημαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τάναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ

τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔσται καὶ προῖον ἐπαύσατο] But the So Much stood still, and ceased to advance,—namely, before it was expelled by μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον. This will account for the use of the aorists. The difference between μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον and σφόδρα καὶ ἥρέμα is not such as Stallbaum expresses in his paraphrase, 'It is an Indefinite, not only extensively as to quantity, but also intensively as to quality;' for the example chosen (of heat and cold) belongs much more properly to the latter. Besides, if quantity had been intended, he would have expressed that by πλέον καὶ ὀλιγόν. Intensity of degree is meant in both instances, but the distinction is marked by the speaker himself, when he adds to one τοῖς γένεσιν, and to the other ταῖς πράξεσιν. In the first case the quality is looked upon as a state; in the second, as an immediate effect. τὸ ποσὸν is the limit of the

former; τὸ μέτρον of the latter.

τὸ δὲ εἰς αὐθις τε καὶ αὐθις] The article which formerly gave me so much trouble is restored to its just rights by the expulsion of the word λεχθέντα; for it gives to the words which follow it the nature of a subject. "Hereafter and Hereafter will bring us into unison." He does not say τὸ αὐθις, because this repetition is not to take place now, as is evident from the opposition νῦν μέντοι.

δεῖν] For δεῖ I read δεῖν, which depends on λέγω, as implied in τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τινα φύσιν] To set upon them the seal of some one nature,—i.e., by giving them a generic name. We should have expected τούτοις, but where two regimens occur together, as here συναγαγόντας καὶ ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, the case of one or the other is suppressed. See Porson on *Medea* v. 734.

ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὃ τί περ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθ-  
B μὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας  
ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν ταῦτο; ἢ πῶς σὺ φῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γ', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μικτόν ἐκ τούτων ἀμφοῖν τίνα  
ιδέαν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὥς οἶμαι.

ΣΩ. Θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γ' ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνη-  
ταί τις θεῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Εὐχὸν δὴ καὶ σκόπει.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶ, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος  
ἡμῖν νῦν δὴ γεγονέναι.

C ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο; καὶ τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῆ;

ΣΩ. Φράσω ὀήλον ὅτι. σὺ δέ μοι συνακολούθησον τῷ  
λόγῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νῦν δὴ πού τι καὶ ψυχρό-  
τερον. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πρόσθε δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς, καὶ πλέον  
καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ θάπτον καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μείζον καὶ σμι-  
κρότερον, καὶ ὅποσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥ-  
τον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν [εἰς ἓν] φύσεως.

D ΠΡΩ. Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ναί. συμμίσγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν  
αὐτοῦ πέρατος γένναν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Ἦν καὶ νῦν δὴ, δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου  
συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἓν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγα-

καὶ πᾶν ὃ τί περ κ. τ. ἔ.] That is στω is unexampled and inconceivable.  
the triple, the quadruple, the third, the Here again we have a specimen of  
fourth, and so on with all multiples that officious interference which has  
and all measures, whether in numbers ruined so many texts.

[εἰς ἓν] τίθεναι εἰς ἓν "to place in a γένναν] Not 'finite genus' (Stallb.),  
genus" is correct, and so likewise is a misconception which has led to a  
τίθεναι τί τινος φύσεως, "to declare wrong view of the whole passage, but  
anything as belonging to a certain na- the whole race or family, τὰ δεχόμενα  
ture." But τίθεναι τι εἰς ἓν τινος φύ- τὸ πέρας. See the following notes.

γεῖν, [οὐ] συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτόν δράσεις.  
[τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανῆς χάλεινῃ γενήσεται.]

[οὐ] συνηγάγομεν] "It may be asked, was there not a sufficient συναγωγή above in Οὐκ οὖν τὰ μὴ δεγόμενα x. τ. ε. ? or if not, in what is the definition which follows better than that former one? But this is not Plato's meaning. The deficiency complained of is, that they had not made an enumeration of *the things which contain* the πέρας. For while we have πέρας corresponding to ἄπειρον, and ἴσον καὶ διπλάσιον τοῦ μάλ- λον καὶ ἥττον, σφόδρα καὶ ἥρμα, and the like, we have nothing to answer to ὑγρότερον καὶ ξηρότερον and the other examples. These are supplied by Socrates further on in the passage beginning 'Ἀρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις.' I leave this note as I find it in the first Edition, but I have two serious objections to make to it. 1. The passage beginning 'Ἀρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις regards the κοινόν and not the πέρας, nor *can* any other enumeration of the πέρας *in itself* be given, except what occurs above in Οὐκ οὖν τὰ μὴ δεγόμενα x. τ. ε., and immediately after this passage, in Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου x. τ. ε. 2. ταῦτόν, whatever is added to it, implies that the thing has been done *before*. Moreover, although, as a general rule, after δέον you expect a negative, this is the result of circumstances, and not involved in the nature of the word; and it appears to me, that neither καὶ nor νῦν δὴ is compatible with οὐ συνηγάγομεν. "The very thing which we just now did" is so natural, and "the very thing which we just now did *not* do" so much the reverse, that I have not hesitated to cancel οὐ. It is true that one of my reasons depends on a disputed passage, to the consideration of which I now pass. ταῦτόν δράσει is interpreted by Stallbaum, "it will do as well." His example is taken from *Epist.* 5, 322. ταῦτόν δὴ οἶμαι δράσαι ἐν καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν συμβουλήν. But if any one will give himself the trouble to read the context, he will see that the sense required is this. "I offered no "advice to my own people, because I "thought them incurable, and it was of "no use running into jeopardy where

"I could get none to listen. I suppose "any adviser *would do the same by my "company*: εἰ δέξαιμεν ἀνατοῶς ἔχειν, "he would leave us to our own de- "vices." Of the passages quoted by Winckelmann, that from the Republic ἡδὴ—ποιεῖ ταῦτόν, δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαδίως, needs no comment; that from Thucydides B. 2, οἶονταί σφίσι καὶ ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ ποιήσαιν τὸ αὐτό, would not be to the purpose even were it sound; but "Read, σφείζ." "They think they will do as much by sea." That in Thuc. B. 7. ταῦτόν ἤδη ἐπολεῖ αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε μαχομένοις διὰ παντός καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι is very much to the purpose, and shews that an infinitive is the subject of the phrase in question, and that the phrase is (as one would expect) not ταῦτόν δράσει, but ταῦτόν ποιήσει. Another difficulty is presented by τούτων ἀμφ. συναγομένων καταφανῆς χάλεινῃ γενήσεται. ΠΡΩ. Πόταν καὶ πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου x. τ. ε.: for beyond all doubt χάλεινῃ refers to the *third* γέννα which they have been some time in quest of. But who could help taking πόταν to refer to χάλεινῃ? and yet πόταν is answered by Socrates as referring to the *second*. If the reader will look very closely into this matter, he will see that ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων μ. x. γ. is an interruption to the argument. "We have (or have not) already told over the members of the πέρας family. Let us do it again (or let us do so now)." What ought to follow? Most undoubtedly the question of Protarchus: "What do you mean by family? and what family?" Then would follow the enumeration; but after this it is most surprising that Protarchus should answer:—"I understand: you mean, I suppose, that if we *mix* them, certain products will result"—. How could he say this, if something about this *combination* had not been mentioned after the description of the family itself? I think there cannot be any doubt that a clause has strayed from its place, and that we should restore it after ἀπεργάζεται, at the end of So- crates' next speech.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἑἴλληλα τάναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα, ἐνθείμεα ἀριθμόν, ἀπεργάζεται. (τούτων δ' ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὲς καὶ κείνη γενήσεται.)

ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω· φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μιγνῦσι ταῦτα, γενέσεις τινὰς ἀφ' ἐκάστων συμβαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς γὰρ φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις \*\*\* ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;

26 ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δ' ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις

Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου] Socrates describes the πέρας family as, *whatever puts an end to the contradiction in Opposites*. For every Indefinite has two opposite extremes, μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, which being unlimited, and having no proportion in themselves, would be in continual contradiction, if they were not tempered and harmonized by the agencies belonging to the class of πέρας, which effects this end by introducing in each case a suitable number or basis of proportion. He does not say τὸν ἀριθμόν, for he is speaking of particulars. This doctrine of the power of Number as the ground both of things in themselves, and of our perception of them, is the chief characteristic of the Pythagorean School, from whom it was adopted by the semi-Pythagorean Epicharmus. Böckh has an ingenious remark that this basis of the Doric Philosophy stands half way between the material groundwork of the Ionic School, and the intellectual principle of the Attic. See Extracts from the "Philolaus" in the Appendix. μιγνῦσι ταῦτα] The MSS. and Edd. have μιγνύς, an anacolouthon, where such a figure is a capricious violation of grammar, serving no purpose of clearness or emphasis. I have therefore adopted the correction proposed by Klitsch.

νόσοις] "The indefinite extremes of hot and cold, moist and dry, &c. τούτων καὶ ταῦτά ταῦτα are the γένηα τοῦ πέρματος, instances of the Limit, not

the πέρας and ἄπειρον, as Stallbaum supposes, for how can they be said to be ἐν τοῖς ἀπείροις, or πέρας ἀπεργάσασθαι? On the other hand, we can say with perfect propriety that each limitative agent produces a Limit." When I wrote the above, if any one had asked me why these Limits were not mentioned by name, I could not have answered him. But I now see by other certain signs that this defect is chargeable upon our present text, which is very different from that of Plato. When Schleiermacher met with ταῦτά ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα in the very next sentence, he was surprised that it was not rather αὕτη ἐγγιγνομένη, (sc. κοινών(α) and proposed a transposition, which would not have mended matters; for the previous τούτων was still to be accounted for. But no one seems to have stumbled at the worst difficulty; namely that in Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις, followed by Ἐν δ' ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ, x. τ. ἔ., we have a most ludicrous attempt at antithesis. The same remedy will allay both this perplexity, and that caused by τούτων. There is a lacuna in the text, where I have indicated one. This the reader can fill up for himself; but the substance of his supplement must be as follows: ἐν μὲν νόσοις (τὸ θερμόν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν ἐν ἀλλήλοις στασιάζετον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον ὅταν ἐγγένηται,) ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία x. τ. ἔ.

οὔσιν, ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦθ' ἅμα πέρας τ' ἀπειργά-  
σατο, καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν † τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσατο;

ΠΡΩ. Μάλιστα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε χειμῶσι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενόμενα τὸ  
μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δ' ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα  
σύμμετρον ἀπειργάσατο.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὠραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάνθ' ἡμῖν B  
γέγονε, τῶν τ' ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἔχόντων συμμιχθέντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρὶ' ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθ' ὑγιείας  
κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπόλλα ἕτερα καὶ  
πάγκαλα. ὕβριν γάρ που καὶ ξύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὕτη  
κατιδοῦσα ἢ σὴ θεός, ᾧ καλὸ Φίληβε, πέρας ἔχόντων οὐθ'

ξύμπασαν τελεώτατα] I do not profess to understand the force of either of these words. The first seems false in fact; for although all music arises from this source, each several combination does not produce *all* music. And again why ξύμπασαν, not ἅπασαν? There is one use of ξύμπας which we often meet with in Plato; where, after speaking of a subordinate genus, he passes to a more comprehensive one: as for instance he would say τὴν τακτικὴν καὶ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ξύμπασαν. (Compare below; ὕβριν καὶ ξ. πονηρίαν.) As for τελεώτατα, that will surely depend on the purity of the medium and the variety of the ποσά. But this attempering of flat and sharp, and swift and slow, produces effects on recitation also, and on movement. The one good quality of all these is λειότης; and I venture to suggest, καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν τε λειότητα.

Μάλιστα γε] The best authenticated reading is Καλλίστα; but the continual confusion of the two words is known to all who are familiar with palæography, and there cannot be a doubt which of the two is most appropriate here. In *Phædr.* 263 c, for καλὸν γοῦν ἄν, we must read μᾶλλον γοῦν ἄν. A few pages further on, the Vatican MS. has καλλίστα for μάλιστα, where the latter is obviously right.

τῶν πέρας ἔχόντων is correct: the par-

ticular proportions belong to the πέρας. Elsewhere they are called περατοιδή.

ὕβριν γάρ που] There seems no occasion for που: it is not improbable that Plato wrote: γάρ ποτε.

ἢ σὴ θεός] The notion that ἡ Ήδὸς is a personification of the third γένος as ὁρθὴ κοινωνία is sufficiently refuted by the appeal to Philebus, which could only be made because *his* goddess was in question. It is so probable that σὴ was lost in consequence of its nearness to ἡ, and it seems so necessary for the sense, that I have restored it conjecturally.

πέρας ἔχόντων οὐθ' ἡδονῶν] πέρας οὐτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὐτε κλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἔχόντων ἔδειτο. Such is the reading of the Bodleian and the two MSS. which mostly agree with it. It is utterly out of construction, and even Stallbaum appears to be only half in earnest in defending it. The inferior copies have ἔχοντ', which I regard as a conjecture, such as one often finds from the hands of the more recent scribes; nor are they always unfortunate ones. But of what use can ἔχοντε be to us? Law and order are the limit in this case, and can scarcely be said to *have* it. I have therefore accepted ἔχόντων as right, but in its wrong place; that is omitted by accident, and then restored to a part of the text to which it did



ἵδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν  
C πέρας ἔθετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῆς αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ-  
ναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω. σοὶ δ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, πῶς φαίνεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτ' εἴρηκα, εἰ ξυνοεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' οἶμαι κατανοεῖν· ἐν μὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ  
ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἐν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσι· τρί-  
τον δ' οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ πληθὸς σε, ὦ Θαναμάσιε, ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ  
D τρίτου γέννης. καὶ τοι πολλὰ γε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον παρέσχετο  
[γένη], ὅμως δ' ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου  
γένει ἐν ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας † οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτ' ἐδυσκο-  
λαίνομεν ὥς οὐκ ἦν ἐν φύσει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἐν τούτῳ τι-  
θέντα, τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν [εἰς] οὐσ[ί]αν ἐκ τῶν  
μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειρασμένων μέτρων.

not belong, after the second πέρας in-  
stead of the first.

ἀποκναῖσαι] Plato uses this word in  
Rep. 406, B, for *to enfeeble*. In comedy  
it occurs in the sense of *to bore to  
death*. There is no evidence of its  
being 'verbum palæstricum,' as Winkel-  
mann supposes; at least, not in the  
sense he intends by his paraphrase,  
'Deam Voluptatem rationibus et argu-  
mentis tanquam ictibus percussam con-  
cidisse.' The sense is, *and you say  
that she has enfeebled them* (πάντας),  
*but I affirm that she has saved them*.  
Though if we durst insert ἡμᾶς after  
αὐτήν, the *Asio te Aeacida* ambiguity  
of the syntax, which has led more  
than one scholar a strange dance,  
would be removed by the *order* of the  
two accusatives.

γέννης] The Books have γενέσεως,  
and one editor informs us that πληθὸς  
τῆς γενέσεως means αἱ πολλαὶ γενέ-  
σεις. If so, πληθὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου will  
be an equally elegant variation of οἱ  
πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι. Till this is certain,  
it will be more prudent to take the  
word which has occurred so often, and

always in the very same acceptance.

[γένη]] This supplement, which I have  
put in brackets, is in the true style of  
the interpolator.

οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν] This is a strange  
assertion after πέρας had been declared  
to contain 'every possible relation of  
number to number and measure to  
measure,' and the instances of it were  
said to be μυρία. I propose ὅτι for  
οὔτε, and οὔτοι ἐδ. for οὔτ' ἐδ.

γένεσιν κ. τ. ἄ.] "In order to un-  
derstand this passage, it is again ne-  
cessary to observe the same kind of  
distinction as was made in the case of  
πέρας between the *ἰσότης*, ἡμίσι, δι-  
πλοῦν, on the one side, and the *in-  
stances of it in Nature* on the other.  
τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, is here equi-  
valent to the instances; these are also  
included under the term γένεσις εἰς  
οὐσίαν, by which is implied that every  
existing thing arises from this combina-  
tion. They are said to arise ἐκ τῶν  
μέτρων, from the *proportions*, or *pro-  
portionate quantities and degrees*, ἀπειρ-  
γασμένων μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος, *which are  
effected simultaneously with the πέρας*

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθόν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτόν τι τότ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι γένος σκεπτέον. κοινή δ' ἡ σκέψις· ὅρα γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς [τούτου] γίγνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιούντος φύσις οὐδὲν [πλὴν ὀνόματι] τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἷτιον ὁρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον [ἔν];

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὖ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον οὐ- 27 δὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νῦν δὴ, διαφέρον εὐρήσομεν. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν αἰεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ [γιγνόμενον] ἐκείνῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταῦτόν αἰτία τ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δου-  
λεῖον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτία.

(Proportion in the abstract), for as soon as ever the πέρας enters into anything, its properties immediately receive their due proportion. The whole passage may therefore be translated, — *But understand me to mean by the third kind the whole produce of these two, considering all such produce as one, as a coming into being, derived from the proportions produced along with the Limit.* On looking over this old note, I feel but one misgiving; and that is as to my implied approval of the words γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν. As every γένεσις must be εἰς οὐσίαν, understanding οὐσία in a lower sense as a γεγενημένη οὐσία, (see *inf.* 27, B), the redundancy is in itself suspicious; but this suspicion becomes still more serious, when we reflect that according to Greek usage this kind of apposition would be connected by a participle; for it is not a description appended, but a reason for the previous name. ἔχοντον γένεσιν δὲ would of course by attraction become ἔ. γένεσιν οὐσαν.

πρὸς τοῖς τρισί] τοῖς has been at last inserted before τρισί, *invisis codicibus*.  
χωρὶς [τούτου] The attempts to de-

ferend τούτου are conclusive against it. χωρὶς is used adverbially, *ut seccentians*.  
ὁρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον [ἔν]] The sentence which ends thus, consists of two parts, the first in which Cause and that which makes are affirmed to have no difference as to nature, and the second in which the two names are said to be convertible. The first has been confused with the second by the intrusion of πλὴν ὀνόματι, borrowed from below. This makes Plato say, "that there is no difference in their essence, except their name," which is like saying, there is no difference in their stature, except their complexion. The second part is made ungrammatical by the intrusion of ἔν; for if τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ αἷτιον are both of them subjects, λεγόμενα is indispensable. But what a clumsy way of saying, "that you can apply either name indifferently" is this? "The Maker and the Cause would rightly be called one." Nor can λεγόμενον ἂν εἴη be used for λέγουσ' ἂν with ἔν or with any name we may apply occasionally, but only where some declaration of a name to be permanently borne henceforth is intended.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γινόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

B ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγωμεν τέταρτον, [τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ἱκανῶς ἕτερον ὃν ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς μὲν ἔχει, διωρισμένων τῶν τετάρτων, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μνήμης ἕνεκα ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ καταριθμήσασθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγεννημένην οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἄρα μὴ πλημ-  
C μελοῖν ἂν τι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

[τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ἱκ. ἕτερον ὃν] See from the other three Classes is that on which the whole stress of the sentence falls. But it was not necessary to change λέγωμεν into λέγομεν. I did so, because the rules of dialogue are very strictly observed by Plato, and therefore Protarchus would have to answer to λέγωμεν. But why should he not answer to both that and ἕτερον, by the adoption of both readings? For γὰρ οὖν compare in this Dialogue 14, B. 16, B. 17, C. 30, C. D. 32, C.

Addenda.  
ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν] The inferior MSS. have λέγωμεν γὰρ οὖν. Stallbaum, who is always haunted by a perverse suspicion that the older MSS. are full of grammatical corrections (a fact notoriously truer of the recent copies), prefers the latter, and asserts that γὰρ οὖν is better suited to λέγωμεν than to ἕτερον. But if λέγωμεν means anything, it means βούλει λέγωμεν (it *could* not be used for λέγειν ἡμῖν ἔξοστι), and is therefore a proposal; and γὰρ οὖν is not, and cannot be, used in the assent to a proposal; whereas in the admission of a thing proved, nothing is more common. The drift of the whole argument confirms the correctness of the Bodleian ἕτερον. ποιοῦν precedes, ποιούμενον follows, but ποιοῦν=αἰτία and ποιούμενον=δουλεῖον κ. τ. ἔ. Therefore αἰτία and δουλεῖον are different. Now our first three Classes belonged to the ποιοόμενα=γινόμενα, or their elements, and as ποιοῦν is different from these, it has a right to a separate (fourth) Class. (Strictly speaking only one Class, the third, is γινόμενον, and for that reason he uses the expression δουλεῖον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίας, in order to include the first and second, and in like manner he speaks of τὰ γινόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται.) The distinctness then of Cause

and its two followers have no μὴ. But as it is easier to account for its omission in some copies than for its interpolation in others, there is *prima facie* evidence in its favour; for, although μή and μή ποτε are very common forms of interrogation among the lower Greeks, ἄρα μὴ is a colloquial Atticism, of which they could know nothing save from books. The following passages will shew the manner in which this form of interrogation is used, and that it is employed alike where the speaker is uncertain of the answer, and where he merely demands an assent on which he has a right to reckon: *Phaedo* 64, c (twice) and *Parmenides* 163, c (in these instances ἄλλο τι makes the question negative) *Phaedo* 103, c. *Crito* 44, E. *Charmides* 174, A.

ἄρα μὴ πλημμελοῖν] The Bodleian and its two followers have no μὴ. But as it is easier to account for its omission in some copies than for its interpolation in others, there is *prima facie* evidence in its favour; for, although μή and μή ποτε are very common forms of interrogation among the lower Greeks, ἄρα μὴ is a colloquial Atticism, of which they could know nothing save from books. The following passages will shew the manner in which this form of interrogation is used, and that it is employed alike where the speaker is uncertain of the answer, and where he merely demands an assent on which he has a right to reckon: *Phaedo* 64, c (twice) and *Parmenides* 163, c (in these instances ἄλλο τι makes the question negative) *Phaedo* 103, c. *Crito* 44, E. *Charmides* 174, A.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος; καὶ τί ποτε βουληθέντες εἰς ταῦτ' ἀφικόμεθα; ἄρ' οὐ τὸδ' ἦν; δευτερεῖα ἐζητοῦμεν πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγναι [ἂν] ἢ φρονήσεως. οὐχ οὕτως ἦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦθ' οὕτω διειλόμεθα, κάλλιον ἂν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσάμεθα πρώτον περὶ καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἠμφισβητήσαμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως. ἦν οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὁρῶμέν που τίς τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖον γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μέρος γ' αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου, οἶμαι, γένους. οὐ γὰρ δυοῖν τινοῖν ἐστὶ μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ ξυμπάντων τῶν ἀπειρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδμεένων, ὥστ' ὁρθῶς ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος ἐκείνου γίγναιτ' ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰεν. τί δ' ὁ σός, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡδὺς καὶ ἄμικτος ὧν; Εἰ ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος ὁρθῶς ἂν ποτε λέγοιτο; ὥδε δ' ἀπόκριναί μοι πρὶν ἀπορήνασθαι.

γίγναιτ'] As the direct question is proved.' The answer to this objection not, "to whom *would* the second prize belong" but, "to whom *does* it," (πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνεται ἢ φρονήσεως;) the dependent question should take the optative *without* ἂν. I have accordingly expelled ἂν, *invisis codicibus*.

μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο] As the whole γένος is meant, of which the βίος is a part, it is plain that the common reading, μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος, is a blunder of the copyist. The correction was long ago proposed by Schlütz. It may be objected: 'If *all* mixtures belong to the κοινὸν γένος, of course the μικτὸς βίος does so: but, as Socrates has only shewn that the κοινὸν γένος contains all mixtures of a particular kind, namely τῶν ἀπειρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδμεένων, unless he can first shew that this βίος is compounded of ἀπειρον and πέρας, his case is not proved.' The answer to this objection is, that the fourfold division professes to be exhaustive; there are no other elements in any mixed thing, than these two: consequently, if any thing is found mixed, we may at once conclude that it is compounded of ἀπειρον and πέρας. But later on, though we learn that ἡδονή is of the ἀπειρα, νοῦς is declared to be of close kin to αἰτία, the fourth Class. To this apparent contradiction I make answer that νοῦς has more than one relation to τὰ γινόμενα. In that it blends with the qualities of matter, and appears as consciousness, it is πέρας; in that it controls and adapts matter to its ends, it appears as σοφία, and as such resembles the σοφία of the Universal νοῦς, which is αἰτία. This remark will prepare the reader for the next turn in the dialogue.

ΦΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἦδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχεται; ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦττον δεχομένων ἐστόν;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πανάγαθον ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

28 ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γ' ἂν, ὦ Φίληβε, λύπη πάγκακον· ὥστ' ἄλλο τι νῦν ἴσχεπτόν ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν, ὡς παρέχεται τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦ. τοῦτο δέ σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γεγονὸς ἔστω. φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Πρώταρχε τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν θέντες οὐκ ἂν ἀσεβοῖμεν; οὐ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσασι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

B ΦΙ. Σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαυτοῦ θεόν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὴν σεαυτοῦ· τὸ δ' ἐρωτώμενον ὁμῶς ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὦ Φίληβε, καὶ αὐτῷ πειστέον.

ΦΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σύ, Πρώταρχε, προήρησαι λέγειν;

πανάγαθον] πᾶν ἀγαθόν is the reading of the MSS. But whether this be taken, like πᾶς ἀναγός in Soph. *Œd. B.* 823, as *good throughout*, or as being *all the good* that is in the world, and therefore *the only good*, neither of these facts would prove that it was without limit; for it might be all good so far as it went, and yet not go very far, or it might have an exclusive title to the name, and yet be ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε. Nothing therefore can be truer or more necessary than Bekker's corrections, πανάγαθον and πάγκακον. In Philebus' creed ἡδονὴ is simply the very best and λύπη the very worst thing.

Οὐδέ γ' ἂν, ὦ Φ.] Socrates' just and ingenious retort supplies the omission in Philebus' answer, and brings us to the twofold conclusion that pleasure and pain are in their own nature without limit, and that this want of a limit, since it admits pain as well as pleasure, the supposed evil as well as the supposed good, cannot be that in which the good of pleasure consists,

for as it is alike the condition of both opposites, it cannot belong to either of them to the exclusion of the other.

σκεπτόν . . ὥς] Some Editors have changed ὥς into ὅ without authority. If σκεπτόν could be used in the sense of "we must look for", this would have been a plausible change. But this sense it cannot have; and therefore the suspicion falls upon σκεπτόν itself. It is possible that λεκτέον or ὑποληπτέον is the right reading, either of which would require ὥς.

τοῦτο δέ] The MSS. have τοῦτων δέ. τοῦτων is a blunder due to τῶν ἀπεράντων. I have substituted δέ for δὴ, because we need the conjunction to oppose τοῦτο to ἄλλο τι. γεγονὸς ἔστω is somewhat unusual for ὡμολογησῶ εἶναι.

ὦ Φίληβε] The accidental omission of these words in the Bodleian, has supplied Stallbaum with another confirmation of his strange theory that the better MSS. have undergone the revision of fastidious critics. Fastidious critics in the eleventh century must have been *rare aves*.

**ΠΡΩ.** Πάνυ γε· νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορῶ, καὶ δέομαί γ', ὃ Σώκρατες, αὐτόν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτην, [ἵνα] μὴ δὴ ἡμεῖς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες παρὰ μέλος φθεγγώμεθα τι.

**ΣΩ.** Πειστέον, ὃ Πρώταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἐπι- C τάττεις. ἀλλ' ὄντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε Φίληβος, σεμνύ- των [ἐν τῷ παλίζειν] ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος ὁποῖον γένους εἶεν.

**ΠΡΩ.** Παντάσασί γ', ὃ Σώκρατες.

**ΣΩ.** Ἀλλὰ μὴν ῥάδιον. πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σο- φοί, ἑαυτοὺς ὄντως σεμνύοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ὥσως εὖ λέγουσι. διὰ μακροτέρων δ', εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα.

**ΠΡΩ.** Λέγ' ὅπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ἡμῖν ὑπολογιζό- D μενος, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐκ ἀπεχθισόμενος.

**ΣΩ.** Καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξώμεθα δέ πως ὧδ' ἐπανερωτῶντες.

**ΠΡΩ.** Πῶς;

**ΣΩ.** Πότερον, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὄλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν· ἢ τάναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τινα θαυμαστὴν ἀντατίττουσαν διακυβερεῖν;

**ΠΡΩ.** Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὃ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες, ὃ μὲν E

[ἵνα] μὴ δὴ . . . φθ. τι] The MSS. have ἵνα μὴδέν. This μὴδέν must belong to φθεγγώμεθα, because μὴδέν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες would be the very contrary of that which he dreads. But μὴδέν and τι are incompatible, except in the combined form μὴδ' ἐν τι, which is foreign to our purpose. The most probable correction seems to be [ἵνα] μὴ δὴ, ἵνα having been supplied after μὴ δὴ was corrupted. ἵνα δὴ and μὴ δὴ are used where the person addressed is appealed to as to the reasonable nature of the thing expected or feared.

[Πειστέον κ. τ. εἰ.] The connection of the clauses is this. "You thought it difficult, because I frightened you."—"You certainly did."—"Nay but it is easy." I have therefore removed the sign

of interrogation after εἶεν. The words ἐν τῷ παλίζειν are very suspicious. They explain what might be left to the intelligence of the hearer, and force σεμνύων to stand alone, whereas σεμνύων ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος is not a very violent displacement of the natural order, and any reader will see why it is made.

[ὑπολογιζόμενος] This is properly a term of book-keeping, and is used of anything which we set against the account of profit, such as χλιδυνος, κό- νος &c. ἀπεχθάνομαι, I give offence.

[Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν] When Socrates offers to Protarchus the alternative belief either in capricious and hap-hazard power, and mere accident, as that which has the universe in its keeping, or in mind and marvellous intelligence, as

ἐν ἀρχῇ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι μοι φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ τῆς ὕψους τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποιμι οὐδ' ἂν δοξάσαιμι.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δὴτ' ἔτι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν [ὁμολο-  
29 γούμενον] ξυμφῶμεν, ὡς ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μὴ μόνον οἰώ-  
μεθα δεῖν τὰλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκιν-  
δυνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φῇ ταῦτα  
μὴ οὕτως ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην;

that which arranges and regulates it, we expect Protarchus to reject the former, and approve the latter supposition. Now Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is a most complete rejection, and so is οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι μοι φαίνεται; but there is in the received text a fatal want of distinctness as to *what* he rejects; for Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is left by itself, and οὐδ' ὅσιον is predicated of ὅ . . σὺ . . λέγεις. This shews that the copyists cannot have done their duty. The difference of the readings is remarkable. Bodl. ὁ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν δὴ λέγεις; Coisl. ὁ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις; Eusebius, ὁ μὲν γὰρ δὴ σὺ λέγεις. It will be seen that they all three concur in μὲν γὰρ, which is the source of all the difficulty. But Eusebius' ΜΕΝΓΑΡΑΗ I take to have been the first deflection from the true reading ΜΕΝΕΝΑΡΧΗ, and the νῦν δὴ of the best MS. will justify the change of λέγεις into ἔλεγες. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is properly, *Nothing like*, and is so used by Isocrates. 270 init. (Steph.) 277 med. 279 med. 241 extr. (τῶν αὐτῶν) and περὶ Ἀντ. p. 802. Lips. 1825. We may here render it by *Nothing of the kind*, or *Nothing like the fact*.

Βούλα δὴτ' ἔτι καὶ ἡμεῖς] *Do you wish, then, that we also should agree in affirming that which is professed by the ancients before mentioned?* I have changed δὴτὰ τι into δὴτ' ἔτι; τι, which the inferior MSS. omit, is quite foreign to the sentence, while ἔτι καὶ in this sense is of continual occurrence in Plato and other writers.

[ὁμολογούμενον] The MSS. generally agree in this reading. Schleiermacher

reads ὁμολογούμενα, some worthless copies ὁμολογούμενοις. But if we adopt -μενα or -μενον, we must have the article, and the perfect is more correct, as Theodoret quotes it, ὁμολογημένοις; and lastly, whether Anaxagoras be meant, or, as I suspect, some older seer or poet, it is not proper to speak of the first expounders of a dogma as ὁμολογούντας. Some one may propose ὁμολογούμενοι, *agreeing with*, but this is said of *things* that agree, not of *persons*. It is wonderful that no one has seen that ξυμφημι is followed by a dative in its own right, and that ὁμολογεῖν, in whatever form you use it, introduces either a tautology or a redundancy.

ξυμφῶμεν] MSS. give ξυμφήσωμεν. It is true we have ξυνέφησε μοις, *Rep.* 242, ε, and in *Sophist.* 236, δ, πρὶς τὸ ταχὺ ξυμφῆσαι—but as to the first example, we have ξυνέφη both preceding and following it, and as to the second, the whole clause is an interpolation. In *Timæus* 72, δ, ξυμφήσαντος may be defended on the ground that the God does not simply assent to their doctrine, but *reasserts* it with higher authority. Where *assertion* is intended, we find the form ἔφησα, so that practically it is an aorist of φάσκειν, but for this very reason ξυμφημι would seldom want any such inflexion. ξυμφῶμεν in this place is to be looked upon as a present tense, like οἴωμεθα, ξυγκινδυνεύωμεν, μετέχωμεν.

τὰλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν] This is evidently a proverbial phrase, slightly changed, probably from *ἐστιν*.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν λόγον ἄρει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἀπάντων τῶν ζώων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα, καθορῶμένον, καὶ γῆν, καθάπερ Β οἱ χειμαζόμενοι φασιν [, ἐνόητα ἐν τῇ συστάσει].

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ὑπ' ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνδε.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι μικρὸν τε [τούτων ἕκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν] ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον, [καὶ] οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εὐλικρινὲς ὄν, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν ἐνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταυτόν. οἷον πῦρ μὲν ἔστι που παρ' ἡμῖν, ἔστι δ' ἐν τῷ παντί.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μικρὸν μὲν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενὲς C καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ παντί πλήθει τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀληθὲς δ' λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται [ἐκ τούτου] καὶ ἄρχεται τὸ τοῦ παντός πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρός; ἢ τοῦναντίον ὑπ' ἐκείνου τό τ' ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἅπαντ' ἴσχει ταῦτα;

[ἐνόητα ἐν τῇ συστάσει.] If this means the σύστασις of our bodies, it is an idle repetition; if of the Universe, it comes too soon. The question is, not whether we see the Elements in composition, but whether we see them at all; that they are περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν is assumed as the general belief. He argues from the elements παρ' ἡμῖν, which we do see, to the same elements ἐν τῷ παντί. The sentence which I have relieved of this burden affords us the very ἐνεστι from which the interpolator helped himself above. "It is present here in small quantity and poor quality," and then the double nature of this φαῦλον is shewn; it is *impure* and *feeble in its effects*. This connexion is spoiled, and the grammar made to suffer, by the intrusion of καί.

[τούτων ἑ. π. ἡ.] Note the miserable repetition περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν . . . τούτων ἕκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν in one sentence, for this is virtually the case, since ὅτι depends on λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνδε. [ἐκ τούτου] ἐκ τ. is quite suitable to γίγνεται, but by no means to τρέφεται; when we omit the words, the sentence becomes ten times more elegant and forcible, ὑπὸ being quite appropriate enough for the three verbs taken together.



ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς.

Δ ΣΩ. Ὅρθως· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐρεῖς, οἶμαι, περὶ τε [τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις] γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ παντί· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων †δὴ πάντων ὅσων ἠρώτησα ὀλίγον ἐμπροσθεν, οὕτως ἀποκρινεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἂν ποτε φανείη;

ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδ' ὅστισοῦν. ἀλλὰ τῷ μετὰ τοῦθ' ἐξῆς ἔπον. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντ' ἄρ' οὐκ εἰς ἐν συγκείμενα ἰδόντες ἐπωνομάσαμεν σῶμα;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

Ε ΣΩ. Ταῦτόν δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦθ' ὃν κόσμον λέγομεν. [διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν εἴη που σῶμα, σύνθετον ὃν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τούτου, τρέφεται τε καί, ὅσα νῦν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἵπομεν, εἵληφέ τε καὶ ἴσχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦθ' ἕτερον, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως.

30 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τόδ' ἄρ' ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τὸ ποῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἄρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀῖνον ὅτι φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὃ φιλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἶπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ

Ὅρθως] Compare *syf.* 53, A. In instances of this kind, we must not take this word as merely expressive of assent, but rather of satisfaction that the argument is advancing as was intended. This will justify the use of γὰρ in the next clause.—The designations τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις (*syf.* 31, D) and τῆς ἐνθάδε both apply to γῆς; but one would be sufficient, and the latter is better here as contrasting with τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί. In place of καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων I suspect that we ought to read καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ περὶ πάντων.—I have changed τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο into τῷ μ. τ.

[διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γ. τρόπον] The cause of its being a body is given in σύνθετον ὃν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. Therefore the causal διὰ seems out of place here as

well as unsuited to τρόπον. We should rather have expected κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, but τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον expresses nearly the same thing. The copyist was perhaps thinking of διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.

ὅσα νῦν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἵπομεν] This refers to καὶ γίνεταί καὶ ἀρχεται. But περὶ αὐτῶν is surely out of place; for that, concerning which they are speaking here, is τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα, and though that σῶμα contains the four elements, those elements have already passed out of the argument.—ἴσχει is both better supported than ἔχει, and more appropriate, as Socrates is speaking of a *continual* derivation.

Πόθεν] The reasons given seem to be two "The Universe has a soul, for

παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὃν ἐτύγγανε, ταῦτά γ' ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρ' ἐκείνα, †πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν \*\* καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν [ψυχὴν B τε παρέχον] καὶ σωμασκήαν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος

what else could have given us our souls?" and "The Universe has a soul, because it has all that we have in greater perfection". But the latter alone is intended. "If *we* have a soul, the Universe which has all that we have &c. must likewise have one". πάντῃ refers to quantity, purity, intensity &c. mentioned above.

Οὐ γάρ που] The subject of ἐπικαλεῖσθαι is evidently *Cause*. But if so, there is no predicate to τέτταρα ἐκείνα. To remedy this, some propose to read ὄντα before τέτταρα; but neither Grammar nor Logic allows such a contrivance. Not Grammar, because if Plato had intended the clause to be taken absolutely, he would certainly have written ὄντων τῶν τεττάρων. Nor Logic, for if we were to take it thus: "Seeing that these four are"—we should immediately ask "are *where*"? If παρ' ἡμῖν, that could not be omitted. If every where, that is as yet unproved, nay the very thing to be proved, for in the next sentence of Socrates the conclusion is stated ὡς ἔστιν ἄπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ κ. τ. ἔ. There can be no doubt that the four γένῃ ought to be mentioned, else how can he make any conclusion about them? So that the words τὰ τ. ἐκείνα are not an interpolation. On the other hand we know that there is an hiatus in the best MS., for it omits πέρας, and though the others have it, it is just as likely that in these it was supplied by conjecture. But the hiatus may have been far greater than that of one word. My impression is that the text in this place was in a very bad condition even in remote times, and that all which intervened between ἐκείνα and καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος was unreadable. The place was then filled up pretty nearly as we find it. But not correctly: for the

enumeration of these γένῃ *without an article* is in itself most unlikely, and if κοινὸν had been mentioned here, it is scarcely credible that Protarchus should so very soon afterwards beg to be reminded what κοινὸν meant. I believe that a more probable mode of filling up the gap would be in this fashion: τὰ τέτταρα ἐκείνα ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν μόνοις εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν κ. τ. ἔ.

[ψυχὴν τε παρέχον]] He argues that αἰτία here below enjoys *many and various appellations of σοφία* (as we say σοφός παιδοτρέβης, ἱατρός, τέκτων, γαλκεύς, and so forth) and he divides the operations of αἰτία under two heads of *combining* and *repairing* (συντιθέν καὶ ἀκούμενον) and gives an example of each in σωμασκήαν ἐμποιοῦν and ἱατρικήν (ἐμποιούν). It is evident throughout that he is speaking of the human ψυχὴ being enabled by this αἰτία to work on our inferior elements by introducing πέρας into the ἄπειρα, and, when the μέτρον thus introduced has been disturbed, by readjusting it; in other words he is speaking of *human skill*. And, pray, what human skill can be said ψυχὴν παρέχον? But some Greek reader, who did not understand the argument, saw something about cause, and something about σῶμα, and thought it was a pity that the ψυχὴ should be missing, and so by his ψυχὴν τε παρέχον he killed all the sense of the passage. The application of these facts concerning human skill to a higher skill must be carefully noted. He does not say "there must be *some other higher effects* elsewhere"; but "we know of certain effects; we know that there is a φύσις τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμωτάτων (i.e. the planets and the whole Heavens) and *this must be an*

ιατρικήν, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθέν καὶ ἀκούμενον, πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι· τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δ' οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν.

C ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν [εἰ μὴ τοῦτο,] μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν ἐπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγομεν, ὥς ἔστιν, ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἅπειρόν τ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολὺ, καὶ πέρας ἱκανόν, καὶ τις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐναντούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆρας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιοτάτ' ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Δικαιοτάτα δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Σοφία μὲν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοίσθην.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φέσει βασιλικήν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δ' ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλά, καθ' ὃ φίλον ἐκάστοις λέγεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην δόξης, ὃ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλοι ἀποσφραγμένοις ὥς αἰεὶ τοῦ παντός νοῦς ἄρχει, ξύμμαχος ἐκείνοις.

effect of this same αἰτία operating in a higher ψυχή." Ast's Lexicon will give the student several examples of ἄρα in this kind of reasoning, where we would show the absurdity of denying in one case, what has been admitted in another less evident case. I should prefer ἐν ὅλῳ τε τῷ οὐρανῷ.

[εἰ μὴ τοῦτο]] These words are out of construction, and redundant. Let them be restored to the margin, or, better still, be forgotten. In this sentence the reader will perceive the playful way in which ἅπειρον is called πολὺ, and πέρας ἱκανόν, and αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, and will be able to judge of the worth of Winckelmann's conjecture, when he proposes to foist κοινὸν without an ἐπιθετ into the text.

Διός] Then Jove is subordinate to αἰτία. This looks like Pantheism, but

in the *Timaeus* we are told of a δημιουργὸς καὶ πατήρ by whom Jove and all other Deities were made. He too is not independent of αἰτία, for the αἰτία is given which caused him to make the world, namely that he was good, and since in that which is good there is no grudge, he begrudged not the world its being, but would have all things like himself. Thus the First Cause is The Good, but the δημιουργὸς does not owe his being to τὰγαδὲν = αἰτία; but through its presence in him he becomes the author of all things, including the Gods. Jove himself appears among these divine beings whom he addresses thus: Θεοί, ὅσων ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἅτε δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα, ἅλута ἐμοῦ γ' ἐξέλοντος—for so the passage ought to be read. *Tim.* 41, A.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ ζητήσῃ πεπορικῶς ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι τοῦς ἐστὶ γυνούστῃς τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου λεχθέντος. [τῶν τεττάρων ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τούτῳ.] ἔχεις γὰρ δῆπου νῦν ἡμῶν ἥδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔχω καὶ μάλ' ἱκανῶς· καὶ τοί με ἀποκρινάμενος ἔλαθες.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάπαντα γάρ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίνεται ἐνίοθ' ἡ παιδιά.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Νοῦς δὴ πον, ὦ ἐταῖρε, οὗ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα 31 ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν δεδῆλωται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἡδονῆς γ' ὡσαύτως πάλαι τὸ γένος ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Μεμνώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι τοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν συγγενῆς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἡδονῇ δ' ἄπειρός τ' αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτ' ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μῆδ' ἔξοντός ποτε γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνησόμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; B

ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τούτου, ἐν ᾧ τ' ἐστὶν ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν, καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον, ὁπότε γίγνησθον, ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς· πρῶτον τὴν ἡδονήν· ὥσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον ἐβασανίσασμεν, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα. λύπης δ' αὖ χωρὶς τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθ' ἱκανῶς βασανίσαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ ταύτῃ χρὴ πορεύεσθαι, ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα.

γυνούστῃς] This word is quoted from this passage by the lexicographers. It is not formed according to analogy, and offers no meaning but what γυνήτης would have supplied. It may have arisen from a dittographia, γένους, γυνήτης.—I once thought that Stallbaum's conjecture, when he put a stop after λεχθέντος and supplied δὲ after τεττάρων, was undoubtedly right. I now see in the words τῶν τεττάρων ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τούτῳ a marginal note, on which all correction is thrown away. ἔχεις γάρ ought to follow immediately upon the statement of the ἀπόκρισις, in place of being separated from it by this reference, which is itself quite superfluous. ταῦτα πρότερα] Namely, *where it is to be found existing, and how it arises.* Henceforth, pleasure is no longer considered as an abstraction, and belonging to the class of ἀπειρα, but as having come into being, and consequently as belonging to the κοινά.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρι;

C ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἅμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινὸν δέ γ', ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, ὑπομίμησθε ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δηλοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἔσται ταῦτ' εἰς δύναμιν, ὃ θαυμάσιε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁ μετὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες; ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;

D ΣΩ. Κάλῃστ' εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δ' ὃ τι μάλιστ' ἦδη πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν, τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις, ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν λέγεις εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' ἁρμοσσομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἱσχυροῦσης, ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι' ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὃ τι τάχιστα ζηθῆναι.

E ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν σε ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐμφανέστερον δ' ἔτι ταῦτά ταῦτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσια που καὶ περιφανῆ ἔχστον συνοεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Πείνη μὲν που λύσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

[ἐπισύσσης] The same word is again ὀδόν, and τὴν ἀναχώρησιν, I should be used below of the same thing, and there inclined to write πάλιν λύσσης, or ἐπα- also with πάλιν. The expression seems νιούσης, which last is perhaps more like strange for a return to a natural state. the text.  
On the faith of εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν

ΣΩ. Αίψος δ' αὖ φθορά καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθῆν πληροῦσα δύναμις, ἡδονή. διάκρισις 32 δὲ [γ'] αὖ καὶ [διάλυσις] ἡ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη· κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἡ ῥίγους πάλιν ἀπόδοσις τε καὶ ψῦξις, ἡδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ [ρίγους] ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζώου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις, λύπη. πάλιν δ' ἑῖς ταῦτ' ἀπιδόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδός, ἡδονή. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος, ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονός εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρό- B σθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δ' αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων, ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τιν' ἔχειν.

[διάλυσις] This differs so little in sense from διάκρισις that it is useless, and moreover it answers to nothing in the antithesis. The opposites are διάκρισις = ἀπόδοσις, παρὰ φύσιν = κατὰ φύσιν, πνίγους πάθη = ψῦξις, λύπη = ἡδονή. In this scheme the only word that suggests any scruple is ἀπόδοσις; a word which conveys no meaning unless we are told what is τὸ ἀποδιδόμενον. That is to say, we want a genitive, and it must be the genitive of that which is opposed to πνίγος. But, for this we need not look very far, for in the very next speech we have ῥίγους, where it is as much in the way as it would be serviceable here. It seems almost certain that we should read ἡ ῥίγους πάλιν ἀπόδοσις τε καὶ ψῦξις, ἡδονή.

[ρίγους] See the preceding note. But a more serious difficulty is offered by εἰς ταῦτ' ἀπιδόντων, which is doubtful not only because of the preposition ἀπό, but also because the plural refers to nothing yet mentioned; nor does ταῦτ' satisfy me, for, though εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντων would do very well for the meeting of things separated, here the natural way is that of separation, as is plain from the nature of the case, and from the word διακρινομένων.

Schleiermacher, in view of Stobæus' reading, εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν, for εἰς ταῦτ' ὁδόν, conjectured εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν. Stallbaum finds every thing to his mind: ἀπιδόντων is said of τῶν ὑγρῶν, implied in ὑγρότης, and εἰς ταῦτ' is "to the same state in which they were before". The reader will observe that there may be as much rashness in defence as in attack. Our only guide is the antithesis, in which τῆς ὑγρότης πῆξις can only answer to τῆς ὑγρότης διάκρισις. From this it would appear to follow that πάλιν δὲ ταύτης διακρινομένης was the original reading. Or perhaps it was πάλιν δὲ τῶν παγόντων διακρινομένων: but at all events it was something very different from what we now read on the authority of some unknown person who did his best to patch up a reading from his damaged copy. In what follows, the construction is purposely loose, in order to admit of more detail, and especially to prevent the φθορά being understood of anything save the dissolution of the compound formed from the union of τὸ ἄπειρον and πέρας: hence also the double μὲν and its double apodosis.

[τύπον] A general outline of truth. See Trendelenburg's *Excerpta*, where there is a very good note on the word.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέρους.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖσθω.

ΣΩ. Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν  
C παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων [ἐλπίζομενον]  
ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερόν καὶ ἀλ-  
γεῖνόν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οἷν τοῦθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἕτερον εἶ-  
δος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος [αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς] διὰ προσδοκίας  
γιγνόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἶμαι, κατὰ γε τὴν  
ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέσι θ' ἑκατέροις γιγνομένοις, τῶς δοκεῖ, καὶ

[ἐλπίζομενον] It is not the expected thing, but the state of expectation which is either painful or pleasant. Nor can we put τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπίζομενον for τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπίσεως πάθος with any shadow of propriety.

[αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς] Protarchus' answer is an admission that there is another species of pain and pleasure *independent of the body*, for so he varies the expression of that which Socrates had called αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς. But this variety does not satisfy the sciolist; so he gives us a tautology in its place, by again repeating αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς.

Ὅρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γάρ] The γάρ after ὁρθῶς ὑπέλαβες shews that a certain satisfaction is implied. See above 29, D.

ἐν γ. τούτοις οἶμαι] It is commonly supposed that Socrates is here speaking of the προσδοκήματα alone; but it would be strange that he should speak of these as pure, and unmingled with pleasure and pain, just after he has made them appear as one kind of them. Nor is it easy to see why he should lay so much stress on this particular εἶδος, as expecting from it a solution of the whole question. ἐν τούτοις however manifestly means not ἐν τούτοις τοῖς προσδοκήμασι, but ἐν τούτοις τοῖς εἶδεσσι, for it follows immediately on Protarchus' ἕτερον εἶδος. But ἑκατέροις cannot be so applied, because ταῦτα here involving only two εἶδη, each of them would be ἑκάτερον. This is one difficulty; and here is another. Socrates cannot speak of either εἶδος

as unmingled with pain and pleasure, since they are kinds of them. But the plurals εἰλικρινέσι &c., if they do not refer to εἶδεσσι, must refer to λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς; and by substituting this emendation for λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, we get rid of both difficulties at once. It may appear somewhat bold to change so many terminations, but only to those who are unfamiliar with the wholesale dealing of the ancient correctors, who would think themselves quite justified in adapting all the neighbouring endings to τούτοις. I do not however admit this conjecture into the text, because, until we are certain about ὡς δοκεῖ, we must be content with uncertainty in every thing else. I once thought that these words meant, that Socrates wished to represent himself as not sure till after further examination whether he should find those pure and unmingled εἶδη, but in that case he would have said ἐὰν εὐρωμεν or οἷα μοι δοκῶ εὐ-  
ρῆσθαι or any thing sooner than ὡς δοκεῖ. If we adopt εἰλ. θ' ἑκατέραις γιγνομέναις καὶ ἀμίκτοις λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς, they will be the instrumental datives to ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι. Perhaps ὡς δοκεῖ is merely a gloss to κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν, before δόξαν was added by way of explanation.

οἶμαι, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν] The second of these phrases modifies the confident air of the first; there is therefore no redundancy, such as some have imagined to be purposely introduced to imitate ordinary conversation!

ἀμίκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν D ἐτέρῳ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν, ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ λύπῃ, καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δ' οὐκ ἀσπαστέον, ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ἦντα, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὅπη φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις ὅτι ταύτη πη δεῖ διαπορευθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν τόδε ξυνίδωμεν. [ὥς] εἶπερ ἦν-  
τως ἔστι τῶν γενομένων διαφθειρομένων μὲν [αὐτῶν] ἀλγηδῶν, E  
ἀνασωζομένων δ' ἡδονή, τῶν μήτε διαφθειρομένων μήτ' ἀνα-  
σωζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι, τίνα ποθ' ἔξιν δεῖ τότ' ἐν ἐκά-  
στοις εἶναι τοῖς ζώοις, ὅταν οὕτω σχῇ. σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων  
τὸν νοῦν εἰπέ· ἄρ' οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῇ τότε χρόνῳ  
ζῶον μήτε [τι] λυπεῖσθαι μήθ' ἡδεσθαι, μήτε μέγα μήτε  
σμικρόν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρὰ  
τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπουμένου. 33

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς τοτὲ μὲν] After δοτέον governing these several datives, the sentence requires ὅτι or ὥς; I have inserted the latter.

ἔστιν ὅπη] For the MS. reading ἔστιν ὅτε, which is a mere repetition of ἐνίστε, the nearest palaeographical change would be ἔστιν οὐ, the Y and T being often confounded; but the most appropriate and, in itself, a very probable change, is ἔστιν ὅπη, "on certain conditions". This I have admitted into the text.

διαπορευθῆναι] The argument is compared, as in many other parts of Plato, to a beast of the chase being tracked.

τῶν γενομένων] τὸ λεγόμενον is the reading of all MSS. and Edd. in place of my τῶν γενομένων. But without some qualifying adverb τ. λ. cannot be used in any other sense but "what is commonly said". And again αὐτῶν refers to no plural expressed or implied. Stallbaum tells us, first that αὐτῶν is put for

ἐκείνων (motive unknown) and that ἐκείνα are ὕγρον, πνίγος, ῥίγος and so forth. The reader need scarcely be reminded that ὕγρον and the rest *never perish*, but the γενέσεις from them do, and it is these γενέσεις, if ἐμψυχοί, which feel the pain or the pleasure of their jarring or blending. It is also usual to say ἀληθῶς λέγεται of statements and ὁντως ἔστι of facts, whereas here we have a confusion of the two. I have restored what in my opinion must have been the original text.

ὅταν οὕτω σχῇ] I have put σχῇ for ἔσχη; we want the sorist, and ἔσχη here is as misplaced as if we should ask a man, Πῶς ἔσχη;

μήτε [τι] λυπεῖσθαι] μήτε λυπεῖσθαι has no more right to τι than μήθ' ἡδεσθαι, and neither needs it.

ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη] ἡμῖν is the reading of the Coislinian and is much to be preferred to that of the Bodleian, ἡμῶν.



ΣΩ. Ἄγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνήσθαι· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν [μεμνήσθαι ταύτην] ἔσθ' ἡμῖν [ἢ μὴ]. βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπεράνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ποῖον.

ΣΩ. [Τῷ] τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν [ἐλομένῳ] βίον οἷσθ' ὥς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

B ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότ' ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἐλομένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ' οὕτως ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ θ' ὑπάρχοι, καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ οὐν εἰκός γ' οὔτε χαίρειν τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε τούναντίον.

ΣΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰσαυθις C ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι ᾗ, καὶ τῷ νῦν πρὸς τὰ δευτερεῖα, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνάμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσθήσομεν.

[μεμνήσθαι ταύτην] Protarchus is to try and remember this, because it is an important fact; not because it is important to remember it. The change from ταύτης, which the author of this foolish supplement saw above to ταύτην, which he certainly wrote, would almost make one suspect that he meant *μεμνήσθαι* for a passive. Just so in the *Politicus*, 286, c, we read, μὴ πρὸς ἄλλα τὰ μὴ καὶ χρίοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τῆς μετρητικῆς μέρος, ὃ τότε ἔφαμεν δεῖν μεμνήσθαι πρὸς τὸ πρόπον. But there the whole context shews that Plato wrote *μεμνήσθαι*.

[Τῷ] .. [ἐλομένῳ] This again has been borrowed from below, and placed here so that it makes ἀποκωλύειν govern a dative. As to οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει being used with the accusative suppressed, this is a common idiom. "*It is quite possible to live the intellectual life in this manner.*"

Οὐκοῦν οὕτως I ought not to have followed two previous editors in preferring οὗτος, which rests on no good authority. The argument runs thus: "This neutral life is compatible with pure intelligence; for the man who chose the life of intelligence was obliged to forego all delight. *In this way then* (this being so) it would be the very life which he *had already chosen*, and it would also probably be the nearest approach to the life of the Gods." The transition from the philosopher to the Gods is marked by ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ. The γε which has usurped the place of τε in the Editions, is absolutely without meaning.

ἐπισκεψόμεθα] This is Bekker's conjecture for ἐπισκεψώμεθα, which occurs in all the Books, but is both less suitable in itself, unusual with εἰσαυθις, which requires a future, and quite incompatible with προσθήσομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γ' ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφραμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστὶ γεγονότος.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ τι ποτ' ἔστι, πρότερον τᾶνα-ληπτέον. καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἰσθησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πῃ γενή-σασθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς φῆς;

ΣΩ. Θές τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελεῖν, ἀπαθῆ' κείνην ἑάσαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καὶ τιν' ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἰδίῳ τε καὶ κοινὸν ἐκατέρῃ.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φῶμέν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀρ' ὁρθότατ' ἐροῦμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

E

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβῃς ὡς λέγω λή-θης ἐνταῦθά που γένεσιν. ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος· ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὕτω γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ μὴτ' ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πῶ γίνεσθαι φάναι τιν' ἀποβολὴν ἄτοπον. ἡ γὰρ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ἀναληπτέον] Δηπτέον alone is the proper verb. Παραληπτέον would be just as unsuitable as ἀναληπτέον; for they are not going to receive the information from others, but to learn it by observation. Nor is it at all likely that Plato would play on the word ἀναλαμβάνειν, as denoting the proper function of μνήμη. I therefore conjecture πρότερον ἂν εἴη ληπτέον.

κατὰ τρόπον] This is the opposite of ἀπὸ τρόπου. See below, 84, A.

ἐνταῦθά που] Somewhere here,—i.e., in the state we have been describing.

By λήθης γένεσις is meant a state of forgetfulness arising out of a previous

opposite state. With this he contrasts that state of unconsciousness as to any particular impression which precedes αἰσθησις, and consequently μνήμη. The latter is described in order to bring into greater relief the proposition which he is now advancing, that Desire being of the opposite to that which is present, as the body is taken up with that which is present, the mind alone can be conversant with the absent opposite, and this through Memory, without which Desire is impossible.

μήτε γεγονότος πῶ] I have adopted Stallbaum's conjecture for πῶς without hesitation.

ΣΩ. Ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅταν ἀπαθῆς αἴτιη γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, [ἦν νῦν λήθην 34 καλεῖς,] ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνώμενα κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἰσθῆσιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη μαθάνομεν ὃ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἰσθῆσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὀρθῶς B ἂν τις λέγοι, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὄρθῶς γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μνήμης δ' ἀνάμνησιν ἄρ' οὐ διαφέρουσιν λέγομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τόδε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν, ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχέ ποθ' ἡ ψυχὴ, ταῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὃ τι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνη, τότε ἀναμνησθεσθαί που λέγομεν. ἡ γὰρ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν, ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτ' αἰσθήσεως εἴτ' αὖ μαθήματος, αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ πάλιν αὐτὴ ἐν C ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ξόμπαντ' ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας που λέγομεν.

[ἦν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς] Protarchus does no such thing. He is bidden to use ἀναισθησία in place of τὸ λεληθέναι, and to keep λήθη in the same sense as hitherto.

γινώμενα] "*Pro γινώμενον Sydenhamus γινώμενα tentat. Non video causam.*" Stallb. And then, of course, we are referred to Matthiæ. That the compiler of a Grammar should treasure up all the anomalies and exceptional instances, which either the self-will of authors or the stupidity of scribes supplies him with, is no more than we should expect. But the province of an editor is, as far as possible, to resist such

evidence and to oppose common sense to the craving after curiosities. In such a passage as this a departure from the common rule is above all things improbable, for here the notion uppermost in the mind of the writer is the *joint participation* in a certain state, the *common effect* of two things, which a singular participle would render less apparent.

ποθ' ἡ] The Zurich editors have not improved this passage by the conjectural reading of κάθη; the word ποτὲ adds to the clearness of the sentence, and is fully supported by analogous passages in this part of the dialogue.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ χάριν ἅπαντ' εἴρηται ταῦτα, ἔστι τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἴν' ἅμα τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅ τι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἅμ' ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτ' ἀμφοτέρ' ἔοικε δηλοῦσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν τοῖνον, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἥδη τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορ- D φὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὥς ἔοικε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σκοπῶμεν τοῖνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, ταῦτά γε, ὃ Πρώταρχε, εὐρόντες ἃ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, [ἀπολοῦμεν] τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἀπορίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως ἡμύνω· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πόλλ' ἕτερα τοιαῦτ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι τινὰς ἐπιθυμίας; E

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί ποτ' ἄρα ταῦτὸν βλέψαντες, οὕτω πολλὰ δια- φέροντα ταῦθ' ἐνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ ῥᾷδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὁμως λεκτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐκείθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν δὴ;

"Ἴν' ἅμα] The reading of all the MSS., appearance, the article has no business ἵνα μή, has sorely puzzled the editors; here.

ἃ νῦν [ζητοῦμεν] The common reading is, Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὃ Π., εὐρόντες δ' νῦν ζητοῦμεν· ἀπο- λούμεν κ. τ. ἔ. It is impossible to make any sense of καὶ ταῦτά γε, nor is the first ἀπολοῦμεν, without a case, supported by usage. The corruption of the pas- sage appears to have originated with the insertion of the second ἀπολοῦμεν, which probably stood at first as a gloss in the margin. Under any circum- stances ὃ would be untenable, for αὐτὰ ταῦτα proves that a plural must have preceded.

πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορφήν] As he means every phase of it, and not its whole

ΣΩ. “Διψῇ” λέγοντες, λέγομεν ἐκάστοτέ τι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δέ γ’ ἐστὶ κενοῦται.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, πῶματός γε.

85 ΣΩ. Πώματος, ἢ πληρώσεως πώματος;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾷ πληροῦσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἔστιν ὁπόθεν εἴτ’ αἰσθῆσει [πληρώσεως] ἐφάπτοισι’ ἂν εἴτε μνήμῃ τούτου, ὃ μήτ’ ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήτ’ ἐν τῷ πρόσθε πώποτε’ ἔπαθεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

B ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γ’ ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ’ ὃ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψῇ γάρ, τοῦτο δέ κένωσις· ὃ δ’ ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πληρώσεώς [γ’] ἄρα πῇ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν ἐφάπτοιο.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενοῦται γὰρ πού.

“Διψῇ”] There are two readings Διψῇ γέ που and Διψῇν που. As to the variety in the Bodleian ἐκάστου ἔτι, we have but to turn it back into the uncial character and we see that it was simply another instance of Y being mistaken for T, ΕΚΑΣΤΟΥΕΤΙ. Now if we try to make sense of Διψῇ x. τ. ἔ. it can only mean, that *something sometimes thirsts*, which is an incredible manner of expression, to say nothing of the perfect uselessness of γε. If we try Διψῇν, we may by some effort obtain this sense, “We speak of thirsting as something”. i.e. There is such a thing as thirsting. But then ἐκάστοτε loses all its meaning, and we are obliged further on to read κενοῦσθαι, whereas

all the Books have κενοῦται. This is one of those examples that in criticism nothing should be looked on as insignificant. Just as in one of the old Epigrams, I have shewn that ἐν δὲ γῶν is ἐν δὲ ῖ Θῶν i.e. ἐν δὲ χοροῖσι Θεῶν, so here Διψῇ ΔΕΓ was read as if it were Διψῇ ΓΕΠ. The rest was either invisible or neglected, and γεπ was so supplemented as to become γέ που.

Πληρώσεώς [γ’] ἄρα] The construction is ἄρα τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἐφάπτοισι’ ἂν πῇ πληρώσεως. *Some part, then, of the man who is thirsting is in contact with repletion.* The γε is useless, unless we change its place and read Π. ἄρα ἐν γε τι.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτ' ἄλλω ἐφάπαιτο; C

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδενί.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηχ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὗ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ παντὸς ζώου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχειρήσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ὁρμὴ γ' ἐπὶ τὸνναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ παθήματα δηλοῖ πον μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμεν' ἀποδείξας D μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς ξύμπασαν τὴν θ' ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζώου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Διψῆν ἄρ' ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι δὴ καὶ τότε περὶ ταῦτά ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν. βίου γὰρ εἰδὸς τι μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου περὶ βίου φράξεις; E

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τούτων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγουσαν] The argument, ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ] Evinces, makes good. then, in showing that Memory is that Compare Rep. 604 c; Parm. 141 D; which introduces one to objects of desire, Crilo 48, c. The figure of speech seems has proved that to the soul belong the to be borrowed from the draught-whole activity and desire, and the di- board. rection of the entire creature.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', όταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίνηται;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;

ΣΩ. Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων ὧν  
γενομένων παύοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνης, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω· τί  
36 τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀγοῦνθ' ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δί', ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ  
μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας  
τινὶ πόθῳ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἶπες;  
ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν ἐλπίδι φανερᾷ  
τοῦ πληρωθῆσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τοῦναντίον ἀνελπίστως  
B ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθῆσεσθαι τῷ με-  
μνῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις τοῖς  
χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τότ' ἄρ' ἀνθρωπος καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα λυπεῖται θ' ἅμα  
καὶ χαίρει.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', όταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύξεσθαι πλη-  
ρώσεως; ἄρ' οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγναιτ' ἂν περὶ τὰς λύπας  
C πάθος, ὃ σὺ νῦν δὴ κατιδὼν φήθης ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε  
χρησώμεθα, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ  
ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν ἢ τὰς μὲν τινὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δ' οὐ.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἂν εἶεν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ ἢ λύπαι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φόβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς,  
ἢ προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ μή, ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς;

D ΠΡΩ. Δόξας μὲν ἔγωγ' ἂν που συγχωροίην, τὰ δ' ἕτερα  
ταῦτ' οὐκ ἂν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῆς; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν οὐ πάνυ μικρὸν ἐπεγείρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὧ παῖ 'κείνου τάνδρος, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ διωφούντων παρὰ τὸ προσήκον λεγομένων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῳς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὲ μοι· θαῦμα γὰρ ἐμέ γ' ἔχει διὰ τέλους αἰεὶ ἔπερι ταῦτα, ἃ νῦν δὴ προῦθέμεθα, ἀπορήματα. πῶς δὴ φῆς; ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ οὐδ' ὕπαρ, ὡς φῆς, [ἔστιν] οὔτ' ἐν μαρίαις οὔτ' ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθ' ὅς τις ποτὲ δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δ' οὐδαμῶς, οὐδ' αὖ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δ' οὔ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνθ' οὕτω ταῦτ', ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔχιν πάντες ὑπειλήφαμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁρθῶς, ἢ σκεπτέον εἴτ' ὁρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται;

ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.

87

ΣΩ. Διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ νῦν δὴ λεγόμενον ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστι γὰρ που δοξάζειν ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡδεσθαι;

ὧ παῖ 'κείνου τάνδρος] The word *ἐκείνος* is often substituted for the proper name in speaking of an absent or deceased person with respect. *Soph. Fragm.* οὐ παῖς Ἀχιλλέως, ἀλλ' ἐκείνος αὐτός εἰ. In the *Republic*, Socrates addresses Glaucon and Adimantus as ὧ παῖδες ἐκείνου τάνδρος. It is not known who was Protarchus' father, except that Socrates above calls him Callias, but he no doubt belonged to a principal family in Athens. Stallbaum's notion that Protarchus is addressed as the disciple of that man, meaning Philebus, is, I regret to see, repeated in his last edition. *τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν]* All other long discourses, except those which are to the purpose; ἢ καὶ διωφούν x. τ. ἔ., is equivalent to, or even short ones, when they are not to the point. *αἰεὶ περὶ ταῦτα]* I have substituted ταῦτα for the unmeaning τὰ αὐτά of the Editions. A little further on, I have restored πῶς δὴ φῆς; from Protarchus to Socrates. *[ἔστιν]* I have followed Stallbaum in bracketing this word, which arose from the scribe not understanding the adverbial use of ὄναρ and ὕπαρ.



ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἐστὶ τι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ τό γε, ὃ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἡδεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἂν τ' ὀρθῶς ἂν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς  
B δοξάσῃ, τό γε [δοξάζειν] ὥντως οὐδέποτε' ἀπόλλυσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἂν τ' ὀρθῶς ἂν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς ἡδῇται, τό γ' ὥντως ἡδεσθαι δῆλον ὥς οὐδέποτε' ἀπολεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, καὶ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ποτ' οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδὴς τε καὶ ἀληθὴς  
ἡμῖν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς μόνον ἀληθές, [δοξάζειν δ' ὥντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφοτέρω ὁμοίως εἴληφεν,] σκεπτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρα, ὅπη δόξη μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψεῦδος τε καὶ  
C ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετ' οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά  
τις ἑκάτερα, σκεπτέον φῆς τοῦτ' εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ναί. πρὸς δὲ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν  
τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πολ' ἅντα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἅπερ ἐστί,  
ποιῶ τινε δ' οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν διομολογητέον.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ ποιῶ τινε.  
πάσαι γὰρ εἵπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ μικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα  
D ἑκάτεραι γίνονται [, λύπαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί].

Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον] *That which fancies, whether it fancies correctly, or incorrectly, never loses its property of really fancying.* It is an actual notion, though it may not correspond to an object. The same may be said of pleasure; the feeling is actually present, though the object is unreal. Thus there is no difference as to truth and falsehood between τὸ δοξάζον and τὸ ἡδόμενον. Unless indeed we say that pleasure is of such nature that it does not admit of any *quality*; but this is not so, for we speak of great and little pleasures, of good and bad pleasures, and so forth: then why not of false and true? I have removed the idle supplement δοξάζειν, which betrays its origin by not knowing its place.

Ὅτι] This is the reading of the best MS. for τῷ. I have adopted it, and added σκεπτέον as Baier first suggested, but my σκεπτέον is that already given to Protarchus. It would exceed the compass of a note to discuss the other changes which I have made, and the reasons for them are sufficiently obvious. Let it suffice to note that the disputants do not consider, nor have they any reason for considering, why both δοξάζειν and χαίρειν have the ἐν- τως, so that, had the sentence in brackets been as well expressed as it is clumsy, it could not have belonged to Plato. σφόδρα ἑκάτεραι] *Violently the one or violently the other*, as the gloss λύ- παί τε καὶ ἡδοναί explains the words.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, προσγίγνηται τινι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν ὁρθότης ἢ τοῦναντίον ὁρθότητι τινὶ τούτων προσγίγνηται; μὴν οὐκ ὁρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ὁρθότης ἴσχη; ταῦτόν δ' ἡδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γ' ἀμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἦ, τὴν δόξαν τὸ δ' ἀμαρτάνουσάν γ' οὐκ ὁρθὴν ὁμολογητέον οὐδ' ὁρθῶς δοξάζουσαν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τί δ'; ἂν αὖ λύπην ἢ τιν' ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ λυπεῖται ἢ τοῦναντίον ἀμαρτάνουσαν φωρῶμεν, ὁρθὴν ἢ χρηστήν ἢ τι τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ ἀμαρτῆσται γ' ἡδονή.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γ' ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὁρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῇ, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν 38 οὐδεὶς ἂν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῇ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ' ἄπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

ΣΩ. Διαφέρει δ' ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἢ μετὰ δόξης τ'

Ἄν δέ γ' ἀμαρτανόμενον] "If, when the object of a belief is misapprehended, the belief itself is wrong, shall we not also call that pain or pleasure wrong, which arises from a misapprehended object? If not, we must call it ὁρθή, χρηστή, and all manner of handsome names."

φωρῶμεν] The Books have ἐφορῶμεν, which is out of the question. Inquirers are not supposed to gaze upon an error, but to detect it.

λέγομεν] This is Stallbaum's conjecture for ἐλέγομεν; the change was

owing to TOTEAΓOMEN, which some copyists read as τότ' ἐλέγομεν, supposing the imperfect to be required after τότε. When the bad fashion began to prevail of writing the words without the apostrophus, a practice which has led to endless corruption and confusion, this would become τότε ἐλέγομεν.

Οὐδέν γε] The γε is added to οὐδεὶς and οὐδέν before πλήν and its equivalents. Compare *Iph. T.* 548 (584) οὐδεὶς γε πλήν θανούσαν οὐχ ὅραν φάος. *Arist. Nub.* 784. οὐδέν γε πλήν ἢ. *Protag.* 810, B, Οὐδέν γ' εἰ μή.

ὁρθῆς καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἡδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης;

B ΠΡΩ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. Τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αἰτοῦν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄγε ὅπη σοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τῇδε δὴ ἄγω;

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Δόξα, φαμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθής.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπετα μὴν ταύταις, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευθεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ

C τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν γίγνεσθον ἐκάστοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς ὧδε περὶ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦμεθ' ἴσχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνν σαφῶς [τὰ καθορώμενα] ξυμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθ' ἅπερ ὁρᾷ.

καὶ τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν] The MSS. have, with few exceptions, τὸ διαδοξάζειν. This is interpreted as *distinguishing one notion from another*. But the argument throughout turns upon the mere act of δοξάζειν, and not a single allusion is made to the distinction here introduced. The confusion of δὴ and διὰ is one of the commonest in MSS., and there is a peculiar force in δὴ which may be illustrated by *Sophist*, 234 c, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι. καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σφωτάτον πάντων ἅπαντ' εἶναι. In this and other instances it is of the same force as καὶ δὴ καί, and expresses a kind of accumulation. The word ἐγχωρεῖν has been changed on the authority of the Bodleian, &c., to ἐγγχεῖν, but *to undertake* is surely less appropriate here than *to be capable*, for so we may render the impersonal ἐγχωρεῖ.

γίγνεσθον] Most MSS. read γίγνεθ', a strange elision; but the Bodleian has preserved the traces of the true reading which I have restored; for γίγνεσθ' in that Book is one of the many examples of the compendium for σν, the sign of the grave accent, being mistaken for an apostrophus. The sense is plain enough. "From Memory, then, and from Sensation, our notions, and indeed the capacity for forming notions at all, are derived in every instance."

[τὰ καθορώμενα] . . κρίνειν . . ταῦθ' ἅπερ ὁρᾷ] It is very unnecessary for a man κρίνειν τὰ καθορώμενα. But whoever is capable κρίνειν ταῦθ' ἅπερ ὁρᾷ, will not fail καθορᾶν the reason why we are thus mocked with a double object. A little further we read something from the same source in ἐστάναι φανταζόμενον. If any place requires simple language, it is that where such a simple

ΠΡΩ. Φαίην ἄν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὕτως ἀνέρουτ' ἂν ᾧδε.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτ' ἄρ' ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτρην τοῦθ' [ἑστάναι φανταζόμενον] ὑπὸ τινι δένδρῳ; ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἂν τις πρὸς Δ' ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτ' ἅττα κατιδὼν φαντασθέντα ἑαυτῷ ποτέ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦθ' ὁ τοιούτος ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴποι ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιτυχῶς εἰπῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παρενεχθεῖς γ' αὖ τάχ' ἂν, ὥς τι τινῶν ποιμένων ἔργον ὄν, τὸ καθορώμενον ἄγαλμα προσεῖποι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Κἄν τις γ' αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντ' Ἐ ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντ' αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἂν πάλιν φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἔκαλυψεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄν δ' ἄρα μόνος ᾗ, τοῦτο ταῦτὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν διανοούμενος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον ὀπερ ἐμοί;

every-day occurrence is described. It is ludicrous to see such words as "What's that yonder by the rock under a tree"? turned into bombast which we cannot even translate, for φανταζόμενον ἑστάναι is not even Greek. τε, and adding ὄν to ἔργον, I think I have restored the passage to its old form and sense. "Looking upon it as the work of some shepherds or other, he would call what he described, a figure."

περὶ τοῦτο] The reading of the MSS. is περὶ τούτων, in defence of which one Editor quotes from *Phædo* 58, A, Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἐλύεσθαι, and refers to Heindorf's note on that passage. Heindorf's note is well worth reading and so likewise is his note to another passage in the same dialogue to which reference is made. But it is very unlikely that he would have looked upon this as an example, or have defended it. The analogy is merely ap-

τί] *Ipsh. T.* 387 (399). Soph. *Ajax* 905. τίνος ποτ' ἄρ' ἐπραξε χειρὶ δύσμορος; ἐπιτυχῶς εἰπῶν] *Chancing on the truth in what he says.* To this is afterwards opposed παρενεχθεῖς, *straying from the mark, or swerving.* προσεῖποι] This is understood to mean, *He would say in addition.* But what he says here is no addition, but a substitution. By changing ἔστι into

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τόθ' ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεικέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

39 ΣΩ. Ἡ μνήμη, ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ξυμπέπτοῦσα εἰς ταύτῃν, [καί] ἐκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταύτας ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνεται μοι σχεδὸν ὅλον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε [λόγους]· καί,

parent. It would be a great mistake to explain τὰ περὶ τῆς δόξης as a change made from περὶ τὴν δόξην because of ἐπύθεσθαι. The main thought is περὶ τῆς δόξης πύθεσθαι; to which another is added, πυθέσθαι τὰ γενόμενα, or, if any one likes it better, πύθεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὴν δόξην. The idiom therefore arises from an attempt to make an article do more than its natural function, and to graft an additional, though more direct, object, on that first one which is attached to the verb by the preposition. Here, on the contrary, περὶ τούτων is not an object at all. Socrates does not want to know Protarchus' opinion about things of any kind, but whether what happens in this case appears to him to be such and such. The mere occurrence of the word γινόμενον disposes of the whole argument; nor would περὶ τούτων be intelligible in any case, for the topic of conversation is singular; namely the man ὃς τὰ φαντασθέντα πλεῖον χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεται.

Ἡ μνήμη] The reading of the Books is the same as that in my text, except that it has περὶ ταῦτα and φαίνονται, and, of course, I am answerable for the brackets. I will briefly point out the misconceptions which have prevailed about this sentence, and the difficulties which must have sorely perplexed every Editor or reader who desired clearness. We are told by one Editor that ἐκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα, is to be understood as "those things which belong to these faculties, namely to Memory and the Senses". But what *other* things besides Memory and the Senses, yet belonging to the same, are intended, we are not told, nor is it easy to guess. Nor is any example given of that most extraordinary use of παθήματα which is thus transferred from the affection of an organ, or of a power, to the

organ or power itself. When I remember *this*, or see *that*, the remembering and the seeing produce no doubt παθήματα of my mind or of my sense of vision, but to call Mind a πάθημα or Vision a πάθημα is a monstrous abuse of language. Thus the second clause of the sentence must be so rendered that ἐκεῖνα τὰ παθήματα may mean 'those above-mentioned sensations' or perceptions, and ἃ περὶ τ. ἐστὶ, *which are connected* with these αἰσθήσεις. Well, what do these do? "They write, as it were, words in our minds." Are these words what we should call *impressions*? If so, it is an odd thing that Memory and the Senses and the Impressions upon them should be said to write *impressions* upon us. But these λόγοι, it will be said, are more than the momentary impressions, they are the abiding records, the subjective facts. If so, let us pass on: "and when this affection (here the commentators haste to the rescue, saying "Do not be alarmed at this break-down of the plural; he is here speaking of a particular case", and like men obliged to change carriages at the small hours of the night, we try to make ourselves comfortable in this new singular, and proceed) "inscribes true things, the results are true λόγοι". That is to say, that true λόγοι are—the results of true λόγοι. At last we come to a γραμματεὺς who opens our eyes. "I am Memory, the Recorder (ὁ γραμματεὺς) also called the Writer (ὁ γραμματιστής); all that has been done above has been done by me. When I am quickened by any of the senses being moved, I write their παθήματα on your mind; and when these παθήματα which I write are true, then my λόγοι are true". Can there be any doubt about a correction which brings such light out of all this smoke?

ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῇ γράψῃ [τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα], δόξα τ' ἀληθὲς καὶ λόγοι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ξυμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι· ψευδῇ δ' ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς γράψῃ, τὰναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβῃ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ῥη- B  
θέντα οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχον δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, ὃς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἀπ' ὅψεως ἢ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγὼν τις τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρᾷ πῶς. ἢ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστι C  
γιγνόμενον παρ' ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΧ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνας ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ὁρῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδ' ἐπὶ τού-  
τοις σκεψώμεθα, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦθ'  
ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὐ.

ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἀπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὡσαύτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι D

τούτων γράφει] τούτων can have no other construction here except as agreeing with λεγομένων, which does not want it, and is too far removed from it to be taken with it, and not far enough to require being repeated in it, or represented by it. It is also probable that Plato would use a different verb for the second artificer; and for these reasons I venture to propose in place of τούτων γράφει, που ζωγραφεῖ.

Οὐκοῦν αἱ γε διὰ τ. ψ.] Two things were said of the second εἶδος of Pleasures and Pains, (the mental class),

first, that they preceded the others, ὅτι προγίγνοντο, and secondly, that our anticipation was thus connected with future time: ὥς ξυμβαίνει . . εἶναι γιγνόμενον. The scribes have turned this into προγίγνοντ' ἂν, and ὥστε ξυμβαίνει. Eleven lines above we have had ἔστι γιγνόμενον, (not γίγνεται,) something that occurs; and in 42, A, we shall find the same usage. So here εἶναι γιγνόμενον is not a mere periphrasis of γίγνεσθαι, but = εἶναι τι τῶν γιγνόμενων. Another instance which I have seen quoted, is nothing to the purpose:

Platonis Philæbus.

ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίγνονται, ὡς θ' ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ τὸ προλυπεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὖν τὰ γράμματα τε καὶ ζωγραφήματα, ἃ σμικρῶ πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα Ε καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἐστί, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὅτι πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτ' ἐλπίδες εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὔσαι, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου αἰεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄγε δὴ, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένους καὶ τόδ' ἀποκρίναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἄρ' οὐ θεοφιλὴς ἐστίν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἄρ' οὐ τοῦ-  
40 ναντίον ἐκείνῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Πολλῶν μὴν ἐλπίδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς ἀνθρωπος γέμει.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ἄσχημον γούν αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστι: "Either of these is unsightly, when it occurs." (Above 33, B.)

Οὐκ οὖν] The Books have Πότερον οὖν. I make a very bold change, but not, as I think, a rash one. First, the argument requires it: "You admit that mental pleasures and pains have to do with the future; then surely you cannot say that, whereas our records and images concern the past and the present, they have no relation with the future." Secondly, Protarchus' answer Σφόδρα γε is a reply not to a question Πότερον, but to an assertion. Some Grammarian who read Οὐκοῦν = ἰδίωρ, and saw that

it gave the opposite sense to that intended, bethought of πότερον as the nearest suitable word, in point of meaning, to that which he supposed to require his correction.

παντάπασι κακός] I am disposed to believe that the word παντάπασι has been added to κακός by way of bringing it into correspondence with the πάντως of the preceding speech of Socrates, which the interpolator supposed to belong to ἀγαθός, whereas it is in fact intended to colour the whole question, and to give it the air of an appeal to the conscience or good sense of the person questioned.

ΣΩ. Λόγοι μὴν εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν, ὧς ἐλπίδας ὀνομάζομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐξωγραφημένα· καὶ τις ὁρᾷ πολλάκις ἑαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεξωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὐτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθορᾷ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

B

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὐτὸ πολὺ τὸνναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα φατέον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδοναί γ' οὐδὲν ἦρτον πάρεσιν ἐξωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δ' αὐταί που.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ψευδέσιν ἄρ' ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθεῖσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ δὴ, κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναί, μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα· καὶ λῦπαι δ' ὡσάντως.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἦρ δοξάζειν μὲν ἥντως αἰεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπ' οὐσι δὲ μὴδ' ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μὴδ' ἐπ' ἐσομένοις ἐνίστε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἦν, οἶμαι, τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν D ψευδῇ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ἐνεξωγραφημένον] 'He sees the gold, and the pleasures which depend upon it, and moreover he sees himself, as part of the picture, rejoicing in himself exceedingly.' It is strange that any difficulty could have been occasioned by so simple and well-chosen an expression. The change of αὐτὸν into αὐτόν is indispensable; but the Editors

have thought it more prudent to make αὐτόν mean *himself*, than to change *as breathing*.

ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα] *Conviv.* 215, A. *Polit.* 293, E, ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ. Horace, *Epist.* ii. 1, 265.

ficto

In pejus vultu proponi cereus.



ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως αἰετῇ τὸ παράπαν ὅπως οὖν καὶ εἰκῇ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὐσι μὴδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίστε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὕσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴδὲ μέλλουσι ποτε γενήσεσθαι.

Ε ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβων τε καὶ θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὥς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῇ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐνίστε;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας [καὶ χρηστὰς] ἄλλως [ἢ ψευδεῖς] γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἡδονὰς γ', οἶμαι, κατανοοῦμεν ὥς ἄλλον τινα  
41 τρόπον εἰσὶ πονηραὶ πλὴν τῇ ψευδεῖς εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάν μὲν οὖν τούναντίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας.

τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔξιν] If all that precedes is genuine, I fear that it is a waste of ingenuity to endeavour to explain τούτων. The ἔξιν (namely that a thing may be real, and yet rest on false grounds,) has been shewn to be ἐν ἐκείνοις, that is in δόξα and τὸ δοξάζειν: and we are invited to attribute an analogous ἔξιν to pleasures and pains; but if so, until this is granted and done, it is surely premature to talk of τὴν τούτων ἔξιν. The ἔξιν also which we grant to *these* must be ἀντίστροφος to another, which is in *those*. This would lead us to read ἀντ. ἔξιν τῇ ἐν ἐκείνοις; but as to τούτων, it is difficult to see what can be done with it, except to leave it out altogether. But what if we could reverse the direction of the pronouns, and by τούτων understand the notions and beliefs, and by ἐκείνοις pleasures and pains? To do this we must remove ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς, and frame the sentence thus: οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν τούτων ἔξιν ἀντίστροφον ἐκείνοις; For those who think this remedy too bold I can offer no other.

Τί δέ; πονηρὰς] Nothing is plainer than this sentence when we leave out the interpolations. καὶ χρηστὰς is evidently out of place; and a little attention to γιγνομένας shews that ἡ ψευδεῖς is no better. The complete sentence would be ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν πονηρὰς δόξας ἄλλως γιγνομένας (πονηρὰς ἢ τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι);

Πάν μὲν οὖν τούναντίον] The MSS. and Edd. have all Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τούναντίον, which is not Greek. As μὲν οὖν, like *immo*, is used when one *improves upon* another's assertion, and this may be done either by adding to it, or by completely changing it, it denotes either assent or contradiction, according to the words which accompany it. Thus πάνυ μὲν οὖν implies that the answerer does not think the first speaker positive enough; it amounts, therefore, to a strong assent. But an assent is out of the question in this passage; so that nothing would remain but to join πάνυ with τούναντίον, which would be as absurd in Greek as to say that one thing is *very opposite* to another would be in English.

σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψευδεῖ μὲν οὐ πᾶν πονηρὰς ἂν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείῃ, μεγάλη δ' ἄλλη καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίας.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὖσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ νῦν· τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνομένας λεκτέον. τούτῳ γὰρ ἴσως χρῆσθό- B  
μεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; εἴπερ γ' εἰσὶν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Πρωτάρχε, εἰσὶ κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα, ἕως ἂν κέηται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δῆ-  
πον γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Προσιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὖ  
τὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἵωμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἵπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, [ὀλίγον] ἐν  
τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὥς, ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὦσι, C  
δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι  
διείληπται.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προεργήθη ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώμα-  
τος ἐναντίων ἔξεων ἢ τότε, τὴν δ' ἀλγηδόνα ἢ τινα διὰ πάθος  
ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον.

τῷ ψευδεῖ] I have altered τῷ ψεύδει into τῷ ψευδεῖ. He is speaking of the abstract quality, not of some particular lie.

τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα] It is necessary to caution the reader against Stallbaum's translation of this passage. He explains τὸ δόγμα as the belief that no pleasures are false; ἕως ἂν κέηται is consequently made to mean *so long as it continues*. To such a remark as is thus attributed to Socrates, Protarchus, who was maintaining the opposite side, would scarcely have answered Καλῶς. But τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα (not ἐκεῖνο) obviously refers to the preceding εἰσὶ κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν, and means the belief that pleasures may be false or true. This is made certain by παρ' ἡμῖν, and no less by κέηται;

for παρ' ἡμῖν must apply to both Socrates and Protarchus, and καίῳ, which is the passive of θεῖναι, is a word of unequivocal force, whether applied to a law or a proposition. The sense of the passage thus becomes plain: *But until this judgment (of mine) is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt from) examination*. I have endeavoured to give the force of the word γίγνεσθαι, which, as will be seen, signifies a great deal more than εἶναι.

ἔξεων ἢ τότε] ἔξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγ. is the reading of the received text. The Bodl. has however τοὺς for τὸ δέ, that is, the copyist had before him TOTE and read it as TOYTO. On this is founded the emendation ΕΞΕΩΝΗΤΟΤΕ. The

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν τούτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

D ΣΩ. †Γίνεται τοίνυν, ὁπότεν ἢ ταῦτα, ἅμα παρακεῖσθαι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἅμα παρ' ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίνεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδ' εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθε κεῖται, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον ἄμφω τούτῳ δέχεσθον, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, [καὶ] ὅτι τῶν ἀπειρῶν εἴτην;

ΠΡΩ. Εἴρηται· τί μήν;

ΣΩ. †Τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὁρῶς κρίνεσθαι;

necessary conjunction Δ' was probably lost from its resemblance to the succeeding Α, as Η was from its likeness to Ν. The continual confusion of ΔΗ and ΑΝ in MSS., illustrates both these phenomena.

τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονήν] The best MSS. have πληζος for πάθος, an error which arose from a confusion of Α and Λ. But though the sentence is thus rid of a second difficulty, another still lies in the sense. Plato is speaking of that condition in which the mind desires the opposite to what the body feels; so that the addition of ἡδονήν makes the mind to desire pain. Many ways might be proposed to remove this difficulty, but the question is not what Plato might have written, but what he wrote, and the ways are too numerous to allow us to fix upon the very one. The sense would be secured by τὴν δ' ἀληθινὰ τὴν διὰ ΤΙ Πάθος ἡδονήν ἐνδὲν κ. τ. ἔ. The meaning of διὰ πάθος appears to be, *through actual impression*, as opposed to the pleasure of *expectation*.

Γίνεται] is not this an error occasioned by the reminiscence of the foregoing γινόμενον? If we read φαίνεται, we shall get rid of the clumsy γίνεται γίνεσθαι, and we shall have a better correspondence to ἐφάνη, and to Protagoras' φαίνεται γοῦν.

εἴτην] The construction is εἴρηται

ὡς δέχεσθον, ὅτι εἴτην,—where ὡς introduces the fact, and ὅτι the reason of it. This gets rid of the causeless departure from the ordinary rules of construction, in defence of which I formerly quoted *Phaedo* 95, D. But there also the text is not trustworthy. καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ κ. τ. ἔ. has already excited the suspicion of Heindorf, though I do not assent to his mode of correcting it. By striking out ἀποφαίνεσθαι and by changing καὶ into ἥ, we clear away the two only difficulties. Then ἢ would take ζῶν and ἀπολλύσθαι for the same reason that ὅτι takes εἴτην.

Τίς οὖν μηχανή] The Zurich editors have adopted Stallbaum's reading, Τίς οὖν: but if Plato had wanted to use the enclitic, he would have written ἔστι τις, or have placed the enclitic anywhere rather than at the beginning of the sentence. A better correction would have been, Τί οὖν; μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὁρῶς κρίνεσθαι; There is a want of adjustment in the different parts of the dialogue. For the question here asked is not more fully explained afterwards, and εἰ is no answer to Πῃ or to Bekker's conjectural Ποῶ. It is not improbable that something has fallen out, perhaps to the following effect. Τί οὖν; μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὁρῶς κρίνεσθαι; (τῇδε δὲ σκεψάμενος πείρω ἀποκρίνεσθαι.)

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ δὴ καὶ πῶς;

E

ΣΩ. Εἰ τόδε τὸ βούλημ' ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων· ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγινῶναι [βούλεται] ἐκάστοτε, τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μεῖζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον [καὶ τίς σφοδρότερα], λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴ πρὸς ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔστι ταῦτά τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὐτῇ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὅψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῇ ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, 42 ἐν λύπαις δ' ἄρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι ταυτόν τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ μικρὸν ἔμπροσθε γέγονεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὐταὶ γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἑμαυτοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

B

Εἰ τόδε τὸ βούλημα] I have changed the reading and punctuation. τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ is certainly not elegant, but by explaining τούτων to be the pleasures and pains and ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ to be on such occasions, some of us may be brought to tolerate it. But τὸ βούλημα τῆς κρίσεως διαγινῶναι βούλεται brings its own condemnation with it. It may be said that there is no impropriety in the expression—"The will wills". But τὸ βούλημα is not the will, but a particular wish, and τὸ β. τῆς κρίσεως is the wish to judge. In the *Lysis* 863, B, Plato declares Pleasure πράττειν ὅ τι περ ἂν αὐτῆς ἢ βούλησις ἐξελέγη; but this expression though unusual was inevitable; for Pleasure cannot desire, and if he had said ἐπιθυμεῖν, he would have been obliged to forego the main ground of opposition to θυμός, πειθοῖ μετ' ἀπάτης. In that passage I will take this opportunity of remarking that βιάζεσθαι written compendiously has been miscopied βιάου. But how can the wish to judge judge?

—and if it cannot judge, how can it wish to judge? My correction is fully borne out by Protarchus' answer — ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὐτῇ. By leaving out καὶ τίς σφοδρότερα, the difficulty which beset τίς μᾶλλον disappears. Compare above 37, D, σφόδρα ἐκότερα, which answers exactly to μᾶλλον λύπη &c.

Ἐναντίον] This is perhaps the most beautiful of all the remarks in this admirable disquisition on pleasure. Formerly it had been agreed that notions, as they happened to be true or false, occasioned a corresponding difference in the pleasures and pains depending on them; but now it has been shown that pleasures and pains, by their comparative distance in time, and by their mutual contrast, produce false notions about themselves.

ἀνεπίμπλασαν] Observe the imperfect: *Were found to communicate their quality* (of truth or falsehood) *to the pains and pleasures.*

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γ' αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθ' ἐν τε καὶ ἐγγύθ' ἐκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἅμα τιθέμεναι παρ' ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δ' αὖ διὰ τὸ παρ' ἡδονὰς τούναντίον ἐκείναις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅσῳ μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἐκάτεραι καὶ ἐλάττους φαίνονται, τοῦτ' ἀποτεμόμενος ἐκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον ὁ ἀλλ' οὐκ ὂν, οὐτ' αὐτὸ ὁρθῶς φαινόμενον ἔρεῖς, οὐδ' αὖ ποτὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὁρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τοιμήσεις λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τοίνυν ἐξῆς ὁψόμεθα, ἐὰν τῇδ' ἀπαντῶμεν, ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἐτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζώοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴρηται πού πολλάκις ὅτι, τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει καὶ πληρώσει καὶ κενώσει καὶ τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσει, λῦπαί τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύνη καὶ πάντα, ὅποσα τοιαῦτ' ὀνόματ' ἔχει, ξυμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, ταῦτ' εἴρηται πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ἡμῶν ᾖ;

ΠΡΩ. Πότε δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἤρου, τὸ ἐρώτημα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὐ κωλύει ἐμὲ διερεῖσθαι σε πάλιν.

Οὐκοῦν, ὅσῳ] That much then, by that the appearance itself is a right ap-  
which either appears greater than it really pearance, nor will you venture to call  
is, that apparent and unreal quantity, that part of the pleasure or the pain  
you will cut off, and you will neither say which is founded upon it, right and true.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φήσω, τὸ τοι-  
οῦτον, τί ποτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκάτερα φῆς;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐθ' ἡδονὴ  
γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτ' οὐτ' ἂν τις λύπη.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, τότε λέγεις, ὥς 48  
αἰεὶ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοὶ φασιν·  
αἰεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντ' ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γ' οὐ φαύλως λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, μὴ φαῦλοί γ' ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκ-  
σιτῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι. τῇδ' οὖν δια-  
νοῶμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σύ μοι ξύμφειγε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ὅπη.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους.  
σὺ δ' ἀπόκριναι· πότερον αἰεὶ πάντα, ὅποσα πάσχει τι τῶν Β  
ἐμπύχων, ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὐτ' ἀυξανόμενοι  
λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν πάσχον-  
τες, ἢ πᾶν τὸνναντίον; ὀλίγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθῃ πάνθ'  
ἡμᾶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄπαν δῆπου τὸνναντίον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν, ὡς  
αἰ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδο-  
νὰς ἀπεργάζονται.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὡδ' ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόμενον.  
C

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα] The passages in Plato, from which we may learn a full account of this doctrine of Heraclitus, are *Theaet.* 179—80, *Sophist.* 249—50, and *Cratyl.* 402. It is here alluded to, because at first sight it would appear to exclude the possibility of that state of indifference to pleasure and pain from which Socrates is about to show another instance of a false pleasure, namely,

where relief from pain (which is indifference) is thought and spoken of as positive pleasure.

ὑπεκσιτῆναι] *Soph. Ajax*, 82. φρονοῦντα γὰρ νῦν οὐκ ἂν ἐξέστην ὄκνη.

Τί μήν] This generally amounts to nothing more than an assent; but as its original meaning is *What else?* it is perfectly suitable here.

ΣΩ. Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δ' αὖ μέτριά τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότερον οὕτως ἢ ἁκείνως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦθ' οὕτω, πάλιν ὁ νῦν δὴ ῥηθεὶς βίος ἂν ἦκοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖος;

ΣΩ. Ὅν ἄλυπὸν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθώμεν τριττοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἓνα μὲν Ἰήδυν, τὸν δ' αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δ' ἓνα μηδέτερον. ἢ πῶς ἂν φαίης σὺ περὶ τούτων;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἢ ταύτῃ, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ποτε ταῦτόν τῳ χαίρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ὅποτεν οὖν ἀκούσης ὡς ἡδιστον πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, τί τόθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἢδὼν λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγ' οὗτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων ἡμῖν, ὧντινων βούλει, τίθει, καλῶς μίσοις ἔν' ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δ' ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ μηδέτερον τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον τούτων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτ' ἂν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς γενόμενος

ὧντινων βούλει] He is not speaking possible to doubt that this is one of the three *lives* in particular, but supposes any three things, to two of which the many instances where λεγόμενος has usurped the place of γενόμενος. It names have been given, but the third would be childish to say ὁ μέσος βίος is merely known as *not either*. The question then is, can it *become* either? is not, and cannot be rightly thought to be, that from which it has been formally distinguished; but it is necessary for the argument to show that the circumstance of its coming immediately after pain cannot *alter* its nature, and make it *become* pleasure.

γενόμενος] Commonly λεγόμενος. But when we consider how awkwardly this word is placed, and then look to the preceding γένοιτ' ἂν, it seems scarcely

ὀρθῶς ἂν ποτε, οὔτ' εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτ' εἰ λέγοι, λεχθεῖη, κατὰ γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὃ ἑταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ δοξαζόντων αἰσθανόμεθα.

44

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἶονται τότε, ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται;

ΠΡΩ. Φασὶ γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἶονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν που.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ψευδῇ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χωρὶς [τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν] ἡ φύσις ἑκατέρου.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μὴν χωρὶς γ' ἦν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἰρώμεθα παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτ' εἶναι, καθάπερ ἄρει, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνα, λύπην μὲν κακὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, Β τὴν δ' ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἡδὺ προσγορεύεσθαι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὲ νῦν τοῦτο, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτώμεθα ὑφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Ὅπως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλῆβου τοῦδε, ὃ Πρώταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγεις δ' αὐτοὺς τίνας;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οὐ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὐ φασιν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγὰς, αἷς νῦν οἱ περὶ C Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν. -

εἴπερ χωρὶς] See Appendix.

Πότερον οὖν αἰρώμεθα] One alternative having been disposed of, the other is taken up: "If freedom from pain is not pleasure, is there such a thing as absolute pleasure?" And thus is introduced another question: "Is pleasure possible without pain?" I have added, in the Appendix, a translation of a passage from Kant's *Anthropologie*, which may perhaps interest some readers.

τοὺς πολεμίους] This is generally understood of Antisthenes. The description applies very well to what we learn of him from Diogenes Laertius. οὐ τέχνη reminds one of the many sneers against the Platonic Ideas which are attributed to him and his friends. A disposition without meanness but harsh, is also in keeping with his character, though not with Plato's general appreciation of the Cynics.



ΠΡΩ. Τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι συμβουλευείς, ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρήσθαι τισι, μαν-  
τευομένοις οὐ τέχνη ἀλλὰ τι δισχερεῖα φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς  
λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικῶτων οὐ-  
δὲν ἰγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγόν, γοήτευμα,  
D οὐχ ἡδονήν, εἶναι. τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταῦτ' ἂν προσχρήσαιο, σκε-  
ψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τὰλλ' αὐτῶν δισχεράσματα· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα,  
αἱ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, πύσει, ἔν' ἐξ ἀμ-  
φοῖν τοῖν λόγοιιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθώμεθα  
πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτους ὥσπερ ξυμμάχους, κατὰ  
τὸ τῆς δισχερείας αὐτῶν ἔχρος. οἶμαι γὰρ τοιόνδε τι λέγειν  
αὐτούς, ἀρχομένους ποδὲν ἄνωθεν, ὥς, εἰ βουλευθεῖμεν ὁτουοῦν  
E εἶδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ  
σκληρότατ' ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν ἢ  
πρὸς τὰ πολλοστά σκληρότητι; δεῖ δὴ σε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καθά-  
περ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δισχεραίνουσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γ' αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ  
πρῶτα μεγέθει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν ἥτινά ποτ'  
ἔχει φύσιν βουλευθεῖμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστάς ἡδονὰς ἀπο-  
45 βλεπτέον ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας καὶ σφοδροτάτας λεγομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς ἂν σοι ταύτη συγχωροίη τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροί γε, [αἵπερ καὶ μέγιστα τῶν  
ἡδονῶν,] ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν αὗται.

μεμισηκότων] This is not a capricious change from the dative to the genitive, nor is to be taken absolutely, for then αὐτῶν would have been necessary; but it is in construction with δισχερεῖα φύσεως—*With the severity of men who have too much hated, &c.*

ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐτῆς] *So that this very attractiveness of it is a trick and imposture, and not pleasure.*

δισχεράσματα is condemned by Pol-  
lux as bad Greek, and Lobeck observes  
that such compound verbs as ἀνοηταίνω,  
δυσθυμαίνω, and the like (where the

noun from which the verb comes is  
already a compound), have no substan-  
tives derived from them. But ἀκολα-  
στάσματα in Aristoph. *Lysist.* 398 is a  
sound reading, and the scarcity of such  
formations would arise partly from the  
scarcity of the verbs, and partly from a  
fear of their length.

τὰς πολλοστάς ἡδονάς] *The smallest pleasures. τὰ πολλοστά σκληρότητι, things having the smallest degrees of hardness.*

The word is formed like the ordinal

numbers used to express fractions.

'ΑΛΛ' οὖν] The MSS. have 'Αρ' οὖν,

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν μείζους εἰσὶ τε καὶ γίνονται περὶ τοὺς [κάμνοντας] ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας; εὐλαβηθῶμεν δὲ μὴ προπετιῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταίσωμένῃ. τάχα γὰρ ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας.

B

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐχ αὐταὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ὧν ἂν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι μέγιστα προγίνωνται;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ διγοῦσι, καὶ πάντων, ὅποσα διὰ

which is incompatible with γε, and as γε is not found in the Bodleian and its fellows, it has been omitted in the recent Editions. But as it is impossible to account for the intrusion of the word in the other MSS., its omission in the first-mentioned must be ascribed to negligence. With γε once restored, the change of Ἀρ' into Ἀλλ' becomes inevitable; and the latter appears to me to be infinitely more in keeping with the nature of the observation; as it is more reasonable in speaking of a matter of every-day talk, to say that *we conclude it is admitted*, than to ask *whether it is so*. But the rest of the sentence requires careful consideration. The subject for inquiry is simply this: "Which are the greatest pleasures?" "Whether they are easily procured", does not concern the inquiry, though it may serve to designate them when found. If we remember that αὐταὶ represents ἀκρόταται καὶ σφοδρόταται, we see that so far there is nothing unsound in the sentence. Ἀλλ' οὖν αἱ πρόγιστοί γε, ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, εἰσὶν αὐταί: but we may go further and introduce αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα. If then we look at the remainder, we see not only that it was unsuited to our purpose, but that it begins with ΑἰΠΕΡ, the same beginning as that of one of the unsuspecting parts already admitted. That is to say; a copyist had got as far as ΑἰΠΕΡ and stopped. Afterwards he saw that he had skipped ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις; so he returns to this, but forgets to cancel ΑἰΠΕΡ. "Here is some gap", says a grammarian, "which

we must fill up"; and he fills it up so as to make Plato say that the common bodily pleasures which are also the greatest are *the most intense*. *En cor Zenodoti! En jecur Cratetis!*

[κάμνοντας] I have put κάμνοντας in brackets. Plato could not use the article with one participle and not with the other, but he must use it with ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, whether the participle had it or not.

προγίνωνται] This is Stephens' emendation for προσγίνωνται; any one who will take the trouble to attend to the Variae Lectiones of even the best collations, and see the blunders com-

mitted in πρὸ and πρ (i.e., πρὸς), will at once see that it is perfectly absurd to decide such differences as these by the authority of the MSS.

πάντων, ὅποσα] The received text is πάντα ὅποσα. I have written πάντων, both because it is necessary, and because the neglect of terminations and the habit of giving the same termination to two consecutive words is confessedly of common occurrence. ἐνδείξι alone might leave us in doubt whether it ought not to be περὶ πάντα; but the addition of ἀποπληρουμένων decides the question in favour of the genitive. Stallbaum's explanatory paraphrase πάντα εἰδῶσαι πάσχειν ὅποσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰδῶσαι πάσχειν shews an utter misconception of what brevity authorises or not, is untrue in fact, and while it gives καὶ the office of joining two co-ordinate clauses, leaves τε to join two sentences.

τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλον τ' ἐνδεία ξυντείνονται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων μεΐζους ἡδονὰς ἴσχουσιν; ἢ τοῦτ' οὐ φήσομεν ἀληθές εἶναι;

C ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν τοῦν ἡθὲν φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁρθῶς ἂν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες ὥς, εἴ τις τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν ἀλλ' εἰς νόσον ἰόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν; ὅρα δέ· μή με [ἡγῇ] διανόου[μενον] ἐρωτᾷ σε εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαιόντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ μέγεθός με ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα [περὶ τοῦ] τοιοῦτον ποῦ ποτὲ γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε. νοῆσαι γὰρ δεῖν φαμέν ἦντινα φύσιν ἔχει, καὶ τίνα λέγουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες D μὴδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν αὐτήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἔπομαι [τῷ λόγῳ σου].

ΣΩ. Τάχα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἥττον δείξεις, ἀποκρινεῖ γάρ· ἐν ὕβρει μεΐζους ἡδονὰς, οὐ πλείους λέγω, τῷ σφόδρα δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας ὁρᾷς ἢ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ; λέγε δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρειν ὁρῶ. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονάς που καὶ ὁ παροιμιάζόμενος ἐπίσχει

ξυντείνονται.] The Books have ξυνγίγνονται. Τέλνομαι and γένομαι (for so it is often written in MS.) are continually confounded. This I first learned from a note of Cobet in his Edition of a Fragment of Philostratus. I have since found another instance in Strabo xvi, 3, where we must read ὥστε ἐπιτείνεσθαι τὸ παράδοξον "so that the marvel is intensified". Compare below 46, D, ξύντασιν ἀγρίαν, and 47, A, ξυντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίστε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ. I am acquainted with the fragments of Eupolis and Teleclides where συγγίγνεσθαι is coupled with μάζαις and with φάγοισι; but they are merely comic expressions for enjoying, like Aristophanes' *having an interview with grapes*. Φροντίζω συγγεγνήμαι (Eup. fragm.) is a little more apposite, but συγγίγνεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον δεχομένων.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν ῥηθέν] νῦν ῥηθέν is the common reading; but there is no authority but that of a worthless copy for νῦν. My impression is that οὖν should be οὕτω, which will make νῦν unnecessary.

ὅρα δέ.] If any one still retains his belief that all the writers of our copies were scrupulous about the text, so as even to prefer nonsense to falsification (for doubtless there were some such) let him look at the words which follow ὅρα δέ. Διανόου is thought to be mutilated, so it is turned into διανοούμενον; then the sense demands the very thing which has been thus sacrificed, and so ἡγῇ is invented. Again τοιοῦτον by some blunder is read or written as τοιούτου; immediately some one is at hand with a healing supplement, and περὶ τοῦ is plaistered upon the text; in the meanwhile τὸ σφόδρα τοιοῦτον is utterly lost.

τῷ λόγῳ σου] I have put this Alexandrian phrase in brackets.

οὐχ ἥττον δα[ς] I entirely agree with Stallbaum that it is, 'nodum in scirpo quærere,' to be dissatisfied with these words; but his own translation of them has led him to suspect another word which is equally sound. The sense is, *You will presently prove it (that you understand me) no less (than you now*

λόγος ἐκάστοτε, ὁ τὸ Μηδὲν ἄγαν παρακλενόμενος, ᾧ πεί- Ε  
θονται· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἡ  
σφοδρὰ ἡδονὴ κατέχουσα περιβοήτους ἀπεργάζεται.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· καὶ εἴ γε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τινι  
πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς [καὶ τοῦ σώματος], ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ μέγισται  
μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι, γίγονται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προελομενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι,  
τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐχούσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

46

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶνδε νοσημάτων ἡδονάς, τίνα  
ποτ' ἔχουσι τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίων;

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ἃς οὖς εἵπομεν δυσχερεῖς μι-  
σοῦσι παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

ΣΩ. Οἷον τὰς τῆς ψώρας ἰάσεις τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ ὅσα  
τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ πά-  
θος ἡμῖν, ᾧ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον  
ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην;

ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τοῦτό γε [ἄρα], ᾧ Σώκρατες, εἰς γί-  
γνεσθαι τι κακόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὴν ἂν Φιλήβου γ' ἔνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον· Β

*profess it), for you will answer my ques-  
tion.*

περιβοήτους] *Frantic*. The word is properly applied to men maddened by the noise of some Bacchanalian or other orgies, and then generally of extravagant and impetuous characters. It is here opposed to the staid and seemly demeanour of the temperate.

[καὶ τοῦ σώματος] It is impossible that this passage should be correct as we now read it. Plato has passed from the diseases of the body to ὑβρις, which is a disease of the mind. The presence of the article betrays the interpolator.

[ἄρα] I have cancelled ἄρα as perfectly unmeaning. Some scribe had written σύμμικτον τοῦτο γὰρ through mistaking γε. Another came and turned γὰρ into γ' ἄρ'.

Οὐ μὴν ἂν Φιλήβου γ'] The Coislinian has μὴν which one Editor adopts and so affords to another the opportunity for telling the world that δὴ is never put after μὴν. A little attention to the sense would have been better bestowed than it is on such a truism. As the words stand in the Books, Socrates is made to say that he did not bring forward these instances about itch on account of Philebus. Probably not; but why say so? Is he afraid lest Φιλήβος ὁ καλὸς should be troubled with the complaint? Or can he think it necessary to declare that it was not to make fun of him that he alluded to it? As this is out of the question, the only other reason for bringing Philebus in at all must be that Philebus is fastidious, and will look upon him as

ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων, ὦ Πρωταρχε, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἂν μὴ κατοφθῶσι, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυνάμεθα διακρίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἰτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων ξυγγενεῖς, τὰς ἐν τῇ μίξει κοινωνούσας, λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ τοίνυν [μίξεις] αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δ' αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. τὰς δ' αὖ C τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρέσομεν λύπας ἡδοναῖς μιχθεῖσας, τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονὰς τὰ ξυναμφοτέρα, τοτὲ δὲ λύπας ἐπικαλουμένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὅποτεν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφθορᾷ τάναντι' ἅμα πάθη πάσῃ, ποτὲ διγῶν θέρηται καὶ θερμαινόμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχεται, ζητῶν, οἶμαι, τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον πικρόγλυκυ [μεμιγμένον], μετὰ D δυσσαπλλακτίας παρόν, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὕστερον ξύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ.

φορτικῶς for making such nasty allusions. This is in keeping with the other traits of him in the dialogue; but then he must say: "For Philebus' sake I would not have introduced this topic, but I cannot do without it." And so the ΔΗ which helped Stallbaum to chastise Fischer disappears into AN, and as μὴν is the equivalent of μέντοι and γε is found in all the Books, I have adopted the latter particle also.

Οὐκοῦν ἰτέον] In the Books Protarchus' speech in continued down to ξυγγενεῖς: which arrangement makes the young man show the way and the philosopher follow it.

Εἰσὶ τοίνυν] I have cancelled μίξεις. Unless this be done, and ἡδοναὶ κοινωνοῦσαι be understood, the following clauses make downright nonsense. "There are bodily pleasures which mix in bodies, and mental pleasures which mix in the mind", is true and simple. But if you say there are *mixtures*—then one of each pair, either κατὰ τὸ σῶμα or ἐν αὐτῷ σῶμασι, either αὖ-

τῆς τ. ψ. or ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ becomes quite meaningless.

ποτὲ] This word occurs twice in the Bodleian, both before and after διγῶν. It is properly cancelled in the second place, for being used in opposition to ἐνίοτε, it would be placed in such a part of the sentence as would mark that it is not used as a mere enclitic. Bekker's correction of πικρόγλυκυ for πικρῷ γλυκῷ is fully borne out by τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον: but in recommending it he should also have advised the expulsion of μεμιγμένον. For δυσσαπλλακτίας Hirschig reads δυσσαπλλαξίας. But the departure from analogy is in favour of our reading, as a probable Atticism.

ξύντασιν] This is the reading of the best MSS.; the others have σύστασιν, which is irreconcilable with ἀγρίαν, such an epithet being only applicable to a word signifying some active process. Besides, σύστασις after ἀγανάκτησις would be an anticlimax; for it is properly used to denote the effect of *sadness*

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀληθές τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ τοιαῦται μίξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἕσων εἰς λυ-  
πῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐτέρων πλειόνων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τὰς μὲν, ὅταν πλείους λῦπαι τῶν ἡδονῶν  
γίνωνται, τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νῦν δὴ ταύτας εἶναι καὶ  
τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν. ὁπότεν δ' ἐντὸς τὸ ζέον ἦ καὶ τὸ  
φλεγμαῖνον, τῇ τριψεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ κνήσει μὴ ἐφικνῆται τις, τὰ  
δ' ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέῃ, τότε φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς Ε  
τοῦναντίον μεταβάλλοντες, ἀπορίας ἐνίοτ' ἀμυγχανοὺς [ἡδονάς],  
τοτε δὲ τοῦναντίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας ἡδο-  
νάς συγκερασθείσας, εἰς ὁπότερ' ἂν ῥέψῃ, παρέσχοντο, τῷ τὰ  
συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγγεῖν †καὶ ἡμοῦ  
λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέναι.

47

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁπότεν [αὐ] πλείων ἡδονὴ κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα  
πάντα ξυμμιχθῇ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμιγμένον τῆς λύπης γαργαλίζει  
τε καὶ ἡρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δ' αὖ τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ  
πλεῖον ἐγκεχυμένον συντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ

in turning the mind back upon itself. *Συντείνειν* is used a little further on as the effect of pleasure; it is obvious that the figure of speech being derived from the strain upon a cord, is applicable alike to the rackings of pain (*renes morbo tentantur acuto*) or the thrill of pleasure (*pertantant gaudia pectus*).

Λέγε δὴ τὰς μὲν] The first part of this passage is easy enough, when once we learn to separate the process referred to in the sentence ending with γαργαλισμῶν from that described afterwards. I have put δ' after ὁπότεν. The first case is that where *κνήσεις* and *τριψεῖς* are said *διαχεῖν*, because they discuss the heat in the part affected. When this is insufficient, the affection being too deep-seated, then recourse is had to irritation of the surface in order to relieve the interior. This is effected by bringing the parts to the fire, and shifting the affection to the opposite place: that is to say, by producing external heat in place of internal. When men do this, they sometimes produce terrible

ἀπορίας, states where pleasure and pain are confounded, and the patient does not know what to do with himself. This sense is brought out by transposing ἀπορίας, and cancelling ἡδονάς. The only difficulty that remains is in the last clause; *they procure, as the case may turn out, sometimes great embarrassments, and sometimes mingled pleasure for the inner parts contrasted with the pain of the outer, by forcibly dissolving what is compacted and compacting what is separate, and by procuring to themselves pain mingled with pleasure.* This is saying that they do a thing by doing it; what we need to be told is, how that which they do involves a mixture of pain and pleasure. I therefore propose to read τῷ τὰ σ. β. δ. ἢ τὰ δ. συγγεῖν, ὁμοῦ λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέντες: *procuring pain along with pleasure, by forcibly dispersing (κνήσει καὶ τριψεῖ) what is congested (the accumulated heat), and determining what is dispersed (by inflaming the surface artificially).*

παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, παντοῖα δὲ πνεύματα τὰ περὶ γὰρ ἀπεργαζόμενα πᾶσαν ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετ' ἀφροσύνης ἀπεργάζεται.

B ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγειν γ', ὡς ἔταιρε, αὐτόν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλον περὶ ἄλλον, ὡς ταύταις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τερπόμενος ὁλον ἀποθνήσκει. καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ παντάπασιν αἰετ' ἀεὶ μεταδιώκει τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος ὢν τυγχάνῃ· καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν ταύταις ὃ τι μάλιστα αἰετ' ὦντι εὐδαιμονέστατον καταριζομένηται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν C πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέρανας.

παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα] It causes all manner of changes in complexion, and changes in posture, and changes in breathing, which produce the utmost excitement and shouting with delirium. Though I have retained ἀπεργαζόμενα, and endeavoured to render it as above, it is rather as against Buttmann's ἀπεργαζόμενον than as believing in the genuineness of the word. The singular would mean that the excess of the pleasure by producing the changes in complexion, posture &c., produced the mental defects; which is no truer than that these changes cause them. But the very combination ἀπεργαζόμενα ἀπεργάζεται is unworthy of even a third-rate writer. I say ἀπεργάζεται, for this is the Bodleian reading, and ἐνεργάζεται is merely a contrivance, and not a successful one, made by the corrector of some inferior copy, to avoid the inelegant repetition. As to πνεύματα, no doubt the respiration would be troubled; as in the description of Hercules' madness, we read (H. F. 869) ἀμνηστὸς δ' οὐ σωφρονίζει, ταῦρος ὡς ἐς ἐμβολήν. But πνεύματα do not admit of sufficient variety to be called παντοῖα. It is not unlikely that this addition is due to some corrupt dittographia, and that the old text ran thus; παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, πᾶσαν δ' ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετ' ἀφροσύνης ἀπεργάζεται.

ἄλλον περὶ ἄλλον] One class of MSS. has ἄλλον, the other περὶ ἄλλον. I have combined the two readings. παντάπασιν αἰετ' ἀεὶ μεταδιώκει] The word παντάπασιν is not applicable to αἰετ', nor does it seem compatible with τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον, for while the first denotes thoroughness of pursuit, the other graduates the pursuit according to the moral condition of the man. As this whole speech is about what men say and think, what if Plato wrote thus: καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ πάντας φασὶ δεινὰ μεταδιώκειν τ. μ., ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τις κ. α. ὢν τυγχάνῃ? τὰ συμβαίνοντα] One Editor approves of Ficinus' translation, omnia quae apud multos in existimationem veniunt. But neither this rendering, nor what I once gave, that which one meets with from the common run of men as to opinion, is in keeping with the Greek; for we have not συμβαίνοντα τοῖς πολλοῖς nor συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν but ἔ. πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν. If this is equivalent to περὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ συμβαίνουνσι, the sense will not be unsuitable; but I know of no such phrase. Perhaps Plato wrote: τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαν. I can offer no better rendering of εἰς δόξαν than, as far as belief. In the *Euthydemus* (305, D) we have it in this sense; νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἷσεσθαι σοφίας πέρι, "that they will carry off the prize of wisdom, as far as public belief is concerned". But this sense would make men's agreement a mere pretence or a delusion, which

ΣΩ. *Περί γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπιπολῆς τε καὶ ἐντός [κερασθέντων]. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι τάναντία ξυμβάλλεται, λύπην θ' ἅμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην, ὥστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφοτέρα κράσιν ἵεναι, ταυτ' ἐμπροσθε μὲν διήλομεν, ὡς ἴδοιτο αὐτὸ κενῶται πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενούμενος δ' ἄλγει, ταῦτα δὲ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐμαρτυράμεθα, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν, ὡς ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα Δ διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πλήθει ἀμηχάνοις οὔσι μῖξις μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ξυμπίπτει γιγνομένη.*

ΠΡΩ. *Κινδυνεύεις ὀρθότατα λέγειν.*

ΣΩ. *Ἔτι τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μίξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπὴ μία.*

*ἐντός [κερασθέντων]* As it is not the outward and inward parts which are mingled, but the pain of one with the pleasure of the other, the word *κερασθέντων*, which is borrowed from above, must be looked upon as a false gloss. In the rest of this sentence I have left *κ. τ. ἐ.* Stallbaum proposed at one time to change *αὐτὸ* into *τις*, while I thought that it proved a lacuna, where the opposite *ἐπὶ τὴν πληρώσιν* had once played its part; but it seems to follow from what I have said above that *So-crates* cannot have entered into any such detail. I will not conceal the suspicion which I have conceived about this very corrupt part of the Dialogue. I believe that of the words, *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ΨΥΧῇ* alone has any claims to legitimacy: that the damaged text was restored by a conjecture founded on the antithetical *Περί γε τῶν ἡδονῶν κ. τ. ἐ.*: but that we may easily find such a beginning as will leave undisturbed and free from all taint of suspicion both *ψυχῇ . . . ξυμβάλλεται* and *ὥστε . . . ἵεναι*, viz. *ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ψυχῇ κ. τ. ἐ.* "Since this is the fact, part of this fact has been stated, but part we now declare". Instead of *ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν κενῶται*, I conjecture *ὅστις ἂν κ.*

he claimed to have done this. Again in the same gap, we have *ὥστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφοτέρα κράσιν ἵεναι*, but this *μῖξις μία* is the very thing which he declares that he now points out for the first time. There remains *ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν* into *τις*, while I thought that it proved a lacuna, where the opposite *ἐπὶ τὴν πληρώσιν* had once played its part; but it seems to follow from what I have said above that *So-crates* cannot have entered into any such detail. I will not conceal the suspicion which I have conceived about this very corrupt part of the Dialogue. I believe that of the words, *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ΨΥΧῇ* alone has any claims to legitimacy: that the damaged text was restored by a conjecture founded on the antithetical *Περί γε τῶν ἡδονῶν κ. τ. ἐ.*: but that we may easily find such a beginning as will leave undisturbed and free from all taint of suspicion both *ψυχῇ . . . ξυμβάλλεται* and *ὥστε . . . ἵεναι*, viz. *ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ψυχῇ κ. τ. ἐ.* "Since this is the fact, part of this fact has been stated, but part we now declare". Instead of *ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν κενῶται*, I conjecture *ὅστις ἂν κ.*

*ξυμπίπτει γιγνομένη* For *ξυμπίπτει γιγνομένη* I have adopted *ξ. γιγνομένη*, which I formerly advocated without knowing that it had been already proposed by others.



ΠΡΩ. Ποία;

ΣΩ. Φημί αὐτήν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῇ πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σίγ-  
κρασιν [ἔφαμεν].

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λέγομεν;

Ε ΣΩ. Ὅργην καὶ φρόνον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρήνον καὶ ἔρωτα  
καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἃρ' οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς  
ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύπας τινάς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὰς ἡδονῶν μεστὰς εὐρήσομεν ἀμηχάνων;  
ἢ δεόμεθ' ὑπομιμνήσκεισθαι τὸ

ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι,

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο,

48 καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὔσας  
ἀναμειγμένους;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω ταῦτά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν συμ-  
βαίνοι γιγνόμενα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἄμα  
χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησαι;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κωμωδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς  
ἃρ' οἶσθ' ὥς ἔστι [κάν τούτοις] μῆξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;

Ποία] The Books have Ποία, φῆς; to which the answer given is "Ἦν αὐτὴν τ. ψ. α. π. λ. σύγκρασιν ἔφαμεν. Nobody believes in Ποία, φῆς; and some have the courage to replace it by Ποίαν φῆς; which is at least grammatical. But there is no reason for φῆς at all, and if any one will compare the instances where we have Πῶς φῆς; Πῇ φῆς; and the rest, with the innumerable examples of the mere interrogative pronoun or adverb, he will desire a special reason for the departure from the ordinary expression; here no such reason exists, and the presence of the verb may be easily accounted for in another way. No exception has been taken to ἔφαμεν, and yet it is quite untrue that they have said anything as yet on this mixture, and Socrates declares as much in the foregoing paragraph. But if ἔφαμεν is false, can we offer the place to

φαμέν? No; for until Protarchus assents to it, it is no joint assertion. Again "Ἦν is μῆξις; and how can we have μῆξιν and σύγκρασιν governed both by λαμβάνειν? A single correction (for I attribute the interpolation to the false reading) removes all these difficulties. It is probable that the MS. had ἡμ' αὐτὴν, the *rubricator* having neglected to put an initial Φ.

τὸ—ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε] Hom. *Il.* xviii. 108. I have omitted the words which all recent Editors are agreed in considering an interpolation, τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ὁργαῖς τῷ, standing after ἐφέηκε.

[κάν τούτοις]] No ταῦτα have been mentioned, but the corrector was unfamiliar with so common an Atticism as οἶσθ' αὐτὴν διδάσκειν ὥς ἔστι μῆξις. Nor is ἐν τούτῳ at all more intelligible; there the neuters αὐτὸ and σκοτεινότερον, which obviously refer to

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ πάνυ κατανόω.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, [ἐν τούτῳ] B  
ξυνηοεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ οὖν ὥς γ' ἔοικεν ἐμοί.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμέν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ σοτει-  
νότερόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ῥᾶον καταμαθεῖν τις οἶός τ'  
ἢ μῖξιν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγοις ἄν.

ΣΩ. Τό τοι νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα λύπην  
τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γ' ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας  
ἡρόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὴν ἄγνοια καὶ ἦν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέραν ἔξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἦντινα φύσιν ἔχει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἔξεώς τινος  
ἐπίκλην λεγομένη· τῆς δ' αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστί τι τούταντίον  
πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ Γνωθὶ σαυτὸν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε. τούταντίον μὴν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μηδαμῇ D  
γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν [λεγόμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ γράμματος] ἂν εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ὡ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῇ τέμνειν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ φῆς; οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ.

πάθος, were supposed to refer to some example or instance.

Ἔστι δὴ πονηρία] The genitive ἔξεώς τινος does not depend on πονηρία, but upon ἐπίκλην. There is a certain πονηρία in general, called after name of a particular habit; that is, called so from πονηρός, which denotes a particular habit. I have added τι after ἐστί. A subject to ἔχον is indispensable.

[λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τ. γ.] It is better to bracket these words, as Beck recom-

mended, than to think Plato capable of such a frigid joke, as Stallbaum, with some violence to the language, has extracted from them.

Πῇ φῆς:] Here is an instance of what was mentioned above. Had Socrates said not πειρῶ τέμνειν, but τέμνωμεν, the answer would have been Πῇ;

οὐ γ. μὴ δ. ὦ] οὐ μὴ ὦ is supported by Plato *Rep.* 341, c. οὐ μὴ οἷός τε ἦς and by Xen. *Hiero* xi fin. οὐ μὴ δύνωνται. The passage, οὐ μὴ—φώμεν

ΣΩ. Λέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγω, καὶ δέομαί γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτοὺς κατὰ τρεῖ' ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἕκαστον;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι πλουσιώ-  
Ε τεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες.

ΣΩ. Πλείους δέ γε, οὐ μείζους καὶ καλλίους αὐτοὺς δο-  
ξάζουσι, καὶ πάντα, ὅσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς  
οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πολὺ δὲ πλείστοί γε, οἶμαι, περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος τὸ  
τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήκασιν, ἀρετὴν δοξάζοντες βελτίους  
ἑαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντες.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

49 ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἄρ' οὐ σοφίας [πέρι] τὸ πλεῖθος  
πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ [ψευ-  
δοῦς];

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἂν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀρθῶς  
ἂν εἴποι πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ

in *Rep.* 486, D, has been changed on the best MS. authority. I should doubt of the rest, but that they all refer to *being able*.

πλουσιώτεροι] The MSS. have πλουσιώτερον, which is indefensible. The construction of δοξάζειν may be with εἶναι, in which case the subject of a reflexive sentence follows in the nominative, or it may govern a direct accusative, as in the next sentences.

καὶ πάντα] *And who, as to all things pertaining to the body, conceive themselves to be far above what they really are.* Literally, 'to be all things which pertain to the body in a degree beyond the reality which belongs to them.' The

*neuter πάντα* is put for *masculine* adjectives understood. See for examples my *Præfatio ad Ionem* p. xvii.

τὸ τῶν] The Books have τούτων, which is utterly superfluous; nor could ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς follow τὸ εἶδος without a repetition of the article.

ἀντεχόμενον] One Editor says: *Intelligendum relinquitur αὐτῆς.* I myself was driven to a conjecture: ἀντίτεχνον ὄν, but fortunately I admitted it to be too audacious. These are the shifts to which we are driven by the dunce who inserted πέρι. I have no faith in ψευδοῦς, for who ever heard of δοξοσοφία ἀληθῆς?

μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὕψεσθαι μῖξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν τέμνωμεν δίχα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντες ὁπόσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν περὶ ἑαυτῶν Β ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ξιπείσθαι τοῖς μὲν βρώμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δέ, οἷμαι, τούναντίον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσὶ μετ' ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι, γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τᾷληθῇ φθέγγει· τοὺς δὲ δυνατούς τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβερούς καὶ ἰσχυρούς [καὶ] ἐχθρούς προσαγορεύων ὀρεθότατον τούτων σαντῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. ἄγνοια γὰρ C ἡ μὲν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἐχθρὰ τε καὶ αἰσχρὰ· βλαβερά γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αὐτῇ τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσὶν· ἡ δ' ἀσθενὴς ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρεθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν μῖξις ἐν τοῖτοις οὕτω μοι καταφανής.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστι που καὶ ἡδονή;

D

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὗτ' ἄδικον οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ὀρῶντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δέ, ἄρ' οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ

ἰσχυροῦς [καὶ] ἐχθροῦς] I have removed the conjunction, which made utter nonsense of the passage, and drove me to follow Schütz's conjecture αἰσχυροῦς. The strong become strong enemies, the weak objects of laughter.

Τὴν οὖν] The completion of the sentence would have been ἄρ' οὐ φατέον γελοῖον εἶναι καὶ κακόν; But instead of finishing the question, he breaks it into two, ἡ μὴ φάμεν—; and Κακὸν δ' οὐχ ὁμολογούμεν—; I have put τῶν φίλων in brackets. No addition was ever more perverse.



Ε ὅσα νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶ λέγοντες εἶδσαι γίγνεσθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὀπόσ' ἀσθενῇ, μισητὰ δ' ὀπόσ' ἐρρωμένα—ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἶπον ἄρτι, τὴν [τῶν φίλων] ἔξιν ταύτην. ὅταν ἔχη τις τὴν ἀβλαβὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοῖαν εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτήν, ἄγνοιαν οὔσαν, εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρομεν δ' ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτῇ γελῶμεν;

50 ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴν δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόρον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν [τοῦτο] ἀπεργαζόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Γελῶντας ἄρ' ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύσας ἡδονὴν φθόρῳ, λύπη τὴν ἡδονὴν ξυκεραννύναι· τὸν γὰρ φθόρον ὁμολογῆσαι λύπῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτῳ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

B ΣΩ. Μηνίει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ [ἐν τραγωδίαις,] μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ βίου ξυμπᾶσῃ τραγωδίᾳ καὶ κωμωδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεραννύσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ καὶ τις φιλονεικοῖ πάνυ πρὸς τὰναντία.

ΣΩ. Ὁργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρήνον καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόρον προϋθέμεθα καὶ ὅποσα τοιαῦτα, C ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὐρήσειν μινύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλὰκις λεγόμενα. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

τούτῳ] φθόρον καὶ γελῶτα. The MSS. have τούτο.

[ἐν τραγωδίαις]] This could not occur without a corresponding mention of comedy; but the words are an idle addition. The unusual break after ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ made some grammarian think there was a gap, and, as we have

seen, in the eyes of these men a gap was a place for the exercise of their healing powers. ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγωδίαις, has one preposition too many.

ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὐρήσειν] ἔφαμεν is my correction of the MS. reading φάμεν. The reference is to 46, κ.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόρου καὶ ὀργῆς πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ διαπερανθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Διὰ δὴ τί μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαί σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μῆξιν; ἄρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν ὅτι τὴν γ' ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥάδιον κρᾶσιν ἐπιδειῖναι; Δ λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαντιῦ [ἀφείναι με] μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα δεῖν μηχανεῖν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε, πότερα ἀρκῆς με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαί σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναι με· τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων αὖριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ ἔ νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅλλ' ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διέξελθε ὅπη σοι φίλον.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μυχθείσας ἡδονὰς ὑπὸ δὴ τίνος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμίκτους πορευοίμεθ' ἂν ἐν τῷ μέρει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλιστ' εἶπες.

51

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὲ πειράσομαι μεταλαβὼν σημαίνειν ὑμῖν αὐτάς.

λαβόντα δὲ] When I affirmed that press ἀφείναι με τοῦ μηχανεῖν; for while λαβόντα ἀφείναι could not depend on it is longer than the other, it is really πίστεως χάριν, I was so little aware of the extent to which the text had been more elliptical.

make it midnight? The plural is used in speaking of the progress of the night, as πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν. *Symp.* 217, D; *Prot.* 310, D; *Arist. Nub.* I. μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, *Rep.* 621, B.

μεταλαβὼν] Only a few inferior copies have this reading in place of μεταβαλὼν. But they have blundered on the truth. Socrates does not change but takes in exchange. Stallbaum has confounded these two senses in his note on 21, D. quoting passages from the *Parmenides* and the *Symposium* where μεταβαλὼν is correctly given. There is a passage in the *Laws* which

τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι πᾶσαν πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πᾶν πως πείθομαι, ἀλλ', ὅπερ εἶπον, μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τίνας ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὐσας δ' οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἐτέρας τίνας ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, [εἶναι δ' αὐτὰς] συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυρῶν τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίας.

B ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖ τίνας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων ὁρθῶς τις διανοοῖτ' ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα, καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας, καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων, καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδεΐας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύτους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδεΐας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ ταῦτ', ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ λέγομεν οὕτως;

ΣΩ. Πάνν μὲν [οὖν] οὐκ εὐθύς δηλὰ ἐστὶν ἃ λέγω, περὶ C ρατέον μὴν δηλοῦν. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐκ ὅπερ ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ζώων ἢ τινων ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλ' εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιφερὲς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τὰ τε τοῖς τόρνους γυγνόμεν' ἐπί-

contains both words, and will shew the distinction between the two. It is here given as, in my opinion, it ought to be read. *Lawe*, 904, D. μεῖζω but conceding; and in this sense μὲν δ' ἦδη ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὅταν μεταβῇ διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς βούλησιν τε καὶ ὁμιλίαν γενομένην ἰσχυράν, ὅπότεν μὲν ἀρετῇ δεῖα προσμείζασα γίγνηται διαφορόντως τοιαύτη, διαφέροντα καὶ μετέλαβε τόπον, ἄγαν ὁδὸν μετακομισθεῖσα [εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον]. Compare what has preceded: μεμηχανηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ κοῖον τι γυγνόμενον αἰεὶ ποῖαν ἔδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι, καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους.

[εἶναι δ' αὐτάς] These words interrupt the continuity of the description; πολλὰς φαντασθείσας *appearing in many shapes*, why?—*συμπεφυρμένας*—*because they are adulterated with pains and reliefs* &c.

ἡδεΐας καθαρὰς λυπῶν] The two last words neither require a conjunction to precede them, nor is there the least ground of suspicion against them; they are added as descriptive of the manner in which the πληρώσεις are ἡδεῖαι.

Πάνν μὲν [οὖν] Nothing can be more out of place here than this frequent formula. Socrates is not correcting, but conceding; and in this sense μὲν οὖν cannot be employed. But it may be said that μὲν belongs to the sentence, and is in apodosis to a suppressed δὲ contained in μὴν, while οὖν characterises the answer, so that the combination of the two words here is purely accidental. I have no doubt that this is the true explanation of μὲν, but the particle after it in this case would most certainly be γοῦν. We must either restore this—but γοῦν οὐκ generally becomes οὐκ οὖν—γε, or suppose οὖν itself to be owing to the frequent combination of μὲν and οὖν. Πάνν belongs more especially to δηλὰ.

τά τε τοῖς τόρνους] As Hesychius defines the τόρνος as a carpenter's instrument by which circular figures are described, ἐπίπεδα cannot be *trianguli* or *quadrata* (Stallb.). The order followed is an inverted one; the products of rules and compasses correspond to the εὐθύ σχῆμα, and those of the τόρνος to the περιφερές.

πεδά τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἴ μου  
μανθάνεις. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρὸς τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ  
ἄλλα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πεφικέναι καὶ τινὰς ἡδονὰς D  
οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κινήσεων προσφερεῖς· καὶ χρώ-  
ματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα [καλὰ καὶ ἡδονὰς]. ἀλλ'  
ἄρα μανθάνομεν, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Πειρῶμαι. μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πειράσθῃτι δὲ καὶ σὺ  
σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων \*\*\* τὰς λείας καὶ λαμ-  
πράς, τὰς ἐν τι καθαρὸν ἰσίσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς  
ἀλλ' αὐτὰς καθ' αὐτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων ξυμφύτους ἡδονὰς  
ἐπομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὁσμὰς ἦτον μὲν τούτων θείον γένος E  
ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεῖχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας,  
καὶ ὅπη τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει γεγονὸς ἡμῖν, τοῦτ' ἐκεί-  
νοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν. ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἶδη  
δύο λέγομεν ἡδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Κατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι δὴ τοῖνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μα- 52  
θήματα ἡδονὰς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὔται πείνας μὲν μὴ  
ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἐξ  
ἀρχῆς γενομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' οὕτω ξυνδοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀπο-  
βολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίνωνται, καθορᾶς τινὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλ-  
γηδόνας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὗ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλ' ἐν τισι λογισμοῖς τοῦ παθή-  
ματος, ὅταν τις στερηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρεῖαν. B

κινήσεων] This is Van Hensde's cor-  
rection for κινήσεων; the same scholar  
also changed κινήσει to κινήσει in the  
passage above. It is strange that the  
Zurich editors should not have adopted  
these corrections.

φθόγγων] The feminine noun which  
denotes the description of sounds, and  
which has dropped out here, as is evi-  
dent from the repetition of the article,  
is perhaps ἰδέας. Some propose φω-

νῶν in place of φθόγγων, but leave the  
second τὰς to shift for itself. It is  
more likely that Plato would use φθόγ-  
γων, as he had done so before, and as  
it is more comprehensive than φωνῶν.

λέγομεν] For this all MSS. and Edi-  
tions have λεγομένων; but Plato would  
not speak of the real pleasures as things  
called pleasures.

λογισμοῖς τ. π.] The genitive does  
not express concerning, but λογίζονται



ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ μακάριε, νῦν γ' ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραίνομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ τοίνυν λέγεις, ὅτι χωρὶς λύπης ἡμῖν λήθη γίγνεται ἐκάστος ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ῥητέον;

C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τὰς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὁρθῶς ἂν λεχθεῖσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὐτῶν καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας, τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου τ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἥττον καὶ μᾶλλον διὰ τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου εἶναι γένους, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτῶν διαθεάτεον.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χεῖρ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι τὸ καθαρὸν

τὸ πάθημα is what they do; so that the phrase should be rendered "in the account they take of the accident".

Οὐκοῦν] I should have bracketed but left in the text the interpolations, by which this passage has been so long rendered unintelligible, but that there were other corrections needed, so that it would only have created confusion to put the new and the old together. προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ is surely not difficult to understand. Socrates wishes to add one more remark to this part of his subject. But some one who took no notice of τῷ λόγῳ must needs have it that some quality is to be added to some kind; so he inserts after τῷ λόγῳ the sentence ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τούναντίον ἐμμετρίαν. But the λόγος is intent not merely on giving the names but on dividing into the several classes of τὰ ἄπειρα and τὰ ἐμμετρα, and does not even use the greatness and the intensity as proofs,

but says that all such as vary in their greatness and intensity belong to the ἄπειρον which itself pervades mind and matter, now less and now more. I will now mention the other changes I have made, ταῖς μὲν—τάς μὲν, καὶ τὸ—κατὰ τό, σφοδρὸν αὐ—σφοδρὸν αὐ i.e. αὐτῶν, ἀπείρου γε—ἀπείρου τε, (the Bodleian has τε γε), [προσθῶμεν αὐ—ταῖς] after φερομένου, ταῖς—τάς, the last with MS. authority.

διαθεάτεον] This is Van Heusde's emendation for διαΐτεον; it had been anticipated by the Venice MS. Σ, a copy full of conjectural variations.

πρὸς ἀλήθειαν] i.e. in relation to truth. As this is the constant and only admissible meaning of these words, ἢ before εἰληκρινές can only be retained on condition of our changing Τί ποτε into Τί πρότερον. Otherwise, we must change ἢ itself into καὶ. The remainder of the sentence is faulty as to the arrangement of the conjunctions and articles. I would

τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τε [καὶ τὸ] πολὺ καὶ [τὸ] μέγα, καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλόν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί ποτ' ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾷς βουλόμενος;

ΣΩ. Μηδέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν ἐκατέρου καθαρόν ἐστι, Ἐ τὸ δ' οὐ καθαρὸν, ἵνα καθαρὸν ἐκάτερον ἰὸν εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ ξυνάπασι τοῖσδε ῥᾶω παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρῶτάτα.

ΣΩ. Ἴδι δὲ, περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὕτωςι διανοηθῶμεν· προελλόμενοι πρώτον αὐτῶν ἓν τι διασκοπῶμεν. 53

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν προελλόμεθα;

ΣΩ. Τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτον, εἰ βούλει, θεασώμεθα γένος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη; πό-  
τερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν ᾧ  
χρώματος μηδεμία μοῖρα ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἐνείη;

read τὸ σφόδρα πολὺ τε καὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ ἱκανόν. *Which must we consider as the first in relation to Truth? The pure and the unmixed? or the exceedingly numerous or great, and the sufficient?* According to this arrangement, each member of the comparison will consist of two parts, for πολὺ ἢ μέγα or πολὺ καὶ μέγα are merely explanatory adjuncts of σφόδρα; compare below μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον." I leave this note as I wrote it many years ago. There is very little in it that I would wish to modify, except as to ἱκανόν. On reference to the Introduction it will be seen that μέτρον which is just disposed of, and ἀλήθεια and κάλλος are those Ideas which play a most important part in the concluding pages of the Dialogue. It will also be seen in the very next page that ἀληθέστατον and κάλλιστον, κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον, ἀληθέστερα καὶ καλλίων are dwelt on together in the conclusion of the argument here started. Now what was to be proved, must have been propounded; and it cannot have been propounded elsewhere. For this reason I have written καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλόν.

εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν] Not *whether* but *if*, as is plain from the addition of ἄρα. *If it should prove that one part of either is pure, and another impure.*

ἵνα καθαρὸν] This depends upon μηδὲν ἐπιλείπειν. Socrates wants to find all the pure kinds so far as he is able, because in these alone can the comparative merits of ἡδονῇ and νοῦς be determined. I believe the MS. εἰς τὴν κρίσιν to be a corruption, for it is unnecessary, and occasions an inelegant repetition. As the κρίσις was to be, 'Which ingredient was of most importance in the mixture,' and this must be determined by mixing the purest specimens of each, I have so little doubt that εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν is the true reading that I have now admitted it into the Text.

ἀκρατέστατον] The ancient grammarians inform us that this is the superlative of ἀκρατος, an usage which to our ears destroys all distinction between the superlative of this word and that of ἀκρατής. I distrust them, but make no change.

ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἐνείη] I have changed ἄλλη into ἄλλου, which is absolutely necessary for the sense. We must not

ΠΡΩ. Ἀῖνον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστα εἰλικρινὲς ἦν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτ' ἀληθέστατον, ὦ Πρωταρχε, καὶ ἅμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων θήσομεν, ἀλλ' οὐ Β τὸ πλεῖστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατά γε.

ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμιγμένου πολλοῦ λευκοῦ λευκότερον ἅμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐὰν φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν ὀρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐ δὴ πον πολλῶν δεησόμεθα παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς περί λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ νοεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν, ὥς ἄρα καὶ ξύμπασα ἡδονὴ σμικρὰ μεγάλης καὶ C ὀλίγη πολλῆς καθαρὰ λύπης ἡδίων καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων γίγνοιτ' ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τό γε παράδειγμ' ἱκανόν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε; ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὥς ἀεὶ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες αὐ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Διαπερανοῦμαι σοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτῶν, ὦ Πρωταρχε φίλε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἐστὶν δὴ τινα δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δ' αἰεὶ ἐγρίμενον ἄλλον.

suppose that ἂν is omitted before ἐνείη: it would be as contrary to Greek usage to employ it after a descriptive relative, as after εἰ with the optative.

καθαρὰ λύπης] If it be unminged with pain, which of course supposes that the other is not. ἡδίων is in fact ἀληθεστέρα, but it is added because of λευκότερον.

κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες] Trendelenburg understands this of Aristippus, who, according to Diogenes Laertius, ii. 87, taught that all pleasure was in κίνησις. But the school of Heraclitus and of Protagoras must have held the same doctrine. These could not, indeed, have

formally denied οὐσία to pleasure, for that would have implied their concession of it to other things; but pleasure itself would probably be one of the examples by which they supported their argument.

Τί δὴ;] Protarchus' answer is not germane to the question ἄρα οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν. Probably the words belong not to Protarchus but to Socrates, who stops himself and says—τί δέ; διαπεράνωμαι κ. τ. ἔ. To which Protarchus answers not by an ungracious Δέγε, but by ὦ φίλε, λέγε κ. τ. ἔ. This will rid us of the absurd collocation, ὦ Πρωταρχε φίλε.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς τούτω καὶ τίνα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμνότητων ἀεὶ πεφνκός, τὸ δ' ἑλλιπὲς ἐκείνου.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Παιδικά που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθαιωρήκαμεν ἅμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτοις τοῖνυν ἐοικότα δυοῖν οὔσι δύ' ἄλλα ζήτει κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι.

E

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ, λέγε σαφέστερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ τι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν τι ποικίλον, ὦ Πρωταρχε· ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐρ-  
σηλεῖ νῦν, λέγει δ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων ἔστ'  
αἰεὶ, τὸ δ' οὐ χάριν ἐκαστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ  
γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μόγις ἔμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Τάχα δ' ἴσως, ὦ παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προελ-  
θόντος τοῦ λόγου.

54

ΠΡΩ. Τί γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὴ τάδ' ἕτερα λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν ἕτερον ἔν.

ΠΡΩ. Δύ' ἀποδέχομαι σου ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέρου; τὴν  
γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἕνεκα;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο, ὃ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία, εἰ γενέσεως ἕνεκα  
τούτ' ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐστὶ, νῦν πυνθάνει;

Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ] The Books have time telling Socrates to speak more  
ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἑτέρῳ, out plainly. It is true that he has only  
of which some have endeavoured to extract a miserable metaphysical joke. ἐρ-  
Protarchus had already asked twice for Socrates' meaning.—Πῶς τούτω καὶ used λέγε σαφέστερον once before.  
τίνα λέγεις; and again Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέ- ἐρ-  
στερον. For ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι, com- thenius in the *Etym. Mag.* referred to  
pare above 16, c., τῶν λεγομένων εἶ- by Pierson on *Mæris* in v. ἐρ-  
ναι. The correction proposed by Hir- schig in the Paris edition was made escheleῖ,  
after I had communicated mine to him. is apparently decisive as to the ortho-  
I suppose that by this time he is con- graphy of this word. If Pierson had  
vinced that Protarchus is for the third known that the oldest MSS. of Plato  
have the η, he would have pronounced  
with greater certainty in its favour.  
Ἐρ-  
escheleῖ seems to have been a later  
form.

ΣΩ. Φαίνομαι.

B ΠΡΩ. Πρὸς θεῶν, ἄρ' [ἂν] ἐπανερωτᾷς με τοιόνδε τι; λέγ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, μοι, πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας; καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί;

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὦ Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαντῷ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ὃ τι οὔ· σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμμετέχε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φημί δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντ' ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ἐκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἐκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τό γε μὴν οὐ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνεται, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκείνῳ ἐστί· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὥ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

D ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν ἡδονή γ' εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὁρθῶς θήσομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ

Πρὸς θεῶν] The MSS. and Edd. have Πρῶ. Πρὸς θεῶν, ἄρ' ἂν ἐπανερωτᾷς με; Σω. Τοιόνδε τι λέγω, ὦ Πρώταρχε μοι, —τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὦ Πρώταρχε. It is strange that Bekker's note, 'τοιόνδε—hæc eidem dant E. H.' has never led any one to the right distribution of this passage. ἂν before ἐπανερωτᾷς has led to all manner of conjectural emendations, but I believe it to have arisen from a negligent repetition of ἄρ'. The absurdity of Socrates calling the same thing τοιόνδε τι and τοῦτ' αὐτό, seems not to have struck the Editors.

γίγνεται.] Commonly γίγνεται ἂν,

which is barbarous. Had ἐκείνο ἂν εἴη followed, γίγνεται without ἂν would have been correct; but with ἐστί we must have either αἰεὶ γίγνεται or αἰεὶ ἂν γίγνηται, and even the latter would be in much better accordance with something more remote than ἐστί, such as ἔσται or ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

Ἀλλ' οὖν—γε] Here again the MSS. have the absurd reading Ἀρ' οὖν. The conclusion follows so necessarily from that which has been said, that it would be quite out of place to make it the subject of a question; the presence of γε shows not only the corruption, but the sure method of correcting it.

μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μὲν, οὐσίαν δὲ μὴδ' ἡν-  
τινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν  
φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἐκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς Ε  
γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάσεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ὅσοι ἐξιώμενοι ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἢ τι τῶν τοι-  
ούτων, ὅσα γένεσις ἐξιάται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἅτε ἡδο-  
νῆς οὐσης αὐτῆς, καὶ φασι ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι μὴ διψῶντές  
τε καὶ πεινῶντες, καὶ τᾶλλα, ἃ τις ἂν εἴποι, πάντα τὰ ἐπό-  
μενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασι, μὴ πάσχοντες.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐοίκαςι γοῦν.

55

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαι γε τοῦναντίον ἅπαντες τὸ φθεί-  
ρεσθαι φαῖμεν ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἰροῖτ' ἂν τις τοῦθ'  
αἰρούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκείνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ᾧ μήτε  
χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δ' ἦν δυνατόν ὡς οἷόν τε κα-  
θαρώτατα.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλή τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἀλογία ξυμ-  
βαίνει γίγνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν τιθῇται.

ΣΩ. Πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδ' ἔτι λέγωμεν,—

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μὴδὲ κα- Β  
λὸν μήτ' ἐν σώμασι μήτ' ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ  
ἐνταῦθ' ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρίαν δ' ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἢ τι  
τῶν ἄλλων ὅς' [ἀγαθὰ] εἴληχε ψυχῇ, μὴδὲν τοιούτον εἶναι;

ἔχαν δα] The best MSS. have δαίν. This error is of continual occurrence in infinitives having the circumflex, which is so easily confounded with the sigla of γ.

ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος] This is a bitter sneer at Aristippus, defining pleasure as a γένεσις, and yet preaching pleasure. The difference between οἱ φάσχοντες and οἱ ἀποτελούμενοι is that between philosophers, and men who follow a

certain mode of life. By understanding this difference we are enabled to do without my change of ὅσοι into ὅς' οἱ, but I still doubt whether we do not require εὐδαμονῶν or μακαρίων after ἀποτελουμένων.

[ἀγαθὰ] "It is unreasonable to suppose that of all the things which belong to the mind such as courage, temperance, intelligence, &c. pleasure is the only one entitled to be called good."

Platonis Philebus.

πρὸς ταύτοις δ' ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα δέ, ἀναγκάζε-  
σθαι φάναι κακὸν εἶναι τότε, ὅταν ἀλγῇ, καὶ ἡ ἄριστος πάν-  
των, καὶ τὸν χαίροντ' αὖ, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, τότε, ὅταν χαίρῃ,  
C τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς δυνατόν ἀλο-  
γώτατα.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡδονῆς μὲν πάντως ἐξέτασιν πᾶσαν ἐπι-  
χειρῶμεν ποιήσασθαι, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης οἶον φειδόμενοι  
σφόδρα φανῶμεν· γενναίως δέ, εἴ πῃ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν  
περικρούωμεν, [ἕως] ὃ τι δὲ καθαρώτατόν ἐστ' αὐτῶν φύσει,  
τοῦτο κατιδόντες εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν χρώμεθα τὴν κοινὴν τοῖς τε  
τούτων καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μέν, οἶμαι, δημιουργικόν ἐστι τῆς

This is a fair appeal to common sense; but if you add ἀγαθὰ, you beg the question. Philebus could not say that of all ἀγαθὰ this is the only one without a manifest contradiction.

εἴ πῃ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει] The verb σή-  
ζω, to strain or percolate, has the same  
relation to σαρρὸς as σήπω to σαρρός.  
Hence the proper meaning of the word  
σαθρὸς is, that which suffers anything  
to run through it; it is therefore used  
of a leaky or cracked vessel. To ring  
a vessel in order to ascertain its sound-  
ness, is περικρούειν (with coins κωδω-  
νίζειν); and then it was said either  
ὑγιὲς or σαθρὸν βουβείν—ἡγεῖν—φθέγ-  
γεσθαι. The conjecture on this place,  
σαθρὸν ἡγεῖν, is not admissible, for if  
this had been the meaning, the future  
must have been used.

ὃ τι δὲ καθαρώτατον] The common  
reading is ἕως ὃ τι καθαρώτατον—  
But ἕως χρώμεθα is barbarous; and if  
we desired to retain ἕως, no change short  
of the following would be really suffi-  
cient: ἕως ἂν κατιδόμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ  
—χρησώμεθα.

εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν] Stallbaum has un-  
successfully defended κρᾶσιν against  
Schleiermacher, who proposed κρᾶσιν.  
There is no question of the comparison  
at present, but of the admixture, in  
order to which, as Socrates had already  
observed (52, ε), it is necessary to have

each kind in its purest state. χρῆσθαι  
μέρεσιν εἰς κρᾶσιν is as elegant as χρῆ-  
σθαι μ. εἰς κρᾶσιν (τῶν μερῶν) is the  
reverse.

Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν] If we would under-  
stand the drift of this question, we must  
divest ourselves of any notion that  
Plato is intending to establish a formal  
classification. His sole object is to show  
that there are two elements in ἐπιστή-  
μη, namely the production of tangible  
results, and the information of the mind.  
The latter is not pointed out for its  
own sake, but to give relief and de-  
finiteness to the former which is its  
opposite; and the former is mentioned,  
because it enables him to introduce  
music and several other arts under one  
head as χειροτεχνία. This explanation  
disposes of the suspicion about some  
portion of the text having been lost,  
and fully accounts for the fact that So-  
crates never returns to the head of arts  
περὶ παιδείαν. But why does he choose  
the arts which he calls χειροτεχνία as  
the subject of particular enquiry? Be-  
cause in these again there is a twofold  
element; the element of certainty de-  
rived from the mathematical sciences  
under which they work, and the em-  
pirical element. Now as one of these  
is scientific (ἐπιστήμης ἐχόμενον) and  
the other not, it is necessary to show  
this, as determining the greater or less

[περὶ τὰ μαθήματα] ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνίαις διανοηθῶμεν πρώταις εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἐχόμενον, τὸ δ' ἦττον ἐνι, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτερα νομίζειν, τὰ δ' ὡς ἀκαθαρότερα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρεΐ.

ΣΩ. Τὰς τοίνυν ἡγεμονικὰς διαληπτέον ἐκάστων αὐτῶν χωρὶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἂν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ Ε, καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικὴν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, φαῦλον τὸ κα-  
ταλειπούμενον ἐκάστης [ἂν γίγνοιτο].

ΠΡΩ. Φαῦλον μὲν δὴ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκάζουσιν λείπουσι' ἂν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς στο-  
χαστικῆς προσχωμένους δυνάμεσιν, αἷς πολλοὶ τέχνας ἐπονο-  
μάζουσιν, μελέτην καὶ πόνον τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένας.

56

pureness of these parts of Intellect, as they had already sought out the greater or less pureness of the several kinds of Pleasure. As for the text, περὶ τὰ μαθήματα is to be understood either in its widest sense, and then it is superfluous; for what ἐπιστήμη is there which is not π. τ. μαθήματα? Or it is to be taken in a restricted sense and then it is on its wrong side; for a knowledge περὶ τὰ μαθήματα is a knowledge περὶ τὴν παιδείαν. Sydenham saw that, χειροτεχνιαῖς being an adjective, you must understand either τέχναις, which would be ridiculous, or ἐπιστήμας; but no ἐπιστήμας have been mentioned, (only ἐπιστήμη in general) so that there is nothing to justify the omission of ἐπιστήμας here. These reasons seem to have been quite beyond the discernment of Stallbaum, who dismisses Sydenham with an authoritative "male", and one of his usual non-apposite quotations. Thirdly I have written πρώταις for reasons very obvious and very little regarded. In place of αὐτῶν, which is unmeaning, I have put αὐτῶν which marks the second distinction.

καθαρώτατα has been already changed into καθαρώτερα before me. Not only ought the comparative to match the comparative, but any art which is καθαρώτατη would on the withdrawal of the scientific element cease altogether; for if the pureness is according to the presence of the mathematical science, the most pure must have this not only as predominating but as excluding all empirical admixture, and when this is withdrawn, there remains—nothing.

ἂν τις ἂν χωρίζῃ—[ἂν γίγνοιτο] This combination is not Greek; and the second half can be omitted without any detriment to the sense.

Φαῦλον μὲν δὴ] This is the form of simple assent; if, in place of repeating φαῦλον, he had said φαυλότατον, μὲν οὖν would have been added; if his assent had been restricted, γοῦν. There is also a shade of difference between μέντοι the old reading, and μὲν δὲ the reading of the Bodleian. The former is the more suitable when the answerer adds the weight of his own authority to the mere assent.

τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένας] The pro-



ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μεστή μὲν πον μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ ξύμφωνον ἀρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτῃ στοχασμοῦ, καὶ ξύμπασα αὕτη καὶ αὐλητικὴ, τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα, ὥστε πολὺ μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

B ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἱατρικὴν τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὡσαύτως εὐρῆσομεν ἔχουσας.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Τεκτονικὴν δέ γε, οἶμαι, πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ ὁργάνοις χρωμένῃ, τὰ πολλὰν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτῇ πορίζοντα τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν παρέχεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ;

ΣΩ. Κατὰ γε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατ' οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐν πολ-

priety of the word ῥώμη depends on μελέτῃ καὶ πόνῳ, which are used of training in the palaestra. The subject of προσχρωμένους is the possessors of the senses, that of ἀπειργασμένας is δυνάμεις.

μεστή κ. τ. ἰ.] This passage has suffered from the well-known practice of transcribers, who, when they could not or would not decipher terminations, invented those which the immediate neighbourhood suggested. From οὐ μέτρῳ the copyist inferred that he must write στοχασμῷ and then altered μελέτῃ into μελέτῃς. The reasoning proves clearly what Plato must have written. In proportion as an art trusts less to measure and more to practice, it must be full of guesswork.

αὐτῇ καὶ αὐλητικῇ] The MSS. have καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητικῇ. But ξύμπασα belongs to the *summu* genus, and flute-playing has no subdivisions worth notice. It was an old subject of dispute between two schools of early musicians whether questions about the intervals in music should be determined by proportions of strings only or also by ear; but in the case of αὐλητικῇ the task of settling such questions by length of pipe was too intricate, so that there especially the empirical method was pursued.

χορδῆς] It is unnecessary to enter into the question whether χορδῆς is applicable to wind instruments, although the passage quoted with such confidence by Mr. Chappell (*Hist. of Music* p. 146) from Plato *Rep.* 399, D. is quite inconclusive, being itself confessedly corrupt; and I can find no other. The very context in that passage would seem to show that Socrates objects to the flute, because the admitted defects of stringed instruments were due to an imitation of the flute. I am inclined to read ἢ εὐ τὸ πολύχορδον αὐτό, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μιμήματα; But here αὐλητικῇ is represented as hunting after the measure of the chord in a *stringed instrument*: that is, having no measure of its own to trust to, it derives its certainty from that which possesses such a measure.

φερομένης] For this word which, though a term in music (see Chappell *H. of M.* p. 98) is quite inapplicable here, I conjecture θηρευμένη, of which the more common form θηρεύουσα was a gloss.

τὰ πολλὰν] In place of this reading, the Zurich Editors have adopted the conjectural one of ἄ. This only spoils what is perfectly plain. "The things which give this art its accuracy, make it τεχνικωτέραν, and therefore more akin to pure ἐπιστήμη."

λοις ἄλλοις τῆς ξυλουργικῆς. κανόνι γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ τόρνον  
χρηται καὶ διαβήτη καὶ στάθμη καὶ τινὶ προσαγωγίῳ κεκομ- C  
ψευμένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν  
μουσικῇ ξυνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάττονος ἀκριβείας μετ-  
ισχούσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῇ πλείονος.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖσθω.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ἃς νῦν  
δὴ πρώτας εἵπομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνει μοι λέγειν καὶ ὅσας μετὰ ταύ-  
της τέχνας ἐφθέγξω νῦν δὴ.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἀλλ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἄρ' οὐ διττὰς αὖ D  
καὶ ταύτας λεκτέον; ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἄρ' οὐκ ἄλλην μὲν τινα τὴν  
τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δ' αὖ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ ποτὲ διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δ' ἄλλην  
θεῖη τις ἂν ἀριθμητικὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐ μικρῷ ὄρω, ὦ Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μο-  
νάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν, οἷον στρατό-  
πεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ μικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάν- E

κανόνι] κανὼν is the rule for mea-  
suring straight lines; τόρνος for curved;  
διαβήτη the cross pieces, (in shape of  
a compass stretched out,) from the angle  
of which the plumb-line depended;  
στάθμη the plumb-line itself; and  
προσαγωγίον is explained to be the in-  
strument for reducing warped timber  
to straightness. If this is correct, it is  
much less κεκομψευμένον than the rest,  
which are scientific helps, while this is  
a mere engine of force. Perhaps it was  
an instrument for taking the angles of  
curves. It is scarcely necessary to say  
that κεκομψευμένον has nothing to do  
with the workmanship, though Stall-  
baum translates "*scite factum*".

ἄλλην, τὴν δ' ἄλλην] This is a com-  
mon ellipsis for τὴν μὲν α. τὴν δὲ β.  
Compare *Laws* 862, B. which I quote  
for the sake of correcting it: καὶ τὸ

μὲν βλαβὲν ἀβλαβεῖ τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ  
δυνατὸν ποιητέον, τὸ τε ἀπολόμενον σώ-  
ζοντα, καὶ τὸ πεσὼν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάλιν  
ἐξορδοῦντα, καὶ τὸ θανάτω δὲν ἢ τρω-  
δὲν ἐγίε, τὸ δὲ ἀποίνους ἐξίλασθαι τοῖς  
δρώσι καὶ τοῖς πάσχουσι (παρέχοντα)  
ἐκάστους ἐκ διαφορᾶς εἰς φίλαν πει-  
ρατέον αἰετὶ καθιστάναι τοῖς νόμοις.

Οὐ μικρῷ ὄρω] οὐ μικρὸς ὄρος is  
the common reading. But this is out  
of structure, and if any one wishes to  
understand ἐστὶ, he must at least insert  
the article. But the words are evidently  
an answer to Πῇ ποτὲ διορισάμενος.—  
The word αὐτοῖς three lines below was  
supplied to give a case to συνακολου-  
θῆσαι, and the consequence is that  
the condition of B assenting to A is  
not, A changing his mind, but some  
third C propounding the same doctrine  
as B.

των μέγιστα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἂν ποτε [αὐτοῖς] συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσαν τις θήσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ' εὖ λέγεις· οὐ σμικρὰν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν τευταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δὴ αὐτὰς εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ λογιστική καὶ μετρητική ἢ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν τῇ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρίᾳ τε καὶ λογισμῷ 57 [καταμελετωμένων]; πότερον ὥς μία ἐκατέρα λεκτέον, ἢ δύο τιθώμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπόμενος ἔγωγ' ἂν δύο κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τιθεῖν ἐκατέραν τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως. οὐ δ' ἔνεκα ταῦτα προηγεγνάμεθ' εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἄρ' ἐννοεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ἀποφήρασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγ' οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐχ ἦττον ἢ ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἡρχόμεθα, ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζητῶν τάντίστροφον ἐν- Β ταῦθα προβεβηκέναι σκοπῶν εἰ ἄρ' ἐστὶ τις ἑτέρας ἄλλη κα- θαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἔνεκα τού- των ἐπιχειρήσαν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπ' ἄλλοις

εἰ μὴ μονάδα] *Except a man shall consider no monad to differ from any other single monad out of all innumerable monads.* There is an intentional redundancy in this triple opposition (μονάδα — μονάδος, μηδεμίαν — ἑ. τ. μ., ἄλλην — ἄλλης) in order to mark the perfect indifference of every monad from every other.

τευταζόντων] *Rep.* 521 κ, *Tim.* 90 β, who give their time to *Arithmetica*.

Τί δὲ λογιστική] In this passage I have changed τῆς κ. φ. γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν, so as to render the sentence complete. This is far better than supplying διαφέρει, which would make Socrates first ask whether two things differ, then whether they are one, and again whether they differ. The only question that can by any possibility be asked as introductory to the other

two is "How do these stand to each other"? The word καταμελετωμένων is nothing but a wretched attempt to bolster up the construction by making a genitive absolute of it; and for this purpose some one has borrowed the remarkably elegant word from its context above and used it where it means about as much as would τυπτομένων.

τάντίστροφον] I have added the article which is necessary to the sense. ἀντίστροφόν τι is not to be thought of. The case of ἡδοναῖς has been already determined, and the corresponding case is to be sought in νοῦς.

προβεβηκέναι] This is Schleiermacher's emendation for προβεβληκέναι; it is obvious that no πρέβλημα is put forward.

Τί οἶν] In this sentence the Books turn two distinct questions into one

ἄλλην τέχνην οὕσαν ἀνεύρισκε [σαφεστέραν] καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἄλλην ἄλλης;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῦτοις δ' ἄρ' οὐ τίνα τέχνην ὡς ὁμώνυμον φθιγγάμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μίαν, πάλιν ὡς δυοῖν ὄντων ἐπανερωτᾷ τούτοις αὐτοῖν [τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ C ταῦτα] πότερον ἢ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν.

ΣΩ. Τίν' οὖν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῷ διδῶμεν ἀπόκρισιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγεθος εἰς σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν ἐπιστημῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινόμεθα ὅξον.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν; καὶ εἰρήσθω γ' ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὐταὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν D ὄντως φιλοσοφούντων ὁρμὴν ἀμήχανον ἀκριβεῖα τε καὶ ἀληθεία περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμούς διαφέρουσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἔστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύοντες θαρροῦντες ἀποκρινόμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὁλήν—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς εἰςὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ καὶ ταύταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται ξυνεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότην ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος δ' ἐνὸς κεκοινωνμένα.

ΠΡΩ. Διδῶμεν τύχην ἀγαθὴν τούτοις, οὓς φῆς δεινοὺς εἶ- E ναι, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστα εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

question asked twice. I have removed *ἀνεύρισκε* and for *ἀνυπόσχεσθαι* written *ἀνεύρισκε*.

εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας] The same expression occurs in *Euthyd.* 305 D. Compare also *Cratyl.* 431 A, εἰς τὴν ἀσάδη-σιν καταστήσας.

ὡς μίαν] The MSS. have *ὡς μίαν*, an alteration probably made to suit *δυοῖν*, as if the construction were the same. I have also supplied *ὄντων* in its right place, and put the absurd

supplement τὸ σαφές . . . περὶ ταῦτα into brackets. *ἀκριβέστερον ἔχειν* is precisely the same as τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ καθαρόν. A little farther on εἰς σαφήνειαν is used as to this same quality; and still further he uses *ἀλήθεια* and *ἀκριβεία* in the same sense.

περὶ λόγων ὁλήν] Compare *Cratylus*, 435 c, *Theaet.* 168 c, ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅπη ἂν τύχουσιν ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχουσι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναινοῖτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν.

58 ΠΡΩ. Τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὐ δεῖ λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι πᾶς ἂν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνῶνι. τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν [καὶ τὸ] ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγ' οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι ξύμπαντας, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρηται, μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν. σὺ δὲ τί; [πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνοις ἄν;]

ΠΡΩ. Ἦκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου †πολλάκις, ὥς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν. B πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ δοῦλα †δι' ἐκόντων ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν. νῦν δ' οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἂν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τὰ ὅπλα μοι ὁκαεῖς βουληθεῖς εἰπεῖν ἀσχυνθεῖς ἀπολιπεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω νῦν ταῦτα ταύτῃ, ὅπη σοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐν αἴτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

Δῆλον ὅτι πᾶς ἂν] For this emendation we are indebted to W. H. Thompson. The old reading was Δῆλον ὅτι ἡ πᾶσαν. There can be no doubt that the phrase περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως is incorrect. τὸ ὄντως would be rightly placed where the question was about the meaning of the word, but here we are considering the objects of a given science. But the object of Dialectic is Truth, and Truth is found either in that which is absolute (τὸ ὄν ὄντως), or in that which is invariable, because it is the effect of the absolute; and this latter Plato expressed by καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκός (γίγνεσθαι). To make τὸ ὄντως, and even τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, mere explanations of τὸ ὄν, as one Editor has done, betrays great looseness of thought.

σὺ δὲ τί; [πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνοις ἄν;]] I have made separate sentences: σὺ δὲ τί; answering to ἔγωγε οἶμαι and πῶς τ. δ. ἄν; to the general question. But πῶς διακρίνοις ἄν is so contrary to the usual order, and a second quotation of a more vague sort

following the only question to the purpose is so unworthy of our author, that I cannot but look on it as a later addition.

πολλάκις] I cannot say what should be done with this word which is quite incompatible with ἐκάστοτε. Nor can I propose anything certain in place of δι' ἐκόντων, of which the sense seem as necessary as the mode of expression is objectionable. But it is not unlikely that the right reading is δι' ἐκόντων αὐτῶν.

Τὰ ὅπλα] This is a play upon the word τίθεσθαι, which Protarchus had used merely in the sense of *advancing an opinion*; but Socrates, taking up the words ἐναντία τίθεσθαι, replies, *'I think you were going to say ὅπλα, but you were ashamed, and dropped the word.* τὰ ὅπλα ἐναντία τίθεσθαι is *in acie stare*, as in Herod. 1. 62, καὶ ἀντία ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα. There is a further play upon ἀπολιπεῖν; for ἀπολιπεῖν τὰ ὅπλα would properly mean to *desert*, but here it is merely to *forego* or *give up the word*.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτ' ἔγωγ' ἐζήτουν πω, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν [διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστη καὶ ὀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστ' ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφές καὶ τὰκριβές καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν ἡ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὀνινᾷσα. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐζητοῦμεν. ἀλλ' ὅρα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθῆσει Γοργία, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπερέχειν τέχνη διδούς πρὸς χρεῖαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, κρατεῖν δ' ἢ εἰπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματεία, καθάπερ τοῦ λευκοῦ πέρι τότε' ἔλεγον, κἂν εἰ σμικρόν, καθαρόν δ' εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ μὴ τοιούτου διαφέρειν, τούτῳ γ' ἀντὶ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ. καὶ νῦν δὲ τσφδῶρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἰκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι, μήτ' εἰς τινὰς ὠφελείας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκίας, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾷν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν διερευνησάμενοι [τὸ καθαρόν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως,] εἰ ταύτην μάλιστα' ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἂν ἢ τιν' ἑτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν ἡμῖν ζητητέον.

E

[διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστη] I once attempted to defend this construction by such examples as that of Aristophanes (*Wasps* 666) τοῦς "οὐχὶ προδώσω κ. τ. ἔ." There never was an interpolation which more clearly betrayed itself. If Plato had used any such word as διαφέρει, he would have made both grounds of comparison, *certainly* as well as *general merit*, depend upon it. ἐζητοῦμεν] MSS. and Edd. give ζητοῦμεν.

πρὸς χρεῖαν] These words are to be taken as governing τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, to *surpass as to their use to men*.

κρατεῖν δ' ἢ εἰπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματεία] The reading of the MSS. and Edd. is ὑπάρχειν (for ὑπερέχειν) and κρατεῖν, ἢ δ' εἰπον. This has been adduced as an instance of the ἀνακλόουον, and it will be well to look closely into it. The case of πραγματεία, according to this supposition, will be owing to a construction intended to be analogous to that of τῇ μὲν ἐ. ὅ. τέχνη — διδούς, which construction is lost or changed by reason of the long parenthesis, so that, when this ends, a new construction, ταύτην εἴπωμεν, is substituted. A conclusive answer to all

these subtleties is, that not only the construction is different, but the sense is altogether unlike. For in the first part, if completed, we should expect *you assign*, or *you ought to assign*, or something which implies a *claim* for νοῦς; but in the second part there is a call on Protarchus to declare what *he* really thinks about νοῦς (ταύτην εἴπωμεν κ. τ. ἔ.). Another objection to the passage as it stands is the awkwardness of διδούς ὑπάρχειν κρατεῖν, which means διδούς κρατεῖν, and nothing more. All these difficulties are removed by so simple a process that I have not hesitated to introduce it into the text, and to change the punctuation accordingly. ταύτην εἴπωμεν] This ταύτην refers to δύναμις, the second to ἐπιστήμην. τὸ καθαρόν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως; is not the proposed object of investigation, as the interpolator thought; they are to search out the dialectic art itself. καὶ νῦν δὲ τσφδῶρα διανοηθέντες] For καὶ νῦν δὴ I have written καὶ νῦν δέ, as opposed to οὐκ ἐζήτουν πω. There is some corruption in σφδῶρα διανοηθέντες, for διανοεῖσθαι cannot be used in the sense of διασκοπεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπὸν, οἶμαι, συγχωρῆσαί τιν' ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτην.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὃ λέγεις νῦν, ὥς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταύτας πεπόνηται, πρῶτον μὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ζητοῦσι ξυνεταμένως; εἴτε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἤγχεῖται τις ζητεῖν, οἷσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπη τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπη πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπη ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαῖμεν ἂν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντ' αἰεὶ, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνώμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρηται τὸν πόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἂν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἀληθείᾳ γίνεσθαι, ὧν μήτ' ἔσχε μηδὲν πώποτε κατὰ ταῦτα μὴθ' ἔξει μήτ' εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μὴδ' ἡντινοῦν πῶς ἂν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν καὶ δειοῦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς.

πεπόνηται] This word and ξυνεταμένως (Schütz's correction for ξυνεταγμένως) explain each other. He is evidently speaking of pursuits which require great assiduity; but what these are it would be difficult to say, if we retained the old reading ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηται. This has been explained by a reference to the passages in the *Phædo*, where ταῦτα is used of visible things; but this would at least include τὸ περὶ φύσεως ζητεῖν, which is here spoken of as a distinct branch. By means of this change we have the arts mentioned first, because they are the subject; but as the following remark turns on the means employed, it is convenient to mention the persons who follow the arts, to avoid the awkwardness of saying that the arts themselves χρῶνται δόξαις, or ζητοῦσι τὰ περὶ δόξαν.

ἡγχεῖται] If the physicist mistook what

φύσις was, and while supposing that he investigated it was searching out something else, ἡγχεῖται would be appropriate. But nothing more is meant than the usual enquiries of the Ionic Philosophy, and no intimation is given that there is any higher sense of φύσις or of the investigation of it. I therefore propose ἡρηται. For while in the handicrafts above mentioned he speaks of those who *labour* at them, he speaks of physical investigations as things in which men *choose to engage*. The tense of ἡρηται is borne out by ἀνήρηται τὸν πόνον. In explanation of this latter phrase I observe that in those well-known combinations πόλεμον — πόνον — κίνδυνον — νεῖκος ἀρεσθῆναι, ἀναιρεῖσθαι may be used in place of the other verb. Some who did not notice this have proposed unnecessary conjectures. Compare *Phædrus* 233 c, 243 c, *Laws* 921 A and B.

Ω. Οὐδ' ἄρα [νοῦς] οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτὰ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ οὐν εἰκός γε.

Ω. Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἔαν, τόδε δὲ διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ,— C

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

Ω. Ὡς ἢ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον [καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν] καὶ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἢ [δευτέρος] ἐκείνων ὃ τι μάλιστα ἐστὶ ξυγγενές· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα δευτερά τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

Ω. Τὰ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλιστα ἄρ' οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαιότατον ἀπονέμειν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

Ω. Οὐκοῦν νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ φρόνησις ἅτι' ἂν τις τιμήσειε D μάλιστα ὀνόματα;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

Οὐδ' ἄρα [νοῦς] οὐδέ τ. ἔ.] We should have expected οὔτε .. οὔτε. But if there is any ἐπιστήμη, however weak or vague, there is some νοῦς, for all ἐπιστήμαι are parts of νοῦς and are discussed as such. The νοῦς of the text is plainly the opposite of that of Anaxagoras, and throws all things into confusion. The scribes were not familiar with the idiom which we meet both in Homer and in the Attic writers, οὐδέ γὰρ οὐδέ, οὐδ' ἄρ' οὐδέ. In the 5th Epistle of Synesius our modern texts have οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅμοιος ἢν ἔχοντι; but in my collations I find that the best MSS. have οὐδέ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅμοιος ἢν ἔχοντι.

Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ] See note on 20, B. The article here has a depreciating effect. It has, in fact, the force of turning the first and second persons into a third, or more properly still, of abstracting the individual from his personality, and making a mere *somebody* of him.

[καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν]] These words are spurious. For βέβαιον cannot be se-

parated from ἀληθές, since the want of truth in physical knowledge has been declared to arise from the instability of the objects. Again καθαρὸν is so nearly the same as εἰλικρινές that it could not occur unless in close proximity to it, and the only place for εἰλικρινές is that which it occupies as a quality deduced from the other two; and as τὰ αἰεὶ—ὡσαύτως answer to βέβαιον and ἀληθές, so does ἀμικτότατα answer to εἰλικρινές.

[δευτέρος]] The Zurich Editors have changed this into δευτέρως, which is at least more rational than Stallbaum's defence of it as a parenthetical proverb with πλοῦς understood. It is incredible that Plato should make two δευτέρα to one and the same *first*. It is therefore a waste of time to enquire how δευτέρος should be corrected.

ἅτι' ἂν] The common reading is ἃ γ' ἂν. It is evident that this is no place for γε. The confusion between the two readings is of very frequent occurrence.



ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὄν ὄντως ἐννοίαις ἔστιν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὁρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἃ γ' εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγὼ τότε παρεσχόμην, οὐκ ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἴεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πέρι πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μῖξιν εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερὲς δημιουργοῖς ἡμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι, παρακεῖσθαι, καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἄρ' οὐ μιγνύναι ἐπιχειρητέον;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁρθότερον ἂν ἔχοι,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἄ καὶ πρότερον [ἐμνήσθημεν]· εὐ δ' ἡ παροιμία δο-  
60 κεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δις καὶ τρις τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπανα-  
πολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· οἶμαι γὰρ οὕτω πως τὰ τότε λεχθέντα ῥηθῆναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φίληβός φησι τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὁρθὸν πᾶσι ζήοις γεγρονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτου στοχάζεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰγαθὸν τοῦτ' ἀπὸ εἶναι ξύμπασι, καὶ δὴ ὀνόματα, ἀγαθὸν

Ταῦτ' ἄρ' κ. τ. ἐ.] Although the reading of this passage has been pronounced to be *verissima*, yet as the authority who states this bids us take ἐστὶ καλεῖσθαι together (he was perhaps thinking of ἐστὶ καλεῖν) and talks strange stuff about ἀπηκριβωμένα and ἐννοιαί, we cannot throw off all suspicion of its unsoundness. If ἀπηκριβωμένα could mean *accurately proved to be* (not *accurately made*) there would be some handle for the infinitive καλεῖσθαι. But as this cannot be, and likewise for other reasons, which good scholars will readily discern, I am inclined to read ἔστω ἀπηκριβωμένως κείμενα καλεῖσθαι. ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς] The first is the material, considered as a kind of secondary cause, *out of which* things are produced; the second, the same material considered as the substance *in which* the workman realises his art. [ἐμνήσθημεν]] This is a supplement originating with some one who did not see that the verbs to be understood are εἴπομεν καὶ ἀνεμνήσαμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.

καὶ ἡδύ, ἐνὶ τινι [καὶ φύσει μιᾷ] τούτῳ ὀρθῶς τεθέντ' ἔχειν. Σωκράτης δ' ἐν μὲν οὐ φησι τοῦτ' εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ Β ὀνόματα, καὶ τό τ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταῦτ' ἔστι τε καὶ ἦν τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὦ Πρωταρχε;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν ξινομο-  
λογοῖτο,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων;

ΠΡΩ. Τίτι;

ΣΩ. Ὡς παρεῖη τοῦτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτ' ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δ' ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ἑκάτερου θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἑκάστων, ἄμικτον μὲν ἡδονὴν φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δ' ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἱκανὸν ἔδοξεν D  
εἶναί τι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν ὅστισοῦν ἐπανα-  
λαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην  
καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος, καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ  
τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ' ἂν οἱ καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι,  
μὴ ὅτι δὴ γ' ἡδονήν, εἴθ' ὥς πλείστην εἴθ' ὥς σφοδροτάτην,

[καὶ φύσει μιᾷ] These words which separate τινι from τούτῳ and leave ἐνὶ without a noun expressed or implied to lean upon, and say nothing more than what is said in ἐνὶ τινι τούτῳ, are an evident contribution of some im-  
prover.

ἐν μὲν σὺ φησι] The scribe has here confounded the ordinal and the cardinal number, both of which are written with

the same compendium. α was taken for πρῶτον, which is in all the Books, but it was meant for ἐν as is plain from the antithesis ἐν μὲν οὐ, δύο δέ.

ἐπειράθημεν—θέντες] We made the experiment of placing, &c. Stallbaum compares the expression used above, (21, A) ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βρασάνζοντες ταῦτα.

μὴ ὅτι δὴ γ' ἡδονήν] This formula

εἰ μήτ' ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι χαίρειν, μήτε τὸ παράπαν γινώσκει  
 Ἐτί ποτε πέπονθε πάθος, μήτ' αὖ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδ'  
 ὄντιν οὖν χρόνον ἔχοι. ταῦτά δὲ λέγω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ  
 τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἂν φρόνη-  
 σιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον [ἢ μετὰ τινων ἡδονῶν] ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς [χω-  
 ρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ] μετὰ φρονήσεως αὐτίνος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ' ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἰδεῖ ταῦτά γε  
 πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν.

61 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἰρετὸν καὶ τὸ παν-  
 τάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τῷ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἦτοι σαφῶς ἢ καὶ τινα τύπον αὐ-  
 τοῦ ληπτέον, ἵνα, ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, δευτερεῖα ὅτῳ δώσομεν ἔχωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁδὸν μέν τιν' ἐπὶ τᾷ ἀγαθὸν εἰλήφαμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Καθάπερ εἴ τις τιν' ἄνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν οὔκησιν  
 Β πρῶτον ὁρῶν, ἵν' οἰκεῖ, πύθοιτ' αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δὴ πού πρὸς  
 τὴν εὔρεσιν ἂν ἔχοι τοῦ ζητουμένου.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ'  
 ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ βίῳ τᾷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ  
 μικτῷ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλπὶς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μιχθέντι καλῶς τὸ ζητού-  
 μενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μῇ.

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι καραννύωμεν,

occurs in several Attic writers. Plato question put by Plato with the utmost  
 and Xenophon sometimes use merely subtlety. In the words given to Pro-  
 μὴ ὅτι and sometimes add δὴ only. tarchus, the part which purports to be  
 In the cases where γε is added, it is found the answer is no answer at all; and  
 sometimes before δὴ, sometimes after his objection to the repetition of the  
 it. Compare this passage with one in question looks like an addition con-  
 Demosth. against Conon, μὴ ὅτι γε δὴ, trived to mask a corrupt sentence. Pro-  
 and with one in Polüicus, μὴ ὅτι δὴ tarchus' answer ought to be ἔστι ταῦτα,  
 βασυλεῖς γε. or in other words οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐδὲν

[ἢ μ. τ. ἡδονῶν]] I bracket the in-  
 sertions which make nonsense of a

ἢ ταῦτά γε.

εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴθ' Ἑφαιστος εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τι- C  
μὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἡμῖν καθάπερ οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρεστᾶσι κρη-  
ναι, μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς  
φρονήσεως νηφαντικὴν καὶ ἄοιρον αἰστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινὸς  
ἕδατος· ὡς προθυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα συμμιγνύναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἄρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ φρονή- D  
σει μιγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσφαλές· ἢ δ' ἀκινδυνότερον ἂν μιγνύοι-  
μεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τιν' ἀποφήρασθαι ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνα.

ΣΩ. Ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε τᾷ ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἴομεθα, μᾶλλον ἐτέ-  
ρας ἄλλῃ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ  
γιγνώμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμεν' ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ μῆτε  
γιγνώμενα μῆτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταῦτά δ' ὡσαύτως ὄντ' αἰεί. E  
ταύτην [εἰς τὸ ἀληθές] ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἡγησάμεθ' ἐκείνης ἀλη-  
θεστέραν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν [εἰ] τάλῃθέστατα τμήματα ἑκατέρως ἴδωμεν  
πρῶτον ξυμμίξαντες, ἄρ' ἱκανὰ ταῦτα ξυγκεκραμένα τὸν ἀγαπη-  
τότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, ἢ τινος ἔτι προσ-  
δεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν οὕτως.

62

ΣΩ. Ἐστω δὴ τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος ἀντὶς πέρι δι-  
καιουσύνῃς, ὅ τι ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἐπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ

παρεστᾶσι κρῆναι] Winckelmann, in his Preface, observes that this is an allusion to the libations in honour of the Eumenides and other divinities, which consisted of water and honey. Compare Aesch. Eum. 107, Soph. Aed. Col. 100 and 471, with the Scholiast.

Ἦν ἡμῖν] I leave this passage in a corrupt state. ὡς οἴομεθα is quite hope-

less, and we have nothing whereby to decide our choice between ἀληθῶς τοιαύτη μᾶλλον or (following the Bodleian which omits μᾶλλον), ἀληθεστέρα ἄλλῃς.

Οὐκοῦν [εἰ] τάλῃθέστατα] I have bracketed εἰ and changed ἴδωμεν into ἴδωμεν.

δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως διανοού-  
μενος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστω γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος ἰκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἔξει, κύκλου μὲν καὶ  
σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην  
ταύτην σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν, καὶ χρώ-  
B μενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανόσι καὶ τοῖς  
κύκλοις;

ΠΡΩ. Γελοῖαν διάθεσιν ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς θείαις  
οὖσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμας λέγομεν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῆς; ἢ τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος ἅμα καὶ τοῦ κύ-  
κλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον αὐδὲ καθαράν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ καὶ  
συγκρατέον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν  
ἐκάστοι' ἐξευρῆσειν οἴκαδε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μουσικὴν, ἣν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν, στο-  
C χασεῶς τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν, καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἔμοιγε, εἴπερ γ' ἡμῶν ὁ βίος  
ἔσται καὶ ὁπώσῃ ποτὲ βίος.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὠθού-  
μενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀπὸ  
πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσερεῖν, καὶ μίγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρᾷ τὴν  
ἐνδεεστέραν;

D ΠΡΩ. Οὐκὼν ἔγωγ' οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ τί τις ἂν βλά-  
πτειτο πάσας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

ΣΩ. Μεθιῶ δὴ τὰς ξυμπάσας ρεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὀμήρου  
καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχὴν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μεθεῖνται. καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν  
ιτέον. οἷς γὰρ διανοήθημεν αὐτὰς μίγνυναι πρῶτον, τὰ τῶν

καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως] Many notes  
have been written in defence and ex-  
planation of these words. If they are  
correct, we must understand by them,  
using other pattern figures in the same  
manner as the circles. Compare below,  
ταυτόν καὶ ἀλήθεια, the same as truth.  
But as it is not the manner of using  
but the things used, which are here in

question, we might read ὁμοίως, and  
omit καί: "Using, in building and in  
other things, patterns like the circles,  
i.e. divine."

μισγαγκείας] Hom. Il. 4. 452, Ὡς ὅτε  
χείμαρροι ποταμοὶ κατ' ὄρεσσι ῥέοντες  
Ἐς μισγάγκειαν συμβάλλετον ὄβριμον  
ὕδωρ.

οἷς γὰρ διανοήθημεν] It is vain to

ἀληθῶν μύρι' οὐκ ἐξεγένεθ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ταὐτὸν μεθεῖμεν ἀθρόας καὶ πρόσθεν τῶν Εἰδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὡρα δὴ βοιλεύεσθαι νῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδονῶν, πότερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἀθρόας ἀφετέον ἢ καὶ τούτων πρώτας μεθετέον ἡμῖν ὅσαι ἀληθεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ τι διαφέρει πρὸς γ' ἀσφάλειαν πρώτας τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι.

ΣΩ. Μεθείσθων δὴ. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἄρ' οὐκ εἰ μὲν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, ξυμικτέον καὶ ταύτας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὰς γ' ἀναγκαίας δῆπουθεν· εἰ δέ γε καὶ καθάπερ τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἦν ἐπίστασθαι 63 διὰ βίου, καὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτα λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἰδονῶν, εἴπερ πάσας ἡδονὰς ἥδεσθαι διὰ βίου συμφέρον θ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀβλαβές ἅπασι, πάσας ξυγκρατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ πῶς ποιῶμεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρωταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρή, τὰς ἡδονὰς δ' αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις, διαπυνθανομένους τὸ τοιόνδ' ἀλλήλων πέρι,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡ φίλοι, εἴθ' ἡδονὰς ἡμᾶς χρή προσαγορεύειν εἴτ' ἄλλῃ ὁπωπὸν ὀνόματι, μὴν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθ' οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρο-

look for any coherence in this passage mix the necessary pleasures?" "I see so long as we retain ὡς γάρ. The no objection." "I presume you do not, sense requires οἷς γάρ. For the parts if they are necessary." This way of of the true sciences, with which we first laughing at the question and answer, proposed to mingle them, were not sufficient for us. I have also changed the as if there could be any question about what was necessary, is quite in Plato's place of πρώτων, which commonly follows μύρια, where it has no meaning. In the following sentence observe the very artistic finish of the

Τὰς γ' ἀναγκαίας δῆπουθεν] These antithesis in an inverted order. τέχνας words are commonly given to Pro- πάσας = πάσας ἡδονὰς, ἀβλαβές τε καὶ τarchus, but Ficinus had long ago ὠφέλιμον = συμφέρον τε καὶ ἀβλαβές, seen that they belong to Socrates. Van ἐπίστασθαι = ἥδεσθαι. This shows how Heusde thought them spurious. Stall- false is the sagacity of those who smell out an interpolation here. In Pro- baum defends them on the ground that tarchus' answer, λέγωμεν refers to λέ- δῆπουθεν in asseverando haud infre- γομεν, and ποιῶμεν το ξυγκρατέον. quens. No doubt; but with an appeal μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ πάσης] The Books to another for his assent. "Must we

νήσεως, ἢ πάσης χωρὶς [τοῦ φρονεῖν]; οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. "Οτι, καθάπερ ἐμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον [εἰλικρινές] εἶναι τι γένος οὔτε πάντι δυνάτων οὔτ' ὠφέλιμον· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γινώσκειν τὰλλὰ τε πάντα καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τελέως [εἰς] δύναμιν ἐκάστης.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γ' εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν, φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο, [τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον.] Ἄρ' ἡδονῶν τι προσδεῖσθ' ἐν τῇ ξυκράσει; φαῖμεν ἂν αὐτὸν νοῦν τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτῶντες. Ποίων, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως, ἡδονῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός.

D ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅδε. Πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς, φήσομεν, ἄρ' ἔτι προσδεῖσθ' ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ξυνοίκους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδρότατας; Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; φαῖεν ἂν, αἶ γ' ἐμποδίσματα τε μυρὶ ἡμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι [διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς], καὶ γίνεσθαι τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ E ἐῷσι τὰ τε γυγνόμεν' ἡμῶν τέκνα ὥς τὸ πολὺ, δι' ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθείρουσιν; ἄλλας δ' ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἃς εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νό-

have μ. φ. πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν. There seems no ground for the omission of μάλλον in an ordinary prose passage, and the attempt at variety in φρονήσεως, τοῦ φρονεῖν, is very poor. Nor is there any fairness in the alternative "either with all or without any". For these reasons I have preferred μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἢ πάσης χωρὶς. In the next paragraph εἰλικρινές is obviously an interpolation.

αὐτὴν αὐτὴν] The MSS. have some τὴν αὐτὴν, others αὐτὴν αὐτὴν. The reason for this answer of the Pleasures is that they like that which appreciates the nature of each of themselves. I have therefore written ἐκάστης and cancelled εἰς.

[τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτη-

τέον] The verbal is plainly out of keeping with φαῖμεν ἂν, and both the repetition of νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν, and still more the would-be variety in "we must ask", "we shall say, asking", is most clumsy. Another conclusive reason against the genuineness of these words is the position of αὐ; for the opposition commences at πάλιν, and there was nothing to prevent the author writing τὴν φρόνησιν αὐ καὶ τὸν νοῦν. But the simplest argument is, that if Plato had written τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον, he would have had no motive for adding anything whatever to φαῖμεν ἂν. [διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς] This is no doubt a true explanation; but who would ever dream of saying αἱ ἡδοναὶ ταράττουσιν ἡμᾶς διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς?

μιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς, ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὁπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ ξυνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνυν· τὰς δ' αἰεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπομένας πολλήν που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μιγνῖναι τὸν βουλόμενον ὃ τι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μῖξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πει- 64 ρᾶσθαι, τί ποτ' ἐν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφικεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τιν' ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον. ἀρ' οὐκ ἐμφρόνως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν ὑπέρ θ' αὐτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὁρθῆς ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γ' ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ' ἂν ἔν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοῦτ' ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδ' ἂν γενόμενον εἶη.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἴ τινος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σύ τε καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καταπαρεῖ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὃ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόχθαι.

ταύτας μίγνυν· τὰς] All subsequent Editors have adopted this brilliant conjecture of Van Heusde for ταύτας μιγνύντας.

καὶ τιν' ἰδέαν αὐτήν] Of the various changes which might be proposed for the removal of the difficulty which this sentence presents, I think the most probable would be καὶ κατὰ τιν' ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον. Compare Sophist, 252, A. ὅσοι κατ' εἶδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναι φασι. ἐχόντως ἑαυτόν] This is a playful allusion to the phrase νοῦν ἐχόντως.

κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων] Socrates speaks of his present argument (ὃ νῦν λόγος), that is the speculation concerning combinations and what admits of them, as concluded; he compares it to

the invisible power which orders the world, because it is capable of regulating man's life. Nothing can be simpler or clearer than this passage, and yet it has been twisted into the most absurd fancies, such as the following: *Descripta est adhuc mixtionis ratio, atque ostensum, quoniam ejus elementa esse debeant, ita ut τὸ πέρας, τὸ ἄπειρον, et τὸ συμμισγόμενον in mixtione ista jam nunc conspiciantur.* (τὸ συμμισγόμενον in mixtione, would imply that τὸ συμμισγόμενον is something different from mixtio; if so, it is τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας.) And again: *Quippe voluptatis constituent veluti corpus, sapientia vero ψυχὴν.* Of all this metaphysical cobweb not a single thread belongs to Plato.



C ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις [καὶ] τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφεστάναι [τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου] λέγοντες ἴσως ὁρθῶς ἂν τινα τρόπον φαῖμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δῆτ' ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ μάλιστ' αἴτιον εἶναι δόξαμεν ἂν ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλεῖ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴθ' ἡδονῇ εἴτε [τῷ] νῦν προσφνέστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ξυνέστηκεν.

D ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ ξυμφορώτατον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ξυμπάσης γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν ἢ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἡμισοῦν ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδενός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδεὶς που τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι μέτρον καὶ τῆς ξυμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἡμισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ξύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τὰ τε κερανύμενα καὶ πρῶτην αὐτήν. οὐδὲ γὰρ κράσις, ἀλλὰ τις E ἄκρατος ξυμπεφορημένη ἀληθῶς ἢ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἐκάστοτ' ὧντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις ξυμφορά.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ καταπέφηνεν ἡμῖν ἡ τἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμμέτρια κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γ' ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμῆχθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

65 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθ' ἰδέα, τὸ ἀγαθὸν [θηρεῦσαι] σύντρισι λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ἐμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέ-

[καθ'] By cancelling this word we arrive at the right construction, ἐπὶ τοῖς προθύροις τῆς τἀγαθοῦ οἰκήσεως. τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου seems to have been inserted after this intrusive καὶ had made τῆς οἰκήσεως seem to be without an owner. ξυμφορά] Observe the play on the word ξυμπεφορημένη. μετριότης] This answers to ἀρετή, and ξυμμετρία το κάλλος. λαβόντες] This has nothing to do

γωμεν ὡς τοῦτο τοῖον ἐν ὁρθότατ' ἂν αἰτιασάμεθα [ἂν] τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὃν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἦδη τοίνυν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἱκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὅστισοῦν κριτῆς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονήσεως, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου ξυγγενέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέ ἐστι καὶ θεοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον μὲν, ὅμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν βέλτιον.

ΣΩ. Καθ' ἐν ἑαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρινώμεν. δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον [ξυγγενές] ἑαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμούμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ναί. πρῶτον δέ γ' ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὦ Πρώταρχε· καὶ λαβόμενος, βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀληθειαν καὶ ἡδονήν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον, ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ, πότερον ἡδονὴ ξυγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθείᾳ.

with catching, though the scribe who interpolated ἡρεῖσθαι thought so. The infinitive to be understood is λαβεῖν. No ἰδέαι can be the instrument for ensnaring or seizing on τὰγαθόν. We have in fact found it; and we *form our notion of it*, (compare ἐπειδὴν λάβης, 17, c) not by a single but by a triple character. For this reason as σύν is quite inappropriate (else we should also read σύν μιᾷ), I have written σύντρισι, and as the three characters have been repeatedly mentioned, and are soon to be mentioned again, as Beauty or Symmetry, *Measure*, and Truth, I have changed συμμετρία into ἐμμετρία. τοῦτο is manifestly τὰγαθόν, and this they consider the cause τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει, which is not quite so easy as it looks. For τὰγαθόν is not spoken of as the cause of the ingredients; and if τὸ ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει does not mean these, it must be constrained to mean the triple conditions of a good mixture just mentioned. But perhaps this constraint would be no longer felt, if we could find out what is lurking under the cor-

rupt ὁλον ἐν. Indeed it is not so certain that τῶν itself is correct, for the repeated ἂν in αἰτιασάμεθ' ἂν, which I have omitted as intolerable in Attic prose, might make one suspect that αἰτιασάμεθ' αὐτῶν was to be read, and that some word like παρουσίας had preceded. The argument is very plain. There is ἀγαθόν in κράσις, for all prefer the mixed to the unmixed. But μέτρον, κάλλος, ἀλήθεια must be present at all κράσις; therefore we may conclude that these three represent that one, and that ἀγαθόν is the cause of their presence in the κράσις, and that the κράσις is good (τοιαύτην) because of the Good that causes it.

[ξυγγενές] This word I have put in brackets. If any one wishes to retain it, he must insert ὥς. But although Socrates afterwards uses this figure of speech, —πότερον ἡδονὴ ξυγγενέστερον— it is not wanted, and its absence is fully compensated by the verb ἀπονεμούμεν. "To which of the two shall we rather declare Measure, Beauty, and Truth to belong?"

**ΠΡΩ.** Τί δὲ χρόνον δεῖ; πολὺ γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὥς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τὰ φροδίσια, αἷ δὴ μέγιστα δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληψε παρὰ θεῶν, ὥς κα-  
**Θάπερ** παιδῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημέ-  
**Νων·** νοῦς δ' ἦτοι ταυτὸν καὶ ἀληθείᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιό-  
 τатὸν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.

**ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέ-  
 ψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέ-  
 τηται;

**ΠΡΩ.** Εὐσκεπτὸν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας. οἶ-  
 μαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς  
 ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἂν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώ-  
 τερον οὐδ' ἂν ἔν ποτε.

**Ε ΣΩ.** Καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὅμως δ' ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. νοῦς  
 ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληψε πλείον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὥστ'  
 εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τούναντίον;

**ΠΡΩ.** Ἄλλ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐ-  
 δεις πώποτε οὔθ' ἔπαρ οὔτ' ἦναρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτ' εἶδεν οὔτ'  
 ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτ' ἦντα οὔτ'  
 ἐσόμενον.

**ΣΩ.** Ὅρθως.

**ΠΡΩ.** Ἡδονάς δέ γέ που, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας,  
 ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὄντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ  
 66 πάντων αἰσχιστον ἐπόμενον ὀρώντες, αὐτοὶ γ' αἰσχυρόμεθα καὶ  
 ἀφανίζοντες κρύπτομεν ἢ τι μάλιστα, νηκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 διδόντες, ὥς φῶς οὐ δέον ἡρᾶν αὐτά.

**ΣΩ.** Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὃ Πρώταρχε, ὑπὸ τ' ἀγγέλων  
 [πέμπων] καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὥς ἡδονὴ κτῆμ' οὐκ ἔστι πρῶ-

ἀμετρώτερον .. ἐμμετρώτερον] I have followed the authority of the oldest MS. Buttman, though disposed to extend the analogy of ἀκροτέρος, σφοδρότερος &c. to compound words, and to consider εὐτεχνώτερος and such like as licenses taken by the Attic poet in unusual words, is content to await a fuller induction. The presence of these forms in a MS. which has preserved so many

Atticisms is a part and no small part of the kind of proof which he wanted. Ἄλλ' οὖν] Here again the MSS. and Edd. have Ἄρ' οὖν, which is evidently out of place where an admission is made in answer to a previous question, and where the only answer made by the next speaker is Ὅρθως.

[πέμπων] ὑπ' ἀγγέλων φράζειν is the same as ἀγγέλους πέμπων φράζειν.

τον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

ΣΩ. Δείτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ Β τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐ ταύτης ἐστίν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεῖς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἵσως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν [οὐ τέταρτα,] ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμιας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὁρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴτερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ μάλ-  
λον τῆς ἡδονῆς συγγενῆ;

ΠΡΩ. Τάχ' ἂν.

ΣΩ. Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ὡς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλόπους ὁρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμιας, τὰς δ' αἰσθησεσιν, ἐπομένας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἵσως.

ΣΩ. Ἐκτὴ δ' ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, καταπαίσατε κόσμον αἰοδῆς. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἑκτῇ

Comp. Eur. *Alcest.* 737, 738. But ὅπ' ἀγγέλων πέμπων is nothing at all.

τοιαῦτα χρὴ] The MSS. are divided between τοιαῦτα χρὴ and χρὴ τοιαῦτα, the former, which alone makes sense, being supported by the inferior MSS.

τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν] I have discussed the proper reading and interpretation of this passage in my Introduction. With regard to the expression τὴν αἰδίων φύσιν in place of ἀγαθόν, which he has all along been employing, it is not difficult to see that Plato here, knowing that the mere argument is virtually at an end, breaks loose from dialectic trammels and allows his enthusiasm full play. It is to be noticed that he uses the word αἰδῖος which to a common hearer meant only *perpetual* or *eternal*, in a further sense with which his scholars were familiar, of the in-

visible or *undiscoverable*. That for the sake of which all things are is the end, and being the end it cannot be explained, as other things are, by that to which it belongs, or of which it is the effect; but its name is also its definition. It is, and there is nothing beyond.

τῆς ἀληθείας] These words are introduced with a certain bye-purpose of shewing that this *voûs* owes its place to the Truth of which it is the realization.

[οὐ τέταρτα] If τέταρτα is in its right place here, it is of no use lower down; but it seems better placed there than here.

ἐπιστήμιας] The MSS. have ἐπιστήμιας, ταῖς δέ. The scribe was put out by the want of τὰς μέν, but it is understood in τὰς δέ, according to a common idiom.

Δ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρεΐ.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτήρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ τὸ τρίτον, ὦ Σώκρατες; ὡς Φίληβος τὰ-γαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ πάντη; ὡς γὰρ ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

Ε ΣΩ. Ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τούτ' ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλ' εἶναι πολλὰ, εἶπον ὡς, εἰ φανείη τι τούτων ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων νῆ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ξυνδιαμαχοίμην, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στεργή-σοιτο.

67 ΠΡΩ. Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γε πάντων ἱκανώτατον τούτοις οὐδέ-τερον [ἱκανόν] ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ μὴ τι τὰγαθόν γ' αὐτὸ μηδέτερον αὐ-

τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτήρι] A common and for παντελῆ, which is absurd, put proverb for adding the finishing stroke πάντη.

Ποῖον δὴ] If the reader will look into any other edition, he will see wherein I have departed from the received text.

The reasons for so doing need scarcely be given. Φίληβος x. τ. ε. in the mouth of Socrates is made to cut Protarchus' question Ποῖον δὴ τὸ τρίτον; in two, making nonsense of both halves, and looking like nonsense itself. I have joined it by ὡς to that part of Protarchus' speech, where it must occur to give sense to Socrates' answer. I have also added γάρ to the second ὡς,

[ἱκανόν]] The interpolation of this word is easily accounted for, if we suppose that the reading of the Coislinian πάντων ἱκανώτατα ἐφάνη was founded on some old copy. For in this way there was no predicate to οὐδέτερον. Afterwards the correctors of the copies which, like the Bodleian, retained ἱκανώτατον, on collation with such another copy, adopted the reading, not suspecting that it was invented as a salve to a corruption from which their own text was exempt.

ἀπήλλακτο] This confirms my conjecture on Thucydides 1, 138: where

τοῖν εἶναι, στερόμενον ἀνταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Φανέντος δέ γ' ἄλλου τρίτου κρείττονος τούτοις ἑκατέρου, μιν αὐτὸν νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφύστερον βέβαιον πεφάνται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πέμπτου κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἦν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφάνετο, γίγνεται ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον δέ γε, οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τὰλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν· οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον [ἢ τοὺς] τῶν ἐν Μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἐκάστοτε λόγων. C

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρησθαι σοι νῦν ἡδὲ φαιδρὸν ἅπαντες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με;

ΠΡΩ. Σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπὸν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δὴ πονεῖν σὺ γ' ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἡμῶν. ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ λειπόμενα.

he says in speaking of the character that in the text.

of Themistocles: κρίνειν δ' ἱκανῶν οὐκ ἀπῆλλακτο. "He did not shut himself declare it, not by word, but by deed, up from men capable of judging." For by following pleasure.

μή τι—γε the Books have μή τοι—γε, which is a blunder of continual occurrence.

ἐν Μούσῃ] Compare *Laus* 899 E, ἐν τε Μούσαις οὐκ ὁρῶς ὑμνούμεναι; not by the Muses, but in songs inspired by

Πρῶτον δέ γε, οὐδ' ἂν] The second class of MSS. and Eusebius have the reading οὐκ ἂν, which, if it be written οὐ, καὶ would be no way inferior to

them. I have put ἡ τοὺς in brackets. The same double construction after a comparative is offered by the MSS. in a passage of the *Euthydemus*.

## PALÆOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

---

### TRANSPPOSITIONS AND INTERPOLATIONS.

Those who have not paid much attention to the Critical History of our Texts will probably think that they cannot have suffered much from the placing of words out of their proper order, and that consequently we ought not to rely on corrections attempted by means of transposition. But if any one will take the trouble to compare the various readings of the MSS. say of Thucydides or Plato, he will find instances continually recurring in which one copy differs from another in this respect, although in others it presents very few diversities of reading. Again if he will search for those cases where a transposition of two or more words restores the sense of an otherwise hopeless passage, he will soon find that their number accumulates far more rapidly than he had expected. Nor will it be long before he is able to make a considerable muster of sentences in which a word has strayed so far from its place that it is found at the other end of the sentence, or even in another to which it cannot belong. And not only single words or phrases, but whole sentences have thus changed places, as in those parts of Tragedy where the dialogue consists of alternating lines or couplets, and the sense has enabled critics to discover the places to which these originally belonged. These faults of transcription are no more than we should have a right to expect: for in the first place it is nothing unusual that a scribe should leave out one or more words, or that having left them out he should place them where the reader will notice the omission, or that his copyist should in his hurry fail to observe the mark in the text corresponding to another in the margin which shewed where the words were to be inserted; or if the first writer was content to write the words in

the body of the text, with certain letters to shew that two parts of a sentence were to be read in an inverted order, it was no wonder if the transcriber neglected those letters. Some of these transpositions are so strange that one can scarcely figure to oneself the state of the MS. in which the blunder first began.

I give two instances of this; of which the first is from the *Plutus* vv. 119-20.

Πλ. ὁ Ζεὺς μὲν οὖν οἶδ' ὥς . . . . . ξμ' εἰ  
 πύθοιτ' . . . . . νῦν δ' οὐ τοῦτο δρᾷ;

The first place where I have left a gap is commonly filled up with the words τὰ τούτων μῶρ' and the second with ἂν ἐπιτρίψει. The result is that you are obliged to take τὰ μῶρα for τὴν μωρίαν, that the speaker must be understood to say τούτων of those whom he is addressing, that Jove is represented as likely to punish one person for the folly of two others with whom he has nothing to do, and that we have to digest such an order of words as we can find no match for in all Greek literature. But transpose these, and fill up the first gap with ἂν ἐπιτρίψει, and the second with τουτωμωρε, and you get

Πλ. ὁ Ζεὺς μὲν οὖν οἶδ' ὥς ἂν ἐπιτρίψει μ', εἰ  
 πύθοιτο τοῦτ'. Χρ. ὦ μῶρε, νῦν δ' οὐ τοῦτο δρᾷ;

In the *Heraclidæ* of Euripides the following verses (682 foll.) occur.

Θεράπων.

ἤμιστα πρὸς σου μῶρον ἦν εἰπεῖν ἔπος.

Ἰόλαος.

καὶ μὴ μετασχεῖν γ' ἀλκίμου μάχης φίλοις.

Θεράπων.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ἰόλαος.

τί δ', οὐ θένοίμι κἄν ἐγὼ δι' ἀσπίδος;

Θεράπων.

θένοίς ἂν, ἀλλὰ πρόσθεν αὐτὸς ἂν πέσοις.

Ἰόλαος.

οὐδεὶς ξμ' ἐχθρῶν προσβλέπων ἀνέξεται.

Θεράπων.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ἰόλαος.

ἀλλ' οὖν μαχοῦνται γ' ἀριθμὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσουσι.



## Θεράπων.

σμικρὸν τὸ σὸν σήκωμα προστίθης φίλοις.

I have written *μαχοῦνται* for *μαχοῦμαι* because Iolaus is thinking of his enemies, as we see from his foregoing speech, and his plea is that at least he will help to make up the number on his side. "Our enemies shall at least fight men not fewer in number." If this wanted confirmation, it would be confirmed by the answer *σμικρὸν* κ. τ. εἶ. But how are we to fill up the gaps? Here are two lines for the purpose which I give from the MSS. and Editions; they both begin alike.

1. οὐκ ἔστ' ἐν ὄψει τραῦμα, μὴ δρώσης χερσός.

2. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ τῶν, ἥτις ἦν φάσμα σέθεν.

If we ask the merest beginner which answers best in either passage, he will say that nothing can be more appropriate than to remind an old man of his weakness, when he threatens to join the battle, nor more inappropriate than when he counts on his enemies flying from his very look; and that as the proper answer to the last boast would be to tell him, that *looks do not wound*, so the same observation is altogether foreign to the purpose, when the old man has just said, "It is not worthy of me to refuse to share the fight with my friends". Now the Books all agree in the very opposite decision, and assign no. 1. to the first gap and no. 2. to the second; and what is far more wonderful, Elmsley mentions the change, which was first proposed by Musgrave, without giving the slightest hint that he even thinks it probable.

In the *Iphigenia Taurica* v. 513 foll. we find the same error. Iphigenia asks the unknown Orestes whether he will tell her something. Orestes answers that he will. And now that we are on the tiptoe to know what question Iphigenia will ask, because we naturally expect the first unravelling of the plot from the answer thereto, she breaks into a sentimental reflexion.

καὶ μὲν ποθεινός γ' ἦλθες ἐξ Ἀργούς μολώω.

to which Orestes answers very naturally, "You may be glad to see me here, but I am not so glad to be here": after which interruption the expected questioning and answering begin. But if we take this interrupting couplet out of the way and put it immediately after Iphigenia has learnt that the stranger is from Argos, in this order,

- I. φυγὰς δ' ἀπῆρας πατρίδος, ἣ ποίᾳ τύχη;  
 O. φεύγω τρόπον γε δὴ τιν' οὐχ ἑκὼν ἑκὼν.  
 I. καὶ μὴν ποθεινός γ' ἦλθες ἐξ Ἀργους μολών.  
 O. οὐκουν ἱμαντῶ γ', εἰ δὲ σοί, σὺ τοῦθ' ὄρα.  
 I. ἄρ' ἂν τί μοι φράσειας ὧν ἐγὼ θέλω;  
 O. ὥς γ' ἐν παρέρῳ τῆς ἐμῆς δυσπραξίας.—

we find each verse naturally arising out of that which precedes and introducing to that which follows it.

For the same reason, to such a line as this (*Ion* 1295)

ἔμελλες οἰκεῖν τᾶμ', ἐμοῦ βίᾳ λαβών,

the retort

κάπειτα τοῦ μέλλειν μ' ἀπέκτεινες φόβῳ;

ought to answer without anything intervening; but that passage would lead me into another topic, that of wilful interpolation, for the four lines *πατρός γε—χθονός* contain nothing but what is said with equal clearness further on.

The same reason does not apply to the passage in the *Euthydemus* (305, c. d) which I have mentioned elsewhere in this Book (p. III), where the following most necessary connexion has been broken by the negligence of some copyist: οἴονται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν ἂν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς, | ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίῳις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι. | ὥστε (τοῦ) παρὰ πᾶσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἣ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. It is true that the words which I have here introduced into their proper place, have, where they now occur, been the innocent cause of the silly interpolation, εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, but they were not displaced on purpose to make room for an interpolation, like the verse in the *Ion* quoted above.

This whole matter of transposition may be summed up thus. If the misplacing of words is an accident of frequent occurrence in writing, and the correction of such errors is liable to be misunderstood and so to lead to further confusion; if the examples of such confusion are to be found in several places where the nature of metrical dialogue would generally be a safeguard against their occurrence; and if these examples often concern not only single words but even whole verses, it is unreasonable to refuse assent to those conjectural emendations which consist of trans-

position, when by such transposition we obtain sentences of which the grammatical construction and the sense are such as satisfy the reader, because it is most unlikely that good grammar and good sense should be produced by accident, and not be the sense and the grammar intended by the author.

The question of the *a priori* probability of interpolations may be disposed of in a few words; probably no one will deny the likelihood that words appearing in the margin, where they were intended as mere observations, should be mistaken by a copyist for restorations of matter omitted in the text; but some persons may feel reluctant to believe that the scribes would wilfully interpolate words of their own, and endeavour to pass them off as the words of the author, or perhaps they would concede such a possibility only where the text which the copyist had before him was corrupt or unintelligible; but this belief that the writers of our manuscripts were scrupulous and were generally guided by common sense, is altogether contrary to experience. Hundreds of passages may be adduced from all the masters of Attic prose, to shew that the scribes were in the habit of inserting unnecessary words, words which were intended to eke out the construction, and which only serve to confound it, and words which shew that the whole drift of the passage was misunderstood. Too much stress cannot be laid on the last class, for if we find a clause added which either contradicts the rest of the sentence or is utterly irrelevant to it, the scribe is at once convicted of deliberate forgery.

I have already pointed out that in *Laws* 710, A, the words *τοῖς δὲ ἐνκαταῶς* are an antithesis invented to answer to *τοῖς μὲν ἀκαταῶς*, and that *τοῖς μὲν ἀκαταῶς* itself is a corrupt reading, for the speaker is describing that vulgar kind of temperance which is developed even in children and in beasts, to prevent their being unrestrained as to pleasure, *ὅπερ εὐθὺς παῖσι καὶ θηρίοις, τοῦ μὴ ἀκαταῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, ξύμφυτον ἐπανθελί.* I have also mentioned a passage in the *Phædo*, where the difference between Plato's meaning and that of the interpolator amounts to a contradiction. For while the one bids us, if we are sure of our principle, disregard any seeming contradictions that may arise out of it, (*χαίρειν ἐφ' ἧς ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα*) the other

tells us to hold our principle only provisionally, until such a contradiction arises. See *Phædo* 101, D.

In *Laws* 841, B, we read, τὸ δὲ λανθάνειν τούτων δρῶντά τι καλὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔστω [νόμιμον] ἔθει καὶ ἀγράφῳ νομισθέν νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ μὴ πάντως δρᾶν. If this is correct, the writer asserts that *not* to do the forbidden things is not disgraceful. But so flat a truism never dropped from Plato's pen. Remove τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρὸν, and then we see that it is not τὸ μὴ δρᾶν that is to be the καλὸν of these men of weak virtue, but that they are to be allowed a lower kind of καλόν, namely τὸ λανθάνειν δρῶντα. And so Plato comments on his own words, οὕτω τὸ τε (vulgo τοῦτο) αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν δευτέρως ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γεγόμενον κέοιτο.

It is difficult to account for such interpolations as those which I have pointed out in my edition of the *Symposium* (Ep. ad Th. pp. xiv-xvi) and yet they are of continual occurrence in Plato. On the one hand we can hardly conceive how any one who knew the construction well enough to supply ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν (*Laws* 817, c) should fail to see that ἑάσειν had already been provided for the same purpose, or why any one should have thought it necessary for the sense in *Theætetus* 171, c, to add τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται, in order to give construction to what follows, when he had before him ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ τῶν Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ γ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται.

But the interpolators are not merely intent on helping out the construction by their supplements; sometimes they endeavour to give an additional beauty to the text, as in the following passage of Demosthenes in *Midium*, which I quote *instar omnium* as a specimen of the manner in which our scribes thought they could add finishing touches to Attic oratory, 546, A. εἰθ' ὑμεῖς τὸν οὕτως ὁμόν, τὸν οὕτως ἀγνώμονα, τὸν τηλικαύτας δίκας λαμβάνοντα, ὧν αὐτὸς ἡδίκησθαί φησι μόνον, (οὐ γὰρ ἡδίκητό γε,) τοῦτον ὑβρίζοντα λαβόντες εἰς τινα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀφήσετε, καὶ μήθ' ἐορτῆς, μήθ' ἱερῶν, μήτε νόμου, μήτ' ἄλλου μηδενὸς πρόνοιαν ποιούμενον οὐ καταψηφιεῖσθε; οὐ παράδειγμα ποιήσετε; If ever there was a passage where the rules of Art required that nothing should interrupt the swelling indignation of the speaker till it burst out in one single call to vengeance, it is this one which

our copyists have garnished with ἀφήσετε and οὐ καταψηφείσθε. But luckily for us, this second ornament is fastened on to an accusative ποιοῦμενον, which refuses to hold it. Perhaps those who believe that all interpolations in Demosthenes are posterior to the MS. E, will allow this to be an exception; while they are making up their minds, let me inform the reader of my suspicion that τὸν οὕτως ἀγνώμονα is nothing but a foolish dittographia of τὸν οὕτως ὀμόν, and that μόνον is an addition but no improvement to φησί.

A very common source of interpolation is the attempt to fill up gaps left in the copy, or to complete passages which seem to be defective. In at least two passages of the *Philebus* it is pretty certain that we have supplements of this kind, but we have nothing to guide us to the detection of these, except the hopelessness of the present reading; and as long as there are ingenious men who undertake to explain everything, (Have they not even explained every Chorus in Sophocles, and that too according to various readings?) it will be difficult to hold one's ground against such adversaries, who offer positive results against a mere οὐ μανθάνω. But the tables are turned when we come to passages, where we can shew the source of the corruption or prove that there is none, as when a marginal note has slipped into the text, and then, being treated as a part of it, has been so supplemented as to bring it into harmony with its surroundings. Cobet supplies me with an instance from the celebrated fragment of the *Cretans*. Euripides had written φοινικογενούς τέκνον Εὐρώπης, and a Scholiast had in the Margin explained the first word by τῆς Τυρίας. This was by accident incorporated with the text and considered as a part of it; but then the Anapaestic metre required another syllable. This was soon found; and so from that day to the *Epistola ad Millium*, and from it to our own they write or print, φοινικογενούς παῖ τῆς Τυρίας τέκνον Εὐρώπης.

I will give an example of the same kind from the *Iphigenia Taurica*. In v. 464, Iphigenia prays, δέξαι θυσίας, ἃς ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος οὐχ ὅστας ἀναφαίνει. Some commentator thinks it worth his while to warn the reader that παρ' ἡμῖν does not mean the Taurians but the Greeks, and this he does by writing one word, Ἑλλησι. When this word comes to be mixed up with the rest, it is found very troublesome to the metre, but an ingenious person

discovers that if it is placed very near the end with a convenient dissyllable of no particular meaning after it, it will give no further trouble at least to the metrical critic. And so we have δέξαι θυ-  
σίας, ἃς ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος οὐχ ὁσίας Ἑλλήσι διδοὺς ἀναφαίνει.

A more striking example is that which I have elsewhere given from the *Medea* vv. 784, foll.

πέποιθα, Πελίου δ' ἐχθρός ἐστὶ μοι δόμος  
Κρέων τε· τούτοις δ' ὀρκίοισι μὲν ζυγείς  
ἄγουσιν οὐ μεθεῖ' ἂν ἐκ γαίης ἐμέ.  
λόγοις δὲ συμβάς, καὶ θεῶν ἀνώμοτος  
φίλος γένοι' ἂν, κἀπικηρυκεύμασιν  
οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο, τὰμὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενῇ,  
τοῖς δ' ὄλβος ἐστὶ, καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

Elmsley's note on κἀπικηρυκεύμασι is as follows. "κἀπικηρυκεύματα legit Scholiasta. ἐπικηρυκεύματα γὰρ εἰσι τὰ διὰ τῶν κηρυγμάτων γιγνόμενα πρὸς φίλαν. τῇ δὲ εὐθείᾳ ἀντὶ δοτικῆς κέχρηται. Ἔδει γὰρ εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοῖς ἐπικηρυκεύμασιν οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο. Διδυμος δὲ φησιν ἑλλείπειν τὴν διὰ. διὰ τὰ ἐπικηρυκεύματα. *Paullo ante legitur*; μὴ ὁμόσας δὲ φίλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦ ἐπικηρυκεύματος. θέλει εἰπεῖν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπικηρυκεύμασιν. λείπει δὲ ἡ διὰ, *Latet hic aliquid quod extricare nequeo*." Let us take account of the difficulties in the whole passage. First there is μεθεῖ' ἂν, which ought to govern the genitive, and although Porson's note is an excellent one, the question still recurs, "why not ἐμοῦ after the nearer verb?" For ἀνώμοτος in the best MSS. there is ἐνώμοτος, but this old Scholium by its μὴ ὁμόσας δὲ supports the former. Then we have κἀπικηρυκεύμασι in the text, but the scholiasts most certainly read either κἀπικηρυκεύματα, or τἀπικηρυκεύματα, or both. Last of all we find in all MSS. and in the Scholia οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο, which, as Dindorf observes, is the contrary of what was to be said. For this reason modern editions have adopted Wyttenbach's τάχ' ἂν πίθοιο. But if we look at the second Scholium quoted by Elmsley φίλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦ ἐπικηρυκεύματος, we observe a new combination, which proves that τἀπικηρυκεύματα must have been so placed that it could be taken, whether rightly or not, as standing ἀπὸ κοινοῦ to the two optatives γένοι' ἂν and οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο; but this would be impossible if the verses ran thus:

Platonis Philebus.

φίλος γένοι' ἂν τάπικηρυκεύματα,  
οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο.

Therefore the verses must have been so arranged that while

οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο τάπικηρυκεύματα

made one line, φίλος γένοι' ἂν followed in such a way as to admit of being construed also with the same word. And this is in fact the key of the enigma. οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο τάπικηρυκεύματα should have followed immediately on ζυγείς. But it was left out, and afterwards restored at the side or at the foot of the page. From hence the last part was fetched and fitted in immediately after φίλος γένοι' ἂν: after which οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο, which still remained on hand, was admitted into the vacant place. But in the meantime the sense contained in οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο could not wait for all these adjustments; so the corrector made a line *de suo*, and that is the very line which Porson defended. The passage therefore should be restored thus:

πέποιθα· Πελίου δ' ἐχθρός ἐστὶ μοι δόμος,  
Κρέων τε· τούτοις δ' ὀρκίοισι μὲν ζυγείς  
οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο τάπικηρυκεύματα·  
λόγοις δὲ συμβάς, καὶ θεῶν ἀνώμοτος  
φίλος γένοι' ἂν, τὰμὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενῇ,  
τοῖς δ' ὄλβος ἐστὶ, καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

The construction of the third line is just the same as the Homeric  
ἦ ρά νύ μοι τι πίθοιο.

In conclusion I will point out some of the most striking interpolations in another Dialogue of Plato which has fared pretty nearly as ill as the *Philebus*, viz. the *Politicus*. 286, A. μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰ μείζω. 286, B. δυσχερῶς (read ἤπερ). 286, D. δεῖν (read μεμερίσθαι and compare 284, E). 287, A. τῶν τοιούτων λόγων. 287, E. καὶ ἐμπύροις καὶ ἀπύροις. (The dialogue is ill distributed, and should be arranged thus. προσφθίγγομεθα.—N. Σ. καὶ μάλα γε συχρὸν εἶδος. E. καὶ τῇ ζ. γε—ἐπιστήμη. N. Σ. πῶς γάρ;) 288, C. προσαγορευθέν. 293, A. ὀρθή (read οὗ ἂν γίγνηται). 293, B. ἡγούμεθα (comma after ἄρχοντας). 295, A. παχυτέρως. (The structure is: θῆσει τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς προσήκον, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ τὸ πῶς οὕτως. Read ἐν ἐκάστοις τῶν νόμων.) 295, D. παρὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα. 295, D. ποτε νομοθετηθέντα. 297, B. οἷοί τε ᾧσι. 298, A. ἀναλώματα. 299, E. ζητεῖν. 303, E. λείπεται.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

I have pointed out several passages in the *Philebus* where the dialogue has found its way into the wrong person's mouth. Similar blunders have been noticed in the *Epistle* prefixed to my *Euthydemus*. I will now bring forward two or three more. *Pol.* 287, E. mentioned above under the head of interpolations. *Pol.* 304, c. N. Σ. Ταύτην ἐκείνων. Ξ. Τὴν δ' εἰ δεῖ μανθάνειν . . . . σύ γ' ἡμῖν ἀποφαίνει δεῖν ἄρχειν; *Pol.* 306, A. πάντως γε μὴν ζητέον is a part of the Stranger's speech. *Laws* 811, B. πολυμαθίαν. πῶς οὖν . . . νομοφύλακι; *ΚΑ.* Τοῦ περὶ λέγεις; *ΑΘ.* Τοῦ πρὸς τί π. . . ἀποκαλῶσι. *ΚΑ.* Λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόνει λέγειν. In Euripides' *Ion* 1356 foll. every one is now agreed that the dialogue should run thus: *Πυ.* λαβὼν νυν αὐτὰ τὴν τεκοῦσαν ἐκπόνει. *Ιων.* πᾶσαν δ' ἐπελθὼν Ἀσιάδ', Εὐρώπης θ' ὁρούς; *Πυ.* γινώσκει τὰς αὐτός.—But I quote the passage in order to complete its correction. When the second line stood as part of a continuous speech, it first acquired that δὲ which the MSS. offer us. But in order to bring δὲ in, a transposition was necessary; so the critic changed

Ἀσιάδ' ἐπέλθω πᾶσαν, Εὐρώπης θ' ὁρούς;

into πᾶσαν δ' ἐπελθὼν Ἀσιάδ'. Yet the old reading which he altered is obviously correct. Ἐπελθὼν would mean that he was to look for his mother *after* he had wandered even the world, and not while he was doing so, which would require ἐπιών.

## FALSE COALITION OF SYLLABLES.

Τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρῳ and τὸ τρίτον ἐτ' ἐρῶ would be undistinguishable in MSS. where neither accents nor breathings were used. In Dion. Halic. *De Lysia*, 7. the words ὅθεν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν ἂν δοῦναι, τοὺς δὲ παθεῖν, were until Markland's time read, οὐθεν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας αἰτοῦσα εἰ ταθεῖη. A fresh instance of this has just presented itself to me in the *Politicus* 290, D. ἤδη τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦμεν οἷον γειτόνος ἔχοντες . . . ἐφάπτεσθαι. Such is the reading of the oldest MS.; some others change γειτόνος into γέ τινος, but no one has yet pointed out that ΟΙΟΝ ΓΕΙΤΟΝΟC is a mere blunder for ΟΙΟΝΕΙ ΤΙΝΟC. Even the youngest scholar will remember Porson's correction of ἐγνώσμεθ' ἐξ ἴσου καὶ ὑστάτοις κακοῖς, and Bentley's of μὴ τινα φάναι τὰ Ἐρικέπεω.



## OMISSION OF OT.

One example among many of the confusion caused by the omission of *οὐ* is to be found in the Vatican Scholia on Euripides printed at the end of Geel's *Phænissæ*. *Androm.* v. 103 Ἰλφαιπεινῆ: μονωδία ἐστὶ <sup>1</sup> τὸ δὴ ἐνὸς προσώπου θρηνοῦντος· ὥστε τὸ "Ἀσιατίδος γῆς σχῆμα" <sup>2</sup> μονωδία ἐστὶ. τραγωδία γὰρ καὶ <sup>3</sup> οὐκ ἴδει οὔτε τὰ ἐν θεοφορουμένη ἁδόμενα, οὐ θρηνεῖ γὰρ. Read, 1) ἐστὶν ῥδή, 2) οὐ μ. ἐ., 3) οὐκ ᾔδει. At other times *οὐ* is intruded into a text by mistake for another word, or from a misunderstanding of the author's drift. Synesius in one of his letters tells his friend that the parcel must by this time have reached him, *οὐ γὰρ ἐπεγέγραπτο*; a most whimsical inference. But the Bishop wrote *σοὶ γάρ*. In Thuc. ii, 43, *οὐ γὰρ οἱ κακοπραγοῦντες δικαιοτέρον ἀφειδοῖεν ἢ τοῦ βίου, οἷς ἑλπίς οὐκ ἔστ' ἀγαθοῦ*, the negative spoils the whole argument, which is that while the poor have something to hope for, the rich have something to fear, and that therefore the rich ought to value life less than the poor.

## ΓΑΡ ΟΥΝ.

I have asserted that *γὰρ οὖν* is only admissible, where the speaker concedes what another has affirmed. It is not used in this sense in *Agam.* v. 674, where the Herald after forebodings of Menelaus' shipwreck adds

*γένοιτο δ' ὡς ἄριστα· Μενέλεων γὰρ οὖν  
πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδόκα μολεῖν.*

Anyone may see that the apparent sense of these words is in contradiction to the fears that precede, and to the faintly hoping *εἰ δ' οὖν* that follows. But the passage is not Greek; for *προσδόκα μολεῖν* ought to be either *προσδόκα μολεῖσθαι* or *π. μολεῖν ἂν*. The emendation is obvious: "Let us hope that some have escaped. Menelaus at least has not the best chance"

*Μενέλεων γ' ἂν οὐ  
πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδοκῶ μολεῖν.*

## A P P E N D I X.

---

### EXTRACTS FROM BÖCKH'S *PHILOLAUS*.

That such an association as the Pythagorean, which united religious and political aims with science, should insist on silence and should have its secrets, is suited to the nature of the case, but it admits of doubt whether the scientific matter, which from its very nature is withdrawn from the eyes of the multitude without deliberate concealment, can have required to be kept secret by means of severe commands. If need for secrecy existed, it must rather have been in relation to their doctrines concerning the Divine Nature and its relation to the world and to man, at variance as they were with popular belief; and yet these very doctrines, expressed in the Pythagorean form, could have been neither dangerous to the common people nor accessible to them. Nevertheless the ancients agree in the firm belief that the doctrines and books of the Pythagoreans were a secret of the order, and as there were no writings to be procured, either of Pythagoras, or of his older disciples or followers, we must at all events allow that *they* told the world nothing; not perhaps however so much because a law expressly forbade them, as because custom bred in them a certain reserve toward strangers, while for those who had capacity and inclination to receive their doctrines oral teaching within the limits of the society seemed more convenient, and lastly because under these circumstances, there was scarcely any occasion for books, whilst again the old members of the order must have been kept from writing by their political occupations, and their life of seclusion, contemplation and asceticism. Yet, if Porphyry is to be believed, Lysis and Archippus and the few others who by their absence were saved from the ruin of the order, preserved a few

feeble sparks of the doctrine, and fearing lest the name of philosophy should wholly disappear from mankind, and lest they should in consequence incur the hatred of the gods, brought together writings of the older Pythagoreans and from these, together with what they themselves remembered, composed brief memorials, which they bequeathed to their sons, their daughters, and their wives, with the order not to communicate them to any stranger; and so this injunction was handed on from generation to generation. Frequent as is the mention of unrighteous and unfaithful revelation of Pythagorean doctrines, we find little agreement as to details. Thus it is related that of the two sects, the *ἀκουσματικοί* and the *μαθηματικοί*, the former was recognised by the latter as Pythagorean, but the latter were recognised by the former only as the disciples of Hippasos, the first according to this story to divulge Pythagorean matter in a mathematical treatise, and who in consequence, met with his death by drowning; yet the same Hippasos, according to a more credible account, never wrote anything. And to say nothing of the poets Empedocles and Epicharmus, Lysis, in an evidently spurious letter, reproaches Hiparchus with having tasted of Sicilian luxury and even of philosophising in public, for which offence he is said to have been banished and to have had a gravestone set up for him as for one dead. But the blame of having spread abroad Pythagorean writings applies more especially to Philolaus, although what is said concerning him is no less filled with contradictions than the rest. Neanthes, whom even Plutarch designates as credulous, informs us that until Empedocles and Philolaus abused their trust, as he terms it, the Pythagoreans had been more free in their communications; Diogenes and Iamblichus tell us that before Philolaus, nobody found out the Pythagorean doctrines, but that *he* first brought out the three celebrated Books which Dion the Syracusan at Plato's instance bought for a hundred minæ, according to Iamblichus, from Philolaus himself, who had fallen into great and urgent poverty, a story which by the bye admirably suits a man who is said to have been put to death for aiming at despotic power. But then again in order, to some extent, to remove the guilt from him, Iamblichus adds that Dion had himself formerly belonged to the Pythagorean connection, and for this reason had been allowed to possess the Books. Among older

authors the first I shall name is Satyrus the Peripatetic, a contemporary of Aristarchus the grammarian. Diogenes follows Satyrus in his account, and tells us on his authority, that Plato wrote to Dion about those Books, and that Dion bought them of Philolaus himself; and he adds, from the same author, that Plato became very rich through the liberality of Dionysius. Indeed one might even suppose that the whole story was invented by the spite of the Peripatetics against Socrates and the Academy, (a subject which Luzac has well treated in his essay *De Dignitate Socratis*.) in order to fix a charge of plagiarism upon Plato, were there not two older witnesses than Satyrus at hand. Hermippus, who was certainly not a more trustworthy man than Neanthes, but yet ancient enough (for he lived under Ptolemy Euergetes) assures us, on the authority of an ancient writer, that Plato when in Sicily bought the Book written by Philolaus from that author's relations in Dionysius' service for forty Alexandrian minæ, and with its contents composed the *Timæus*. Others again make Plato procure the work in return for having prevailed on Dionysius to release a young man, the disciple of Philolaus, from prison. And Timon the sillographer who flourished about the 127th Olympiad, has already a palpable allusion to this story. For Gellius, after mentioning the purchase of the three Books of Philolaus, the mopey for which Plato is said to have received from Dion, quotes Timon as saying that Plato purchased a little Book for much money and with this as his groundwork wrote his *Timæus*. It is true that Iamblichus, Synesius and Proclus have referred the passage of Timon to the little Book of Timæus the Locrian, a supposititious work of a very late date and quoted by no ancient writer before Clemens of Alexandria, but Satyrus and especially Hermippus prove conclusively that what Timon said had reference to the writings of Philolaus, and Tzetzes so represents the matter. After attributing the *Timæus* and a great deal besides to the Book purchased of Philolaus through Dion, he represents not Philolaus himself as the seller but certain poor women and widows who sell the Book under a condition that it must not be imparted to any one save a Pythagorean; and I take this opportunity of remarking that Tzetzes makes Dion buy the *Mimes* of Sophron also in the same manner for Plato. However I do not reckon Timon as

the originator of the story, for he so touches upon the matter, that it can be understood only by one who knows of it already, while Hermippus appeals to an author who made a formal narration of it. It is much more likely that the tale was put in circulation by some earlier historian, not perhaps a Sicilian but apparently one of the first Alexandrians, as may be inferred from the Alexandrian minæ. This reckoning according to Alexandrian money is indeed not well adapted to commend the credibility of the tale, since in Plato's time no part of Greece reckoned according to Egyptian money, and Alexandria was not yet in existence; nor is there any great probability that the sum was computed by the narrator according to its value in Alexandrian coin, and that a statement in some other coin, whether Attic or Sicilian, was the basis of this calculation. Lastly, the work could not well have been purchased from Philolaus himself, as he can scarcely have been still alive in the fourth year of the 97th Olympiad, the time of Plato's first Sicilian voyage. We should therefore have to suppose that relations or descendants of his disposed of the work, as is indeed asserted by some writers; their statement evidently resting upon the notion of the keeping secret of Pythagorean writings even after the dissolution of the order, and being at the same time intended to set Philolaus free from the reproach of having divulged them, which others in fact brought against him. But that the secrecy of the Pythagorean doctrine had ceased long before the age of Plato, has already been remarked by Meiners, and one can scarcely see why Philolaus, if he taught in Thebes, could have had any scruple about writing there; in which case Plato may have acquired an early knowledge of his doctrine. My conclusion is that in all these contradictory accounts about a supposed purchase of Books, the substantial basis is simply this,—that Philolaus was in fact the first to publish a Pythagorean work, that Plato had read it and used it according to his manner, that is, intelligently and not as a mere transcriber. The former fact is asserted in so many words by an author who deserves all credit, since the purpose of his Book was critical, that is by Demetrius Magnes, a contemporary of Pompey and Cæsar in his work *περὶ ὁμωνύμων ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων*, quoted by Diogenes: *Τούτον φησι Δημήτριος ἐν Ὁμωνύμοις πρῶτον ἐκδοῦναι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν περὶ φύσεως*.

After which follows the somewhat strangely worded beginning, as it purports to be, of Philolaus' work, of which we shall have to speak more than once. Now if, assuming for the present the genuineness of the extant fragments, we compare them with Plato, we shall find in the *Phædrus*, *Cratylus*, *Philebus* and *Timæus*, allusions to Philolaus, upon which however I shall advance nothing here, since it is only the consideration of the fragments themselves that can justify my assertion; in the *Gorgias* however it seems to me there is a much more distinct reference to Philolaus' work, and although in this as well as in the *Phædo*, where Philolaus' views as to the unlawfulness of suicide are touched upon, the knowledge of his doctrines is attributed to hearsay only, yet I cannot help observing that in both dialogues this reference to hearsay is put into the mouth of Socrates, who had read very few books, whereas Philolaus' tenets are quoted with such distinctness, and in the *Gorgias*, at least, with such particularity, as is only possible when one has an author before him in writing, seeing that attention is paid even to the expression and the words; so that this contrivance about hearsay is a mere figure of speech, which accords well with Plato's irony and by means of which he attempts to mask his somewhat unceremonious handling of the *divine man*. But at the same time, we cannot fail to perceive that what Plato blames, is not so much the inner substance of Philolaus' view, as the mythical character of his exposition, and more especially the want of clearness and dialectic accuracy in his investigation and the oddity of his expressions, and this is pretty broadly stated in the *Gorgias* as well as in the *Phædo*.

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that a work by Philolaus was quoted in times much earlier than the earliest date of the Pythagorean forgeries, such as those attributed to Ocellus and the Locrian Timæus. He discusses the probable contents of his Book, which he divides on ancient authority into three parts. These he supposes to have been respectively entitled, *περὶ κόσμου*, *περὶ φύσεως*, *περὶ ψυχῆς*. And these he further identifies with the *Bacchæ*, a work attributed by Proclus to Philolaus, after which he continues as follows.]

Our enquiry up to this point, if the result of it is admitted, is more important for forming a judgment about the fragments of

Philolaus, than might at first sight appear: if there was only one work of Philolaus, whether spurious or genuine, nothing remains for us but either to admit all that is offered, or to reject all. Now what we have, is to a great extent so remarkable and contains such peculiar ideas, that no man can possibly be inclined to attribute it to a forger, and at the same time it perfectly coincides with that which, according to Plato, Aristotle, and the universal tradition of antiquity, must be viewed as really Pythagorean.

With the exception therefore of some pieces of Archytas, I hold these fragments and extracts to be the surest remains of the Pythagorean School; indeed Meiners also himself felt compelled to consider some few of them as genuine. Now the spirit of Pythagorism, as it appears according to the most trustworthy data, may be most clearly apprehended in contrast with the Ionic philosophy, since the Hellenic character habitually separates itself into this dualism of Ionic and Doric, and the difference of these races is perceivable in all that concerns life and culture. Pythagorism is the genuine Doric form of philosophy, and the philosophy of a people is nothing else than the peculiar mode of perception of that people, which in the deepest and most distinguished thinkers becomes itself the object of its own thought and explains itself to itself, whereas in the rest it works and creates unconsciously. On this account it is in philosophy on the prose side of literature that the popular character will always present itself most distinctly, as on the poetical side it will appear in lyrical art, because the latter springs forth most immediately from the feeling and sentiment of the people. The sensuousness of the Ionians, their attachment to what is outward, their susceptibility to outward impressions, and their lively activity in this outward world, presents itself in their materialistic view of the origin of things and in the manifold vitality and restlessness of matter, upon which all the Ionic systems rest; they all look for the essence of things in matter, they more or less derive the spiritual from it and neglect the moral element. The want of the sense of unity which is essentially connected with this, was favourable to the atomic view of physical science, and Heraclitus' doctrine, which was built upon strife, clearly expresses the restlessness of the Ionic nature, when it calls repose the death of the soul. The Doric on the contrary presents in comparison the aspect of an inward depth,

from which at the same time powerful action bursts forth, and of a tranquil persistence in established and almost inviolable forms, through which genuine Doric characters were exalted high above the whirl of sensuous impressions, whilst a certain inward consistency was introduced into their lives, which is not found in the same degree among the Ionians. In philosophy, this tendency of their mind displays itself in ethical endeavours, although they never made their way to a complete theory; but it especially appeared in this, that they sought for the essence of things not in a ground which was purely material, but in one that was formal and which gave to things unity and order, just as Pythagoras is said to have been the first to call the world *Kosmos*: and although Anaxagoras makes the order of the world to be produced through Reason, yet this thought, as Socrates has already observed, did not pierce at all deeply into his philosophy. In keeping with the peculiar character of the Dorians and even with their civil life, the outward appearance of the Doric philosophy took the form of a society or order, which was subject to a discipline and rule almost monastic, or at least Moravian, to which there can scarcely be found a more suitable analogy in all antiquity than the Spartan constitution. This organisation is united with depth in religion, symbolism, mysticism and ascetism, and moreover with the practice of music, all which formed essential elements of the Pythagorean mode of life; for which reason indeed so early a writer as Herodotus speaks of Pythagorean *orgies*. But to return to the ground of their speculations, the Ionic philosophers, though they mostly rejected the criterion of the senses, started from matter, which is the object of sensuous cognition, and then sought by reflexion to arrive at some material ground of all things, which ground, it must be confessed, some of them did not hold to be cognizable by the senses. From this sensuous philosophy the bound was too great and violent to the Socratico-Platonic, which sought for the essence of things in pure ideas furnished through the inward intuition, and the Pythagorean view was exactly that which formed the bridge; since the formal ground which they assumed is cognizable through that mathematic intuition, *διάνοια*, which hovers in the midst between the sensuous and the non-sensuous. And yet in its ideas they recognised typical forms of something higher,



though as it seems, they were unable to resolve the sense of these types so as to put them into clear intellectual light. Thus philosophy passed from a thoroughly sensuous beginning, through an intervening grade, to the unsensuous view of Plato, (who indeed had been preceded by the sagacious but one-sided members of the Eleatic school, but who by the power of the Socratic criticism had raised these partial views as well as all former views, through the proper limitation and modification of the one by the other, to the most perfect view of which the Hellenic mind was capable,) and the essence of things was thus sought in an ascending scale, first in matter, then in mathematical forms, and lastly in ideas of the reason.

\* \* \* \*

2. *Περίωρα* does not mean *limited* as some have understood it but *limiting*, what Plato in the *Philebus* calls *πέρας limit*. \*\* It remains for us to consider what the Pythagorean meant by the *limiting* and the *unlimited*. The ancients, very naturally, thought of them from the numerical point of view; and in fact the limiting has been taken to mean unity, parity, and identity, and the unlimited duality, disparity, and diversity, in which sense both Nicomachus and Boethius clearly express themselves and with a distinct reference to Philolaus. \*\* But this view is nevertheless quite untenable, partly on this account that what is odd is not therefore necessarily to be called indefinite, because, as a determinate magnitude, for example three or five, it derives a limit from unity; and partly because, as we see quite clearly from Aristotle, the Pythagoreans rather compared the *even* number to the indefinite; at least they did so in a certain sense and without reference to the definite magnitude of any such number. In his *Physics* iii. 4, he tells us expressly that some laid down the unlimited, *ἄπειρον*, as the origin of all things and he says of the Pythagoreans, *καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι τὸ ἄρτιον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναπολαμβάνόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ περιττοῦ περιαινόμενον παρέχει τοῖς οὖσι τὴν ἀπειρίαν*, for which also he adduces Pythagorean testimony. \*\* Shall we then say that Philolaus by the unlimited meant the *even* and by the limiting meant the *odd*? Against this view likewise the same objection as before holds good, because the even also as a definite number is limited by unity, so that if the even is called by the Pythagoreans unlimited, it must have some peculiar circumstantial application.

But this supposition is unnecessary, since according to Philolaus himself, the unlimited has no number in it, for which reason also, since, according to him, it is only through number that we understand, nothing would be intelligible if everything were unlimited. On the other hand the following explanation seems to me perfectly satisfactory. As, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held *one* to be both odd and even, and thus to contain both opposites, so Philolaus too set up above both these opposites a higher unity in which both have their roots. \*\* In the same way Plato in his *Philebus* sets up above the limit and the unlimited, out of which two the limited comes to be, the Cause as God. But how do the two elements proceed therefrom?—for proceed they must as from the Beginning of all things. I cannot conceive this otherwise than as follows. The highest Unity, simple Unity, what the later Pythagoreans and Platonists called the Monad, is merely One: but Unity is also conceivable as endlessly divisible, as the same authorities likewise remark. Through an opposition between the One and the Many or Indefinite, which opposition resides even in Unity itself, there is produced out of the highest Unity, which has no opposite, the twofold nature of the One and the Many, of the Limit and the Unlimited; and here we come at once to that which Philolaus means by limit and unlimited. By the former he meant the One or, as the ancients express it, the Same, by the latter the Many or the Different. And of these two the former has the more affinity with the highest Unity. These opposites are the constituents of all that is produced, τὸ γινόμενον, while the highest Unity, as being that which is not produced, is exalted above it. For, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held that Number is the essence of things, and things themselves, no less as Matter, than as the properties of Matter, or in other words Form. But the same author allows that the Pythagoreans expressly named the numbers which compose the essence of things, ἓν and ἄπειρον, out of which two the πεπερασμένον is produced. (Aristotle *Metaph.* i. 5.) These same elements are also called Unity and the Indefinite Duality (ἡ ἀόριστος δύάς). Under the latter the conception of diversity or plurality simply is represented, and the definite number Two only accrues to it by a limitation bestowed by Unity. \*\*

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that the next step in Philolaus' work must have been to describe the evolution of the world out of the two opposite elements, and he quotes a passage given below (*Καὶ πάντα γὰ μὲν κ. τ. ε.*) in which the elements are divided in the same manner as numbers. He supposes that he must have then proceeded from the combination of odd or even to that of harmony, because all the chief ratios of harmony [1 : 2, 2 : 3, 3 : 4, 8 : 9, 243 : 256] consist of an even and an odd number; and he supposes that Philolaus meant by harmony the result of reconciled opposites, and attributes to him the following passage in Nicomachus, *ἔστι γὰρ ἁρμονία πολυμιγέων ἑνώσεις καὶ διχᾶ φρονεόντων σύμφρασις* (of the Doric nature of which passage I entertain strong doubts).

The last extract which will be given is of great importance for the understanding of more than one passage in Plato and is the beginning of a very learned disquisition upon the music of the ancients.]

In the immediate sequel of the former passage [he refers to the passage given below, beginning *Περὶ δὲ φύσιος*—] which sequel we shall presently quote, one is surprised by the phenomenon, that Philolaus' harmony is nothing else than the octave, but there is no objection on the side of usage to this interpretation, since the ancients called the octave "harmony", as Aristotle does (see Plutarch's treatise on Music: but it is precisely in this that we find the explanation of the Pythagorean view of the harmony of the Universe in general, and especially of the mode in which the composition of the world was conceived to have been effected out of the opposite elements of the limit and the unlimited; for Unity as we have seen is limit, while the Unlimited is the indefinite duality, which becomes definite duality when the measure of Unity has been twice introduced into it. Thus then the limitation is given through the measuring of duality by means of Unity, that is by laying down the ratio of 1 : 2 which is the mathematical ratio of the octave. The octave therefore is harmony itself, through which the opposite elements are reconciled; and every reasonable man must confess that there is a deep perception contained in this, since the unity of the One and of the Diverse (*ἑσπερον*) or Many (*πολλά,*) which Plato in his Doctrine of Ideas has presented

in a dialectic form, and the conception of which was one of the chief problems of Greek philosophy, is here expressed by mathematical symbolism. \*\* The magnitude of harmony, says Philolaus, is συλλαβὰ καὶ δι' ὀξειᾶν. Συλλαβὴ is the old name of the Fourth, because it is the first combination of concordant tones, πρώτη σύλληψις φθόγγων συμφώνων. Δι' ὀξειᾶν is the Fifth, because it comes after the Fourth in the ascending scale. Now as a fourth and a fifth comprise the octave, since  $3 : 4$  with  $2 : 3 = 1 : 2$ , as we see from these numbers 2 . 3 . 4, Philolaus says that συλλαβὰ καὶ δι' ὀξειᾶν is the magnitude of harmony, because  $2 : 4$  is harmony,  $2 : 3$  is δι' ὀξειᾶν, and  $3 : 4$  is συλλαβὰ. But the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the interval of a tone which is  $8 : 9$ , as the following numbers shew, 6 . 8 . 9. For  $6 : 8$  is the Fourth,  $6 : 9$  is the Fifth, and the difference is  $8 : 9$  or the tone. And now to prove the truth that the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the tone, he states the position of the Fourth and Fifth in the octave, for in the ascending scale, there is from the ὑπάτη to the μέση a Fourth, but from the μέση to the νήτη a Fifth. (See the fragment beginning Ἀρμονίας δὲ μέγεθος.)

---

Φιλολάου. Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* i. 1, 2.

Θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἔσσιαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ καττὰν δύναναι ἃ τις ἐντὶν ἐν τῷ δεκάδι. Μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελὴς καὶ παντοεργός, καὶ θείω καὶ οὐρανίῳ βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγεμάτων κοινονοῦσα . . . δύναναι καὶ τὰς δεκάδος. Ἄνευ δὲ ταύτας πάντ' ἀπειρα καὶ ἄδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ. Γνωμονικὰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἡ τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἀγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικὰ τῷ ἀπορουμένῳ παντός καὶ ἀγνωσμένῳ παντί. Οὐ γάρ κα ἥς δῆλον οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε αὐτῶν ποθ' αὐτά, οὔτε ἄλλω ποτ' ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ ἥς ἀριθμός καὶ ἡ τούτῳ ἔσσια. Νῦν δὲ οὗτος, καττὰν ψυχὰν ἀρμόσδων αἰσθήσει πάντα, γνωστά καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλήλοις κατὰ γνώμονος φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται, ἴσωμάτων καὶ σιζῶν τοὺς λόγους χωρὶς ἐκάστους τῶν πραγμάτων, τῶν τὲ ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν περαινόντων. Ἴδοις δὲ κα οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς δαιμονίοις καὶ θείοις πράγμασι τὰν τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσιν καὶ τὰν δύναναι ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι παντῶ, καὶ κατὰ τὰς δαμιουργίας τὰς τεχνικὰς πάσας, καὶ κατὰ τὰν

μουσικάν. Ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδὲν δέχεται ἅ τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσις, οὐδὲ ἀρμονία· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰκείον αὐτοῖς ἐστί. Τὰς γὰρ ἀπείρων καὶ ἀνοήτων καὶ ἀλόγων φύσιος τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστί. Ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδαμῶς ἐς ἀριθμὸν ἐπιπνεῖ, πολέμιον γὰρ καὶ ἐχθρὸν τῷ φύσει τὸ ψεῦδος, ἃ δ' ἀλάθεια οἰκείον καὶ σύμφυτον τῷ ἀριθμῷ γενεᾷ.

Φιλολάου Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Ψυχῆς. Stob.

*Ecl. Phys.* i. 20, 2.

Παρ' ὃ καὶ ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀκαταπόνατος διαμένει τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα. Οὐτε γὰρ ἔκτοσθεν ἄλλα τις αἰτία δυναμικωτέρα αὐτῶς εὐρεθήσεται, οὔτ' ἔκτοσθεν, φθεῖραι αὐτὸν δυναμένα. Ἄλλ' ἦν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἰς ὑπὸ ἐνὸς ἱπῶ συγγενέω καὶ κρατίστῳ καὶ ἀνυπερθέτῳ κυβερνώμενος. Ἐχει δὲ καὶ τὰν ἀρχάν τὰς κινασίους τε καὶ μεταβολᾶς ὁ κόσμος εἰς ἐών, καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ φύσει διαπνεόμενος καὶ περιαγεόμενος ἐξ ἱαρχιδίου. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλητον αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἐστί· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβολον ἀπὸ τῶς τὸ ὅλον περιεχούσας ψυχᾶς μέχρι σελάνας περαιοῦται, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἀπὸ τῶς σελάνας μέχρι τῶς γᾶς. Ἐπεὶ δὲ γε καὶ τὸ κινεόν ἐξ αἰῶνος εἰς αἰῶνα περιπολεῖ, τὸ δὲ κινεόμενον ὥς τὸ κινεόν ἄγει, οὕτω\* διατίθεσθαι ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ἀεικίνατον τὸ δὲ ἀειπαθὲς εἶμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν νῶ καὶ ψυχᾶς ἀνάκωμα πᾶν, τὸ δὲ γενέσιος καὶ μεταβολᾶς· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῷ δυνάμει καὶ ὑπερέχον, τὸ δ' ὕστερον καὶ καθυπερεχόμενον. Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ μὲν αἰεὶ θέοντος θείου, τοῦ δὲ αἰεὶ μεταβάλλοντος γεννατοῦ, κόσμος. Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει λέγεν κόσμον ἡμεν ἐνέργειαν αἰδίου θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος κατὰ συνακολουθίαν τῶς μεταβλατικᾶς φύσιος· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐς αἰεὶ διαμένει κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσανύτως ἔχων, τὰ δὲ γιγνώμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα πολλά. Καὶ τὰ μὲν φθορᾷ ὄντα καὶ φύσει κατὰ μορφὰς σῶζεται, τῷ γονᾷ πάλιν τὰν αὐτὰν μορφὰν ἀποκαθίσταντα τῷ γεννήσαντι πατέρι καὶ δημιουργῷ.

Ἐκ τῶν Φιλολάου Περὶ Κόσμου. Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* i. 21, 7.

Ἀνάγκη τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαινόντα, ἢ ἄπειρα, ἢ περαινόντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα· ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐ καὶ εἴη. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὐτ' ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα, οὐτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δηλὸν ἐντ' ἅρα ὅτι ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὃ τε κόσμος καὶ

\* i.e. ὁμολογεῖν.

τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη. Ἀηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ περαινόντων, περαίνοντα, τὰ δ' ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων περαίνοντά τε καὶ οὐ περαίνοντα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀπείρων ἀπειρα φανέονται.

Καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὲν τὰ γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτου. Ὁ γὰρ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει δύο μὲν ἴδια εἶδη, περισσὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, τρίτον δὲ ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων μιχθέντων, ἀρτιοπέρισσον. Ἐκατέρω δὲ τῷ εἶδος πολλὰ μορφαί, ὥς ἕκαστον αὐταυτο ἴδημαίνει. Περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἀρμονίας ὧδε ἔχει· ἃ μὲν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀίδιος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μόνα, φύσις θεία ἐντὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίναν ἐνδέχεται γινῶσιν, πλὴν γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἥς οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γινωσκομένων ὕφ' ἑμῶν γε-γενῆσθαι, μὴ ὑπαρχούσας τὰς ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ται ἀρχαὶ ὑπάρχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι οὐδ' ὁμόφυλοι ἔσσαι, ἥδη ἀδύνατον ἥς κα αὐτοῖς κοσμηθῆμεν, αἱ μὴ ἀρμονία ἐπεγένετο, ᾧ τινι ἄρα τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. Τὰ μὲν ὧν ὅμοια καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἀρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μὴδὲ ὁμόφυλα μὴδὲ ἰσοτελῆ ἀνάγκη τῶ τοιαύτῃ ἀρμονίᾳ συγκεκλείσθαι, αἱ μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι.

Ἀρμονίας δὲ μέγεθος ἐντι συλλαβὰ καὶ δι' ὀξειᾶν. Τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν μείζον τὰς συλλαβὰς ἐπογδόω. Ἐντὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας ἐς μέσον συλλαβὰ, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσας ποτὶ νεάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν, ἀπὸ δὲ νεάτας ἐς τρίταν συλλαβὰ, ἀπὸ δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν. Τὸ δὲ ἐν μέσῳ μέσας καὶ τρίτας ἐπόγδοον. Ἀ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν ἡμιόλιον, τὸ διὰ πασαῖν δὲ δίπλοον. Οὕτως ἀρμονία πέντε ἐπόγδοα καὶ δύο διέσεις, δι' ὀξειᾶν δὲ τριῖ ἐπόγδοα καὶ διέσεις, συλλαβὰ δὲ δυ' ἐπόγδοα καὶ διέσεις.—

### Platonis *Timæus*, 35 A.

Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχουσης οὐσίας, καὶ τῆς αὐτῇ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς δὲ ταύτου φύσεως αὐτὴ περὶ καὶ τῆς θατέρου\* κατὰ ταῦτά. Καὶ ξυνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. Καὶ τρία λαβὼν ὄντα αὐτὰ συνε-

\* Commonly *ῥατέρον*. Καὶ τατὰ ταῦ- *Philebus*. The soul of the world is the τα. I have altered the text according *πέρας* of the whole and of all its parts; to the evident requirement of the sense. and we here see that this soul partakes The passage itself has been appended of the opposite *ἀρχαί*, τὸ ἐν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν as serving to illustrate the *πέρας* in the and τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ ῥατέρον.

Platonis *Philebus*.

κεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταύτὸν ξυναρμώτων βίᾳ.

Ἐκ τοῦ Ἀρχύτου περὶ Ἀρχῶν. Stob. Ecl. i. 35, 2.

Ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο ἀρχαὶ ἦμεν τῶν ὄντων, μίαν μὲν τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχουσιν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ ὁρίστων, ἑτέραν δὲ τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχουσιν τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ ἀορίστων. Καὶ τὰν μὲν φητὴν καὶ λόγον ἔχουσιν καὶ τὰ ἕντα ὁμοίως συνέχειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἕντα ὀρίζειν καὶ συντάσσειν· πλατιάζουσιν γὰρ αἰεὶ τοῖς γινομένοις εὐλόγως καὶ εὐρυθμῶς ἀνάγειν ταῦτα καὶ τῷ καθ' ὅλῳ οὐσίας τε καὶ ἰδέας μεταδίδομεν· τὰν δ' ἄλογον καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ τὰ συντεταγμένα λυμαίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἐς γένεσιν δὲ καὶ ὥσιν παραγινόμενα διαλύειν, πλατιάζουσιν γὰρ αἰεὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἱσομοιοῦν αὐταύτα. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ περ ἀρχαὶ δύο κατὰ γένος ἀντιδιαίρουμένηι τὰ πράγματα τυγχάνοντι, τῷ τὰν μὲν ἀγαθοποιὸν τὰν δ' ἦμεν κακοποιόν, ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο λόγους ἦμεν, τὸν μὲν ἕνα τὰς ἀγαθοποιῶ φύσιος, τὸν δ' ἕνα τὰς κακοποιῶ. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ τέχνη καὶ τὰ φύσει γιγνόμενα δεῖ τούτων πρῶτον μετεληφέν, τὰς τε μορφῶς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν μορφῶ ἐστὶν ἡ αἰτία τοῦ τόδε τι ἦμεν· ἡ δὲ ὥσία τὸ ὑποκειμένον, παραδεχόμενον τὰν μορφῶ. Οὕτε δὲ τῇ ὥσϊα οἷόν τε ἐστὶ μορφᾶς μετεῖμεν αὐτῇ ἐξ αὐτᾶς, οὔτε μὲν τὰν μορφῶ γενέσθαι περὶ τὰν ὥσιν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν τινα ἦμεν αἰτίαν τὰν κινάσοισιν τὰν ἐστῶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφῶ, ταύταν δὲ τὰν πρῶταν τῇ δυνάμει καὶ καθυπερτάταν ἦμεν τῶν ἄλλων· ὀνομάζεσθαι δ' αὐτὰν ποθᾷκει θεόν· ὥστε τρεῖς ἀρχαὶ ἦμεν ἤδη, τὸν τε θεόν, καὶ τὰν ἐστῶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰν μορφῶ. Καὶ τὸν μὲν θεὸν τεχνίταν καὶ τὸν κινέοντα, τὰν δ' ἐστῶ τὰν ὕλην καὶ τὸ κινεόμενον, τὰν δὲ μορφῶ τὰν τέχνην καὶ ποθ' ἂν κινέται ὑπὸ τῷ κινέοντος ἡ ἐστῶ. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κινεόμενον ἐναντίας ἑαυτῇ δυνάμει ἴσχει τὰς τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων, τὰ δ' ἐναντία συναρμογᾶς τιнос δεῖται καὶ ἐνώσιος, ἀνάγκα ἀριθμῶν δυνάμειος καὶ ἀναλογίας καὶ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ γεωμετρικοῖς δεικνύμενα παραλαμβάνειν, ἃ καὶ συναρμόσαι καὶ ἐνώσαι τὰν ἐναντιότατα δυνασεῖται ἐν τῇ ἐστοῖ τῶν πραγμάτων ποττᾶν μορφῶ. Καθ' αὐτὰν μὲν γὰρ ἔσσα ἡ ἐστῶ ἁμορφός ἐστι, κινθεῖσα δὲ ποττᾶν μορφῶ ἑμορφος γίνεται καὶ λόγον ἔχουσα τὸν τὰς συντάξιος. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ δι' ὃ κινέται τὸ κινεόμενόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτως κινέον· ὥστ' ἀνάγκα τρεῖς ἦμεν τὰς ἀρχάς, τὰν τε ἐστῶ τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὰν μορφῶ, καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῷ κινητικὸν καὶ πρῶτον τῇ δυνάμει. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ νόον μόνον ἦμεν δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ νόον

τι κρέσσον. Νόω δὲ κρέσσον ἐστὶν ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν θεόν. "Ὅθεν φανερόν ὡς ὁ μὲν τῷ ἴσῳ λόγος περὶ τὰν ζητὰν καὶ λόγον ἔχουσιν φύσιν ἐστὶν· ὁ δὲ τῷ ἀνίσῳ περὶ τὰν ἄλογον καὶ ἄρρητον· αὐτὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἁ ἐστὼ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ γίνεται περὶ ταύταν, καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ ταύτας.

Kant's *Anthropology*, Book II. § 59.

We may also explain these feelings by the effect which the sensation of our state produces upon the mind. That which directly (through sense) urges me to quit my state (to come out of it), is unpleasant to me, it pains me. That which in like manner urges me to maintain it (to remain in it), is agreeable to me, it gives me pleasure. But we are irresistibly carried along in the stream of Time, and through all the changes of sensations involved in the fact. Now, though the quitting of one moment of time and the entrance into another is one and the same act (that of change), yet in our thought and in the consciousness of this change there is a *succession*, such as belongs to the connection of cause and effect. The question then is, whether it is the consciousness of quitting the present state, or the prospect of the entrance into a future one, that excites in us the sensation of pleasure? In the former case, the delight is nothing else than the removal of pain, something negative; in the latter it would be an anticipation of something agreeable; consequently, an expansion of a condition of pleasure, and hence something positive. But we may already infer, *a priori*, that the former alone can take place. For time carries us from the present to the future, and not contrariwise; and the fact that we are compelled first of all to quit the present, uncertain into what other we are about to enter, only that it is *another*, can alone be the cause of pleasurable feeling. Pleasure is the sense of that which promotes life, pain of that which hinders it. But life (animal life) is, as the physicians themselves have remarked, a continual play of the antagonism of the two.

*Consequently, every pleasure must be preceded by pain; pain is always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continual advancement of vital power (which, however, cannot mount beyond a certain degree), but a speedy death for joy?*



Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another; but between the one and the other pain must have place. It is the slight intermissions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, that together make up the healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously-felt state of well-being; whereas in fact this condition consists only of a succession of pleasurable feelings, following each other with alternations,—that is, after continually intervening pain.

Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life: without it an inanimate state would ensue.

---

## A D D E N D A.

---

My friend Mr E. R. HORTON, who has most kindly undertaken the laborious task of superintending the edition of this work, has sent me some important suggestions as to the text of the first sheet. In the passage (12, A) he is inclined to read \* τούναντίου. I have more than once had the same suspicion, but suppressed it through fear of being taxed with the love of unnecessary changes. But I am now convinced that the construction of the sentence imperatively requires the alteration proposed. The *contrary* intended is not a contrary to the main part of the sentence, κύριος ἂν εἴης, but only to the subordinate phrase τῆς π. Σ. ὁμολογίας. The alternative is not between being κύριος, and not being κύριος, but between being κύριος of the agreement and κύριος of the disagreement.

p. 13, B. Mr HORTON reminds me of Dr W. H. THOMPSON'S conjecture ἐνορῶν in place of ἐνόν. But my note will shew why I cannot assent to this conjecture. Protarchus is not, and cannot

\* [My later view of the expression ἢ καὶ τούναντίον is that it is a troublesome interpolation. In order that the argument may proceed, there must be an ὁμολογία between Socrates and Protarchus. Cf. διομολογησώμεθα καὶ τότε ταῦτ' οὕτως ὁμολογούμενά φατε, ἢ πῶς; (11, D, E and also 20, C). τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἐτι μᾶλλον δι' ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσώμεθα. (14, C). The question is how far Protarchus may go to meet Socrates, since the conduct of the discussion belongs to the latter. But this question is one for himself, not Philebus, to decide. Yet Philebus by his profession of unalterable faith in his goddess, not for the present only but for the future also, δοκεῖ καὶ δόξα (for so the MSS. read), is endeavouring to prejudice him, even whilst in the same breath he acknowledges his freedom of judgment, αὐτὸς γνῶσει. With this implied interference Protarchus accordingly twits him. "Now that you have resigned your brief to me, your rights of dictation are over."—St. Paul's expression in 2 Cor. i, 24; οὐχ ὅτι κυριεύομεν ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως is closely analogous. The word ὁμολογία itself may be illustrated from the same Epistle (ix, 13). δοξάζοντες τὸν Θεὸν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποταγῇ τῆς ὁμολογίας ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

E. R. H.]

be, asked to shew why he calls *all pleasures good*, for Socrates assumes already that he looks upon some as bad; but he is challenged to point out any further ground of likeness between them beyond that indicated by their common name of *ἡδοναί*. As 'this is the only question which can be asked him without clashing with the rest of the argument, *ἀγαθὸν εἶναι* is a manifest interpolation. But if we omit *ἀγαθὸν εἶναι*, *προσαγορεύεις* is necessarily to be construed with *τί ταῦτόν ἐνόν*: else it would be without any government at all. For I do not suppose that any person will have recourse to such an intolerable ellipsis as the following: *τί ταῦτόν ἐνορῶν, π. ἡ. (τοῦτο) προσαγορεύεις*; Apart from this I very much doubt whether a good Greek prose writer would say, *ἐνορῶ ἐν σοι τοῦτο*, without adding some participle.

p. 14, D. Read: *ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ [τὰ τοιαῦτα] ὅταν τις κ. τ. ε.*

p. 17, D. *ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα*. "Is not one of these *de trop*?" E. R. H.

Most assuredly, and I thank my friend for this fresh instance of what I have before pointed out as a peculiar feature in these supplements. The word *εἶναι* under various forms has occurred several times in this sense, and it is therefore no wonder that some sciolist should insert *ἐνόντα* without troubling himself to look further on, where he would have found *γιγνόμενα*. Or perhaps he merely meant it as a note and had no intention of disturbing the text; but if so, and if this is to be the explanation of the many similar passages, this would shew the extent to which the copyists must have gone in blindly copying what they found in the Margin, as if it had been accidentally omitted in the body of the text, and afterwards supplied in the blank space.

Mr HORTON also mentions two conjectures made by English scholars on this passage. I will briefly state my objections to each of them. It is proposed to read *μάθης* for *πάθη*. Now we do not want a verb, for *λάβης* may be easily conceived to run through the whole passage; and if we wanted one, it could not be *μάθης*, for *μανθάνω ταῦτα γιγνόμενα* is not such a construction as one will find in any good prose author. But we do want *πάθη*, because otherwise *τοιαῦτα* would imply *διαστήματα*, a word not applicable to rhythm and metre. Indeed there is no word so applicable, and for that very reason Plato employs the more general term *πάθη*.

It is also proposed to read *ἐννοῆς*, but to this there are two very strong objections. In the first place *ὅταν λάβῃς . . . καὶ ἄμα*—would certainly need *ἐννοήσης*, and in the next place the alteration runs counter to the whole arrangement of the sentence, and cannot be reconciled with *γάρ*, which can stand where it now is only on the condition that it belongs to the clause immediately following the parenthesis; whereas this change would make the parenthesis end at *ἐπινομάζειν*. Indeed the true balance of the sentence is lost by any such change; for whereas Plato might have arranged his clauses thus: The men of old have taught us (A) the power of number in Music and Rhythm, and have directed us (B) to look for the same power in all *ἄπειρα*, and so whenever you learn A, (*λάβῃς*), or detect B, (*ἔλῃς*), *σοφὸς ἐγένου*—, he thought fit to introduce the first part of this sentence in a kind of running parenthesis alongside of the second. By reading *ἐννοῆς* you destroy the antithesis between what the ancients taught (*καὶ ἄμα ἐννοεῖν* κ. τ. ἔ.) and what we are counselled to do in order to get *σοφία*, (*ὅταν τ' ἄλλο*—*ἔλῃς*), and you put a tautology in its place.

The reader will observe that the contrast between *λάβῃς* and *ἔλῃς* is a real one, but that between *σοφὸς ἐγένου* and *ἐμφραν γέγονας* is a very paltry verbal variation, where no real contrast can take place, for while there is a difference between the man who is taught and the man who discovers, there is none in the method or in its result.

As here we have a foolish variation between *ἐγένου* and *γέγονας*, so in *Euthyd.* 287, B, we have a verbal antithesis between the present, which is correct, and the future, which is quite inappropriate. *Οὕτω Κρόνος εἰ, ὥστε ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμνήσκει, καὶ εἴ τι πέρονσιν εἴπον [· νῦν ἀναμνησθήσει]*. I referred to this passage in my *Letter* (page III), but inadvertently put the branch of spuriousness upon the wrong part of it.

But before I leave the *Euthydemus*, I would fain point out some other false supplements which have occurred to me quite recently in lecturing upon that Dialogue.

274, D. [*τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας*].

276, B. Read *ἐθορεύθησαν* for *ἀνεθορεύθησαν*.

277, D. [*καταβαλῶν*].

281, A. [*τῶν ἀγαθῶν*] and [*τὸ ὁρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις χρησθαι*] The genitives *πλούτου* etc. are governed by *ἡγουμένη*.

281, c. [μᾶλλον].

282, A and B. This is one of the places where from not perceiving the interpolation I was led into a wrong mode of restoring the syntax. Read: *Καὶ παρὰ πατρός γε δήπου τοῦτ' οἰόμενον δεῖν μεταλαμβάνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα, καὶ παρ' ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων, τῶν τ' ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φασκόντων ἐραστῶν εἶναι, καὶ ξένων καὶ πολιτῶν, δεόμενον καὶ ἱκετεύοντα σοφίας μεταδιδόναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν οὐδὲ νεμέσθητον ὅτιοῦν ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπηρετημάτων, προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέσθαι.* This is as elegant a sentence as any in Plato, and a model of symmetry without formality. The foolish writer who supplied *ἐθέλοντα* has not only destroyed the construction, but has caused another to bolster it up with the clumsy contrivance of *ἐνεκα τούτου ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἐραστῇ καὶ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.*

282, D. Read; *οἷον ἐπιθυμῶ τὸν προτρεπτικὸν λόγον εἶναι.*

But the most impudent attempt at improving the text occurs in 284, B. The Sophist wishes to prove *ὅτι οὐδεὶς λέγει τὰ μὴ ὄντα*, and this he does by bringing Ctesippus to admit the following propositions. 1. *τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐκ ἔστιν.* 2. *τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐδεὶς ἂν ποιήσειεν.* 3. *οἱ λέγοντες πράττουσι τι.* 4. *οἱ πράττοντες ποιοῦσι.* 5. *οἱ λέγοντες ποιοῦσι.* 6. *οἱ λέγοντες τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ποιοῖεν ἂν τὰ μὴ ὄντα, τοῦτο δὲ ὁμολόγηται ἀδύνατον εἶναι.*

From this it follows that the words *Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τὰ γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἔστιν; Οὐδαμοῦ.* are quite foreign to the argument, and were probably invented to give some force to *ἐν τῷ δήμῳ*: and likewise that Euthydemus' question is simply this: *Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως τὰ μὴ ὄντα ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ ὅστισοῦν;*

This quite throws into the shade such minor invasions as 297, c, *ἀφιγμένῳ*, 298, D, *βοιδίων* or *κωβίων*, 302, B, *ἔφευγόν τε*, 290, B, *τοῦτο δ' ἂν θηρεύωνται*, and *τούτοις ἂ ἐθήρευσαν*, (for *πόλιν θηρεύσωνται* read either *χειρώσωνται* or *θηρέσωνται.*) 278, D, *οἷον αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω*, and a score of others, in which I cannot with certainty include 302, D, *σοὶ* [*θεοί*], as this may arise from a two-fold reading *COI* and *ΘOI*, but in 303, B, the words *ὥσθ' ὁμολογεῖν—σοφούς*, are so manifestly a false interpretation of *οὕτω διετέθη*, and so completely spoil what immediately follows, that they can be nothing but a deliberate forgery.

There are others which are yet upon their trial, such as the following, 307, A, *ὥστ' οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπὶ*

φιλοσοφίαν. Crito's faith in philosophy is already shaken by Isocrates' sneer, and by his own impressions about these *ἐριστικοί*. Otherwise Socrates' exhortation not to care about the men, but to look into the thing itself, is altogether idle. His embarrassment is *ὅποιοι προτρέπη τὸ μειράκιον, πότερον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα*.

I will end this digression *vineta mea cædendo*. To make the question tally with the answer in 304, E, I formerly edited *ἀπεφαίνοντο*, but this is applicable only to *γνώμας*, and by no means the right word to use of the displays of the Sophists. But the question is rightly given in the received text: *τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι*, "well, what did you think of them"? The answer however is corrupt, and interpolated after its corruption. I believe the true reading to be: *Τί δ' ἄλλο, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢ ὅτι περ ἀεὶ δὴ τις τῶν τοιούτων, ληρούντων καὶ περὶ οὐδέενος ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων*; "What else should they look like but what every one of the men of their class at all times looks like, a class of triflers etc."

p. 16, E. *τότε δὴ δεῖν*] For *τότε δ' ἤδη*, the reading of most MSS., the Bodl. gives *τότε δὴ δεῖ*. For the Bodl. *δεῖ*, *δεῖν* has been substituted in the text.

p. 17, E. *ἐλλόγιμον*] The meaning of *ἐλλόγιμον* and that of *ἐνάριζμον* are so nearly the same, that one is tempted to suspect either that the former word is a later addition, or that Plato must have justified the twofold expression by a twofold reason; namely, by writing, *ἄτ' οὐκ εἰς λόγον, οὐδ' εἰς ἀριζμόν οὐδένα . . . ἀπειδόντα*. But, as the importance of *πέρας* is uppermost in the writer's mind, any addition to *ἀριζμός* weakens the effect which he wishes to produce. For this reason I look upon the words *καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον* with some suspicion. It may be said, in answer to this, that *λόγος* and *ἀριζμός* are by no means equivalent, and that Shakspeare illustrates the difference when he says that certain offences "*stand more for number than account*", and that the Tragic *ἀριζμός* ἄλλως and the Horatian '*Nos numerus sumus*' shew that *ἀριζμός* is rather the antithesis of *λόγος* than its equivalent. But in this passage who can doubt that the idea which *ἐνάριζμος* presents is identical with that presented by *ἐλλόγιμος*? Then why was it introduced?

p. 18, A. *τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφαμεν*] The Books read *φαμεν*. But Socrates is comparing a past observation with a present one, and for this reason uses *λάβοι* with the former, and *ἀναγκασθῇ* with the latter, according to the common rule as to the optative and subjunctive moods.

p. 18, A. *ἔδε*] I have substituted this for the *δεῖ* of the MSS., to accord with *λάβοι* and *ἔφαμεν*.

p. 18, B. μὴ ἐπὶ κ. τ. ἐ.] I have placed the absurd supplement μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν κ. τ. ἐ. in brackets, but there is still something amiss, and any body trying to correct it must be guided by the illustration presently offered in the discovery of the Alphabet. We want δεῖ or some equivalent to accompany κατανοεῖν, and we require that πληθος should have number, i.e. be definite, and not that number should have πληθος, which every number above one has in any case. It is not improbable that Plato wrote ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν τινὰ πληθος ἕκαστον ἔχον κατανοεῖν ΔΕΙ.

p. 18, B. Ἐπειδὴ [φωνήν δ. κ.] Unless we reject the words φ. ᾤ. κ. as a supplement of some expounder, we have a mass of words without any construction, and furthermore a statement which Plato could not have made. The word κατανοεῖν implies that the discovery has already begun, but there is no act τοῦ κατανοεῖν in acknowledging the existence of φωνή, nor indeed of any object while still in its indefinite state; so that φωνήν ἄπειρον κατανοεῖν is a contradiction in terms. The first stage of discovery is κατανοεῖν τὰ φωνήεντα.

p. 18, B. λέγων, πρῶτος] I retract my former conjecture of λέγω ὥς, and hold ὅς, the reading of most MSS., and ὥς, that of the Bodl., to be mere grammatical attempts to give coherence to that which the above named supplement had thrown out of gear. ὁ λόγος λέγει is perfectly good Greek, but the passage from the *Republic* 360, D, affords no example of it. We ought there to read ὁ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων, "*the advocate of this view.*" For πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα, read πρῶτα τ. φ. i.e. "*first the Vowels, then the Mutes, after that the Liquids.*"

[p. 19, D. τὸ προσρηθισόμενον ὀρθῶς [δ. ἡ. γ']] The interpolation here is similar to that in 11, B.

p. 22, D. αἰτιόμεθ' ὅν] αἴτιον and εἶναι have been put in brackets, the sense and construction being complete without them.

p. 23, D. πρὸς τοῖς τριῶν] Here as well as below in 26, E, the article has been inserted without the authority of the MSS.

p. 24, C. ἀνέμνησάς μ'] The pronoun με is wanting in the MSS.

p. 27, E. [τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὥς ἱκ. ἔτερον ὅν] τὴν αἰτίαν is here bracketed, as being an obvious marginal gloss. Nine lines above, γιγνόμενον has been dealt with in the same way and for the same reason.

p. 44, A. εἴπερ χωρὶς] The Editor has omitted to state his reasons for bracketing τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαλεπῶν. He has evidently regarded the clause as a gloss on ἑκατέρου. An alternative correction of the sentence might be proposed, viz. to retain the bracketed words and cancel ἑκατέρου.

E. R. H.]

p. 14, D. ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ τὰ τοιάδε] I have tried to make excuses for this phrase, and to explain the whole passage as it stands. But I cannot reconcile myself to the text for many reasons. (1) Though we may say συγχωρῶ μὴ δεῖν ἄπτεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων, we cannot say ταῦτα συγχωρεῖται μὴ δεῖν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν, and still less ἄπτεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων. (2) συγκεχωρημένα ἐστὶ is not the same as ὁμολογεῖται, and cannot mean that we admit *something concerning* certain things, but that the things themselves have been *given up, admitted to be true*, because we wish to get rid of them and their propounders. (3) The words μὴ δεῖν τ. τ. ἄπτεσθαι sever ὑπὸ πάντων from the rest of the clause and from the participle ὑπολαμβάνοντων, which is a great offence against elegance. (4) ὑπολαμβάνοντων needs an accusative, such as αὐτὰ or some equivalent. (5) ἐπεὶ μὴδέ is only appropriate when a preceding assertion is upheld *a fortiori* on the ground of a statement which follows. But Socrates' instance is neither weaker nor stronger than those of Protarchus, but a mere addition of something akin to the foregoing. (6) There is no good defence to be made of μὴδέ, unless we read τῶν τοιούτων, and even then the sentence is rendered very clumsy by the intervening παιδαριώδη κ. τ. ἔ., which separates μὴ δεῖν from μὴδέ. These grounds lead me to the conclusion that the passage is interpolated by some one, who not understanding the artificial turn of the sentence, supposed it to be suffering from some omission. If we leave out μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἄπτεσθαι and ἐπεὶ μὴδέ, τὰ τοιάδε becomes the accusative to ὑπολαμβάνοντων γίνεσθαι, and gives a kind of unexpected addition to Socrates' speech. This contrivance was adopted in order to introduce an additional example of ἐν καὶ πολλά, without resorting to a tedious and formal introduction of new matter.

p. 24, B. In my former edition I left ἀνέμνησας, as I found it, without an object. But it may be doubted whether we should read, Ἄλλ' εὖ γε, or Ἄλλ' εὖ τε. Εὖ γε as a mere exclamation is well known; but here εὖ is an adverb joined with two verbs, and it does not begin the sentence. I am decidedly in favour of εὖ τε.

p. 27, B. I am responsible for τὴν αἵτιαν appearing in brackets. The reason of this is obvious; but it is not quite so obvious why I have preferred λέγωμεν, according to which reading δεδωλωμένον should have been followed by a mark of interrogation, to λέγομεν which is the reading of the Bodleian. The passage as I have printed it is far from satisfactory; and I have great misgivings about this double question and answer, and fear that this λέγωμεν, or λέγομεν, is a mere Will o' the wisp, which has led me into a false conjecture. For if this word is a gloss, we see at once why the oldest MS. has *nothing to correspond to it in the answer*, whereas the revisor of some later copy would see that it must have an answer, and so one gloss would beget another. If we continue the structure of the preceding speech Οὐχοῦν τὰ μὲν γινόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίνεταί πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη—the natural sequel would be Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν τὸ τέταρτον (sc. παρέχεται ἡμῖν γένος) ὡς ἕτερον κ. τ. ἔ. To this Protarchus needs only to answer with the Bodleian, Ἔτερον γὰρ οὖν.—Ὡστε ὑπὸ σοφίας ἔλαβον οὐδὲν εἰπών.

p. 62, E. εἰ δέ γε καὶ—καὶ νῦν δὴ] νῦν only admits of one καί, and the other is a mere repetition occasioned by the interrupting sentence. But if the



second καὶ is superfluous, δὴ is something worse, for whether we join it to νῦν or to εἰ, it changes the sense of either, so as to make it quite unsuitable to this passage.

p. 63, E. ἀλλήλων περί] That is ἐκατέρας τῶν ἑτέρων περί. But this is a very slovenly substitute, and moreover we have a most suspicious stranger in φρονήσεις. The plural is used for *thoughts, intentions* and *dispositions*. But here we want only the equivalent to νοῦς, and therefore the singular noun. When Plato introduces plurality to match with the plural ἡδοναί, he speaks of ἐπιστήμαι, μαθήματα or τέχνη. Again αὐτάς ought to belong to φρονήσεις as well as to ἡδονάς, but its place renders this impossible. As the address first proposed is made to pleasures only, there can be no doubt that καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις and ἀλλήλων περί are as unnecessary as they are incorrect. I should therefore now not scruple to edit the text thus: Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρωταρχε, διερωτῶν χρεὶ, τὰς ἡδονὰς δέ, διαπυνθανομένους τὸ τοιόνδε. Further on I can propose something better than what I offered in my note, namely, this: μὴν οὐκ ἂν δεῖξαισθε οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης [ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν]; "Would you refuse to dwell with *any intellect whatever*?" In the answer to this question, it now appears to me that τελῶς εἰς δύναμιν "*as thoroughly as possible*" is added, to imply that the clearer the consciousness, the fuller justice is done to pleasure. But τὰλλὰ τε πάντα (or rather τὰ τ' ἄλλα πάντα) requires αὐτῶν ἡμῶν in the opposite clause. Perhaps we should read, καὶ αὐτῶν τιν' ἡμῶν τελῶς εἰς δύναμιν ἐκάστην. "Any one of us, each to the utmost possible degree of completeness." This use of τις followed by ἕκαστος can be supported by examples.

p. 63, E. Expel Θεοῦ. καθάπερ ὅπαδοι should be taken together. The structure is: ὁπόσαι γιγνόμεναι καθάπερ ὅπαδοι τῆς ἐνυμπάσης ἀρετῆς, ξυνεχολουθοῦσιν αὐτῇ πάντῃ. But in the text I think that αὐτῇ is either misplaced or altogether foreign. As τοῦ τιν' ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον, nothing more seems wanting than the article; τίνα τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτήν. He adds αὐτήν to contrast the Idea itself, or the absolute Good, with the forementioned (relative) Good ἐν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντί.

p. 64, C. Read προσφυέστερον ὄν.

p. 64, D. As ἤτισσύν and πᾶσα cannot both be retained, which is the intruder? Certainly ἤτισσύν, which the scribes have repeated from above; for it so separates τυχοῦσα from ὁπωσοῦν that they cannot be taken together, so that the adverb is left to itself. Read, τυχοῦσα ὁπωσοῦν ἔ. πᾶσα.

p. 64, E. It is strange that such expressions as μετριότης ἀρετῇ γίγνεται or ἑνυμμετρία κάλλος γίγνεται should have passed so long unchallenged. Moderation cannot *become* Moral καλόν or ἀρετή, nor Symmetry Physical κάλλος, else they would cease to be Moderation and Symmetry. Read, μετριότητι καὶ ἑνυμμετρίᾳ.

Ibid. ἀνθρώπῳ] with what? If with τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ἑνυμμέτῳ, the author should have said τοῦτοιοις. But the Bodleian has ἑαυτοῖς, a word often confounded with ἑκάστοις, which would yield a good sense. See 64, B.

p. 65, A. Protarchus should have answered to λέγωμεν: but ὁρδότατα μὲν οὖν is an answer to one of two dependent clauses ὁρδότατα' ἂν αἰτιασάμεθα. This fact renders λέγωμεν ὡς very suspicious, but I question whether αἰτιασθαι can govern αὐτὴν γεγρονέναι.

p. 65, B. Δῆλον μὲν is not only indirect, but also bald, and quite contrary to Plato's practice. But ὁμῶς δ' οὖν certainly belongs to the same speaker as Ἥδη τοίνυν x. τ. ἐ. Besides, the colour of the phrase βέλτιον τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεῖσθαι is suited to the person conducting the dispute, and to no other. But whoever says this, must certainly have said something more; such as, that it is better to continue the argument in *its several particulars*. Now, if we add καὶ ἔν ἑκαστον τοῦ βέλτιον, we not only gain this improvement, but we are also able to remove the objection, which all must feel, to κρινόμεν *without a case*. Repeat ἑκαστον, and all difficulty ceases. Read: Ἥδη τοίνυν, ὦ Π., ἱκανὸς ἤμῃν γένοιτ' ἂν ὅστισιν χρυτῆς . . . . καὶ θεοῖς. ὁμῶς δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεῖσθαι βέλτιον καὶ ἔν ἑκαστον. ἑκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν—.

p. 66, D. Read διαμαρτυρόμενοι. I must ask the reader to take no notice of my proposed change of the passage beginning Ποῖον δὴ—and ending at δεῖν λόγον. The received text is correct in everything except παντελῇ for which I read πάντῃ. It should therefore have been printed thus: ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ; ΣΩ. Φιλήβος . . . . πᾶσαν καὶ πάντῃ. ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον, . . ὡς ἔοικας x. τ. ἐ. The apparent abruptness of Socrates' answer is explained by what follows: Ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτ' ἀκούωμεν. Everything in this part of the dialogue is intended to shew that Socrates is *in haste* to sum up and conclude. The meaning of Protarchus' answer is; "Then, when you spoke of repeating a third time, it was the old argument that you meant us to repeat." But although this passage is nearly correct as the MSS. present it, the same cannot be said of what follows: ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἅπερ νῦν δὴ διελέλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς x. τ. ἐ. It is quite foreign to Plato's intention to represent Socrates as discerning from the first the nature of the argument which he is to pursue. He follows the λόγος whithersoever it leads him; and therefore even if ἅπερ νῦν δὴ διελέλυθα meant the general argument, κατιδὼν cannot be applied to it. The most that he admits afterwards is a *suspicion* that there might be other claimants to the name of Good (ὑποπτεύων καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλά). And now we see why the oldest Manuscript has ἅπερ νῦν δὴ δυσχεράνας διελέλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας— Here we find the confusion, caused by some ancient misplacement of δυσχεράνας, in its undisguised condition. But if we try to conceive what must have been the appearance of the text before this displacement arose, the most probable supposition is that δυσχεράνας occurred where κατιδὼν was afterwards contrived to fill up the place of the missing participle. For these reasons I propose, ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ δυσχεράνας ἅπερ νῦν δὴ διελέλυθα, τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλαχιμυρίων x. τ. ἐ. "For I *as you know* (δὴ) disliking the saying which I have just repeated (Φιλήβος τάγαδὸν ἐτίθετο x. τ. ἐ.) which is the saying not of Philebus alone but of many thousand others &c."

p. 67, A. Remove the brackets from ἱκανόν, and read with the *inferior* MSS. ἱκανώτατα. I was misled by the Zurich editors, who in spite of common sense invariably adhere to the Bodleian MS. The play on ἱκανόν ἱκανώτατα is quite in the manner of the author.

## CORRIGENDUM.

Page 115, Line 8 (of notes). For *quonam* read *quacnam*.



## C O R R I G E N D A.

(See also Page XXVI.)

Page Line	
III, 5.	<i>For nonsense read nonsense.</i>
„ 16.	<i>For ἐφ. δ. μεμερίσθαι, read ἐφ. [δεῖν] μεμερίσθαι. See p. 130.</i>
„ last.	<i>Correct from p. 151.</i>
V, last.	<i>For substitution read insertion [the Editor's original word]. ἀρειοτατε (αρ = ἀνὴρ, ἀρος = ἀνδρός) is changed into ἀχρειότατε by the insertion of χ.</i>
1 4	<i>For 1. read ΣΩ.</i>
4 12 (of notes)	<i>For 'sonrce' read 'sources'.</i>
8 16	<i>For ἀνδρώπους read ἀνδρώποις.</i>
„ 10 (of notes)	<i>For ἐκάτεροι read ἐκάτερος.</i>
34 last but 2 (of notes)	<i>For πσόν read ποσόν.</i>
71 5 (of notes)	<i>For καὶ τις read καὶ τίς.</i>
75 1 (of notes)	<i>For Appendix read Addenda.</i>
92 last but 5 (of notes)	<i>For ἐλιχρινές read τὸ σφόδρα.</i>



















**U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES**



**C022218163**



